[…] been occasions when the intelligence services, the CIA and SIS for example, actually did provide intelligence of substance. The first that springs to mind was the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
[PDF file]: […] account of the Soviet-American contest (Britain entered the race but was swamped by the other two), first to acquire German rocket scientists and then to develop a missile, contains one chapter on a bit of dodgy business by an American on the committee deciding which of the rival bids should make the American missile, […]
[…] his Vassal State, writes that 56% of British shares are now owned overseas. See the review by John Booth at or . 63 21 64 the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
[…] been occasions when the intelligence services, the CIA and SIS for example, actually did provide intelligence of substance. The first that springs to mind was the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their or 75 The View From No. 11 (London: Corgi, 1993) p. 185 76 28 summary of […]
[PDF file]: […] the CIA inserted the fatal flight. Prouty did not accept what became the official story of the U-2 shootdown: that the plane was hit by a Soviet missile at 60,000 plus feet. He believed that Power’s plane was forced to descend to where it was in range of ground-to-air missiles. Curiously, this was the […]
[…] been occasions when the intelligence services, the CIA and SIS for example, actually did provide intelligence of substance. The first that springs to mind was the Cuban missile crisis, when the information from the Soviet intelligence officer Penkofsky about the actual accuracy of Soviet missiles did appear to play a major role in the […]
[…] attempt to put their nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. These are recounted in ‘Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ by Sergey Radchenko and Vladislav Zubok. This is their summary of what the documents tell us. But the declassified Soviet documents make some important corrections […]
