See note (1)
This article explores the three pro-European Union propaganda campaigns mounted to date: in 1962-63 to secure public support following Britain’s first application to join the EU; in 1970-71 to prepare the public for accession; and in 1974-75 to ensure continued EU membership in the 1975 Referendum.
For simplicity, the term European Union (EU), rather than Common Market, European Economic Community (EEC), or European Community (EC), will be used throughout this article to refer to the post-war project of European integration.
In the beginning
The post-war project of European integration began in 1951 when six states established the European Coal and Steel Community. It was followed by the creation of the EU in 1957. Britain, however, was not one of the original members. In the 1940s the British political elite, although supportive of European co-operation, opted to pursue an independent strategy by projecting Britain as a ‘Third Force’ between the Soviet Union and U.S.. By the 1950s, however, this strategy was perceived to be untenable and a new policy of ‘limited liability’, supporting a limited form of European integration without British participation, was adopted.(2) The 1948-56 policy of ‘limited liability’, changed between 1956 and 1960 from ‘partial engagement’, participation in a British-determined integration process, to ‘significant engagement’, participation as determined by the original members, and ultimately to a decision by Harold Macmillan’s Conservative Government to opt for membership. Having made the decision, Macmillan set about swinging the Conservative Party and the Commonwealth behind it. Between the autumn of 1961 and January 1963, a team under the leadership of Edward Heath negotiated the terms.
Public support for European unification, including Britain, stood at 78 per cent in 1954. By 1962, however, the situation had changed significantly with only 47 per cent in favour. In May 1962, a Gallup poll found that 53 per cent supported the government’s European policy. By June, this had fallen to just 36 per cent, prompting the Cabinet to decide that ‘public opinion was getting dangerously sceptical and needed correction’. (3)
The first campaign (1962-3): Macmillan’s application
The government enlisted the services of Sir Frank Lee, a civil servant who had played a pivotal role in influencing opinion in the Cabinet and Whitehall in favour of membership. Lee set about devising a propaganda campaign to ‘sell’ the concept of entry to the British public:
‘At the Treasury…Lee held the national purse strings. He controlled government expenditure. His responsibilities included budget and monetary controls. He was at the nerve centre of Britain’s communications; in an exceptional position to orchestrate and manipulate the entire complex of Britain’s government and civil service communications system with the machinery of private enterprise…….geared for a single objective…the “Big Push” [towards membership]…… The planning and co-ordination of the exercise had been intensively organised during the final twelve months of the negotiations.'(4)
With plans in place, the Cabinet approved Britain’s first concerted pro-European propaganda campaign:
‘…mobilising every means of communications guidance, instruction, information and training…. [Efforts were also directed towards] establishing international civil servants capable of dealing with the exhaustive variety of the aspects of Britain’s relations with the EC. It involved allocating and seconding personnel from the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Foreign Office, and the Home Office.’ (5)
For the government, bent on projecting one intention to members of the EU and another to its domestic and Commonwealth constituencies, the issue of presentation was critical. For domestic consumption, the government chose to highlight the economic benefits of membership whilst minimising its political costs.
The government’s campaign included the publication of a booklet by the Prime Minister in favour of entry, another produced by the Central Office of Information, and the widespread distribution of leaflets and ‘fact sheets’ to business, the media, politicians, trade unions, and the general public. The government campaign was augmented by several others. Foreign Office official Gladwyn Jebb was instrumental in forming the Common Market Campaign, with Roy Jenkins as deputy, which aimed to recruit Labour intellectuals and trade unionists to its cause. Other campaigns were launched by the Conservative and Liberal parties, Federal Union (assisted by a number of former civil servants), the United Europe Association (with support from several religious leaders), businesses (British and European bankers, insurers, and manufacturers for example), and by the EU itself.
Following the publication of The Economist Intelligence Unit report, Britain in Europe, in May 1961, several of these organisations merged. This report followed two earlier studies, in 1957 and 1958, both of which concluded that British industry, and Britain as a whole, would benefit from membership. Allegations have since been made that these studies were funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. being in favour of British entry.(6)
Although no official record of the first campaign exists, making it difficult to assess its cost, estimates range from hundreds of thousands of pounds to millions (7) Its aim was to swing the media, business, political parties, trade unions and ultimately the public behind British entry. In this it was conspicuously successful. By 1964, public support for European unification, including Britain, stood at 59 per cent, and by 1965, at 69 per cent. In January 1963, however, French President de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s first application. The propaganda campaign was consequently scaled down. Nonetheless, the infrastructure orchestrated by Lee was left intact and four pro-European organisations, Britain in Europe, Federal Union, the Labour Committee for Europe, and the United Kingdom for Europe launched ‘holding operations’.(8) They were reactivated during later campaigns.
The second campaign (1971-72): accession to the EU
Having set out five conditions for entry, Harold Wilson’s Labour Government pledged to renegotiate the membership terms agreed by the previous government. In May 1967, Britain made its second application to join the EU. Once again it was vetoed by de Gaulle.
The third, and ultimately successful, entry attempt was made by Edward Heath’s Conservative Government. Following a meeting in May 1971 between Heath and Georges Pompidou at which the French President signalled that a new entry attempt would be successful, Heath turned his attention to securing the support of the Conservative and Labour parliamentary parties, the Conservative Associations, and public opinion.
Once again, pro-Europeans perceived the state of public opinion to be a problem. Gallup found that between 1967 and 1971, support for entry fell from 65 to 22 per cent; in April 1970, another Gallup poll found that only 19 per cent were in favour of entry and more than half rejected even the principle of negotiating. Ernest Wistrich, director of the European Movement, noted that in December 1970 only 18 per cent supported membership, whilst 70 per cent were opposed.(9) The government enlisted the assistance of the Information Research Department (IRD). This covert unit, established by the Labour Government in 1948, was financed from the Secret Intelligence Services budget, with close links to MI6.
The government’s campaign had three stages. The first involved the dissemination of information to the press and public; the second, from the announcement of the terms of entry until the end of the party conferences, concentrated on influencing MPs, parliamentary parties and Conservative Associations; and the third saw the launch of a national campaign.
Following extensive survey research, the government decided on seven themes for the campaign: membership would protect Britain’s national interest, increase its strength through European unity, enhance its world role and deliver higher standards of living and improved social welfare; Britain could no longer manage its affairs alone; and anti-EU campaigners were ‘extremist’ and ‘out of touch’.
The first stage of the government’s campaign began in the spring of 1971 when it issued 11 free ‘fact sheets’ and distributed six million free copies of a 16-page booklet outlining the benefits of entry. Campaigners flooded the press with pro-EU letters, whilst government ministers made 280 speeches on the issue between July and October. Furthermore, a special IRD unit, the European Unit, was established to work closely with pro-Europeans to rebut the anti-EU campaign in the press.
The second stage witnessed the targeting of Conservative MPs by the parliamentary Conservative Group in Europe and party whips, plus the negotiation of a secret alliance with the 68-strong pro-European wing of the Parliamentary Labour Party to ensure a successful parliamentary vote. (10) Conservative Associations were targeted by Conservative Central Office, the Conservative Research Department and the Conservative Political Centre through constituency chairs, party agents and officers.
The third stage of the campaign was a national one aimed at influencing the wider media. Geoffrey Tucker, a public relations expert who had worked for the Conservative Party, organised a series of regular cross-party ‘breakfasts’ of between 20 and 30 people at London’s Connaught Hotel. These meetings, initially funded by the IRD, were attended by ‘insiders’ – ministers, MPs and civil servants business leaders, media representatives and the opposition. Geoffrey Rippon and Crispin Tickell, from the British negotiating team, reportedly attended some of these meetings.(11) ‘Fast’ media, radio and television, were particularly targeted, including such programmes as News at Ten, Panorama, Today, 24 Hours, Woman’s Hour and the World at One. The breakfasts led, for example, to the News at Ten series on the EU, ‘television time that as advertising would have cost something like ‘£1.25 million in one month’.(12)
The national campaign was augmented by others, co-ordinated by a government committee, chaired by Tony Royle, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. They included campaigns by the Conservative Party for Europe, the Labour Party for Europe, the Liberal Party for Europe, and the European Movement with its Britain in Europe campaign.
The Britain in Europe campaign included the recruitment of over 200 voluntary lecturers who addressed over one thousand public meetings during the first six months of 1971; distributing over ten million leaflets and ‘The British European’ newsletters; a major advertising campaign in the British press; a billboard advertising campaign; the distribution of prepared articles and letters to national and local newspapers; and the release of a pop record called ‘We’ve got to get in to get on’. The campaign lasted for six months and cost over £1 million.(13) To ensure that the European Movement complemented the government campaign, meetings of the former were secretly attended by Foreign Office officials.
As with the first campaign, no official record of the second campaign exists, making it difficult to estimate its expenditure. However, Wistrich reported that the European Movement campaign alone spent over £1 million. This was in contrast to the anti-Market campaign which only spent £50,000.(14) The pro-European campaign also attracted other funds: from the CIA, through the European Movement, and from business. Documentary evidence found by Aldrich revealed that the CIA funnelled millions of dollars to organisations and politicians in Britain and continental Europe, including Labour MPs. Aldrich argued that the accounting structure of the European Movement was designed to hide this fact. £5 million is believed to have been spent by these sources in 1970 and 1971 alone.(15)
This second propaganda campaign was a success. By July 1971, Gallup found that public support for membership had increased to 28 per cent and by August to 34 per cent. This was the signal for pro-Europeans to act. In October, the government presented the European Communities Bill to Parliament and on on 28 October 1971, a free vote in the House of Commons saw 356 vote for entry with 244 against. The Bill passed unamended into law and Britain entered the EU in January 1973.
The third campaign (1974-75): the 1975 Referendum
The hope that Britain’s entry to the EU would settle the issue was not realised. In January 1973, when Britain entered the EU, Gallup found that 38 per cent believed ‘we were right’ to have joined, 36 per cent that ‘we were wrong’, and 26 per cent did not know. The political class was also divided: the major parties, like many individuals, have repeatedly changed their European policy over the period in question. The Labour Party in opposition, for example, was ambiguous about membership until 1963; in government, between 1967 and 1970, it favoured and sought membership; and in opposition between 1970 and 1974, it opposed membership.
In an attempt to rally the public and the Labour Party behind continued membership, the 1974 Labour Government under Harold Wilson pledged to renegotiate the terms of entry and consult on the outcome through a general election or a consultative referendum. Although there was significant opposition to staging a referendum on the issue, a prolonged pro-referendum campaign, led by Tony Benn, was eventually successful.
In March 1975, following negotiations, the Cabinet voted by 16 to 7 to remain in the EU.(16) When the Cabinet decision was put to Parliament, it received a large majority, mainly due to Conservative support. However, on the Labour side, 145 MPs voted against membership, 137 voted in favour, and 33 abstained. Furthermore, at a Labour Party Special Conference in April, 3.7 million votes were cast in favour of leaving the EU compared to 1.98 million against.(17) A split between the executive and the party was clearly evident. To avoid exacerbating this, Wilson decided to allow ministers to campaign both for and against membership.
Yet again, pro-Europeans perceived the state of public opinion to be a problem. Following Britain’s entry to the EU, public opinion returned to a position where a majority opposed membership. In January 1975, Gallup found that 55 per cent were in favour of withdrawal compared to 45 per cent in favour of membership.
The pro-European lobby had anticipated the referendum. In the spring of 1974 an elite group, known as the ‘principals’, launched a series of secret meetings to co-ordinate a campaign, led by Geoffrey Tucker and the European League for European Co-operation, a group of economists established in 1947. Wistrich, who was now head of Britain in Europe, reported:
‘[w]ithin a month of the February 1974 election we [had] set up a campaign committee involving not just the European Movement but representatives of political parties and others. We conducted a major attitude survey in June. In July we distributed 6.5 million leaflets to try and recruit the troops to conduct a referendum, as a result of which we got about 12,000 people involved. So we were already working flat out between the two general elections, and we definitely expected a referendum’.(18)
These preparations presaged Britain’s third concerted pro-European propaganda campaign, culminating in a referendum on June 5 1975.
There were three stages to the propaganda campaign preceding the Referendum: the first whilst the government was re-negotiating the terms, the second during the passage of the Referendum Act, and the third during the final weeks of the Referendum campaign. The ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns broadly coalesced around two organisations: Britain in Europe’s ‘Keep Britain in Europe’ campaign united most of the ‘Yes’ campaigners, whilst the National Referendum Campaign brought together many of those opposed to membership. The ‘Get Britain Out’ campaign included several organisations in addition to the National Referendum Campaign: the Anti-Common Market League, British Business for World Markets, the Common Market Safeguards Committee, and the National Council of Anti-Common Market Organisations. (19)
Mori’s Bob Worcester recalled how polls at the time indicated that economic rather than political issues were decisive: 58 per cent of those polled said that the cost of living was central to how they would decide, 37 per cent said food prices, 15 per cent said unemployment, and only 9 per cent said independence and sovereignty.(20) Butler and Kitzinger noted that the electorate were divided into three roughly equal groups pro-EU, anti-EU and ‘hesitant’; and that the ‘Yes’ campaign agreed that the ‘hesitants’ were more likely to be persuaded by another ‘hesitant’ than a ‘pro’.(21) This belief became central to the strategy of the pro-Europeans.
Britain in Europe’s propaganda campaign involved the employment of 17 regional coordinators; the training of over 600 speakers who addressed several thousand public meetings; the creation of cross-party committees in many towns and cities which led to the formation of 374 local campaigning groups; the development of a network of pro-European campaigning professionals, such as doctors and solicitors; the establishment of specific organisations such as ‘Christians for Europe’, ‘Women for Europe’ and ‘Youth for Europe’; the enlisting of high profile public personalities to the campaign; the production and distribution of millions of leaflets, pamphlets, posters and other promotional material; the renting of shops in prominent locations in dozens of towns and cities to distribute this material; the staging of mass public meetings; the filming and screening of a Party Political Broadcast-style television programme; the launch of a newspaper campaign, using the national and local press; and the display of posters on billboards throughout the country.(22)
The publication of three publicly-funded pamphlets preceding the Referendum – the government’s New Deal for Europe, Britain in Europe’s Why you should vote YES , and the National Referendum Campaign’s Why you should vote NO was only one example of the intrinsic imbalance between pro- and anti-EU campaigns. Analysis of the Referendum reveals a number of disparities between the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ campaigns, specifically concerning campaign employees and financing, and the roles of the government and opposition, business, the civil service, the EU, the CIA, and the media.
The ‘Yes’ campaign officially employed 163 people whereas the ‘No’ campaign only had 6.(23) Both the pro- and anti-EU campaigns were given government grants of £125,000 for publicity. In addition, Britain in Europe managed to raise another £1.8 million from business whereas the National Referendum Campaign merely secured an extra £8,610.(24) The government and opposition actively assisted the ‘Yes’ campaign. Sir Con O’Neill, the former Foreign Office official who had led the accession negotiations, played a central role in Britain in Europe. Heath, Jenkins and Jeremy Thorpe, leader of the Liberals, shared the same platform several times during the campaign. Wilson and James Callaghan had a relatively low profile during the campaign. Callaghan gave five speeches and Wilson eight, far fewer than would be expected during a national campaign. Butler and Kitzinger argued that their seemingly reluctant, but ultimate ‘Yes’ vote, was designed to carry the ‘hesitants’.(25)
Business was united in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote: a Confederation of British Industry survey of companies found that 415 out of 419 favoured continued membership. The civil service was not neutral during the Referendum campaign. In addition to helping produce the government’s pro-membership pamphlet, Whitehall established a number of task forces and liaison committees to support the ‘Yes’ campaign.26 Further evidence of bias was alleged by Sean Stewart, who worked for Peter Shore MP. Stewart felt:
‘…the Civil Service was intensely disloyal. Peter Shore was my minister. Most of my colleagues thought he was a “fellow traveller”; and Benn was regarded as a Communist…. In the whole of Whitehall, at the middle level, there was fear all over the place, and the “antis” were being labelled as Communists and “fellow travellers”.(27)
The EU and the CIA also intervened in the Referendum campaign. Of the former, one commentator remarked:
‘In the deployment of two international civil servants [British Commissioners Christopher Soames and George Thompson financed by the European Comm-ission] and the comprehensive coverage of their every speech in the press, the [pro-EU campaigners] displayed an extraordinary lack of sensitivity to the constitutional ethics of non-interference… in the domestic policies of a nation-state’.(28)
Of the CIA, Conservative MP, Sir Richard Body, recounted:
‘At the very beginning of the campaign, two CIA agents came to see me in the House of Commons. They were Anglophiles and they were very upset at the way their agency was going to interfere in the Referendum campaign. They said a new station head [Cord Meyer] was going to be appointed who was not a normal CIA man, he was well known in the federalist movement and they were going to interfere in different ways’.(29)
The media
As with previous pro-European propaganda campaigns, the media, particularly the press, played a central role in the Referendum campaign. The press were united in favour of membership with only the Morning Star campaigning for a ‘No’ vote. In terms of press coverage of during the Referendum campaign, Butler and Kitzinger revealed ‘the grossly unequal treatment of the two sides as far as sympathetic column inches were concerned … the mean balance was 54 per cent pro and 21 per cent anti (the rest neutral).'(30) They argued that these figures reflected neither public opinion, nor the final result. Broad and Geiger noted how the media were almost all pro-Europe yet public opinion polls, between mid-1973 and January 1975, showed a narrow majority in favour of withdrawal.(31) Press bias was also identified by the British Business for World Markets (1975) study. This bias led a member of the Press Association to argue:
‘[w]hat the referendum….. [revealed] was the power of the press when linked with the big battalions of politics. It is probably true that newspapers do not shape people’s opinions, at least not directly. Readers read the news columns and do not automatically adopt the opinions of the leader columns. But when the news is opinion, as it was during the campaign… with no facts to go on, and the emphasis is in one direction then readers are swayed in that direction’.(32)
Broad and Geiger questioned whether a ‘shadow referendum’ on Benn and Enoch Powell, among others, was the real influence in terms of public opinion and the actual Referendum vote.(33) A Britain in Europe survey in April 1975 found that of the 21 leading political figures involved in the Referendum campaign, each of the 13 pro-Europeans drew a positive reaction, whereas 6 of the 8 anti-Europeans had a negative one. The campaign of media vilification took its toll and central to this was the personal vilification of Benn. Indeed Hollingsworth argued that:
‘……the personalisation of the……Referendum was so intense that a “Yes” or “No” vote really meant whether you were “for” or “against” Tony Benn as an individual politician.'(34)
The third pro-European propaganda campaign worked. The swing took place over the first three months of 1975. In January, Gallup found that 55 per cent supported withdrawal and 45 per cent supported membership. By early March, these figures had reversed: 55 per cent supported membership and 45 per cent supported withdrawal. By the end of March, 66 per cent supported membership and only 34 per cent withdrawal. The result of the Referendum on 5 June 1975, where the British people were asked ‘Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (Common Market)?’, produced a ‘Yes’ vote of 67.2 per cent and a ‘No’ vote of 32.8 per cent.
Conclusions
Britain’s first application to join the EU in 1961, its accession in 1973, and its referendum on membership in 1975 represent key milestones in Britain’s relationship with the EU. These events were marked by government-organised pro-European propaganda campaigns in the British media. These in turn coincided with significant changes in public opinion to the benefit of pro-Europeans. The evidence, in the form of public opinion polls, presented in this article clearly demonstrates a positive correlation between the timing and duration of these campaigns and changes in public opinion. As indicated by the literature, however, it is not possible to infer a cause-and-effect relationship between the two because, as yet, no theoretical basis exists to support such a proposition.
Using Carey’s terms, 35 pro-European propaganda campaigns employed both ‘grassroot’ and ‘treetops’ propaganda. The former aims ‘to reach as vast a number of people as possible in order to change public opinion’; the latter represents a ‘more sophisticated form of propaganda…. aimed at the leaders of society’. The British media, in particular newspaper editors and reporters, were targeted in these campaigns. The media was a key ‘treetops’ constituent.
There are four principal reasons why pro-Europeans resorted to propaganda campaigns rather than educating the British public about the EU. First, the EU is essentially a political project involving the loss of British sovereignty to new inter-governmental and supranational institutions. The governing elites on the continent have been generally honest with their electorates about this. The governing elite in Britain, however, has not. The late Peter Shore, once a Cabinet Minister, and Hugo Young, a Guardian journalist, are politically both on the centre-left. Although at opposite ends of the spectrum on the issue of Europe, they agree about the subterfuge infusing Britain’s relationship with Europe. Young concedes that at best, Britain’s relationship with Europe witnessed high political misjudgement, and at worst, involved not just a plot but a conspiracy; integration was accomplished only by deception.(36) Likewise, Shore charged that on the issue of Europe, deception has been practised by successive governments on a scale, and over a prolonged period of time, without precedent in our modern history.(37)
Shore identified two major problems with the EU project, its ambiguity and a momentum for change, arguing that there is a built-in ambiguity in the EU treaties as to their inter-governmental and supranational characteristics, whilst there is a momentum for change built into the whole concept of ‘ever closer union’.(38) Second, the EU is expensive. It has been estimated that British membership of the EU drained the economy of £255 billion between 1973 and 1997.(39) These losses were incurred as a result of Britain’s trade deficit with the EU, its budget contributions, the costs of membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and the costs of meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria. This figure does not include the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, the erosion of Britain’s manufacturing base by import penetration, and the imposition of Value-Added Tax. No British government, however, has conducted a cost-benefit analysis of EU membership.
Third, the EU project is driven to a considerable degree by the recommendations of the European Roundtable of Indus-trialists composed of 45 ‘captains of industry’ from European-based transnational companies and the EU’s policy and treaty output. (40)
Fourth, the public opinion polling data cited in this article clearly indicates that substantial sections of the public are sceptical of the EU. Pro-Europeans perceived this scepticism and volatility as a threat to their plans for full British engagement in the EU project, thus requiring a ‘correcting mechanism- propaganda. For these reasons, pro-Europeans have not sought to educate the British public about European integration because they could not risk doing so. Instead, they employed concerted propaganda campaigns to manufacture consent for EU membership. British public opinion has been a key concern of pro-Europeans from the early 1960s. With a possible referendum on membership of the euro, the trend looks set to continue. Indeed, according to Tucker, one of the architects of past campaigns, ‘the battle will never be over’.(41)
This account of previous pro-European propaganda campaigns is of both historical interest and contemporary relevance. Despite protagonists’ insistence that any referendum on British membership of the single currency should involve an informed debate, it is likely to witness Britain’s fourth pro-European propaganda campaign. The Labour Government and sections of business have already indicated that they support a ‘Yes’ vote in principal. Furthermore, since their election in 1997, the government has effectively undermined its official ‘wait and see’ policy by introducing preemptive institutional and legislative changes, and launching two ‘low intensity’ propaganda campaigns in favour of the euro. However, the obstacles to a fourth successful campaign appear to be greater than in the past.
Notes
1 Andy Mullen is doing a PhD on the British Left and European Integration.
2 See David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (London: Longman, 1991) pp.192-201; Sean Greenwood, ‘The Third Force in the Late 1940s’ in Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (eds) From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993) pp. 59-70; Mark Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power (London:, Zed Books, 1995) pp. 10-28.
3 Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 140)
4 Richard Kisch, The Private Life of Public Relations (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1964) p. 163
5 Ibid.
6 Lindsey Jenkins, Britain Held Hostage – The Coming Euro-Dictatorship (Washington D.C.: Orange States Press, 1998) p. 217
7 Kisch – see note 4 – p. 164
8 Ibid. pp. 169-170
9 Ernest Wistrich, ‘Lessons of the 1975 Referendum’ in Roger Beetham (ed) The Euro Debate: Persuading the People (London: Federal Trust, 2001) p. 841.
10 Lindsey Jenkins – see note 6 – p. 239.
11 British Management Data Foundation, ‘Document: A Letter to The Times’, Transcript of BBC Radio 4 programme broadcast on Thursday, 3 February 2000, (Stroud, Glos,: British Management Data Foundation)
12 Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War, 1948-1977 (Stroud, Glos: Sutton Publishing, 1998) p. 149.
13 Ernest Wistrich, – see note 9 – pp. 41-42
14 Douglas Evans, While Britain Slept: The Selling of the Common Market (London: Gollancz, 1975) p. 120
15 British Management Data Foundation, see note 11. On the CIA and the European Movement see also Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, (London: John Murray, 2001) chapter 16.
16 Tony Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries 1973-76 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990) p. 349.
17 Hugo Young – see note 2 – p. 284.
18 Cited in Roger Broad and Tony Geiger, ‘The 1975 Referendum on Europe: A Witness Seminar’ in Contemporary Record, Volume 10 no. 3, 1996, p. 89.
19 Tony Benn – see note 16 – p. 285
20 Cited in Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – p. 98.
21 David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum – Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 94-95.
22 Wistrich – see note 9 – pp. 44-46.
23 Cited in Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – p. 95.
24 Butler and Kitzinger – see note 21 – pp. 86, 110.
25 Ibid. pp. 94-95
26 Young – see note 2 – p. 290
27 Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – p. 103.
28 L. J. Sharpe, ‘British Scepticism and the European Union’ in Martin Holmes (ed) The Eurosceptical Reader (London: Macmillan, 1996) p. 305.
29 Cited in Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – p. 93.
30 Butler and Kitzinger – see note 21 – p. 224.
31 Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – p. 87.
32 Cited in Mark Hollingsworth, The Press and Political Dissent (London: Pluto Press, 1986) p. 50.
33 Broad and Geiger – see note 18 – pp. 84, p.100.
34 Hollingsworth – see note 32 – p.48
35 Alex Carey, Taking the Risk Out of Democracy: Propaganda in the U.S. and Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1995) p. 88.
36 Young – see note 2 – pp. 2-3.
37 Peter Shore, Separate Ways: The Heart of Europe (London: Duckworth, 2000) p. 4.
38 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
39 Will Podmore and Phil Katz, Sovereignty for What? Why Stopping European Monetary Union is Just the Start (London: Tribune, 1998) p. 15.
40 Bélen Bálanya et al, Europe Inc (London: Pluto, 2000) pp. 4-6, 19-36.
41 British Management Data Foundation – see note 11.