Compiled by Jane Affleck
The US GAO is the investigative arm of the US Congress, and is charged with examining all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds. It conducts audits, surveys, investigations and evaluations of federal programmes, either at its own initiative or at the request of Congressional Committees or members.
Most GAO reports (those that are not restricted or classified) are available to the public free of charge (one copy only of any report per person), and can be obtained either by telephone (001 202 512 6000) or by post from: US General Accounting Office, PO Box 6015, Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. It is sufficient to quote the reference number alone. There is no charge for postage.
Here is a selection of relatively recent GAO reports.
Human Experimentation: an Overview of Cold War era programs (11 pp.)
GAO/T-NSIAD-94-266, September 1994.
During World War 2 and the Cold War, US Government agencies (including the DoD, Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA and Dept. of Energy) conducted or sponsored extensive radiological, chemical and biological research programmes, in which hundreds of thousands of people were used as (often unwitting) test subjects. They were exposed to hazardous substances including radiation, blister and nerve agents, biological agents and LSD. This short document is a brief summary of these events.
Heath and Safety: status of federal efforts to disclose Cold War experiments involving humans (8 pp.)
GAO/T-RCED-95-40, December 1994.
Discusses the working group/committees set up to examine the issue and states that the full extent of human radiation experimentation may never be known, and most subjects of Cold War radiation activities may never be identified.
Nuclear Health and Safety: examples of post World War II radiation releases at US nuclear sites (19 pp.)
GAO/RCED-94-51FS, November 1993
Starting in the late 1940s, the US Government began a series of nuclear tests which resulted in the intentional atmospheric release of potentially dangerous quantities of radioactive material. These releases/tests were part of US nuclear weapons R and D, conducted by the military and the Atomic Energy Commission, and were of 2 types: atmospheric radiation tracking tests and radiation warfare tests (the use of non-bomb radioactive agents for offensive military purposes). This document details 13 releases of radioactivity at US nuclear sites including Hanford, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos between 1948 and 1952. For example, atmospheric radiation from the tests at Los Alamos reached towns 70 miles away. Possible health effects from these experiments are still being studied.
Nuclear Health and Safety: safety and health oversight at DoE defense nuclear facilities. (7 pp.)
GAO/T-RCED-94-138, March 1994.
Testimony stating that in the past production goals had taken priority over environmental and safety concerns at DoE nuclear weapons facilities. The importance of independent health and safety oversight at DoE nuclear facilities and recent actions taken to increase internal oversight are discussed. Past operations have left the DoE with many health and safety problems, including the dismantling of retired nuclear weapons and the decommissioning or decontaminating of facilities.
Nuclear Safety: international assistance efforts to make Soviet-designed reactors safer (43 pp)
GAO/RCED-94-234, September 1994
Serious concerns about the safety of 58 Soviet-designed civil nuclear reactors in former soviet Union and central and eastern Europe. These do not meet international safety standards, and 15 are of the Chernobyl type. This report includes an assessment of the goals and scope of the international assistance aimed at improving reactor safety, and the potential for closing the highest risk reactors. There is uncertainty as to whether international assistance has improved reactor safety, and without a commitment to close them down assistance could encourage their continued operation.
Operation Desert Storm: questions remain on possible exposure to reproductive toxicants (35 pp.)
GAO/PEMD-94-30, August 1994.
Gulf War participants believe that health problems arising since their return from the Gulf are caused by exposure to hazardous substances encountered there. These include diesel fuel, drugs, vaccines, pesticides and smoke from oil well fires. Some veterans believe their exposure has also resulted in reproductive problems including birth defects, infertility and miscarriages. This report details substances to which Gulf combatants were exposed, that could potentially have resulted in reproductive problems.
Operation Desert Storm: Army not adequately prepared to deal with depleted uranium contamination (42 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-93-90, January 1994.
Report finds that at least several dozen US soldiers, some unknowingly, were exposed to depleted uranium (DU) by inhalation, ingestion or shrapnel, during the Gulf War. The Army and the Nuclear Regulatory Commisssion believe DU exposure did not exceed NRC limits, but because any radiation exposure carries some risk, Army regulation require personnel exposure to be limited, and personnel in non-combat situations should take precautions to ensure DU exposure is as low as reasonably achievable.
Chemical Warfare: soldiers inadequately equipped and trained to conduct operations. (43 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-91-197, May 1991.
Report finds that deficiences in training and equipment of US Army forces could jeopardise their ability to survive and sustain operations in a chemical warfare environment.
Chemical Weapons Destruction: advantages and disadvantages of alternatives to incineration (28 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-94-123, March 1994.
Discusses possible alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons. The most feasible alternatives are in the initial stages of development, and more than a decade from being fully operational, so are unlikely to be ready in time to destroy the US chemical weapon stockpile by the December 2004 deadline. The report details advantages and disadvantages of each technology.
Chemical Weapons: stability of the US stockpile (12 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-95-67, December 1994.
The US Army’s assessment that its stockpile of chemical weapons can be stored safely until 2004 is questionable. Plans to incinerate have been delayed by technical problems and public opp-osition. Threats to safe storage include the leakage of chemical agents from the warheads and autoignition of propellant, in addition to earthquakes, plane crashes and accidents during handling. Nerve agents, especially GB, become acidic over time and can corrode metal warheads, leading to external leaks which are easily detected, or internal leaks (which are not detectable without disassembling the munition) which could lead to contact with explosive components and increase the risk of ignition or explosion during handling. Sandia National Laboratories recommend the Army expand its stockpile monitoring activities.
Chemical Weapons Disposal: plans for non-stockpile chemical warfare can be improved (32 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-95-55, December 1994.
There are uncertainties over the cost of disposing of non-stockpile chemical warfare material, mainly because the amount of material to be destroyed has not been fully identified. Non-stockpile material includes binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, buried chemical warfare material and former chemical weapons production facilities. The amount and condition of non-stockpile material is unknown; for example, the US Army has little information on the nature and extent of buried chemical agents, estimated to be located at 215 sites in 33 states. The US Army has limited experience of disposing of non-stockpile chemical materials and it will probably be several years before a disposal plan with reliable cost estimates can be developed.
Arms Control: status of US-Russian agreements and the Chemical Weapons Convention (35pp)
GAO/NSIAD-94-136, March 1994
Reviews progress made in implementing bilateral agreements between the US and Russia aimed at destroying chemical weapon stockpiles, the status of Chemical Weapons convention, and the costs incurred by the US in preparing for and implementing the treaties. Findings include: technical, political and financial obstacles have prevented Russia beginning to destroy its chemical weapons, and agreement for a US contractor to develop a plan for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. Several key countries suspected of having or developing chemical weapons have not signed the CWC. These include Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Syria, N. Korea and Taiwan, and without their membership it will be difficult for the Convention meet the goal of destroying the world’s chemical weapons stockpile.
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safety: challenges facing the IAEA (76 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-284, September 1993.
Recent events, including the discovery of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme, North Korean objections to IAEA nuclear inspections, and the Chernobyl accident, have increased concerns about nuclear proliferation and power plant safety. These are of particular concern to the IAEA, whose main duties include verifying the peaceful use of nuclear material and promoting nuclear energy. This report examines the effectiveness of IAEA’s safeguards programme, management of the US technical assistance to this programme, its effectiveness for advising member states about the safety of nuclear power plants, and adequacy of funding. Among the GAO’s findings are that IAEA does not have access to all nuclear material (several states developing nuclear weapons have not accepted full scope safeguards) and weaknesses in full scope safeguards, as witnessed by Iraq, which was secretly developing nuclear weapons despite being subject to full scope safeguard inspections.
IRAQ:US Military Items Exported or Transferred to Iraq in the 1980s. (21 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-94-98, February 1994
Discusses US policy and practice on sales of US military equipment to Iraq during the 1980s. Since 1980, US policy prohibited the licencing of sales of munitions list items to Iraq (except where for the protection of the head of state), on the basis that the US should not aid either side in the Iran-Iraq war. But the sale of dual-use items (with both civilian and military applications) from the US to Iraq was not constrained by national security controls, and the Dept of Commerce approved licences for exporting $1.5 billion of dual-use items to Iraq between 1985 and 1990.
Nuclear Non-proliferation: export licensing procedures for dual-use items need to be strengthened (69 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-94-119, April 1994.
This report discusses the nature and extent of US exports of dual-use items, the implementation of policies and procedures to prevent exports that pose a proliferation risk, and the effectiveness of methods used to detect diversion of such exports to foreign nuclear proliferation programmes. Recommendations are made to improve export licence review procedures.
Nuclear Non-proliferation: licensing procedures for dual-use exports need strengthening (12 pp.)
GAO/T-NSIAD-94-163. (Testimony), May 1994.
Testimony on the above. Although most licencing decisions (for dual-use nuclear exports to 8 specified countries) accorded with the goal of minimising proliferation risk, between 1988-92 over 1500 licences were approved for organisations involved in, or suspected of involvement, in developing explosives or special nuclear material, thus increasing the risk that US exports could contribute to nuclear proliferation.
Export Controls: actions need to improve enforcement (74 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-94-28, December 1993.
Reviews the enforcement of export controls intended to prevent or detect illegal exports of controlled items such as dual-use equipment and technology. The GAO examines the resources available to the Dept of Commerce and US Customs in carrying out enforcement responsibilities, their success at enforcing export controls and impediments to effective enforcement. Poor co-operation between Commerce and Customs is identified as the most serious impediment to effective enforcement.
Electromagnetic Fields: federal efforts to determine health effects are behind schedule (54 pp.)
GAO/RCED-94-115, June 1994.
Examines 1) the extent to which federal power lines may expose people to EMFs, 2) the actions which state regulators and commercial and federal utilities have taken to mitigate exposure to EMFs from power lines, and the costs of these actions, and 3) the status of the federal role under the Energy Policy Act 1992 for determining health effects of exposure to these fields.
Concludes 1) exposure to EMFs from Federal power lines minimal – other sources of exposure are more important; 2) States and utilities have only taken limited inexpensive actions to minimise public exposure; and 3) EMF research programme is delayed.
FBI: advanced communications technologies pose wiretapping challenges (23pp.)
GAO/IMTEC-92-68BR, July 1992.
Reports that the ability of law enforcement agencies to carry out court-approved wiretaps is challenged by advanced telecommunications technoogy. Since 1986, the FBI has become aware of a potential loss of wiretapping capability due to the rapid development of new technologies. They proposed legislation in May 1992 intended to maintain wiretapping capability for new telecommunications technology. Technologies that the FBI says it needs to wiretap include analogue and digital using copper wire transport or fibre optic transport, ISDN, PBX, broadband and cellular; future technologies such as satellite switches, Personal Communication Services (PCS) and Personal Communication Number (PCN); also features such as call forwarding and electronic mail.
The technological alternatives for wiretapping vary with the telecommunications technology being tapped and the location of the tap. The GAO’s analysis of these alternatives was classified by the FBI as National Security information, so could not be published in this report.
Electronic Surveillance: technologies continue to pose challenges (5 pp.)
GAO/T-AIMD-94-173 (testimony), August 1994
Examines changes in the state of technology since the above 1992 report. Although some technical solutions have been developed to facilitate wiretapping by law enforcement agencies, other technological changes have increased the difficulties of using traditional wiretap methods. For example, the National Technical Investigators Association (representing law enforcement officers engaged in technical investigative activities) report that it was almost 2 years after the introduction of cellular telephones before they had any means of intercepting criminal activity conducted on them.
Communications Privacy: federal policy and actions (37 pp.)
GAO/OSI-94-2, November 1993.
Examines 1) the need for information privacy in computer and communications systems, such as encryption, to mitigate the threat of economic espionage; 2) the development of cryptographic standards for the protection of sensitive unclassified information, and the policies of the NSA, DoD, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Dept of Commerce regarding the selection of federal cryptographic standards; 3) the roles and policies of the NSA and Department of State related to export controls for products with encryption capabilities; and 4) the FBI’s legislative proposal regarding telephone systems that use digital communications technology.
There is increased use by industry of software and hardware with encryption capabilities to combat economic espionage, but the sale and export of US commercial encryption technology is hindered by national security and law enforcement concerns, while export controls in other countries are less stringent. The NSA plays a major role in determining the rules for the export of US products with encryption capabilities, usually limited to those products and technologies which could affect the performance of NSA missions. There is a conflict between the need for communications privacy and the need for access to communications desired by law enforcement and national security agencies. In April 1993, the FBI announced support for the key-escrow system, which would allow legally authorised government officials to obtain access to the plain text of encrypted communications.
Arms Control: US and international efforts to ban biological weapons (67 pp.)
GAO/NSIAD-93-113, December 1992
This report assesses the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention and US and multilateral export controls in addressing the proliferation of biological weapons. Findings include 1) many critical countries are not members of the BWC, (including Israel, Syria and Egypt; but Iraq is a member) and 2) compliance measures are ineffective, with more countries developing BW today than when the Convention was created in 1975; the workability of a verification regime with inspections is discussed. Appendices include the BW Convention, members and non members of the BWC and BW items controlled by the US.
Nuclear Waste: further improvement needed in the Hanford tank farm maintenance program (16 pp.)
GAO/RCED-95-29, November 1994
Over 61 million gallons of high level radioactive waste, derived from the production of nuclear materials, are stored in 177 underground storage tanks at the US DoE’s Hanford site in Washington State. Serious deficiences have been reported in the maintenance programme. Adequate maintenance and monitoring is critical because of the hazardous nature of the contents and the potential consequences of an accident or leakage. This report discusses the mai-tenance programme, its deficiences and suggests improvements.
Nuclear Waste: foreign countries’ approaches to high-level waste storage and disposal (59 pp)
GAO/RCED-94-172, August 1994
Report 1) compares approaches to management of civilian high level waste by major nuclear countries and compares with the approach taken by the US; and 2) identifies lessons that can be learned. Includes appendices on high-level waste management in Canada, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland and the UK. Finds that most governments support geologic repositories for HLW disposal, but no country has an operational facility. All had encountered difficulties with their waste management programmes and most do not plan to have a repository until 2020 or later.
Nuclear Weapons: safety, technical and manpower issues slow DoE’s disassembly efforts (28 pp.)
GAO/RCED-94-9, October 1993.
Recent treaties and retirements of nuclear weapons have resulted in the largest nuclear weapons disassembly programme since the beginning of the Cold War, with a reduction from approx 21,000 weapons in 1990 to a planned stockpile of 3,500 in 2003. This report reviews the DoE’s success in meeting the disassembly schedule The GAO found that disassembly at the DoE’s Pantex facility in Texas has been curtailed by various problems, and the prospect for meeting the schedule in the next few years is not good. Issues that need addressing include a shortage of technicians, and problems concerning the adequacy of facilities for, and the environmental impact of, storing large amounts of plutonium at Pantex.
Nuclear Science: developing technology to reduce radioactive waste may take decades and be costly (45 pp.)
GAO/RCED-94-16, December 1993
Nuclear power and nuclear weapons production have left a legacy of radioactive waste. Current US policy requires disposal of high level radioactive waste in a deep geological repository. Some scientists believe the DoE, which is responsible for disposal of spent fuel and highly radioactive defence waste, should attempt to transmute the waste into a less radioactive form before burying it. This report identifies US efforts to develop waste transmutation technology, determines the estimated timing and cost of this development, and assesses the prospects for practical application of transmutation to highly radioactive defence waste and spent fuel from commercial reactors. DoE laboratories and the Office of Nuclear Energy have identified concepts for the transmutation of radioactive waste, including reactor or accelerator driven systems. These are mostly based on theoretical studies. The GAO finds that the technical and economic feasibility of waste transmutation is unproven. The cost of transmuting waste would be high, any practical application is likely to be decades away, and a repository would still be required.
Mission-critical systems: defense attempting to address major software challenges (27 pp.)
GAO/IMTEC-93-13, December 1992.
Billions of dollars in defense weapons and command, control, communications and intelligence systems depend on high-performance, correctly functioning real-time computer systems capable of withstanding severe stresses without failing. This report identifies the many software problems affecting weapons and other mission-critical systems, and questions whether initiatives set up to address these ‘formidable’ software problems will be successful.
Reproductive and Developmental Toxicants: regulatory actions provide uncertain protection (116 pp.)
GAO/PEMD-92-3, October 1991.
Report identifies 30 chemicals of concern as environmental and developmental toxicants, and examines whether their regulation by Federal government is adequate. The chemicals included cadmium, mercury, lead, arsenic, DDT, PCBs, 245T, alcohol, nicotine, tobacco smoke and excess vitamin A. The report concludes that public protection afforded by current regulation is uncertain at best, and that the protective regulation for other environmental and developmental hazards may also be insufficient.
Inventory Management: hand-held missiles are vulnerable to theft and undetected losses (36 pp)
GAO/NSIAD-94-100, September 1994
GAO inventoried US’s most sensitive, (Category 1) handheld, missiles – the Stinger, Redeye and Dragon. The Stinger and Redeye can destroy aircraft in flight and the Dragon can pierce armour. Thousands were sold to other nations. GAO found poor over-sight and record keeping, were unable to determine which missiles may be missing, and conclude that missiles have been and remain vulnerable to theft or other undetected losses.