An Unbiased Watch? the police and fascist/anti-fascist street conflict in Britain, 1945-1951

The history of the police, fascism and anti-fascism in Britain, is dominated by three very different interpretations. First, there is the argument that the police acted as a constraint against fascism: intervening against fascist groups as the need arose. Second, there is the opposite view: that the police were a hindrance to anti-fascists, acting always on the side of the fascists. Finally, there is the conventional view, that the police acted as ‘neutrals’, protecting liberal society from two parallel sets of extremists.

The first view was argued by the politicians of the 1930s, who claimed that the key event in the defeat of fascism in Britain was the passing of the Public Order Act (POA) in 1936. Viscount Simon, the former Home Secretary, maintained that the POA ‘operated like a charm’, and that after 1936 the fascists ‘evaporated’. This idea has been developed by historians such as Robert Benewick and Colin Cross who stress the role of the state in ending fascism, with the POA, and with the internment of fascists in 1940. To quote Colin Cross, ‘British fascism ended in May 1940, and has not since been revived under that name’.(1)

The second interpretation is defended by historians such as John Hope and D. S. Lewis. Hope investigates the links which existed between the secret services and the fascist groups. By examining the fortunes of fascists, such as W. E. D. Allen, and of members of MI5, including Maxwell Knight, he demonstrates a general point, that ‘MI5 colluded with British fascism in the interwar years’. Lewis examines the role of the police in the Battle of Cable Street, and in implementing the POA. He stresses that the POA was used more against the left than the right, and argues that the actions of the police demonstrated an ‘institutionalised anti-left bias’.(2)

The third view is suggested by historians such as Richard Thurlow and Gerald D. Anderson. According to Thurlow, the Home Office files in the Public Records Office prove that the top policemen were liberals: ‘the police at the highest levels were not biased in favour of fascism, even if there were problems of interpretation of the law in developing conflict situations at the street level among junior ranks.’ Anderson goes further. He believes that ‘fascism and communism….were reciprocating polarities.’ It follows that the task of the police was to keep the two ‘polarities’ apart. To defend the argument that this happened, Anderson returns to the POA; ‘the Public Order Act weakened the menace [of fascism] considerably.'(3)

Although there has been a great deal of research into the behaviour of the police in the 1930s, there has been very little research into the relationship of the police to fascist/anti-fascist confrontation in any later period. Nobody has looked at the behaviour of the police in the period 1945-1951. Examining this period, I will argue that it is the second interpretation which is closest to the truth. The police arrested anti-fascists, in far greater numbers than fascists. They were used to protect fascist meetings. The police went out of their way to hinder and disrupt anti-fascists. They acted in collusion with the fascists.

The post-war fascist revival in Britain

Between 1945 and 1951, there was a marked revival of fascism in Britain. It began in November 1944, when Jeffrey Hamm held a series of meetings in Hyde Park. Hamm moved his meetings to East London, where the pre-war British Union of Fascists (BUF) had held together relatively well. Hamm’s organisation, the British League of Ex-Servicemen and Women, held rallies with hundreds, and eventually thousands, of people in the audience. Oswald Mosley, the former leader of the BUF, gave Hamm his blessing. One of Mosley’s lieutenants, Alexander Raven Thomson, organised a parallel network of book clubs, to recruit a new layer of respectable fascists. Finally, in November 1947, Mosley held a large meeting, attended by Hamm, the book clubs, and about 50 organisations all told, to announce the formation of a new party: the Union Movement.(4)

The Union Movement

In its core politics, anti-Communism, elitism and racism, a belief in the destruction of trade unions, and in the abolition of democracy, the Union Movement was little different from its predecessors. The best indicator of continuity was the way in which the new organisation revived the anti-semitism of the BUF. One open-air speaker described the Jews as ‘filthy lice, underhanded swine, black marketeers corrupting the children of the country.’ Another speaker claimed that ‘the reason why so many British mothers were dying in childbirth was because the hospitals were full of alien refugees.’ This anti-semitism went right to the top. Following the November 1947 pre-launch meeting, Mosley gave an interview to the press. He said that a Union Movement government would deport Jews from Britain; that Buchenwald and Belsen were ‘unproven’; and that the German gas-chambers had been designed to burn the corpses of Jews killed by British bombing.(5)

The opposition forms

A number of groups determined to oppose Mosley: individual Conservatives,(6) Liberals,(7) and members of the Labour Party;(8) left-wing organisations, including the Communist Party (CP),(9) Common Wealth,(10) the Socialist Party Of Great Britain (SPGB),(11) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP);(12) civil rights organisations, such as the National Council of Civil Liberties (NCCL);(13) and Jewish groups, notably the Board of Deputies,(14) the Trades Advisory Council (TAC),(15) the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (AJEX),(16) the Workers Circle,(17) and the 43 Group.(18) There were strong disagreements between and inside these organisations. Among the left-wing groups, there was a contrast between the politics of the Communist Party, whose activity revolved around anti-fascist demonstrations, and groups like Common Wealth which attempted to debate with the fascists. Among the Jewish groups, there was a division between the 43 Group, who stressed the need to disrupt fascist meetings and turn over their platforms; and the Board of Deputies, who believed that any confrontation was futile.(19) At the street level, however, there was an effective coalition of different groups and individuals who agreed that it was necessary to confront the fascists and disrupt their meetings. Not surprisingly, the fascists were unwilling to have their meetings disrupted or closed down. As a result, there were large, angry, conflicts, and a high level of violence and counter-violence.

The violence existed on at least three levels. First, there was the violent anti-semitism of the fascists. The Jews who lived in the areas in which the Union Movement was organised had to endure constant anti-semitic abuse and regular anti-semitic violence. There were attacks on synagogues. Fascists set fire to the Ark and Sacred Scrolls of the Dollis Hill Synagogue; Edgware and Burnt Oak synagogues were compelled to employ 24-hr. security guards. There were also attacks on individual Jews. In August 1947, H. Trainis and his wife, were assaulted in the area around Colverstone Crescent in Hackney. In the same area, in September 1947, another Jewish man, J. Kerstein, was surrounded and attacked by a mob shouting, ‘Down with the Jews’ and ‘We’ll put you in Belsen, where you belong.’ Following a separate incident in October 1947, three fascists were given 28 days for a ‘deliberate and unprovoked assault’ on three Jews.(20)

Then there was the counter-violence of the anti-fascists. Sometimes it was possible to oppose the fascists peacefully. When there were large numbers of anti-fascists, there would be demonstrations or protests; and then there would be less violence. At other times, however, groups of anti-fascists would be faced with large, hostile, meetings. In this context, many anti-fascists, and especially members of the 43 Group, would use violent tactics to make up for their lack of numbers. In particular, they over-turned fascist platforms, hoping to get the meetings closed down.(21)

Finally, there was the further violence of the fascists, as they defended their meetings, or sought to disrupt the meetings of their opponents. Union Movement members carried knuckle-dusters. They attacked trade union and Communist meetings, using broken bottles, penknives and smoke bombs. Sometimes they would hire gangs of ‘toughs’, as in Romford, where the Union Movement paid a gang of Maltese to repel the 43 Group, throwing potatoes stuffed with razors.(22)

The government’s response

The great majority of anti-fascists looked to the Labour Government to act against fascism. The idea that the state should be used against fascism, was shared by the Communist Party, the 43 Group, the NCCL and most trade unionists. A typical motion was that passed by a Hackney Town Meeting in September 1947:

We demand that the Home Secretary make full use of all powers he possesses under the existing law to prevent the spreading of Fascist and anti-semitic propaganda and we urge the Government to introduce legislation making such propaganda illegal in this country.(23)

D. H. Snell, secretary of a branch of the Amalgamated Society Of Woodworkers, argued that,

Freedom for these thugs means the gas chambers and concentration camps; also the destruction of the trade unions and working class organisations.(24)

The only real debate was whether a new law was needed. Generally, the members of groups involved in the street fighting wanted a new law against fascism or racial discrimination. Generally, the groups which were not involved in the street conflicts, simply wanted the existing laws to be used properly.

The proposals to ban fascism needed a bill to embody their suggestions. One such bill was written by D. N. Pritt, the barrister and Labour MP. It would have made it an offence to support or encourage fascist doctrine; to use or display fascist signs or symbols; to incite racial hostility, violence, or discrimination; or to join a body doing any of the above. This proposed legislation, which was supported by the Communist Party and the NCCL, could only have been enacted by the police. It gave the police the specific power to search the homes of suspected fascists.(25)

Among those who argued against new legislation were the Board of Deputies, and the Labour Cabinet. The Board were worried that a specific law to combat anti-semitism might draw attention to ordinary Jews and thus prove counter-effective. The Labour Cabinet insisted that existing the laws were sufficient. Thus Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary, told the House of Commons:

The law is fully adequate to enable action to be taken against all really dangerous activities. If believers in Fascist doctrine engage either simply or in conspiracy in subversive activities, or disturb the peace, they can be, and will be, dealt with firmly as law breakers.(26)

In a sense, Ede was correct. The police did have an extensive range of powers which they could have used against the fascist organisations. They had the power under common law to close meetings, or to move speakers on. They could charge fascist paper sellers with obstructing the traffic. Using the 1839 Metropolitan Police Act, the police could arrest anyone using ‘threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace.’ Under the 1936 Public Order Act, speakers could be arrested not just if their intent was to provoke a breach of the peace, but also if ‘a breach of the peace [was] likely to be occasioned.’ The police also had the authority to regulate or prohibit demonstrations. Following the cases of Duncan vs. Jones and Thomas vs. Sawkins, they had the power to enter private premises, or to prevent meetings.(27) Even without new legislation, they did have the powers to destroy the fascist movement.

As we have seen, there are three basic interpretations of how the police behaved in the 1930s. These interpretations correspond to the three ways that the police could have acted: against the fascists, with the fascists, or as neutrals. The same applies for 1945-1951. The police could have used their powers positively, to close down fascist meetings. They could have used their powers negatively, intervening with the fascists against the anti-fascists. Or they could have acted neutrally, choosing between fascists and anti-fascists, and always upholding the law.

The police side with the fascists

The clear view of contemporaries was that the police took the side of the fascists. Surviving anti-fascists will disagree on many things, but they will all agree on this. The police were not dealing with the fascists. Nor were they striking a balance between the Union Movement and its opponents. Rather, they were intervening again and again on the side of the fascists:

‘The police were totally hostile to us and totally supporting the fascists.'(28)

‘We were not favourably regarded by the police. The police protected the fascists.'(29)

Most anti-fascists at the time held a similar view. In September 1947, at a Hackney Towns Meeting, Mr. S. Davidson, of the North Hackney Liberal Association, attacked the police, saying that ‘the police were provoking assault.'(30) In January 1948, Romford Borough Labour Party passed a resolution which noted: ‘The apparent connivance of the police and courts in actions committed by Fascist supporters which are provocative of breaches of the peace.'(31) An internal Communist Party report, written in August 1948, described, ‘open collaboration with the Fascists against the people… [the fascists were receiving] police protection on a lavish scale.(32) D. N. Pritt complained that:

The police… would tell the organiser of meetings which they did not like – for example, peace meetings, or Communist ones, that in the judgement of the responsible police authorities…..it was not practicable to protect the meeting and that it must therefore not be held…… On the other hand if the police or their superiors did want a [fascist] meeting to take place, they could provide huge forces to protect it from mass indignation or opposition.(33)

A similar point was made by B. Rosen of the Manchester And Salford Union Of Jewish Ex-Servicemen And Women. He spent April 1948 in London with AJEX. As part of the visit, he witnessed a Hamm meeting, which started with a march to Hereford Street.

[It was] not a Fascist demonstration but a police demonstration… The march was led by police on motor cycles, followed by more police on motor cycles, followed by a couple of vans of police, followed by foot police, then we had the band.(34)

Mr. Weitzman, the Labour MP for Stoke Newington, complained in the Commons that he was receiving dozens of reports of anti-semitic speeches, and yet the police were taking no action. Each time a fascist speaker made an anti-semitic comment, and this was noted by an anti-fascist observer, the police would reply that their shorthand writers had not heard it. As Weitzman put it,

Surely it cannot believed that every statement…… by reliable observers is inaccurate and every statement from the police must be accepted as a matter of course.(35)

The most angry description of police bias came in a letter from one Mr. Orman to the Home Secretary,

I suppose it is perfectly in order for a lousy swine like Jeffrey Hamm to get up on a street corner in the East End of London and shout, ‘Down with the Jews. Burn the synagogues. Kill the Aliens,’ and he gets away with it, but if a person tries to pull him up, what happens? The so-called keepers of law and order, the police, go up to this person and tell him he’d better move away before he gets hurt….. These guardians of the law and order from Commercial Street Police Station openly boast about being members of Jeffrey Hamm’s fascist party.(36)

Among the fascists, however, there was only praise for the police. When Mosley finished a meeting in November 1947, he was seen by a journalist, thanking the police for keeping order:

While his followers were shuffling (sic) with anti-fascists, Sir Oswald, escorted by a bodyguard, left by a back door, where he shook hands with a police Superintendent, thanking him for keeping ‘such excellent precautions.'(37)

Another fascist, Frederick Coxall, was heard to remark, during a speech in June 1947:

When I hear people criticise the police, I say don’t blame the police for they have their job to do… but blame the government who have… allowed the dregs of Europe to come into this country.(38)

The Home Office agreed that most anti-fascists regarded the police with suspicion. As Mr. Baker, who worked in section F4 of the Home Office, put it:

Practically all the charges that have been leveled in recent months against the police for discrimination at political meetings have been accusations of discrimination against anti-Fascists, and Jeffrey Hamm has often paid tribute to the police and said in so many words that he has no complaint about the manner in which they maintain order at his meetings.(39)

Even magistrates were prepared to criticise the police on the grounds that if they were seen to be partial in their defence of the fascists, then they might bring the law, as a whole, into disrepute. For example, on 23 June 1947, Mr. Daniel Hopkin heard the case of eight men arrested at a British League of Ex-Servicemen and Women meeting at Ridley Road. He commented on the fact that seven of the arrested men were Jews and observed that the police had not chosen to arrest any of the fascist speakers:

I am sorry that a few – or perhaps I had better say the platform – had not been brought in by the police, as well as the eight defendants. They are not here, therefore I am not entitled to say anything about them, except that I do say that I am quite satisfied that the words they used were highly provocative [and] and that these words were intended to be provocative.(40)

Similarly, on 15 December 1947, Mr. Geoffrey Raphael dealt with a case of three anti-fascists, of whom two were Jews and one was a Gentile, who had been arrested at a British League meeting at Hereford Street:

It is not for me to give instructions to the police, but I can say, speaking for myself, I hope this particular form of offensiveness will be dealt with by the police… I have no doubt at all, and I speak with some experience, that such an expression as ‘Fascist police’ is a mischievous observation and completely false, but I realise in some cases it persist from an ill-conceived sense of grievance.(41)

There were several reasons for this ‘sense of grievance’. One was the way in which the police were more likely to arrest anti-fascists that they were to arrest fascists. There are no figures for the period as a whole, but there are figures for the period April-October 1947, when the fascist meetings were at their height. In this period, police arrested 64 anti-fascists, and 23 fascists. So the police were nearly three times as likely to arrest anti-fascists as they were to arrest fascists.

Also, of the arrests, all took place at fascist meetings. There were no arrests of fascists who heckled or attacked anti-fascist meetings. This was a period in which fascists and anti-fascists were competing for the same ‘pitches’. Popular platforms would be taken, not only by the fascists, but often by the NCCL, Commonwealth, AJEX, or the CP. Speakers from these groups would be just as likely to suffer violence; and yet it seemed that the fascist hecklers were immune from arrest.(42)

Arrests April-October 1947(43)

49 cases
Total no. of individuals separately charged: 96
Pro-fascists: 23
Anti-fascists: 64
Undefined: 7

Organisations from whose meetings court cases ensued

British League of Ex-Servicemen	80
Mosley meetings (including Book Clubs)	8
Union of British Freedom	2
Britons Action Party	1
Unnamed (Hyde Park)	5

It was not just that police were less likely to arrest fascists; it also seems that they colluded with them in court. In the case heard by Mr. Daniel Hopkin, the defendants claimed that they had been provoked by an anti-semitic speech, made by the fascist speaker Hargreaves. The defence was not given access to the shorthand report of the speech taken by the police at the time which stated:

I went to prison twice, not because I was a snivelling Communist denying my King and calling for the liquidation of the British Empire, for which my forefathers fought and bled; I went to prison because I was anti-Jewish, not because I was not a patriot but because I committed the unforgivable sin to come out on the street to enlighten my fellow Britons on the menace of Jewish control of my country… People’s Justice (Here the speaker took a drink amid silence). You fought the war for Jewish interests and Jewish interests alone. I make that statement because I know it to be true, and I go further and say that if Adolf Hitler had not been anti-Jewish there would have been no war between Germany and this country… I don’t accept that Jewish people in this country are entitled to the political franchise… I will not admit the right of any alien to ask the questions or interfere with my meetings……Britain for the British is the slogan which is going to sweep this country from end to end. PJ.(44)

Instead, they had to make do with the testimony of Inspector Innes:

Q. What was the worst provocation you heard from the platform?
A. I did not hear any particular provocation, the speaker was speaking in the most general terms on the subject of Palestine.
Q. Meetings are frequently held in that part which is a strong Jewish area.
A. Yes.
Q. The reason why meetings are held is to provoke the Jewish people.
A. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. Did you hear the words ‘PJ’ shouted from the platform?
A. I did not hear those words shouted from the platform but I heard someone in he crowd shout them.
Q. Did you not hear the speaker drink a glass of water and give the toast ‘PJ’?
A. No.(45)

If Innes was not lying, then he was certainly being economical with the truth.

Police hostility to anti-fascists, by contrast, continued even after their arrest. When Murray Silver was arrested, on 17 July 1947, the police called him a ‘fucking Jew bastard’ and then beat him up. At the same meeting, the police arrested a Mr. Goldstein. When Silver first saw Goldstein, in the police cells, ‘his face [was] covered in a mass of blood and his glasses were broken at the bridge.’ In court, the defence solicitor asked Superintendent Satterwaite, ‘you are quite sure that it is an unbiased watch you keep at these meetings?’ He replied, ‘as police officers it is always an unbiased watch.'(46)

Keeping fascist meetings open…

Probably the key complaint of the anti-fascists was that the police were being used to steward fascist meetings, or to keep them open even when a majority of those present were hostile. Again, there was no complete survey of fascist meetings over the whole period; but there was a survey of meetings held between April and October 1947. The largest meetings were at Ridley Road where the meetings were weekly. In the April to October period, crowds ranging from 250 to 3000 were policed by between 6 and 300 police, on two occasions with horses. Of the 22 meetings in the survey 11 were kept open by the police despite protests; 5 were closed early by the police after protests; at 2 the platform was rushed by anti-fascists; and at 3 anti-fascist hecklers were arrested by the police.(47)

The Home Office records make it clear that the police regarded their central function as being to keep these meetings open. Typical reports read:

Adequate uniform police were in attendance and the meeting closed without disorder.(48)

Only the fact that there were adequate uniform police present prevented disorder.(49)

Woodrow Wyatt, the Labour MP, visited a fascist street meeting in Ridley Road, in August 1947. In the New Statesman, he described the police running the meeting, and guiding the speaker like a conductor:

Five policemen stood in a row behind the speaker. Ten formed a cordon in the road in the twenty yards ahead of him. Others were on the pavements, and more were among the crowd beyond the cordon. Round the inside of the ring formed by the policemen walked the Chief Superintendent in a smart grey suit, wearing a black homburg, and with a cigarette hanging from the side of his mouth. Sometimes he directed a policeman towards an interrupter in the crowd. Sometimes he made a cautioning sign to the speaker.(50)

In February 1948, the Union Movement were short of stewards to check the tickets of the audience at a meeting in Wilfred Street. The police were used to fill the gap. This led to arguments in the House of Commons, with one MP asking the Home Secretary, ‘Does he not consider that this is a job for the stewards?’ Chuter Ede replied:

No sir, it is the duty of the police to prevent a breach of the peace. It was quite evident that there was a number of people who desired to get to this meeting to create a breach of the peace.(51)

‘too much frivolity in politics and trade unionism’

While the police were extremely unwilling to stop fascist meetings, they would routinely close anti-fascist meetings. On 26 October 1947, at West Green Road, in Tottenham, the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen (AJEX) tried to preempt the British League of Ex-Servicemen by placing their platform there first. This tactic was accepted practice: whoever claimed a spot first could keep it. The police moved the AJEX speaker on – before allowing the fascist speaker to take the spot.(52) At Crestfield Street in October 1950, the Labour Party arrived to take their usual pitch, only to be told by the police that the Union Movement were planning to speak. The police then closed the Labour Party meeting, before allowing a fascist meeting at same location. W. Tolerton complained to the acting officer, Superintendent Hood. Hood replied, warning him and saying that ‘there was too much frivolity in politics and trade unionism.'(53)

On 25 October 1948, Hackney Trades Council organised a Peace Conference. The organisers knew that there was a likelihood of it being attacked by fascists, and asked for police help. Several hundred fascists began to attack at 7.15 pm, using a variety of weapons, including knuckle-dusters. The police arrived at 7.45. They refused to help the besieged members of the Trades Council. They would not provide any delegates, not even the Dean of Canterbury, with an escort. Afterwards, two fascists were charged with assault. It was the opinion of the Trades Council that the police had deliberately destroyed the prosecution, by stating that the meeting had been called by the Communist Party, and implying that it should not have been held.(54)

In December 1948, the police closed down meetings of the Peace Union, telling the organisers that they could close such meetings ‘because it [the Peace Union] was run by the Communist Party.’ In 1950, there were at least ten occasions during which the police closed down the street meetings of the Communist Party, on the grounds that CP members were obstructing the highway, that is selling copies of the Daily Worker.(55)

Normally, however, the police were able to exercise their preference more quietly. Rather than arresting anti-fascist hecklers, it was usually sufficient to give them a warning, or simply to take their names and addresses, and to give these details to the chairman of the fascist meeting. Rather than closing down every anti-fascist meeting, it was more common simply to move the anti-fascists on, thus making it easier for the fascists, but without having to file an arrest.

On 29 January 1946, there was a Fascist meeting in Barnet Grove. An observer from the NCCL, described the meeting as ‘definitely provocative’. The speaker was not arrested, and neither were any fascists in the crowd. When a heckler described the fascist speaker as a traitor, however, he had his name taken by the police.(56) At a Hamm meeting in Bethnal Green during May 1946, a Jewish ex-paratrooper who had fought at Arnhem asked the platform for a right to reply; the police moved him on. There was a further Hamm meeting, in Hackney on 18 June 1947. Hecklers disrupted the meeting, and police closed it early. Afterwards, the police followed anti-fascists, searched them, and took their names; but did not arrest them.(57)

At Derby, where fascists attacked a CP meeting, broke the loud speaker, and struck and kicked several people, the police intervened on behalf of the fascists and threatened the Communists with arrest.(58) In November 1947, a loudspeaker van for a Harry Hynd meeting against fascism was stopped by the police, and the driver was detained for several hours in a police cell. When the driver asked why he had been detained, one policeman told him that he ‘thought the law on loudspeaker vans had been changed.’ The fascists used such vans over the whole period from 1946 to 1951; and there is no evidence that any fascist vans were ever stopped or detained.(59)

In November 1947 Mosley spoke to a meeting in Wilmot School, Bethnal Green. There was a large anti-fascist picket. After the meeting, several fascists came out and fought the remaining anti-fascists. The fascists used knuckle-dusters. At one stage, they attacked a car full of non-fascists in Wilmot Street. The police watched and took no action.(60) On 18 January 1948, a Union Movement speaker claimed that Jews lived off brothels. A member of the audience asked him to repeat the comment, with the intention of bringing it to the attention of the official shorthand reporters present. And the police intervened, not in arresting the speaker, but in warning the ‘heckler’, and in forcing him to move on.(61)

The sheer volume of this evidence makes it clear that the police colluded with fascism. It was not a matter of ‘one or two bad apples’, but of an institution which acted consistently and repeatedly in the same direction. The only question is why the police acted in this way.

Why police collusion?

At the time, many anti-fascists believed that the main reason was that individual policemen were anti-semitic. They were drawn from the local population, in which there was a great deal of anti-semitism:

Ridley Road was a hot-bed of fascism, and a lot of the police officers were anti-semitic.(62)

There were definitely anti-semitic police.(63)

There is some evidence of police anti-semitism. At the larger meetings, the opposition to Mosley came from ordinary trade unionists or socialists. Many, although not a majority, would have been Jewish. But in the minds of the police, most socialists and communists were Jews. This can be seen in their descriptions of the opposition at fascist meetings:

Most of whom appeared to be of Jewish descent.(64)

The Jewish opposition.(65)

About a quarter of those present appeared to be Jews.(66)

There is also evidence that many individual policemen were profoundly hostile to the left. Even Labour newspapers, such as the Daily Herald, were not seen in police messrooms. This is how C. H. Rolph, who was then a police clerk, explained police support for Mosley in the 1930s:

Because the Blackshirts seemed disciplined and marched with military precision, they seemed at first preferable to the dreary rabble who opposed them.(67)

The problem with these arguments, however, is that they explain police bias in terms of a police culture of soft racism and right-wing politics. It is precisely this culture which requires explanation.

An alternative idea is that the police were only doing their job, and it was not the ordinary police but their superiors who were responsible:

The policeman has a difficult job to do and they didn’t want to lose their job.(68)

The state rests upon the army, the police and the courts. And these are riddled with elements sympathetic to the aims of fascism, especially at the top.(69)

From this, it follows that the real culprits were in the Home Office, and it was the government and the civil service that was responsible for collusion.

Again, there is some evidence of Home Office collusion with Mosley. For example, in February 1946, and September 1946, Mosley wrote to the Home Office, giving details of his private meetings, and asking for the protection of the police. Out of this, came the following instructions, from Chuter Ede, the Labour Home Secretary, to Sir Harold Scott, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police:

In the Secretary of State’s view if a group of Communists approached the place where a private meeting of this ‘book club’ was to be held with the obvious intention of preventing or breaking it up they would constitute an unlawful assembly and it would be the duty of the police to disperse them. He further thinks that if Communists succeeded in entering such a meeting and assault any of those taking part, the police, if they are called in, should take the names of those concerned and, if no proceedings are taken by the victims of the assault, should prosecute the offenders.(70)

The problem with explaining the attitudes of the police in terms of Home Office policy, is that police attitudes remained consistent, while the attitudes of the Home Office changed. The police were happy to act in harmony with the Home Office or against the Home Office. Either would do, so long as they were intervening against the anti-fascists. For example, in November 1946, F. A. Newsam of the Home Office wrote to Sir Harold Scott, informing him that the Home Secretary and the Director of Public Prosecutions both wanted to see Hamm arrested and charged under Section 5 of the Public Order Act. This order was simply ignored.(71)

The most convincing way to explain the action of the police is to place their actions inside the history of the police more generally. Historians of the nineteenth century have stressed the function of the police in imposing a certain class-order, and in attacking existing working-class pursuits.(72) Similarly, historians of the twentieth century have shown that there was a culture of popular resistance to the police, manifested in the inter-war years in individual attacks on the police, collective defence of working-class hobbies, and anti-police riots.(73) The police were used throughout the 1930s and 1940s, to crush hunger marches, to weaken industrial disputes, and as a battering-ram against all forms of popular protest. Using this evidence, Marxist historians have argued that

The police are not really concerned with looking after people. Quite the opposite, they are interested in keeping ordinary people in their place in order to look after the tiny ruling class at the top of society.(74)

From this perspective, the police had a function: to protect property, and to obstruct anyone that threatened it. The police saw the anti-fascists, connected them to the political left, and believed that they were the greater threat. The police saw the fascists, with their stress on law, order, and discipline, and believed that the fascists were on their side. In other words, the police had a role, and they played it.

Notes

1. Viscount Simon, Retrospect (London, 1952), p. 216; C. Cross, The Fascists In Britain (London, 1961) p. 195; also see R. Benewick, Political Violence And Public Order: A Study Of British Fascism (London, 1969), passim.
2. J. Hope, ‘Fascism, The Security Service, And The Curious Careers Of Maxwell Knight And James McGuirk Hughes’, Lobster 22 (1991), pp. 1-5; D. S. Lewis, Illusions Of Grandeur (Manchester, 1987), pp. 116-117.
3. R. Thurlow, Fascism In Britain, A History, 1918-1985 (London, 1987), pp. 114-115; G. D. Anderson, Fascists, Communists And The National Government (Columbia, 1983), 1, p. 203.
4. Jewish Central Information Office, Organised Anti-Semitism In Great Britain 1942-6 (unpublished document, 1946); F. Mullally, Fascism Inside England (London, 1946); N. Nugget, ‘Post-War Fascism’, in K. Lunn and R. Thurlow (eds.), British Fascism (London, 1980), pp. 205-226; A. Poole, ‘Oswald Mosley And The Union Movement: Success Or Failure?’ in M. Cronin (ed.), The Failure Of British Fascism (London, 1996); G. Thayer, The British Political Fringe (London, 1965), pp. 33-52.
5. L. Rose, Factual Survey No. 1: Fascism in Britain (unpublished document, 1948), pp. 13-15; and L. Rose, Factual Survey No. 2: Survey Of Open-Air Meetings Held By Pro-Fascist Organisations April-October 1947 (unpublished document, 1948), p. 28; Special Branch, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 15 October 1946.
6. There are traces of individual anti-fascist Conservatives in the NCCL archive (DCL), in the Brynmor Jones Library in the University of Hull, DCL/42/6.
7. See, for example, Hackney Gazette, 22 September 1947.
8. For Labour views, see T. Driberg, Mosley? No! (London, 1947); D. N. Pritt, The Mosley Case (London, 1947); conference discussions in Labour Party Annual Reports 1947, 1948, and 1949 (London, 1947, 1948 and 1949); and the discussions of the Labour Cabinet, in the Public Records Office, CAB 128/2, pp. 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15.
9. The relevant Communist Party records are held in the archives of the CP’s National Organising Committee, CP/CENT/ORG/12, in the National Museum of Labour History in Manchester. See also London Communist Party, Ban The Fascists (London, 1945); and Edward [E. P.] Thompson, Fascist Threat To Britain (London, 1947).
10. See, for example, Manchester Guardian, 6 October 1947.
11. SPGB, The Racial Problem: A Socialist Analysis (London, 1947).
12. Jock Haston collection (DJH) in the Brynmoor Jones Library; also T. Grant, The Menace Of Fascism, What It Is And How To Fight It (London, 1948).
13. NCCL archive at DCL.
14. Board of Deputies of British Jews, A Brief Survey Of Its Work 1933-1950 (London, 1950); and S. Salomon, Anti-Semitism And Fascism In Post-War Britain: The Work Of The Jewish Defence Committee (London, 1950).
15. A. L. Easterman, Hitlerism In Trade (Leicester, 1945); Trades Advisory Council, If Fascism Marches Again In Britain (London, 1946); and N. Barou, Jews In Work And Trade (London, 1945).
16. AJEX: Journal Of The Association Of The Jewish Ex-Servicemen; and CAJEX: Magazine Of The Jewish Ex-Servicemen (Cardiff).
17. Minutes of the Central Committee Of The Workers Circle 1946-1950, in Hackney Archives, D/S/61/1/2-6.
18. M. Beckman, The 43 Group (London, 1992); A. Hartog, Born To Sing (London, 1978), pp. 74-7. See also On Guard, the paper of the 43 Group.
19. For the tension between Common Wealth and other anti-fascists in the Bristol area, see R. Bruce Bartlett, Report On Visit To Bristol, 14 January 1948, NCCL File report, DCL/42/9.
20. NCCL File Report, December 1946, DCL/42/1; NCCL File Report, February 1948, DCL/42/2a; J. Kerstein and H. Trainis, Statements, 21 September 1947, DCL 42/2b. ‘Assault Was Anti-Jewish’, Reynolds News, 12 October 1947. W. Grunfeld, ‘Mosley Makes A Comeback’, New Republic, 9 February 1948.
21. Beckman, Hartog, passim.
22. Beckman, pp. 119-20; C. H. Darke, letter to NCCL, undated but October or September 1948, DCL/48/5; ‘Broke Up A Meeting: Two Men Fined’, Daily Worker, 22 September 1951; Daily Herald, 9 October 1951; T. Grundy, ‘My Childhood’, Independent 28 November 1996.
23. ‘Spread Of Propaganda’, Manchester Guardian, 19 September 1947.
24. D. H. Snell, Letter To Home Secretary, 11 January 1946, HO 45/24467/260.
25. D. N. Pritt, An Act To Give Further Powers For The Prevention Of Fascist Activities And Propaganda, Attached To NCCL Memorandum To Home Secretary, Undated, DCL/42/6.
26. ‘Fascist Activity’, Hansard vol. 421, no. 122, 11 April 1946. The Home Office thought so highly of this speech that civil servants kept multiple copies, to send in response to letters or questions; see the Home Office (HO) records in the Public Records Office, HO 45/24468/298.
27. L. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, Fascist And Anti-Semitic Activities And The Law (unpublished document, 1948), p. 10; J. Mahoney, Civil Liberties In Britain During The Cold War, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge (1989), p. 197; F. E. Jones, ‘The Law And Fascism (1)’, New Statesman And Nation, 13 December 1947; F. E. Jones, ‘The Law And Fascism (2)’, New Statesman And Nation, 20 December 1947; S. Bowes, The Police And Civil Liberties (London, 1966).
28. Interview with CR, former member of RCP, October 1996.
29. Interview with RH, former member of CP, December 1996.
30. Points From Speeches At Hackney Towns Meeting September 18 1947, DCL/42/2b.
31. ‘Curb Fascists Says Labour’, Romford Recorder 16 January 1948.
32. R. Falber?, Untitled Report On Fascist Activities, 15 August 1948, CP/CENT/ORG/12/7.
33. D.N. Pritt, The Autobiography Of D.N. Pritt, Part Two: Brass Hats And Bureaucrats (London, 1966), p. 67.
34. Manchester And Salford Union Of Jewish Ex-Servicemen And Women, Newsletter 2/6, May-June 1948.
35. Hansard Parliamentary Debates 5th Series, vol. 470 (1948-9), pp. 2042-52, 7 December 1949.
36. L. J. Orman, Letter To Home Secretary, 28 October 1946, HO 45/24468/340.
37. News Chronicle, 28 November 1947.
38. Special Branch, Meeting, 15 June 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
39. Marginal notes, HO 45/24469/342
40. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, pp. 4-5.
41. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, p. 6
42. For one example of unsuccessful heckling by Hamm, were it not for the prompt action of the police he might have been lynched by a hostile crowd of 1000. See Special Branch, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 30 June 1945, HO 45/24467/188.
43. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, p. 3.
44. Special Branch, Meeting, 1 June 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
45. Special Branch, Court Proceedings, 16 June 1947, HO 45/24469/383
46. Murray Silver, Statement, DCL 42/2B; Special Branch, Court Proceedings, 15 August 1947, HO 45/24469/399.
47. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, pp. 8-13.
48. Special Branch, Meeting, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 23 March 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
49. Special Branch, Meeting, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 31 March 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
50. W. Wyatt, ‘Well, It’s A Free Country – Isn’t It?’, New Statesmen And Nation, 30 August 1947.
51. (Hansard) Parliamentary Debates 5th Series, vol. 447 (1947-8), pp. 551-4, 12 February 1948.
52. Rose, Factual Survey No. 3, pp. 7-8.
53. Letter from W. Tolerton to Geoffrey De Freitas (Home Office), 24 October 1950, HO 45/25389/62.
54. Darke, op. cit.
55. Mahoney, pp. 199, 201, 238; DCL/21/4.
56. NCCL File Report, 12 January 1947, DCL/42/1.
57. Daily Worker, 27 May 1946, 19 June 1947.
58. Falber (?), op. cit.
59. E. Allen, Memo On The Banning Of Loud-speaker Vans In Hackney, NCCL File 6 November 1947, DCL/42/2a.
60. DCL/42/1.
61. Rose, Factual Survey No 3, p. 8
62. Interview with LS, former member of 43 Group, October 1996.
63. Interview with SM, former member of 43 Group, October 1996.
64. Special Branch, Meeting, 19 October, 1946, HO 45/24468/338.
65. Special Branch, Meeting, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 23 March 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
66. Special Branch, Meeting, League Of Ex-Servicemen And Women, 13 April 1947, HO 45/24469/367.
67. C. H. Rolph, Living Twice (London, 1974), pp. 84, 91
68. Interview with MB, former member of 43 Group, November 1996.
69. Grant, pp. 73-4.
70. Oswald Mosley, letter to Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, 26 February 1946, HO 45/24468/277; Oswald Mosley, letter to Chuter Ede, 11 September 1946, HO 45/24468/277; Chuter Ede letter to Sir Harold Scott, undated, but September 1946, HO 45/24468/277.
71. F. A. Newsam Letter To Sir Harold Scott, 26 November 1946, HO 45/24468/315.
72. A. Silver, ‘The Demand For Order In Civil Society: A Review Of Some Themes In The History Of Urban Crime, Police And Riot’, in D. J. Bordua (ed.), The Police: Six Sociological Essays (New York, 1967), pp. 1-24; R. D. Storch, ‘The Policeman As Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline And Popular Culture In Northern England, 1850-1880’, Journal of Social History 9/4 (1976), pp. 481-509.
73. J. White, ‘Police And People In London In The 1930s’, Oral History, 11/2 (1983), pp. 34-41.
74. A. Farrell, Crime, Class And Corruption (London, 1992), p. 169. Also T. Bunyan, The History And Practice Of The Political Police In Britain (London, 1977).