[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their or 75 The View From No. 11 (London: Corgi, 1993) p. 185 76 28 summary of […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
[PDF file]: […] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
[PDF file]: […] CIA and FBI. Senior Eisenhower administration officials, who resented Alsop’s public derision of the President and his irresponsible scare-mongering about alleged Soviet nuclear superiority (the so-called ‘ missile gap’), looked for ways to use the material. In 1959, Attorney General William Rogers and Hoover began briefing senior government Note 33 continued sex. They set […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. 44 The View From No. 11 (London: Corgi, 1993) […]
[PDF file]: […] been occasions when the intelligence services, the CIA and SIS for example, actually did provide intelligence of substance. The first that springs to mind was the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[PDF file]: […] President Eisenhower threatened to use them in Korea, and offered them to the French in Vietnam. President Kennedy practised nuclear brinksmanship twice: the authors discuss the Cuban missile crisis, but not the equally serious crisis over NATO access to Berlin, for which the Pentagon offered a slate of nuclear options. Lyndon Johnson differentiated himself […]
[…] been occasions when the intelligence services, the CIA and SIS for example, actually did provide intelligence of substance. The first that springs to mind was the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[…] generates weapons sales for (mostly American) weapons corporations. Reuters reported recently that NATO member Poland was about buy the Patriot missiles: ‘Poland strike deals for US Patriot missile systems that could be worth up to $8 billion’ was the subheading to the story.3 9 To sell weapons, ‘threats’ need to be created and thus […]
