When falsehoods are bared, we have to be alert to those that will take their place as well as the ones that remain concealed.(1) At the time of writing (October 2004), the deluge of media coverage on the false justifications for the Iraq war – now understandably giving way to greater anxieties about the well-being of British troops – has led to widespread public recognition of intelligence failure, without balanced apportionment of blame. This has served to obfuscate one of the real problems: over the years ‘intelligence’ has come to be defined by separate ‘products’ such as weapons inspection, which have a predetermined objective, when ‘good’ espionage can be exclusive, but is holistic, never singular.
Other obfuscation includes the threat to government, including spooks, posed by ‘do-it-yourself’ diplomacy and/or justice: e.g. the campaigns mounted by Ken Bigley’s family, prior to his execution in Iraq, to secure his release; or that of hotelier John Ward following the murder of his daughter Julie in Kenya. These personal tragedies have been presented in a vacuum, when the reality is that the campaigns organised by the families, and the conflicts of interests exposed, are examples of a trend.(2)
‘The 52’
There are two more important obfuscations. The first is lack of media follow-up on the impact the open letter from retired British diplomats, ‘The 52’, (see last Lobster) had on Whitehall when they set various worlds in conflict vis-à-vis Britain’s policy in the Middle East. Attempts to embarrass ‘The 52’ because some were commercially or otherwise conflicted – as were their Atlanticist critics – did not diminish their expression of overwhelming concern for British interests in the area and beyond, as well as the lives of all. Despite their best efforts, their heirs will have to start from scratch in the Middle East, since what I can only describe as the cumulative caress of decades – a mutual Anglo-Arab love affair – has been smashed along with the towns and cities of two ancient and once glorious lands
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Europe
Implicit, and licking at the edges of ‘The 52’, is the second obfuscation: anxiety about the ongoing destruction, without constitutional evaluation, far less approval, of this country’s one-time independent, non-polarised and reasonably politically neutral civil service. This, for the most part, has served us well, including acting as a check on a prime minister’s otherwise presidential powers. An example of polarisation was engagement in Iraq; and of politicisation, although this is denied, the appointment of John Scarlett as head of SIS.
With the latter, it is not merely the personalities, nor SIS’s future, that are important, although they are, but the wider issue: i.e. the decisions being taken, without reference to the British people, that presuppose Britain is best administered by a politicised, polarised – or, in some cases, but not in that of Mr Scarlett – commercial, mandarin class.(3) This brings me to parallel constitutional developments which are independent of ‘The 52’s’ work but into which it nevertheless unravels: one of the reasons why politicisation/polarisation/commercialisation of the civil service is accelerating – driven by unchecked prime ministerial but not (yet) presidential powers – is because both are preparing for a European constitution and all this implies.(4)
One of the departments of state in a position to explain ‘Europe’ and attendant issues – since the judiciary cannot or will not – is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It cannot do so for a number of reasons, including the fact it is pro-Europe – whether or not its representatives fall into the pro or anti-Atlanticist camps – and even though the issue has marginalised it and the Foreign Secretary. This has collapsed what was once a major department of state: FCO weakness is one of the reasons why ‘The 52’ wrote their letter so many months after Iraq’s illegal invasion, even though some of their serving colleagues, including some spooks, lobbied strongly at the appropriate time, albeit in vain, to prevent it.(5)
The snub, if it is not addressed, may have put into play the endgame of traditional Whitehall hegemony when the only two departments that currently matter – the Treasury and the Prime Minister’s Office – are rival courts. Within the FCO – historically adept at sleeping with rival courts simultaneously – external and internal ‘battles’ are now in progress. (It is not necessarily the case, incidentally, that Mr Scarlett will be a successful ‘courtesan’ at both: the day of ‘the courtier’ is over.)
FCO goals are likely to include: a) restoration of the FCO, irrespective of the standing of its foreign secretary, as a major department of state; b) reestablishing Britain’s independent foreign policy including, where necessary, distancing itself from America or Europe; c) achieving stalemate between its pro and anti-Atlanticist wings; d) resolving conflicting cultural positions such as commercial/military pragmatism versus human rights/social justice; and e) working out where it stands in respect of SIS. If the first three are accomplished, much of the credit will rest with ‘The 52’ whose open letter six months ago laid bare the terms of engagement. However, the ‘winning’, if it happens, will not necessarily resolve the position of SIS, not least because parts of the FCO, including some of those backing ‘The 52’, despise it. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that, whether or not the FCO reasserts its independence, decisions may be taken on SIS’s immediate future within an Atlantic-Europe straightjacket, and the resulting limitations may not serve British interests, not least because that which is polarised is selective. Effective intelligence is never so fastidious.(6)
Few, including this author, will weep for SIS’s humiliation.(7) However, to use the intelligence failures exposed by the illegal invasion of Iraq, as the excuse for its trashing is a travesty.
Some spook definitions
First some spook definitions: ‘Intelligence’ is knowing, for example, that this country’s head of state has a daughter named Anne. ‘Analysis’ is understanding why this is not spelt ‘Ann’: the Queen is Head of the Anglican, not Roman, church. To offer the ‘product’, the analyst does not need to be a specialist in bells and smells or the split from Rome. (A criticism of SIS is that some of its staff are over-specialised.) S/he does have to have a cultural knowledge of Britain.(8) This does not require an Oxbridge degree (another criticism of SIS). Of far more consequence, s/he requires the common sense to know that although the information is correct, it has no importance to the majority and is irrelevant except in specific circumstances.
However, those with a predetermined objective could ignore the analysts’ common sense, and instruct the spooks to come up with the evidence to support it and/or make it relevant. In this instance, ‘espionage’ could then be described as wasting time ascertaining whether the Princess Royal could ever be persuaded to spell her first name without an ‘e’ and under what circumstances; ‘special operations’ could be about facilitating those circumstances, if any; ‘public relations’ could be seeking to persuade the public such circumstances had arisen even though this would be a lie; ‘propaganda’ could be telling the public how to think. (Although both can be used concurrently, normally PR is used when there is sufficient time for persuasion to work; propaganda when there is none. In either case, the truth is immaterial.)
Something similar is what seems to have happened to SIS vis-à-vis Iraq. Because there was a predetermined objective to invade, the intelligence ‘product’ favoured by government was not completion of weapons inspection, nor societal knowledge, but WMD information with its caveats removed, accompanied by some good military intelligence: e.g. having detailed street plans of all Iraqi cities, down to the colour of individual front doors, as well as some equally good contacts with some then serving Ba’th officers. Meantime, government launched a PR and propaganda campaign telling the public that Saddam Hussein was a threat to Britain.
However, like all singular products, the military intelligence became irrelevant once the immediate objective had been achieved. Greeted in Iraq, particularly following the breakdown of law and order, with hostility rather than welcome, government scapegoated the spooks for providing the singular product they had been instructed to provide, when spook and non-spook Arab specialists alike had warned of what would happen. In turn, some spooks – although I understand this applies to the CIA rather than to the SIS – blamed their exiled ‘kings-in-waiting’ for supplying information that, not surprisingly, advanced the latter’s singular objective: to replace Saddam Hussein as President.
SIS under new management
Under new management, a battered SIS is now being forced into ‘co-ordination’ (sometimes confused with ‘consolidation’, which may also be happening) which has the laudable intention of eradicating ‘lack of communication or turf wars of any kind’.(9) As has been acknowledged over Iraq and WMD, this can result in national/cross-national group-think. Moreover relationships riddled with mutual instrumentality – including, incidentally, those between spooks and their agents – lead to a banality of understanding anyway.
It is easy to see the ‘management accountant’ model in use: nationally, SIS and, say, the Security Services, are ‘servicing’ the different ends of a global ‘account’, as are their ‘foreign’ allies from their different foci, and all face similar trends and challenges. Since local variations in culture often require tailored solutions, it makes sense, so the theory goes, for them all to ‘coordinate’. It is also cheaper for taxpayers. This process, however, gives weight to necessarily predetermined objectives – e.g. acquiring information to protect the citizen from terrorism – but none to ‘pure’ general intelligence which can only be acquired without objectives. It also locks SIS into a policing ‘profile’, when its ‘brand image’ was its political, economic and persuasive expertise.(10)
The impetus towards coordination with ‘foreign’ allies has grown because, unsurprisingly, the spooks cannot guarantee consistency in their officers, agents, sources and associate partners world-wide (11) Therefore, the world is being divvied-up among confreres including, say, the CIA in South America, Mossad, or today’s equivalent of the KGB, with each taking, in PR jargon, ‘lead agency status’ in their own areas.
‘Coordination’ will, of course, unravel. It always does. CIA imperatives, much like President Putin’s, do not serve British interests, including moral objectives, any more than Mossad’s do. (The last of these could be the reason why Prime Minister Blair has linked his name to ‘saving’ Africa. Previously it was Palestine.)
The ‘benefits’ of torture
Meantime, Chief Scarlett is presented to the public as an expert in agent running and recruitment: i.e. the PR ‘legend’ being created is that his ‘strategy’ will be to put the demands of intelligence, rather than what can be done technically, first.(12) This vital skill, however, is a tactic, not a strategy. No matter how well-intentioned, it will be results-driven, devaluing the service by commodifying the product – i.e. a repeat of existing error – demanding its value be quantified and delivered within set timeframes so that taxpayers see a return on their investment.(13)
This ‘return’ will not be judged in isolation but positioned squarely alongside other agencies into which it feeds, or is fed by. This, as we have already seen, can result in disgraceful spook participation/acceptance of, for example, information obtained through torture in prisons world-wide, because torture is ‘cheap’ in the short-term, no matter how ‘expensive’ it is in the medium to longer term. (A prisoner went on to lead South Africa. It is not necessarily the case that someone held in, say, Abu Ghraib, who also goes on to influence or head his/her country will have former President Mandela’s ability to forgive his gaolers.)
Which brings me back to the need for the acquisition of non-objectivised intelligence (information for the sake of information) which SIS, at one time, was good at providing. (The same argument is being made about the need for education for the sake of education rather than today’s singular emphasis on ‘skills’ to yoke the citizen solely to the economic needs of the nation.) One of the reasons why SIS may have found ‘proving’ the case for general intelligence difficult, is because providing it can be expensive. not least because it may offer no obvious or immediate return. Additionally, it means admitting what everybody knows: although some of SIS’s work requires specific skills, and although some of it is incredibly dangerous, part of its brief is about being, not doing, observing not participating: i.e. espionage can be a fantastic career for lazy people. (So can one in the Foreign Office.)
The rise of ‘do-it-yourself’ diplomacy
The taxpayer may have had greater sympathy for this truth had not a wholly separate – and accurate – SIS/FO profile become mainstream. This reached maturity when the Lockerbie families mounted an international campaign to secure justice for their dead loved ones, which established the DIY trend subsequently followed by, for example, Julie Ward’s father, or Ken Bigley’s family. However, an earlier example pointed the way: the 1980s battle of Helen Smiths father, a retired policeman, to prove that his daughter, a nurse, was murdered in Saudi Arabia. This pitched him against spook, MOD and FO officials alike – along with the British class system – who perceived state and private sector interests to be best served by cynical cover-up of a heinous crime.
Concurrent with the DIY, has been growing, sophisticated, public awareness of the inherent conflicts of interests and countless hypocrisies within the system: e.g. government’s pretence that it does not negotiate with kidnappers, when kidnap and ransom (K&R) is insured at Lloyds of London, and K&R negotiation is a recognised commercial product offered by some British companies.(14) Exposure of such deceits has assisted some of the public to make the final jump – dreaded by all PRs – into other ‘associations’, such as, for example, recognising that although the government’s position is that it does not negotiate with terrorists, it does with some, including financial ones.(15)
Spook recruitment
These developments have understandably obscured ‘good’ FCO/SIS work, such as in Libya or, before the American executive derailed the peace process, Palestine.(16) This means that the only view prospective SIS recruits may have – at a time when ‘good’ recruitment has national and international consequence – may be determined by a poverty of balanced judgement and an overemphasis of SIS’s anti-terrorism role. This could limit SIS’s ability to recruit skilled, altruistic, brave and patriotic agents and officers.
The latter, presumably British, who may wish to move between the public and private sectors during their working lives, could, additionally, be anxious about their transferable skills if they sign up to what is effectively an international police force. (‘Terrorism’ is an issue today. In ten years time, a candidate who ‘only’ has experience of this, or, say, conflict resolution, could find his/her ‘back’ career worthless in the national or international job market.) Their decision could be determined further by knowledge of untoward events in the lives of individuals which inadvertently provide other uninviting job description or specification.
Unrelated happenings include sudden death (Dr David Kelly); surprise resignation (SIS Director, Africa and Middle East, Mark Allen, because he could not get on with his new boss);(17) interference in the career of a non-spook diplomat (Britain’s former Ambassador to Uzbekistan); imprisonment (Simon Mann); and the suspension of senior personnel at Customs and Excise while allegations of perjury and perverting the course of justice are investigated.(18) As linkage and negative advertising goes, things could not get much worse.
Any attempt at SIS image-change may come unstuck. Its commercial associate BP ran a hugely expensive high profile soft focus advertising campaign seeking to rebrand the company as ‘Beyond Petroleum’. This imploded when BP’s chairman, ex-SIS Lord Browne, allied it to the anticipated spoils of Iraq’s illegal invasion.(19)
Iraq
While all this is going on, spooks and non-spook FCO diplomats live in jeopardy in some areas overseas, perhaps seeing their marriages and families collapse under the strain too. Additionally, those specialising in the Arab world recognise that unless their Whitehall colleagues can pull things back, their expertise and commitment to the Middle East will continue to be used by government as an instrument of betrayal anyway. FCO/SIS expertise in the area has, of course, always been about this, none more so than in Iraq. Some of ‘The 52’ know this better than anyone else: Iraqis were so aware that Britain was trying to swipe their oil that the Iraq Petroleum Company, known by its initials IPC, was affectionately turned into a spoken English word which sounded like ‘I pissee’.
However, the fair-minded will also accept that many British diplomats, civil servants and spooks have seen their careers, including in retirement, flounder, because of their loyalty to the Middle East. Many British politicians, from all parties, have been, and continue to be, equally loyal. These have eyes that bleed for, say, Basrah’s people and lost beauty; and heads that shake in disbelief that its musicians – because of fanatics – are now too frightened to play their instruments. Basrah without its musicians is like St James’s Park without its ducks.
By declaring themselves, ‘The 52’ have performed their last service to Britain and, so far as is possible, leeched the betrayal. As a result, they have done all they can to reposition their heirs and leave them untainted by the past. However, in Iraq, and through no fault of ‘The 52’, it is too late: in the late 1960s, the country’s currency was so strong that one Iraqi dinar was equivalent to four British pounds. Today, its break-up is a possibility, and its currency, which could have been an implement of unity, is worthless.
As bloody debacle reaches conclusion, there is an awful symmetry to all of this: colonial Britain bequeathed Iraq a superb civil service. Today, partially because of Iraq, Britain’s is imploding. How this shakes down will help define the British constitution, whether or not the citizen is gulled into voting for a European one, for many years to come. How things work out in Iraq is a different matter.
Notes
1 A speculative point: One concealment could have been exposed by the government’s announcement that it supported Turkey’s application for membership of the EU, September 2004. If it is accepted that Britain and America – which is also backing Turkey’s EU membership – have always wanted to cut Iraq off from its Arab neighbours, it could follow that the British government is working towards the restoration of the Baghdad Pact: i.e. it is seeking to link Iraq’s fate to that of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, all of which are predominantly Muslim but not Arab. If this is the case, it could do well to remember that the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are the warrior sisters of the Nile, not the Indus.
2 As a development, ‘DIY’ is an alternative ‘third way’ and natural, albeit inadvertent, development of Thatcherism.
3 Commercialisation describes not only those who move into the public sector from the private at senior rank, but also more junior personnel who do a ‘stage’ in the public sector before returning to the private. As importantly, it includes those who have spent whole-life careers in the civil service, who on retirement move into senior positions in globalised, not necessarily British, companies. This phenomenon is not evidence of private sector ‘creep’, as most people would have it, but a sort-of corrupt public sector reverse. Incidentally, too much is made of the public sector losing its younger talent to the private. Parts of the public sector are shedding bureaucratic image, and offering in addition good salaries, training, work-life balance and secure pensions. This could result in a reverse drain, particularly from the IT industry where management can be poor. (The Guardian, IT Recruitment, 7 October 2004)
4 By polarisation, I mean public servants who fall into two camps: pro or anti-Atlanticists, with some from both being pro-Europe. Patriots who refuse to fall into either category, who, additionally, may be Eurosceptic, are marginalised for self-serving, albeit different, reasons.
5 Under Mr Scarlett’s direction, a danger could be that, understandably focused on an immediate goal – defeating terrorism – SIS may be forced to relinquish another of its major roles: supporting the FCO in anticipating/preparing for, Britain’s medium to longer term requirements, which includes progressing relationships with Beijing. This is one reason why it was not necessarily in the country’s best interests for SIS’s leadership to pass to Mr Scarlett, rather than area specialist Sir Nigel Inkster. The former’s promotion – which will have done little for the morale of area case-officers or their agents – seems all the more surprising given the exciting possibilities, including for civil rights, that may emerge as China prepares for the 2008 Olympic Games.
6 It is noticeable that Britain’s commercial community, part of which has had good service from SIS, has neither been investigated nor spoken up publicly in SIS’s defence. Similarly, the global insurance industries, particularly those who own private security consultancies offering, apparently, area risk analysis – for which they charge their clients a fortune – have also kept quiet, leaving SIS to carry the can.
7 I assume SIS long recognised how vulnerable it was if a sizeable chunk of appointed, elected or executive government had the chance and will to unite against it.
8 It would also be useful if s/he spoke English. However, to extrapolate, it is daft for the spooks to be running around advertising for, say, Arabic speakers, without being specific a bit like asking for an English speaker, and getting an Australian, when you need an American. Moreover, people are snooty: waiters who speak Arabic are not the same as a surgeon who speaks it too, and neither would necessarily wish to be lumped together.
9 A quote from Dame Stella Rimington’s novel At Risk.
10 SIS’s profile is also damaged by increasingly mainstream information about its role in Northern Ireland and a military group attached to it called ‘The Increment’. This has shifted SIS’s image from ‘James Bond’ to that of ‘Terminator’. A speculative point illustrating why this could be an error is to use the example of Lt Colonel Teddy Tinling’s career: had he served with ‘The Increment’ he could have, say, set up a private security company, with all this may imply, when he retired, because he could have been conditioned for little else. Instead, he designed frilly knickers, dominated Wimbledon tennis fashion for three decades, and was an invaluable fixed intelligence point throughout the Cold War.
11 In the past, and in order to maintain credibility, SIS has had to pretend to be perfect in every region. As a result, rather than admit it is not strong in a particular area, it has favoured, say, containment, rather than resolution. This is one of the reasons – another was anxiety about the Chinese getting their hands on Iraq’s oil – why SIS favoured the despicable UN sanctions regime imposed for over a decade on Iraq. Had SIS had the pragmatism, if not the morality, to check out what happened to Gibraltar when Franco closed access links to Spain in 1969 – the border did not reopen until 1985 – it could have been offered a quasi case-study in far less draconian isolation.
The demonisation of China as a newly emerged oil guzzler is discriminatory because it is singular. There are other more legitimate criticisms to be made. It plays to traditional Chinese feelings of paranoia which may be counterproductive e.g. forcing it into alliances with historic adversaries such as Russia or India. The latter, which has a strong economy, and a far more competent civil service, is, I presume, similarly drinking up the oil. However, it does not attract the same opprobrium. This could be because Britain has underestimated India’s development, or because it feels that old ties will prevail. In which case, Britain may be naive.
12 Emphasising Mr Scarlett’s excellent agent care, Colonel Oleg Gordievsky described him with moving sincerity as ‘charming’ and ‘very sensitive to the dangerous problems I faced’. (Times Online, 7 May 2004.) However, Mr Scarlett is also the man who told Lord Justice Hutton that Dr David Kelly should have been subjected to a ‘security style interview’.
13 Some value-for-money issues are not explained to taxpayers. To use a Security Service, rather than SIS, example – and given that some pharmaceutical companies in the UK are threatening to withdraw new research investment unless action is taken against extremist animal rights activities – no financial breakdown is offered to citizens so that they may judge to what extent, if at all, they may be subsidising this particular public sector intelligence ‘product’, as well as the possible resulting diminution in private sector insurance costs, which could reasonably be expected to be born by shareholders. I accept that the private sector pays tax too. (The Times, 9 and 10 September 2004.)
14 An expression apparently catching like wildfire to describe terrorist conduct, including the beheading of hostages, is ‘Armed Propaganda’ (AP). This could backfire and seems vaery like a typically dated, crude attempt at ineffective Anglo-US mind control: ‘the Allies’ are equally adept at AP, albeit of a different type. ‘This Week’, BBC TV, 23 September 2004.
15 Financial Terrorists: An example could be those known collectively as the Russian oil oligarchs, whose corruption is responsible for as much destruction as the more ‘traditional’ sort. It is worth remembering that President Gorbachev, who tried to prevent the West from asset-stripping Russia, was toppled, in favour of the corrupt rule of President Yeltsin who presided over it.
16 It is a measure of FCO and SIS excellence that despite Italy’s long history with Libya, Britain still has substantial influence there. With the EU lifting sanctions on Libya, and Italy cosying up to the latter once more, it could be that the ‘old’ order in the Middle East is seeking to reestablish itself. For this reason, and in order to outmanoeuvre ‘old’ Europe, America could be interested in a new Baghdad Pact (see above).
17 Sunday Times 26 September 2004. Mark Allen’s resignation from SIS and acceptance of a job as an adviser with BP, throws up many issues including the poor example he may have set British troops in Iraq, who may lose life or limb serving The Crown, when they could join the private security companies and face the same risks for better pay.
18 The Guardian, September 30 2004.
19 The Security Service also has a steep learning curve vis-à-vis knowing how to project a ‘good’ image. Example of SS inexperience includes use of dated, dominant, in-your-face ‘head shot’ photographs of Dame Eliza Manningham Buller. Senior police chiefs, who have years of public relations experience, usually provide the press with half-body shots, taken in situ or at a desk. In so doing, the police chiefs retain their ‘dominance’ but present themselves more modestly. This has the dual role of diminishing personality cult, and promoting the organisation as a whole.