Paul Johnson recently sneered in The Times at the ‘conspiracy theories’ about the Falklands War held by the likes of Tam Dalyell MP. Reading this, what struck me was just how few conspiracy theories about that war have emerged in the past 3 years. So, here are a couple. Mine is little more than a suggestion; Steve Dorril’s is more substantial. They may demonstrate just how little serious work has been done so far on the wider context of the war and, perhaps, that the current concentration on the sinking of the Belgrano is a mistake. With all due respect to the dead, there are more serious issues at stake.
RR
Oil…
The received liberal version of the Falklands War now seems to be something like this. By a combination of cockups (the information on the threat of an Argentine invasion didn’t get to the right people), luck (the Argentine bombs were wrongly fused), authentic British ruthlessness (sinking the Belgrano), and large dollops of near-racist, sickly patriotic guff, Mrs Thatcher won the war, duly dispersed the ‘wets’ and the would-be peace-makers, and duly won the election which followed. Having thus spent a vast amount of money defending the ‘rights’ of a handful of (white) British citizens, she promptly embarked on the ‘Fortress Falklands’ policy, spending even more in her determination to demonstrate the “persistence of illusions about Britain’s place in the world.” (1)
This version of events is attractive to the liberal mind because it looks like an exemplary demonstration of the cockup theory of history, and it is that which passes for political sophistication in most of respectable intellectual society in this country. Unfortunately this ‘cock-up’ version of the Falklands War conspicuously fails to encompass two items: the existence of oil deposits around the islands, and the so-called ‘intelligence failure.’
The Falklands-and-oil story can be traced quite easily through the annual index of The Times newspaper which is in every reference library. Start around 1977 and work forward from there. (2) There is little need to elaborate this here. Suffice to say that there are, or are believed to be, considerable – possibly huge – oil deposits in the seabed between the islands and the Argentine mainland. (This was apparently sufficiently obvious for the US political columnist, William Saffire, to write a piece in the early stages of the conflict, stating that oil was the ‘bottom line’ in the war. (3)
The ‘intelligence failure’ is extremely smelly. “…key intelligence did not immediately reach Carrington, either raw, in summary or by way of assessment … At the Joint Intelligence Committee level, however, the SIS report (of a firm Argentine intention to invade – RR) ..was considered sufficiently important for the Chiefs of Staff to be informed.” (4)
Tam Dalyell’s nose wrinkles at this in his Thatcher’s Torpedo (London 1983), and Verrier, quoted above, apparently trying to make the muddle merely ordinary, succeeds (deliberately?) in deepening the mystery with some tricky distinctions between ‘imminent’ and ‘probable’ invasions. These remain barely plausible until the reader reflects that what was ‘probable’ or ‘imminent’ was an armed invasion of a Crown colony. How many of those are there in a routine decade? Even a ‘probable’ invasion of British territory must rank as a major ‘flap’ – perhaps the major flap short of a full-scale nuclear alert.
It is no great causal leap to read the accounts of the ‘intelligence failure’ and conclude that somebody (or: some body) took a deliberate decision not to inform the Foreign Office and the Cabinet of the probable invasion, thus ensuring that it would occur.
Dalyell suggests that Mrs Thatcher, “knowing what SHE did … was not averse to allowing the situation to run so that would be able to present Britain as the injured party and have a little war that would rally the nation behind her.” (5)
I think Dalyell may be right that she did allow the situation ‘to run’ – and sections of the British state certainly did – but to put this down to a political motive is a mistake in my view. In describing this as ‘a little war’ Dalyell is using hindsight. Before the war took place it must have looked rather more risky than that: the British could easily have lost. No, there had to be something more pressing on the agenda than simple electioneering on Thatcher’s part.
There was: oil.
North Sea oil revenues are due to begin declining in 1987. When the decline gets underway the economic consequences for this country are going to be horrendous. This is hardly a secret. Some economic commentators (Wynne Godley, William Keegan), have been warning about it for at least 5 years. The Treasury computer model of the British economy will have been grinding away for at least five years trying to work out what the British economy looks like minus a third of its pre-oil manufacturing capacity and minus North Sea oil revenues. Bet your life on this: the print-outs will have been giving the upper echelons of the British state the runs. A solution – perhaps the only solution – compatible with this country’s present political/economic structure is: find more oil.
It is late 1981 and the British state has a problem. The only place it knows of where there are significant new oil deposits under possible British control is around the Falkland Islands. But the British claim to the Falkland Islands is extremely tenuous in international law.
This is not a big problem for a state which has spent the previous 300 years creating an empire by stealth, bribery and deception. The solution was obvious: an Argentine invasion – threatened before often enough – would put the Argentine in the wrong, enable the British state to don the mantle of the aggrieved party, temporarily obscure the dodgy nature of the British claim to the islands, and provide the pretext for a post-invasion military build-up.
The ‘cock-up’ theory would have us believe that none of this was in the collective mind of the British state, that the Falklands were just an imperial legacy. But any reading of this country’s postwar foreign policy will show that nothing has been more prominent in that collective consciousness than oil.
So the invasion was ‘invited’. The protracted diplomatic talks with the Argentine over the islands got ‘bogged down’ again. HMS Endurance, the last ‘guard’ over the islands, was withdrawn, and the British government let the Argentine government know – informally – that an invasion would not provoke a military response from the British. (6)
Cue invasion; and cue, as if by magic, the British task force. The Belgrano was sacrificed to ensure that peace didn’t break out and spoil everything. War was essential: a negotiated settlement would expose the dubious British claims to the island.
Three years on and hardly any of this has been looked at. Dalyell and co. are still worrying away at the Belgrano, fed on leaks from within the state itself. Criticism of the Falklands war has now become virtually synonymous with the sinking of the Belgrano.
This may be an accident, but maybe not. When the state starts leaking (apparently) against itself, I get suspicious. The Belgrano is a wonderful sideshow, but the main event is a British state now in the Falklands, in strength, ready and increasingly capable of defending ‘its’ oil.
It is a neat little theory at this sketchy level. But is it true? As Steve Dorril’s essay shows, there were other balls in the air at the same time. Falsifications, please!
Notes
- Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (London 1983) p337
- e.g. March 23 1977, May 2 1977 (‘Oil muddies the water of the Falkland Islands’); December 17 1979 (‘How much oil off the Falklands?’); February 23 1981 (‘The oil that has not helped to calm the Falklands’); 18 May 1981 (‘UK threatens to take legal action against oil companies if they take up tenders offered by the Argentine’).
Most recently, see Observer (Business section) July 27 1985 (the day before I typed this) (‘New Moves on Falklands offshore oil drilling.’) - New York Times April 5 1982. I haven’t read this, just seen it mentioned in the NYT index. If someone has access please send me a copy.
- Verrier (see 1, above) p341.
- Tam Dalyell, Thatcher’s Torpedo (Cecil Woolf, London 1983) p29
Another element I have not included here is the various reports which suggest that elements of the British Armed Forces were making preparations for the war some time before the actual invasion. On this see introduction to Dalyell book by Dr. Paul Rogers. I heard Rogers give details of some of these reports at a public meeting but as far as I am aware they have yet to be collected and printed anywhere.
- Verrier (above) p 341
RR
SATO….
Steve Dorril
“The Falklands are starting to assume a more global defence role.” (Sunday Times 22 May 1985)
An intriguing article in International Affairs (1983) by Andrew Hurrell disclosed a whole series of diplomatic and strategic moves which were happening in the South Atlantic before and at the time of the Falklands War. “The Politics of South Atlantic Security: a survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation” looked at the task of “relating western concerns for South Atlantic security to the interests and perceptions of the major Latin American states, particularly Argentina and Brazil.” It seems to me it would be possible to outline a conspiracy in which the Falklands War was part of a planned route to a South Atlantic alliance. I’m not going to draw it fully but will present a few pointers.
In 1980 a top Reagan aide, General Daniel Graham, was reported to have said in Buenos Aires that “Mr Reagan would favour a NATO-like treaty linking the militaristic nations of South America with South Africa.” (New York Times 20 April 1980) The successive visits to Buenos Aires in 1981 of General Vernon Walters, General Edward Meyer, General Richard Ingram, and Admiral Harry Train clearly pointed to the American desire to establish close military links. (Le Monde 24 August 1981)
Similarly, in his speech in Brazilia in August 1981, Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders stressed his concern for the South Atlantic. This concern, together with the need to exclude foreign intervention in the Caribbean, and the preoccupation with Soviet activities in Afghanistan and Poland were proclaimed as factors which draw the US and Brazil closer together. (Le Monde 19 August 1981)
The American desire to secure the southern region free from alleged possible Soviet influence was, as we see, being given diplomatic muscle before the Falklands War occurred. It was a time when perhaps other, more important, factors were coming into play. The war coincided with “increasing emphasis placed on the strategic seabed resources by the Department of Defense,” and also by the CIA. (See Foreign Affairs Summer 1982) With new publicised scares about the massive Soviet navy there were obviously compelling reasons for putting together a SATO pact.
But there were huge problems. The military government of Argentina was becoming increasingly unstable. A sign of that instability was the invasion of the Falklands. This was appreciated by the US but the other partners were hardly in a position to help. South Africa is a leper nation and no way would Latin American countries, who had close ties to other third world countries, tie themselves to her. Hurrell thought “Brazilian participation in a ‘SATO’ is highly unlikely. Brazil remains a country with the capacity militarily to alter the basis of South Atlantic politics. Up to now it has chosen to maintain a low profile. Defence spending has been low, and the navy has only a limited deep-water capacity.”
SATO, it seemed, was off the agenda. But even as Hurrell was writing, events had overtaken him, as Admiral Harry Train, NATO’s Supreme Commander Atlantic, realised. In Montevideo, in July 1981, he had said “The need to safeguard the security of the South Atlantic must lead the nations concerned to develop a natural defence, even without a pact, treaty or formal agreement”(Le Monde 24 July 1981) (emphasis added). It didn’t take long.
In 1984 the US and Brazil signed a ‘memorandum of understanding’ (Guardian 6 February 1984). It paved the way for joint ventures in arms production. More importantly, a sub-section then being negotiated talked of the need “to build up Brazil’s armed forces to act as a watchdog for the Americans in the South Atlantic.”
The Americans were offering Brazil ten destroyers, 60 helicopters and other materials on a charge-free lease basis. In return Brazil would ‘perform certain duties’ in the South Atlantic and offer facilities to American warships. The signing was to make formal something which clearly had been going on for some time.
“After the Falklands War pressure was put on Brazil to make better use of Trindade. Washington was to meet the entire £190 million cost of setting it up for Brazil.” (Observer 30 May 1983) Trindade, which is an island some 200 miles east of Rio de Janeiro, was the site of a huge naval base construction. The island is barely a mile long and had to be extended to take a full runway for military planes. (Interestingly, it is in a direct line between Ascension Island and Port Stanley on the Falklands.)
“The Americans applied pressure to attain it. It started with President Reagan’s visit at the end of 1982, when he rescued Brazil from insolvency with a Federal Reserve emergency loan. Demands made then by Mr Reagan were partially met.” (Guardian 6 February 1984). Britain also played its part in this, applying considerable financial pressure. In 1983 it refused for a time to put up money towards a 12 billion dollar rescue package. “It is understood that this is only part of a bigger move, with Mrs. Thatcher ordering that no new British money go towards alleviating Brazil’s problems.” (Daily Telegraph 16 October 1983)
The business world was extremely displeased with this. “Companies are astounded that having given £250 million export credit to Iraq last month, the Treasury continues to refuse half that amount to Brazil” (Times 12 November 1983) As the Observer said: “Brazil appears to have been singled out for special treatment – or punishment.” (16 October 1983)
The reasons for this were clear to some: “Bankers also suspect that the matter is tied up with British landing rights in Brazil for aircraft en route to the Falklands.” (Times October 1983) In May it had been reported (Observer 30 May 1983) that plans for Britain to use Trindade as a staging post on the way to the Falklands had “been put on ice because of a row between Brazilian military officers.”
With the signing of the ‘understanding’ and a little financial pressure the ‘row’ was quickly shut up.
Britain has just opened an extremely expensive airstrip on the Falklands which officially is required to alleviate the cost of transporting materials and men via the air shuttle. It is an essential part of ‘fortress Falklands’. On the surface it is the policy of madmen (and women), but the global strategist and the geo-politicians will see it in a different light.
Firstly, it guards the Antarctic and the Horn. Secondly, it is now part of the western defensive chain of Ascension Island, Trindade and Port Stanley.
“It clearly has a strategic role not just a tactical function”, said a civil source on the island, “that seems to be one long term role for the Falklands – an allied staging post that everyone can regard as secure.” (Sunday Times 22 May 1983)
I think you are probably getting the general drift of the idea. Did the strategists plan or foresee all this before the Falklands War? Another piece of the jigsaw took shape when it was revealed that the US had requested of the Chileans the right to expand the runway on Easter Island to enable it to take the Space Shuttle in case of emergencies. Most commentators assumed the real reason was the US wished it to take military planes. Can the creation of a Southern Region Rapid Deployment Force be far off?
NB Andrew Hurrell wrote the article cited above while studying for a PhD at the spooks college, St.Antony’s, Oxford.
SD
Information wanted on the following
- There was a very small report in the Guardian (30 April 1983) that Britain was setting up a military base in Punta Arenas, Chile, near the border with southern Argentina. British troops, including Ghurkas, were said to be helping to train Chilean troops.
- What happened to the book on the diplomacy surrounding the Falklands War by State Department official Douglas Kinney? (Guardian 31 August 1984)
- ‘Project Zeus’ a huge new radar dome rising on Mount Kent, Zeus will have a range of 1000 miles – well into southern Latin America. I suspect that the NSA/GCHQ may be setting up a base on the Falklands. It would make an ideal listening post since it has very little radio activity.
- The radio ham who ‘heroically’ relayed details of the Falklands invasion by the Argentine was recently revealed to be an employee of Cable and Wireless Ltd, seen by some as a cover for GCHQ. Any more examples of this?