U.S Army Intelligence mind control experimentation

This article examines hallucinogenic-type drug experiments conducted by various elements of the U.S. Army Intelligence community in conjunction with sections of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. Most of the related records have been destroyed. The following is what I have been able to salvage from the records available on these programs.

Edgewood Tests

From the available records in the Intelligence Center at Fort Holabird and the Chemical Warfare Laboratories we know that a joint co-oordinated psychochemical drug project started in November 1957. The ground work on this joint project was apparently conducted in the latter part of 1957 and early 1958. The discussion about this programme took place between officers of the Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird, Maryland, and the Medical Research Laboratories at Edgewood Arsenal in May 1958. As a result of this meeting, on June 3 1958 the President of the Intelligence Board sent an informal plan to the Medical Research Directorate of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories.(1) The plan was entitled ‘Material Testing Program EA 1279’. EA 1279 was LSD. The plan’s main thrust was the ‘method of approach to prospective volunteers’ who were to be selected from official personnel, based on their records and security clearance information. It called upon the proper code of conduct for volunteers, requiring them to sign a security statement. The volunteers were to be examined physically and mentally prior to any testing.

The test program on the first group of volunteers arriving at Army Chemical Center (ACC) Edgewood, contained a specific emphasis on ‘Unwitting test reaction’. A three-day stay was required for the test to be carried out on the first group. After physical examination, those who were physically unfit were excused. In the early evening of the first day after arrival at ACC, the group met socially. Each volunteer had been introduced to a trained interrogator, who had already studied the file on the subject volunteer. In reality the scene was set for each interrogator to try and elicit additional information from the volunteer under his control — simulating a diplomatic cocktail party where an attempt would be made to obtain classified information from unwitting subjects. All drinks served to volunteers included LSD. The interrogators then tried to extract extra classified information about their special duties at their place of service. Where and when necessary, the interrogators, without the knowledge of their subject, administered additional doses of LSD.

Additional facilities were provided for private meetings and interviews in the course of the gathering for each pair. The results of these interviews would be compared with the results of interviews the next day when the individual was not under the drug influence. The volunteers were informed but were unaware of their previous ‘interview’. On the second day, the volunteers were told about the events of the previous day.

In the course of other planned tests on other groups of volunteer visitors to Edgewood, experiments were conducted to evaluate the ability to deliberately lie while under the influence of LSD. There were also ‘Memory Impairment Tests’, to evaluate the effects of LSD on retention ability of subjects; ‘Specialised Motor Reaction Memory Testing’, to evaluate the impairment of simple motor reactions of the subjects after ingestion of LSD; and ‘Effect of Environment and Physical Condition’, evaluating the effect of LSD on a subject under various environments and physical conditions, including total isolation and hostile interrogation situations. A further test, ‘Influence of Material Under Artificially Created Stress Situations’, was to determine the ability of the subject to withhold information under unusual stress and the influence of LSD.

There is no evidence that these tests were approved at any level above the President of the Intelligence Board or Director of the Medical Research Laboratories at Edgewood. The only document available to the Office of the Inspector General and the Auditor General, U.S. Department of the Army, shows that the proposed plan was sent from the Intelligence Center to the Commanding General, Edgewood. It was signed by the Adjutant General for the Center Commander, indicating that the Intelligence Center Commander may have approved the program from the Intelligence Corps side. (2) However, the former Commander of the Intelligence Centre, Richard S. Prather, in his testimony of 29 October 1979, admitted that he knew nothing about the plan, and it is possible that the letters were signed on his behalf. He further stated that although the Intelligence Board was located within his command, they usually reported directly to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, (ACSI) Department of the Army, regarding any subjects dealing with operational matters. (3)

The Intelligence Board Project Officer, William J. Jacobsen, supported Richard Prather’s testimony, adding that it was his understanding that at the time no definite decision could have been made at Holabird to participate in these testings without the approval of ACSI. (4) Jacobsen’s statement on this matter was not confirmed by former ACSI staff. Furthermore, no evidence was found showing that the Medical Research Laboratories obtained approval through Chemical Corps, nor had the Surgeon General’s Office checked or reviewed the plan. They had clearly over-stepped the legal line.

The surviving records show that the experiments were conducted in two phases: the first series of tests from August to November 1958,(5) and the second from September 1959 to May 1960. Although there are no records of the exact number of volunteers used, from the travel orders and testimony, between 30 and 35 volunteers were used. There are no records to indicate the number of times LSD was administered to each volunteer. It is important to note that none of the volunteers gave their ‘informed consent’ prior to receiving LSD. Furthermore, there was a deliberate attempt to deny the volunteers any information that would have permitted them to evaluate the dangers involved. The responsibility for this deliberate failure lies with the Intelligence Board, as the initiator, and the Medical Research Laboratories, as medical investigators. It was only after surreptitious administration of LSD that the volunteers were informed and briefed about the rest of the project.

These tests were conducted a few years after Dr. Frank Olson’s death, caused mainly by unwitting administration of LSD in his drink in November 1953. As Dr Olson had worked quite closely with the Army’s Chemical Corps’ Special Operations Division (SOD) at Fort Detrick, these records show that the U.S. Army soon put behind them the lessons learned from Olson’s death and carried on the tests as before. According to the testimony of Charles L. Shirley Jr., one of the volunteers, in August 5 1975, the belief amongst most of the volunteers was that if they declined to participate in the tests it would have put them in an immediate disfavour with their superiors.

Field Tests

After the first phase of Intelligence Corps experiments in November 1958, a letter from the Chief of Clinical Division at Edgewood to Commanding General Army Intelligence Center stated that all the initial work on the first phase was completed with rewarding results. He further recommended that ‘actual application of the material [LSD] be utilised in real situations on an experimental basis, if possible.’ (6) It is hard to believe such a recommendation on such a dangerous drug with unpredictable results after tests on only 35 volunteers.

On 21 January 1959 the U.S. Army Intelligence Center gave the go-ahead to Edgewood: ‘This headquarters has forwarded your letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army, concurring in your recommendation that that actual application of the material be utilized in real situations on an experimental basis.’ (7) From the records available, a field test plan was prepared with Medical Research Laboratories’ representatives and an Intelligence Board officer as an aid to interrogation. Early in March 1959 the Director of Medical Research at Edgewood informed his superior, Commander, Chemical Warfare Labs, that the plan would be submitted to him shortly by the Intelligence Center. (8) The plan called for use of LSD overseas on foreign nationals. The Surgeon General’s office was the avenue chosen to rapidly implement the plan. (9)

On April 9 1959, representatives from the Chemical Warfare Laboratory and the Intelligence Center briefed the Chief, Research and Development, Office of the Surgeon General on ‘Material Testing Program, EA 1729’, proposing the field experimentation. He had shown reservations in approving the plan, but later informally notified Edgewood that the Surgeon General would reconsider the plan if it was presented through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI). The Intelligence Center sent the plan to ACSI to be co-ordinated with the Surgeon General, and the latter ‘concurred in the finding of the Chemical Corps and offered no medical objections to the field experimental plan.’ (10) The Office of ACSI ordered the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAINTC) to prepare a detailed staff study about the test on overseas nationals and prepare a report for ACSI. On October 15 1959, USAINTC sent the requested study to ACSI. (11)

On August 8 1960, the ‘Office of Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence Liaison Team’ was sent to Europe to brief the European intelligence community on the joint Intelligence Corps/ Chemical Warfare Laboratories project for testing LSD and acquaint the G-2 U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) with the plan. The team consisted of three members: the action officer from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army (OACSI), the Project Officer from the U.S. Army Intelligence Board at Fort Holabird (USAINTB), and another Project Officer from the U.S. Chemical Research and Development Laboratories (USACRDL) at Edgewood. This team briefed the G-2, USAREUR.

It was left to the intelligence community in Europe to devise the plan and provide the subjects for the proposed ‘Field Test’. They were to be non-volunteer, foreign nationals. The Department of the Army was to be responsible for the execution of the plan under the watchful eyes of the Special Purpose Team (SPT). (12) Surviving records suggest that on 25 November 1960 the Deputy, ACSI and the G-2 USAREUR, informally agreed on the working relationship for the proposed plan. (13)

On December 7 1960, the USAINTC Project Officer, in the presence of representatives of the Chief Chemical Officer DA, and the Surgeon General’s office, briefed the ACSI about the plan to conduct LSD tests on European non-volunteer subjects. (14) The briefing report shows that ACSI agreed with the method applied to enhance their conventional interrogation standards. Although little concern was shown, the question of co-ordination with other agencies such as the CIA and FBI was raised. The final decision was made that the co-ordination with the other agencies would be postponed until after the conclusion of the field tests in Europe. According to ACSI’s remarks, ‘His concern was that if this project is going to be worth anything it [LSD] should be used on higher types of non-U.S. subjects, and, as he put it – staffers. This could be accomplished if the CIA was brought in.’ ACSI also added that ‘maybe the FBI should be informed and to possibly join us to further develop the experimentation.’ (15)

There is absolutely no evidence that this plan was approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army or any other officers higher than ACSI. Furthermore, there is no evidence that it was co-ordinated either with FBI, CIA or any other non-U.S. Army department. In January 1961 the Chemical Corps made an officer available to be a member of the Special Purpose Team who joined the USAINTB project officer.(16) The new member, apparently provided by the Surgeon General’s office, was a medical officer from Fort Totten, New York. (There is no documentary evidence of this assignment by the Surgeon General.)

Operation THIRD CHANCE

On 28 April 1961 the Department of the Army EA 1729 [LSD] Special Purpose Team (SPT) departed for a 90-day field experimentation program to Europe, ‘Operation THIRD CHANCE’. The team consisted of an Army medical officer, a Chemical Corps EA 1279 project officer and the U.S. Army Intelligence Center project officer representing OACSI. The objectives were: ‘to confirm or refute laboratory findings (1958-60) in an effort to ascertain whether or not the EA 1729 technique could be employed as an aid to interrogation and whether or not the technique does enhance the exploitability of actual subjects of intelligence interest.'(17)

The subjects had already been nominated by the sponsoring intelligence units. They were all from the critical category considered unresolvable through conventional interrogation or investigation techniques. The subjects were brought individually to a prearranged operational site on the pretext that they were to undergo a physical examination by the SPT doctor. After the introduction to the members of the SPT in a social environment, the subjects were surreptitiously administered LSD in drinks. Once the LSD had taken effect the group moved to an interrogation room. The medical officer and psychologist were present throughout the interrogation in an advisory capacity.(18) There were 11 experiments involving 10 individuals, all but one of whom were foreign nationals, Army intelligence sources or agents. The exception was a U.S. soldier who was involved in the theft of classified documents. All the subjects were non-volunteers, although one had agreed to take a ‘truth serum’ test.

The Special Project Team returned to the U.S. in late July 1961. They concluded that there was an urgent need for advanced and unconventional techniques to improve the field capability of intelligence units where intensive special interrogations were required, and that LSD had a promising future in this area. Among their other recommendations were: ‘A comprehensive field testing program to be established in conjunction with appropriate associated U.S. intelligence and security agencies for the scientific derivation of empiric data upon which to standardise the EA 1279 technique; and that future field experimentation utilise real subjects of actual cases for both research purposes and operational advantage.’ (19)

There is no evidence that any part of THIRD CHANCE was presented to, or approved by, the Army Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army. From the evidence it is clear that from start to finish the project violated Department of Defense and Department of Army policies, as well as specific procedures set for chemicalor medical research. Furthermore the SPT used non-volunteers of foreign nationality in all but one case. Additionally, the use of the U.S. soldier was not experimental but operational. Finally, the flagrant disregard for Department of the Army policies and directives was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the Office of the Surgeon General and the Chief Chemical Officer.

Operation DERBY HAT

After the return of the Special Purpose Team from Europe in December 1971, a decision was made at ACSI to explore the possibility of similar experiments in the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). (20) On 27 February 1962 the Intelligence Corps project officer briefed the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USARPAC about the LSD program at his headquarters in Hawaii. ‘The primary purpose of the field testing program will be experimental research under actual operating conditions, verification of previous laboratory and field test findings regarding [LSD] technique and development of further data regarding operational employment of the material. Any operational gains accruing to individual cases selected for experimentation will be considered a collateral advantage.’ (21)

The initial tests were to begin on 20 April 1962. The program was code named Operation DERBY HAT, and ACSI requested the Chief Chemical Officer to provide an officer as a member of the Special Purpose Team for this phase. (22) The Chemical Corps assigned the same officer who had been present in Operation THIRD CHANCE. (23)

For reasons that are unclear Operation DERBY HAT was aborted before LSD could be administered to any of the eight subjects — seven foreign nationals and one U.S. soldier — chosen for it. In a briefing on 10 April 1963 the Deputy ACSI, DA ordered that no further field testing with EA 1279 be conducted. The reasons given were the lack of data, the inconclusive nature of the tests, and the legal, political and moral problems inherent in the use of EA 1279 (LSD). (24)

In conclusion

In the course of two years the Intelligence Corps used 30 to 35 humans in their LSD tests. The first experiments of the surreptitious administration of LSD at a simulated social reception were in direct violation of published Department of Defense and Department of Army policies. For a majority of the volunteers and the tests themselves no records are available. Records were deliberately destroyed to protect the identity of many of the participants in these operations. Although the use of LSD on any subject, for any purpose, was stopped as from 10 April 1963 in the U.S. Department of the Army, these operations opened new avenues for other U.S. agencies — and allies of the U.S. government — to continue research using LSD on unwitting human subjects thereafter.

Notes

1. U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories (ACC), MD. Letter to Commanding General, U.S Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, MD. Subject: Proposed Plan for Field Experimentation with EA 1279, dated 19 March 1959.
2. U.S Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, letter to Commanding General, U.S Army Chemical Center, Edgewood, MD. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 28 April 1958.
3. Disposition Form by a Medical Research Laboratory staff member. Subject: Comments on ‘K’ Material Testing Program Proposed from USAINTC, dated 27 March 1958.
4. Testimony of Lt. Col. (Retd.) William J. Jacobson, 29 August 1975.
5. U.S. Army Intelligence Board, letter to Chief Medical Research Directorate, Chemical Warfare Laboratories. Subject: Transmittal of Planned Worksheet, dated 3 June 1958.
6. Medical Research Laboratories, letter to Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 14 January 1959.
7. U.S. Army Intelligence Center, letter to Commanding General, U.S Army Chemical Research and Development Command, Edgewood. Subject: Material Testing Program, EA 1279, dated 21 January 1959.
8. Disposition Form from Director of Medical Research to Commander, U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Laboratories. Subject: CIC Test Plan, dated 6 March 1959.
9. USAINTC Letter to ACSI, DA. Subject: Staff Study: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 15 October 1959. (Includes a reference to ACSI-SC letter, 27 July 1959, requesting study.)
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Report of trip of OACSI Liaison Group re Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 26 August 1960.
13. U.S. Army Chemical Corps R and D Command, letter to Commander, U.S. Army Chemical R and D Laboratories. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 25 January 1961. Enclosure 2, Material Testing Program EA 1279. Phase 1, Background and Summary to date. Undated.
14. Ibid. — enclosure 4. Fact sheet by OACSI/ODSMCI Security Division. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 9 December 1960.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid. without enclosure.
17. Project Officer Report to ACSI. Subject: Report of Trip and Activities of the Department of the Army EA 1279 Special Purpose Team re: Operation ‘Third Chance’, dated 6 September 1961.
18. Ibid.
19. Reference to letter, ACSI-SC. Subject: Material Testing Project EA 1279, dated 29 December 1961.
20. Memorandum for Record. Subject: Policy and Operational Factors involved in the conduct of Field Experimentation of EA 1279, dated 1 March 1962.
21. ACSI letter to Chief Chemical Officer. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 28 March 1962.
22. U.S. Army Chemical Corps Research and Development Command Letter. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 6 April 1962.
23. ACSI letter to USAINTC. Subject: Material Testing Program EA 1279, dated 9 April 1962, with attached Memorandum for Record.
24. ACSI, DA, Memorandum for Record. Subject: Material Testing Program, EA 1279, dated 12 August 1963.