Operation Paget, the investigation by the team led by Sir John Stevens into the death of Diana, Princess of Wales, briefly tried to investigate a collision between a white Fiat Uno and Princess Diana’s BMW. The head-on collision happened on 22 March 1996, on Cromwell Road, Kensington, when a casino employee lost control of a sports car and shunted the driver-less Uno into oncoming traffic.
After a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) asked Kensington and Chelsea Police and SO14 (Royalty Protection) to examine their files for material about this incident. All documents had been routinely destroyed in 2000 (written records) and 2003 (computerised), before the January 2004 creation of Operation Paget itself.
Operation Paget was also contacted in response to the FOIA request and according to MPS:
‘Operation Paget confirmed that they are aware of the incident being referred to in this request, but they have no MPS documents relating to it. They have, however, during the course of their enquiries, come into possession of one document connected to that incident, that would fall within the terms of your request.’
An insurance document detailing repairs on Diana’s car after the crash, the document in question was technically exempt under FOIA due to its possible evidential value.
‘It is however felt to be in the public interest, because of speculation it may generate if we are silent on this issue, that some clarification is provided as to the content of this document and the relevance that it has to this enquiry.’
No mention of the 1996 Uno crash appears in the 850 pages of the final report of Operation Paget,(1)even to dismiss it as non-evidential.
Published in December 2006, Paget was lauded around the world as the definitive last word on the Diana case, a triumph for reason over the forces of conspiratorial thought. It is in fact a multi-million pound demolition of the sprawling conspiracy claims of Mohamed al-Fayed. Paget does not attempt to find the cause of the Paris crash – a task for the inquest – with only the apparently dismantled claims of Mr al-Fayed to stand in the way of a straightforward non-conspiratorial explanation. In the gap between the positions of Paget and Fayed, we find numerous grey areas, some of which are very serious.
Paget certainly represents a significant advance on the flawed and inconsistent 10,000 word report summary issued in 1999 by French investigative Magistrate Herve Stephan, the title of which alone, Accident Mortel de la Circulation, 31/08/97 00h30, managed simultaneously to predefine the crash as an accident and get the time of the crash itself wrong by seven minutes.(2) Dragging the crash into the light of British police procedure reminds us how lucky we are in some respects: witnesses’ full names are given (instead of Stephan’s profusion of pseudonyms and anonymities), surnames are given in full (French procedure is to give only the initial of the last name, littering the 1999 report with infuriating vaguenesses such as ‘Thierry H’) and the entire thing is published on the internet (as opposed to Stephan’s full report which totalled 5,000 pages of statements, reports and photos, and which remains unpublished).
Lord Stevens is, of course, an honourable man and the present writer is sure that his report has told the truth. But it has not told the whole truth. Indeed, there are parts of Paget that leave one reeling.
Possibly the classic illustration of Paget’s ability to talk around its subject comes on p. 821, which deals with Fayed’s claim that:
‘An assertion by the security services that they have no involvement in illegal activities such as assassinations is not credible [as] confirmed by the report of an inquiry carried out by Sir John Stevens………’
You or I might take this as a claim that Britain’s security and intelligence institutions have been involved in assassinations (the attempts to get Nasser or Lumumba spring to mind). Paget’s reply to Fayed’s assertion is:
‘It is important to note in the Stevens (Northern Ireland) Report that the term “agents” is used to refer to informants or sources and not “agents” as it is sometimes colloquially understood to be, “MI6 spies”. Thus the reference to “agents being involved in murder” was a reference to actions of informants rather than the authorities.’
Paget concludes with the cosmically irrelevant observation that:
‘These Inquiries relate specifically to activity in Northern Ireland. There was no evidence linking the allegations in Northern Ireland to the events in Paris. Operation Paget will however continue to assess any relevant evidence produced at the Public Inquiries examining collusion issues.’(3)
The following is a brief survey of some of the crucial problems with Operation Paget’s report, fuller examination being prevented by consideration of space. Page references to Paget are preceded with a capital ‘P’, followed by the page number, e.g. P123.
Disappearing evidence
Other problems include French-held evidence which was destroyed after Paget’s official inception. This includes photographs taken at the scene of the accident (P404) and parts of Diana’s Mercedes (see below). Quite why Paget did not move immediately to secure all this evidence is not stated.
British evidence that seems to have evaporated by the time Paget arrived included alleged threatening letters to Diana from Prince Philip. A package of these was claimed to exist by Paul Burrell and this was apparently independently confirmed by a police officer’s notes. However: ‘The MPS does not have any such letters. Specific enquiries have been made with the Exhibits Officer involved in the Paul Burrell trial. No letters written by HRH Prince Philip ever came into police possession in that investigation.’ (P127). (Paget also asked Prince Philip about the claim that he had written ‘vitriolic letters’ to Diana. He did not see fit to respond. [P121]) Also missing were 14 videotapes owned by Diana’s voice tutor, Peter Settelen. These were part of 20 videotapes that were seized from the home of Paul Burrell and appear to have evaporated while in police hands. The six tapes that eventually resurfaced were broadcast and famously contained remarks including Diana’s fears that a former bodyguard had been assassinated, and personal reflections about the Prince Of Wales’s affair with the now-Duchess of Cornwall. ‘The other [tapes] are unaccounted for.’ (P136)
Lord Stevens appears to have been affected personally by ‘evaporating evidence’ syndrome. His offices were burgled twice in the space of a fortnight in February 2006 with a computer being stolen and no trace of a forced entry left behind on either occasion. (4)
Threats and surveillance
Diana’s confidant Simone Simmons told Paget that in early 1997, Diana allowed her to listen in on a telephone call she had received.
‘Simone Simmons heard a male say, “Don’t meddle in things that you know nothing about because you know accidents can happen”. [Emphasis in original] She stated there was an inflection in the voice which both she and the Princess of Wales found threatening. The telephone call reportedly took place shortly after the Princess of Wales had returned from a trip to Angola connected with an anti-landmine campaign.’
The male caller in question was allegedly Sir Nicholas Soames, a supporter of Prince Charles during the War of the Waleses and (at the time of the call) Minister of State for the Armed Forces. In November 1995, Soames had publicly claimed that the Princess was in ‘the advanced stages of paranoia’ (on BBC 2’s Newsnight) and said that she was pulling off ‘a very calculating and a very polished performance’ (Radio 4 Today programme) after her Panorama appearance. The claim that Soames made ominous remarks about accidents would appear to be directly pertinent to Paget’s remit to investigate a possible conspiracy to murder.
However, it was resolved in the most casual manner (P110): ‘Nicholas Soames provided a statement to Operation Paget…… in which he categorically denied ever having such a conversation with the Princess of Wales.’ And that was that. Soames was not even asked to produce phone records for the period in question and we are left with an unresolved claim of a threatening call from a known critic of the Princess.
Paget does not elaborate or even examine the context in which the alleged call happened. This is a sin of omission. A month before the alleged Soames phone call (i.e. January 1997), Diana had taken the first (unwitting?) steps towards becoming a political figure by visiting Angola as part of an International Red Cross campaign against landmines. What would normally have been a strictly humanitarian gesture was given a political dimension by the fact that John Major’s rapidly-deflating Conservative government had stalled repeatedly on banning landmines, whereas Labour was promising a foreign policy with ‘an ethical dimension’.
Declassified US diplomatic cables record that ‘Government officials immediately scrambled to repair the public relations damage, and issued statements affirming the government’s commitment to working toward a world-wide ban on landmines’, adding that ‘Labour Party officials used the flap to highlight differences between Labour and the Conservative government on the landmine issue.’(4) Junior defence minister Earl Howe called the Princess ‘ill-informed on the issue of anti-personnel mines’ and famously declared her ‘a loose cannon that Her Majesty’s government does not need.’(6) Peter Viggers MP, Conservative member of the Commons Defence Select Committee, called the Princess ‘very ill-informed about……. landmines’ saying: ‘This is an important and sophisticated argument. It doesn’t help simply to point at the amputees and say how terrible it is.’ During the same period David Howell MP (Conservative Chairman, Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee) said that Diana should not be given any sort of ambassadorial role.
By Summer 1997 Diana was in discussions with Tony Blair about a ‘unique’ semi-ambassadorial role. The ongoing discussions had ‘taken on a fresh momentum in light of Diana’s charity work and her crusade to ban landmines.’(7)
Having elided the matter of Diana’s nascent political activism, Paget then fails to make a vital connection. On (for example) P735 Paget makes much ado of the fact that it tried and failed to gain access to 39 documents concerning Diana that are currently held by America’s National Security Agency: ‘Operation Paget was not allowed access to NSA/CIA intelligence files.’ This should hardly be a surprise (Herve Stephan was similarly rebuffed in February 1999) but what is left unexplained is why the NSA was monitoring her at all. In February 2000 former NSA employee Wayne Madsen stated that ‘undisclosed material held in US government files on Princess Diana was collected via the Echelon system because of her work with the international campaign to ban landmines ……Anybody who is politically active will eventually end up on the NSA’s radar screen.’ (emphasis added) (8)
Elsewhere in Paget we read about Diana’s fear of being bugged and a statement that her private apartments were ‘swept’ and a possible device located. Electronic security specialist Grahame Harding was called to the Royal apartments at Kensington Palace in 1994 to help the Princess protect herself against eavesdroppers [P119], and told Paget:
‘She talked about “dark forces”, but other than questioning the existence of listening devices, she never said who she suspected of spying on her. When she did say things like this, I thought, “Why would anyone try to do that?…… [I] detected an electronic signal, which indicated that a possible bugging device may have been present behind a wall in her bedroom. Princess Diana was present when I found this signal…… The next time I did a sweep of this area, which was a day or two later, the signal it had gone (sic). I did not tell anyone of my findings and do not know if Princess Diana looked into it further. I cannot give an explanation as to what caused the reading I got.’
In his memoir, Shadows of a Princess, Patrick Jephson describes how Diana pulled up a carpet in an upstairs room at Kensington Palace, to show Jephson what she believed was evidence of bugging: fresh sawdust and disturbed planks. ‘She pointed silently at the sawdust, and nodded significantly.’(9)Paget however is content to note that, ‘The witness evidence indicated that the Princess of Wales believed that her telephone conversations were being listened to; she was being monitored; or being followed.’
Again, Paget refuses to look under its proverbial nose. As has been shown elsewhere, there was a real, proven and documented conspiracy to damage the Princess of Wales in the early 1990s(10) when her intimate telephone conversations with her lover James Gilbey were recorded, doctored and repeatedly re-broadcast. When those broadcasts were recorded by radio hams, the tapes quickly ended up in the hands of The Sun – who dithered for nearly two years over publishing them. The people behind ‘Squidgygate’ then became impatient with their proxies and started sending journalists taped copies of the conversation through the post. Naturally, once the story broke, suspicion fell on MI5.
Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke told the House of Commons:
‘The security services are strictly controlled in their telephone tapping and I know of no evidence whatever to indicate that they [MI5] were involved…… There is nothing to investigate…… I am absolutely certain that the allegation that this is anything to do with the security services or GCHQ……is being put out by newspapers, who I think feel rather guilty that they are using plainly tapped telephone calls.’
The 1993 Annual Report of the Interceptions Commissioner, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, specifically dismissed ‘stories which occasionally circulated in the press with regard to the interceptions by MI5, MI6 and GCHQ’, which were, in his experience, ‘without exception false, and gave an entirely misleading impression to the public both of the extent of official interception and of the targets against which interception is directed.’
Clarke was either misled or misleading, and Lord Bingham was evidently looking in the wrong places. In his 2002 memoir, Inspector Ken Wharfe stated that the internal security services (i.e. MI5) had mounted an ‘investigation which had identified all those involved [in Squidgygate], but for legal reasons I cannot expand further, and nor is it necessary to do so.’(11)Since no public prosecution has taken place for the crim-inal interception of telecommunications in the case of Squidgygate (compare the fate meted out in January 2007 to The News of the World’s Clive Goodman), we may safely infer that the culprits were indeed rogue members of the secret state. Yet Paget’s only reference to ‘Squidgygate’ is a single line on P120: ‘There is substantive evidence from the broadcast of her personal telephone conversations with, for example, James Gilbey, to show that conversations had been recorded.’
MI5 was not called upon by Paget to explain how its agents came to be persecuting the Princess of Wales and neither Clarke nor Bingham was asked to explain how they had come to get it so wrong, or offer explanations for their false statements to Parliament and public.
To this extent, by not sufficiently documenting a proven case of espionage against the late Princess, when its remit specifically included claims of surveillance mounted by the intelligence agencies against the late Princess, Operation Paget may be regarded as perpetrating a cover-up of a cover-up.
Into the tunnel
Paget provides evidence that can only be held as supportive of the presence in the tunnel of a ‘small dark car’ ahead of the Mercedes, and a motorcyle (with pillion passenger) which was on the scene before all the pursuing paparazzi and which left without stopping. Bled out of Paget are witness claims recorded in 1997 by Sancton and MacLeod that in the tunnel, ‘the Mercedes hit the first vehicle [the small dark car] that preceded it and after that lost control and crashed into the pillar…….The vehicle accelerated at the moment of the loss of control of the Mercedes. I then saw it take off and when I pulled level with the Mercedes, [the other car] was already far away.’ (emphasis added)(12)
If this is the case, it would have been a separate impact from the one with the infamous white Fiat Uno, which was determined as having occurred approximately five metres outside the tunnel mouth.
The white Fiat Uno is now popularly supposed to have been driven by a Vietnamese immigrant, Le Van Thanh. He indisputably owned a white Fiat Uno that was involved in some kind of crash on the night of 30-31 August and which was surreptitiously repaired and resprayed red. One serious discrepancy is that the witnesses to the Uno leaving the tunnel accurately describe Le’s vehicle (right down to the dog in the back seat) but got a good look at the driver and described him as a European male aged approximately 50, with short-cut brown hair. Le Van Than is conspicuously Asian, was 22 years old at the time of the crash and had (and has) a thick mop of jet-black hair. A further anomaly is that the Uno witnesses did not hear the sound of an impact behind them, did not hear the blaring of the Mercedes’s jammed horn, and described pedestrians around the tunnel exit as behaving normally (see Gary Hunter, below). One possibility would therefore be that the Uno witnesses’ sighting happened slightly before the Mercedes crash. However, all this is academic since Le Van Thanh is not mentioned once in the entire Paget report and will apparently not be attending the inquest.(13)
Where did the small dark car go, if it existed?
At 12.25am that night, Gary Hunter (now deceased) was in a hotel room on the Rue Jean Goujon, just around the corner from the Alma tunnel. He ‘heard an “almighty crash” followed immediately by the sound of skidding tyres and then immediately a further very loud crash.’ Jumping out of bed he looked out of the window and saw the kerbside commotion around the tunnel mouth following the crash. Around one minute later, he heard car brakes ‘screeching’ at the bottom of the road and saw a small dark vehicle, which had ‘completed its turn’ into Rue Jean Goujon, ‘……. immediately followed by a larger white vehicle, which he thought might have been a Mercedes’, both travelling at ‘inordinate speed’. (P494) Later, he told reporters: ‘My initial reaction was “here are people in a hurry to get away from that particular spot.” ’ (P496)
Paget concludes:
‘Other than the manner of driving close together there was no evidence to suggest that the two vehicles were travelling together in a co-ordinated way’ [P498]
and
‘There is no evidence to connect what Gary Hunter saw with what happened in the Alma underpass. (P503)… It is not possible with any degree of certainty to give a full description of all of the vehicles that did not stop. This is an extremely common occurrence in collisions where some vehicles do not stop; and others even unconnected with the crash, do so. A further complicating factor is that many eyewitnesses give honestly held conflicting accounts.’ (P501)
The car
Parts of the Mercedes were unavilable for testing by Paget, having been destroyed while in storage in Paris. The car’s front right door, an offside hubcap, an interior sill and several paint samples taken fom the car and the tunnel were all destroyed in an unexplained fire that occurred in a secure storeroom of the Palais de Justice on 26 May 1999. The car’s front right wing was destroyed under orders from a French Judge on 17 June 2003, since no further use was foreseen for it. Pressed about this destruction of evidence, a Scotland Yard spokesman said: ‘We refuse to discuss it. That’s not even not confirming or denying. We don’t want to talk about it.’(14)
Paget contains no reference to this missing evidence. If parts of the car were unexpectedly rendered unusable by fire, other parts of its mechanisms suffered from quite the opposite problem.
‘The sampling of brake fluid by the French investigators revealed contamination by moisture. This had resulted partly from prolonged exposure of the fluid to air prior to their sampling and partly from exposure to damp items during collection. David Price’s examination confirmed the presence of moisture in the sample, but he did not consider it likely to have affected the braking ability of the car in the circumstances pertaining to the crash.’ P422
This is Paget’s gloss on the fact that the Mercedes’ brake fluid was found to contain 7.5 per cent water.
No evidence is given that might support Paget’s claim of post-crash contamination and the period of time over which the supposed contamination occurred is not specified (for comparison, paint samples and speedometer readings were safely in the hands of the French investigation by 1 September 1997). Such a level of dilution would have had significant effects on the performance of the Mercedes: a level of just three per cent water contamination can result in compressible steam bubbles forming in the brake fluid, preventing hydraulic action from activating the brakes. Moreover, as every careful motorist knows, water accumulates naturally in brake fluid over time, often reaching two per cent by volume within one year. Levels of seven or eight percent would typically be seen after many years of uninterrupted service and we are able to put a ‘start’ date on this accumulative process because Diana’s Mercedes had been totally rebuilt that May after having been hijacked at gunpoint in April 1997 and stripped of its electronics.
On the same page [P422] we learn that another chauffeur had had problems with the Mercedes: ‘The chauffeur, Olivier Lafaye, had reported that the brake warning light on that car came on intermittently.’ Paget does not mention is that Lafaye had also reported the rear of the car ‘slewing out’ unexpectedly, a feature that would certainly be dangerous at high speeds.(15)
Henri Paul
One particularly shocking finding which is not expanded upon at all by Paget concerns the (non) treatment of Henri Paul’s corpse, a set of circumstances that – at the very least – can only leave the drunk-driver theory very badly weakened and that possibly renders it wholly untenable.
‘[N]ormally, when a body arrived at the IML [Institut Médico-Légal, i.e., the Paris morgue] it was dealt with by the “Identificateur”, i.e. measured, weighed and tagged. It would then be placed in a refrigerator to await examination by the pathologist. In this case however, because it was a Sunday and autopsies are not normally performed on a Sunday, the only bodies not in the fridges were those of Henri Paul and Dodi Al Fayed.’ [P284]
August 1997 was one of the hottest months on record in Paris until the deadly heatwave of 2003, weather conditions that were extended across England, where the hot sticky Saturday night meant that many people were still awake and watching television when Diana’s crash was announced.
Elsewhere [P283], we learn that: ‘The post mortem examination was conducted at eight o’clock in the morning on 31 August 1997, in other words, a few hours after the accident.’
Paget does not connect these particular statements but those seven and a half hours constitute just under a third of an entire day in which Paul’s still-warm corpse was left to begin decomposing in an unrefrigerated room at the height of summer.
This creates a hair-raising problem because blood notoriously ferments after death, producing alcohol which cannot be distinguished from ingested alcohol (although it can be inferred from glucose levels, which Paget never attempted). This posthumously-fermented alcohol – which is produced even faster in the presence of pre-ingested alcohol – will quickly spread throughout the corpse, relying on osmosis via body water and tending towards an even distribution, thus rendering useless attempts to take comparison readings from (for example) eyefluid.
While Paul’s blood was beginning to ferment, a second process was occurring – clotting. It is normal procedure to administer an anti-coagulant to posthumous blood samples to ‘fix’ the distribution of exogenous chemicals. Blood plasma makes up 55 per cent of blood volume (the rest being composed of red and white cells and platelets) and, crucially, is 95 per cent water. Because alcohol is soluble in water, plasma in a blood sample will contain a higher percentage of ingested alcohol than the blood sample considered as a whole. The long and the short of this is that the blood-alcohol concentration reading obtained from clotted blood will always register significantly higher than the original pre-clotting level. In the case of Henri Paul’s corpse, then, we see a candidate for post-humous fermentation coupled with an inevitably clotted sample.
The normal processes of clotting and decomposition provide a more than plausible explanation for the fact that a man who had provably drunk only two glasses of heavily-diluted Ricard in the hours before his death, the next day tested three times over the French drink-drive limit. Despite finding no confirmation for Stephan’s claim of ‘chronic alcoholism’, Paget does not even consider these forensic commonplaces.
The pointless ‘controversy’ over whether or not it was Henri Paul’s blood at all is however ‘resolved’ by the heavy-handed magic of DNA testing: the French pathologists in 1997 took several sets of samples (including blood, urine, hair and eye fluid), some of these procedures being photographed, and the samples were all clearly tied to Henri Paul by the presence of medicines that he was known to have been taking. Quite why there was ever any debate over the provenance of these samples is something only Mr Fayed can explain, as is his contention that the decidely non-lethal carbon monoxide (CO) level found in the blood was because Henri Paul’s sample had been switched with a sample from a suicide victim who had used car exhaust fumes.
That said, Paget does not adequately explain the presence of the CO itself. Detailed examination of this matter is important because CO displaces blood oxygen and forms carboxy-haemoglobin (COHb), increasing levels of which which lead to increasing dizziness, disorientation, loss of muscular control, and eventually (at 50-60 per cent) blackouts and death. COHb also has a ‘half-life’ of around 320 minutes, because it has an affinity of haemoglobin some 200 to 300 times greater than oxygen itself. This means that CO is so much more ‘sticky’ than oxygen, when introduced into the blood system, that it will take an average of five hours and twenty minutes before the level of COHb in the blood will have halved, as the body gradually expels it through breathing (assuming, that is, that no more CO is introduced during this time). If the COHb in M Paul’s blood was residual from a pre-death exposure to CO, then the question of poisoning – accidental or deliberate – inevitably arises.
Henri Paul’s levels were 12.8% in blood from the femoral vein and 20.7% in blood obtained from the thorax (previously referred to as heart blood due to laboratory mislabelling – Henri Paul’s ruptured heart had emptied into the chest cavity)
Having disposed of the theory that Henri Paul had inhaled CO from the explosion of the Mercedes’s airbags (an interesting theory, given that M. Paul is meant to have died instantly from a broken neck), Paget’s retained consultant moves to explain the blood-CO as a by-product of smoking:
‘Whilst figures of up 15% for the concentration of carboxy-haemoglobin in smokers have been quoted, a more generally acceptable figure is that only about 2.5% of smokers have carboxyhaemoglobin concen-trations in blood of greater than 12%. That is to say 1 smoker in 40 might have a carboxyhaemoglobin concentration of greater than 12%.’(P323)
Nevertheless, he adds:
‘I accept that a concentration of carboxy-haemoglobin of the order of 12% could be found in the blood of a very heavy smoker but, in general, lower concentrations of carboxyhaemoglobin tend to be found in smokers’ blood.’
Here, Paget performs one of its best squirms.
‘[…A] carboxyhaemoglobin concentration of around 12% is higher than I would usually expect to find in the majority of deceased persons even if they had been heavy smokers. Consequently, I believe that there is a real possibility that the results obtained on the femoral sample may be higher than the carboxy-haemoglobin concentration that was actually present in the femoral vein at the time of death.’
Paget’s position is that both COHb readings are too high: the chest-blood reading is unreliable because it was contaminated on death (by COHb-rich bone marrow, although no marrow samples were analysed). On the other hand, the uncontaminated femoral blood reading is too high because it had somehow inexplicably accumulated CO in between M. Paul’s death and the samples being drawn.
Paget quotes Fayed’s retained experts who stated:
‘The cardiac blood sample was taken on 31 August 1997 whereas the femoral vein sample was taken on the 4 September 1997 (four days later). It is not surprising therefore that it shows a level of 12.8% as one would expect such a reduction over this period of time from a level of approximately 20% down to approximately 12%.’
This would be in accordance with natural loss in high temperatures.
Paget’s dismissal is a masterpiece of surrealism: ‘It was clear at this time, i.e. November 1998, the three professors still believed the blood samples on 31 August 1997 were taken from the heart, i.e. cardiac blood – ‘Sang Cardiaque’ – and were not aware that the sample was chest cavity blood. Their points are therefore naturally based on this premise.’
Henri Paul’s whereabouts in the hours before the crash remain unknown and there is no final explanation for the money found on his body (P199 et seq).
Notes
- Online (PDF format) at <http://tinyurl.com/2wly33>
- Full text reproduced at <http://tinyurl.com/6adz3>
- Despite the general rubbishing of former SIS officer Richard Tomlinson and his allegations about an SIS proposal to assassinate Milosevich, the SIS officer he named did indeed recall that he had proposed the assassination of an unnamed Balkan politician and that the document recording this proposal had been destroyed. Not that you’d know this from reading the media coverage.
- <http://tinyurl.com/2nbls9>
- <http://tinyurl.com/3x2khk>
- According to Jephson (p. 272), this epithet was current in the Royal Households as early as 1992. Patrick Jephson, Shadows of a Princess(London: HarperCollins, 2000).
- <http://tinyurl.com/2kgojd>
- The Sunday Times, 27 February 2000
- Jephson (see note 6) p. 371
- <http://tinyurl.com/336ln6>
- Inspector Ken Wharfe, Diana: Closely Guarded Secret, (London: Michael O’Mara, London, 2002), pp. 174-5
- Thomas Sancton and Scott MacLeod, Death of a Princess: An Investigation, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), p. 241
- <http://tinyurl.com/35y4wh>
- <http://tinyurl.com/g8vcn>
- Sancton and MacLeod (see note 12), p 193