A. Some two months ago, the Guardian revealed that the British Government was considering the introduction of a bill under which it would become illegal to claim that any individual is an officer or agent of either the Security Service (MI5) or of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). It was also made known that the publication of British Intelligence and Covert Action last year was considered provocative in this respect. The book contains an appendix listing a number of British officials who it is alleged have been/are involved in intelligence activity.
This memo deals with the allegations that the content of the book is inimical to national security by its naming of these officials.
B. Why name names?
Intelligence gathering and covert political operations are an integral part of current British foreign policy and both factors must therefore be taken into account in any analysis of this subject. We do not feel that there is any need to justify delving into the activities, structure etc. of MI6 any more than into any other part of the British foreign policy establishment. Our book was moreover thoroughly checked to ensure that it did not breach any existing legislation. The identification of MI6 personnel is simply part of the work examining that agency. More specifically, we wished to draw attention to the presence of many intelligence officers on the staff of British embassies. We also hope that the list will serve as a useful research tool for others concerned with the subject.
C. “You’re putting their lives at risk.”
The use of published sources to identify MI6 personnel is applicable only to those stationed in British embassies, under what is often known as ‘light’ cover. The term serves as a reminder that it is a simple task for the local counter-espionage outfit to determine which embassy staff are genuine diplomats. Nevertheless the embassy has several advantages over locations outside: access to embassy facilities (archives, communications etc), diplomatic immunity and natural opportunities to meet important locals. Embassy-based officials are supplemented by ‘deep cover’ personnel who live as ordinary private citizens in the target country with backgrounds which should enable them to withstand thorough investigation. For operational purposes, the identities of ‘deep cover’ officers are vital secrets, but those of embassy-based personnel are of little security consequence. The level of anonymity is traded with the advantages of accompanying diplomatic status.
For those who serve or who have served under ‘light’ cover it scarcely matters how many people are aware of their true identity. There is not a single case of a British intelligence officer having been victim of an assassination attempt as a result of his or her name having been published. Proponents of the bill cite the cases of Welch and Kinsman, CIA officers who were attacked allegedly as a result of their identities being printed in American magazines; the evidence to support this allegation is, in our view, extremely flimsy.
The bill, if passed in its proposed form, will not afford intelligence officers any greater protection than they have already: writers and journalists are an irrelevant threat compared to some of those whom they encounter in the course of their work – why else do they receive weapons training? The purpose of this proposed bill should be recognised for what it is: to draw a further veil over those areas of governmental activity which most urgently require investigation.