Brice is right?
An ‘immoral’ government has undermined human rights in Northern Ireland and is threatening to do the same across the rest of the United Kingdom, argued Professor Brice Dickson, the then Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,([1]) in an interview with ePolitix.com to mark Human Rights Day last December.([2])He claimed that ministers are set to prevent ‘the real truth’ about collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries from emerging and also accused them of using the powers of his Commission as a bargaining chip with which to extract further concessions from Republicans. He was particularly critical of the Inquiries Bill([3]) which he felt would allow ‘….ministers to prevent any tribunal of inquiry that is set up from hearing important information relevant to the handling of informers. That has the potential to completely undermine the effectiveness of any investigation.’
Scott free
Mark Phythian, Professor of International Security and Director of the History and Governance Research Institute, University of Wolverhampton, compares and contrasts the Scott and Hutton inquiries, the resulting reports ([4]) which
‘…[bookended] the process whereby the British government moved from supporting Saddam, while seeking to keep the extent of this support from the British public, to preparing for a war to remove Saddam which was opposed by considerable sections of it.’
He argues that whereas Scott extended his terms of reference to include more of the political background of the inquiry, Hutton stuck more rigidly to his instructions, claiming that key issues (the 45 minute claim, for example) were beyond the scope of his inquiry. One other crucial difference. ‘The Scott inquiry was largely focused on ministerial and departmental decision-making and interaction. The focus of the Hutton inquiry was on decisions taken by small groups of unelected officials…’.
Mark Phythian, ‘Hutton and Scott: a tale of two inquiries’. Parliamentary Affairs, 58(1), 2005, pp. 124-137
Forward planning
Blair’s pre-election protestations about there being no long term plan to invade Iraq have been roundly contradicted by the media over here.([5]) The following snippets also cast doubt on his claims. In a recent interview film director David O. Russell recalled his meeting with George W. Bush during post-production on one of Hollywood’s more subversive mainstream productions, Three Kings (a critical look at the US military mentality during the first Gulf War). ([6])
‘Terry Semel was running Warner Bros. and had [Bush] over in the summer of ’99. He hadn’t even gotten the [presidential] nomination yet. I was invited to meet him with a small group of people. I told him, “I’m editing a movie right now that questions your father’s legacy in Iraq.” And his face for a moment was like, What the f*** is this? And then he immediately said, “Well, then, I guess I’m gonna have to go back and finish the job.” I guess they had been planning this for a long time, he and his cronies.’ ([7])
Less than a year later Bush was expressing similar views. In May 1980 Osama Siblani (publisher of The Arab American newspaper) was present at a meeting where Bush (still to become the Republican Presidential nominee) claimed that
‘…he was going to take him out, when we talked about Saddam Hussein in Iraq…But at that time…..the Democrats had occupied the White House for the previous eight years. So he was not privy to any intelligence whatsoever…he didn’t know what kind of situation the weapons of mass destruction was at that time.’ ([8])
About Open Government
The first issue of About Open Government: a Journal on Freedom of Information, has just appeared. Funded by the School of Business Information at Liverpool John Moores University, it is a peer reviewed journal publishing research and communications relating to Freedom of Information legislation from the perspective of academics, practitioners and users. As you would expect it’s run under open access principles and is freely available over the Web.
Further details at <www.opengovjournal.org>
The Plot that never was?
George Smith (a protein chemist and Senior Fellow at the Virginia-based think tank GlobalSecurity.Org) ([9]) offers a harsh critique of the combination of the ‘sheer incompetence’, ‘specious intelligence’ and ‘bureaucratic bungling’ that culminated in the collapse of the Wood Green terrorists trial in April.([10]) As Smith points out ‘there was no UK poison cell…..There was no ricin with which to poison London, only notes and 22 castor seeds. There was no one who even knew how to purify ricin.’
Smith acknowledges the assistance of Duncan Campbell ‘…expert witness and scientist for the defence in the trial’ in compiling his report. However, Campbell’s own account of the ‘ricin plot’ (‘The Ricin ring that never was…’) published in The Guardian on 13 April at time of writing no longer appeared on that newspaper’s website. Commentators on the media-watch discussion group (<http://lists.stir.ac.uk/mailman/listinfo/media-watch>) suspect the imposition of a D Notice. Whether or not this is the case, at the time of writing the article could still be viewed at <www.globalecho.org/ view_article.php?aid=3697>.
George Smith, ‘UK terror trial finds no terror…’, National Security Notes 11 April 2005. (Available at </www.global security.org/org/nsn/nsn-050411.htm>)
PSC plc
Further news on the boom in ‘private security companies’ or PSCs as they are sometimes referred to; or to use older terminology mercenaries. ArmorGroup International plc (formerly known as DSL Defence Systems Limited) was successfully listed on the London Stock Exchange in December, describing itself as ‘…a leading international provider of defensive protective security services…’. Clients include ‘….first world national governments, major international inter-governmental organisations and multinational corporations’. Geographically it ‘…..operates principally in regions of the world with diminished law and order or with a high risk of terrorism or which were former areas of conflict………’ Ever optimistic, ‘The Directors ([11]) believe that current world-wide security issues and risks will continue to provide the Group with significant opportunities to expand its client base, geographic reach and activity levels’. More information on ArmorGroup’s website <www.armorgroup.com>.
Peter Oborne takes a more critical view,([12])commenting that the company’s flotation:
‘….is a sign that the mercenaries now wish to be viewed as professionals like accountants and solicitors……Academically subnormal Old Etonians, who might once have looked forward to blameless careers as estate agents, are today pressed into profitable service as security operatives. A generation ago retiring army officers could look forward to lives of genteel poverty as public school bursars or land agents. Now they make fortunes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The huge packages earned by ex-British army mercenaries irritate more conventional colleagues, who claim that it is often the dimmest and most hopeless officers who have made the most money.’
Mission Impossible
Douglas Little provides a detailed and well referenced account of US clandestine activities in the Middle East, including Operation Ajax, the CIA’s code name for its covert removal of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an event so successful that it was said to have inspired similar actions in Guatemala, Indonesia and Tibet.([13])
Less successful, however, were some of the CIA’s other Middle East enterprises. Plans to install a pro-western government in Syria were thwarted; it failed in its efforts to preserve Egyptian Present Sadat (considered to be a friend of the West) from the hands of assassins; and it was forced to abort a destabilisation operation in South Yemen.
The Suez Crisis is also discussed, with Little arguing that the post-Suez falling out between the US and Britain was due in part to misunderstandings about covert action. The US favoured
‘[bringing down] Nasser…. gradually with the help of the CIA and MI6, while Eden, Lloyd, and Macmillan preferred to proceed more swiftly with the help of the Israeli army and the Royal Navy.’
Douglas Little, ‘Mission impossible: the CIA and the cult of covert action in the Middle East’, Diplomatic History 28 (5), (November 2004) pp. 683-701.
Notes
[1] His term of office came to an end in February. At the time of writing the Northern Ireland Office has yet to appoint a replacement.
[2] The full interview is available here: <www.epolitix.com/EN/ Interviews/200412/1433a3a0-a9b7-421e-a30b-e2ff3bf10de3.htm>
[3] Now the Inquiries Act 2005, it received Royal Assent on 7 April 2005, days before Parliament was dissolved. The full text can be read here: <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050012.htm>
[4] Report of the inquiry into the export of defence equipment and dual-use goods to Iraq and related prosecutions… (London: HMSO, 1996); Report of the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G…. (London: HMSO, 2004) <www.the-hutton-inquiry.org. uk/content/report/index.htm>
[5] See for example: Raymond Whitaker, ‘Evidence reveals Blair’s true intention for war’, Independent on Sunday, 1 May 2005; David Hughes, ‘Premier’s secret council of war’, Daily Mail, 2 May 2005; Richard Norton-Taylor and Patrick Wintour, ‘Papers reveal commitment to war: Iraq secret documents indicate Blair support for military action a year before invasion took place’, The Guardian, 2 May 2005.
[6] For an account of what usually happens see David L. Robb, Operation Hollywood: how the Pentagon shapes and censors the movies (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004)
[7] Gavin Smith, ‘Hearts & minds’, Film Comment 40 (5), September-October 2004, pp. 28-33.
[8] ‘Arab American publisher says Bush told him in May 2000 he planned to “take out” Iraq’. <www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/03/11/1449253>
[9] GlobalSecurity.org seeks ‘…to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and the risk of their use….. and to reduce the worldwide incidence of deadly conflict. The organization is working to improve the capabilities of the American intelligence community to respond to new and emerging threats, reducing the need to resort to the use of force, while enhancing the effectiveness of military forces when needed. GlobalSecurity.org also supports new initiatives utilizing space technology to enhance international peace and security.’
[10] Andrew Gilligan (admittedly not an unbiased source these days) had a good go at Newsnight’s coverage of the trial (‘Ricin certainties’ The Spectator 23 April 2005).’…..the story of this particular plot, at least, is the exact opposite of that told by the media: if anything, a rather reassuring picture of amateurishness, isolation and incompetence, a success for effective police work but a serious failure of journalism. Have we learnt nothing from the experience of Iraq? Can’t we recognise an agenda when we see one? The authorities may tell few direct lies in cases like these, but they are very good at pointing journalists in the wrong direction, then letting us charge off down the path under our own steam. That is exactly what appears to have happened here.’ Another broadcaster, Adam Curtis, criticised media exaggeration of terrorist threats in general and coverage of the ricin trial in particular when he collected a Bafta award for his documentary The Power of Nightmares. His remarks were nowhere to be seen or heard when BBC1 broadcast highlights of the ceremony later that evening. (Anon., ‘Row as BBC cuts Bafta speech’, The Guardian 18 April 2005)
[11] These include former Tory Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary, Sir Malcolm Rifkind (non executive Chairman); ex-CIA operative, Jerry Hoffman (Chief Executive Officer); and former SAS officer, Noel Philip (Chief Operating Officer). The company also recently appointed Stephen Kappes (former Director of Operations with the CIA) as Executive Vice President Global Strategy.
[12] Peter Oborne, ‘Making a killing’, The Spectator, 11 December 2004, pp. 22-23.
[13] According to Little this event also inspired the TV series Mission: Impossible (1966-1973), with one episode being a fictionalised account of Operation Ajax itself.