Right-wing Terrorists and the Extraparliamentary Left in Post-World War 2 Europe: Collusion or Manipulation?

Jeffrey M. Bale

Lobster Issue #18 (1989)

Right-wing Terrorists and the Extraparliamentary Left in Post-World War 2 Europe: Collusion or Manipulation?

Jeffrey M. Bale

In this essay, and the notes and sources that accompany it, there are many words from languages – French, Spanish, Portugese etc – which should have various accents on them. These accents have been omitted to simplify type-setting.

This essay was first published in the Berkeley Journal of Sociology and is reprinted here with their permission.

Right-wing terrorism is one of the most poorly-understood political phenomena of our time, so much so that many highly educated and knowledgeable people seem to be entirely unaware of its existence. There are two main reasons for this dangerously high level of ignorance. To some extent it is simply an inevitable by-product of the general absence of serious scholarly work devoted to the activities and ideologies of the extreme right since the end of World War 2, a lacuna that is almost invariably commented upon and lamented by the handful of specialists on these matters.(1) Most academics avoid the post-1945 right altogether, whereas others casually dismiss its ideological and operational significance on the basis of pre-existing biases or – at most – superficial examinations of traditional indicators of political strength like electoral results and parliamentary influence, indicators which are largely irrelevant when one is attempting to assess the threat posed by clandestine or covert (2) organizational networks that rely primarily on the use of subversive extra-legal methods.(3) The upshot of this neglect and cursory treatment is that far too little is known about any aspect of the contemporary ultra-right, including its extensive and systematic use of terror.

However, most of the confusion surrounding this subject can be traced to the pernicious cumulative impact of large numbers of politically distorted, sensationalistic, and superficial publications dealing with terrorism, many of which appear to be the direct or indirect products of a loosely-coordinated disinformation campaign launched by hardline rightist elements with various Western intelligence services and disseminated through their media assets.(4) This ever-increasing flood of material portrays ‘international terrorism’ as an essentially left-wing phenomenon, specifically as a form of ‘surrogate warfare’ that constitutes part of a larger Soviet strategy of subversion and expansionism (5) – an intepretation that has by now gained a certain degree of popular acceptance despite the generally spurious or contaminated nature of the evidence upon which it rests.(6) Under these circumstances, it is little wonder that the serious threat posed by transnational right-wing terrorism has so often been underestimated, if not entirely unacknowledged.

This widespread lack of awareness was rudely shattered in the latter half of 1980 when a series of spectacular terrorist attacks by the ‘Nazifascist’ (7) groups – the Bologna train station bombing on 2 August, the Oktoberfest bombing in Munich on 26 September, and perhaps the bombing outside a Paris synagogue on 3rd October (8) temporarily focused the attention of the press, the public, the security forces, and the coteries of intelligence-connected terrorism ‘experts’ on a subversive ultra-rightist underground that had never been truly banished from the European political scene. For years prior to this trio of bombings, the authorities and ‘experts’ had systematically minimized the threat posed by neo-fascist and neo-Nazi elements; (9) but now even they were forced to publicly acknowledge the existence of an international network of right-wing extremists willing to use force to achieve their goals.(10) Even so, official concern about violence from this quarter quickly dissipated, and both the media and the public subsequently lost interest in keeping an eye on what journalist Frederick Laurent has referred to as the ‘black orchestra’. (11)

Since then, certain terrorism ‘experts’ have cast the events of 1980 in a new light. One of these is Christopher Harmon, a researcher at the rightist Heritage Foundation,(12) who has suggested that these bombings did not so much reflect a resurgence of ‘fascism’ – the standard media line – as a new and dangerous form of collusion between rightist (‘black’) and leftist (‘red’) extremists, aided and abetted behind the scenes by the sinister hand of the KGB.(13) Although his view that the Soviets manipulated these developments is based on politically-motivated speculation rather than credible evidence,(14) Harmon’s thesis that various contemporary black and red revolutionary elites have been ‘displaying common modes of action, proclaiming common strategic and doctrinal ends, and attacking the same targets’, is not at all baseless.(15) The question is not whether certain groups of rightist ultras have been publicly expressing solidarity and secretly ‘cooperating’ with their leftist counterparts during the past decade – of this there is little doubt – but rather what these actions signify.

The purpose of the present article is to shed light on this latter query by examining two of Harmon’s key assumptions in more depth. The first is that certain shared attitudes and interests provide a basis for operational collusion between black and red ultras, a view that has much to recommend it. The second is that recent neo-fascist overtures to the violent extra-parliamentary left necessarily reflect genuine efforts by the former to initiate a common struggle against the hated bourgeois state, an interpretation that ingores both the overall complexity of the situation and the specific pattern of right-wing terrorist activities from the mid-1960s up to the mid-1970s and probably beyond. Although it would be premature to attempt to resolve these issues definitively in the absence of sufficiently comprehensive and reliable source materials on the last decade’s incidents of Euro-terrorism,(16) some discussion of the historical background should make it possible to put them in context and thereby avoid over-simplified assessments.

The Bases for Right-Left Collusion

In regard to the first of these assumptions, I believe Harmon is justified in calling attention to the limitations of the traditional left-right dichotomy, as well as in pointing out certain fundamental assumptions between contemporary radical leftists and rightists. There is nothing new about this. Many scholars have commented on the problems involved in applying the conventional ‘left’ and ‘right’ political labels to particular movements;(17) and attempts to draw parallels and even moral equivalences between groups at the termini of this standard spectrum are now common to several theories, most notably certain versions of ‘totalitarianism’, ‘authoritarian personality’ and ‘opposing extremism’ theories.(18) Despite the blatant political biases characteristic of many such attempts, there are good psychological, ideological and practical reasons for suspecting that various violence-prone rightists and leftists may be willing to work with each other, at least on a temporary basis.

First of all, ‘extremists’ of all political persuasions probably have more in common with each other psychologically than they do with any sort of moderate.(19) All genuine radicals are profoundly alienated from the status quo, not merely dissatisfied with particular aspects of it on an abstract intellectual level.(20) It might therefore be said that specific ideological orientations are later accretions grafted onto estranged, rebellious temperaments,(21) a perspective that is well illustrated in the following remark by a young Italian ultra-rightist named Giancarlo, Esposti: ‘I colored my nausea with black. Others instead colored theirs with red.'(22) Although it would be absurd to disregard or minimize the potential political differences between individuals who may only share an overriding and visceral hostility toward society at large, this hostility in and of itself creates a psychological bond betwen them which is arguably deeper than that which links them to less disaffected personalities who have similar political opinions. From this point of view, it does not seem at all incongruous when an Italian neo-fascist editor insists that ‘a revolutionary of whatever stripe is closer to us than a conservative’,(23) a view which echoes those expressed by many fascists and Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s (24); or when a German neo-Nazi from Schwartzwald-Franz Schubert Kommando argues that the petty differences between the right and left ‘can be set aside by those who claim to be undogmatic.'(25)

Second, as Harmon points out, contemporary neo-fascism is ‘marked …… by socialist, revolutionary, anti-Jewish and anti-American strains, and as such shares very disturbing affinities with Europe’s terrorist left.'(26) If taken at face value, this would suggest that a certain degree of collusion between black and red extremists might be the natural result of a process of ideological convergence or parallelism. But the ideological situation is considerably, more complicated than Harmon indicates.

For one thing, Harmon shows little awareness that neo-fascism is only one ideological component among many associated with the extreme right. Far from constituting a monolithic entity, this right actually consists of a kaleidoscopic array of rival factions with distinct and often irreconcilable ideological orientations.(27) As Bernard Brigouleix has aptly characterized the situation in modern France, ‘there is not really one extreme right, but several’,(28) a description that applies equally well to other national contexts. Moreover, neo-fascism is itself fragmented into several conflicting currents of thought,(29) the most important of which are nowadays: the ‘social racist’ or neo-Nazi tendency (30); the ‘revolutionary nationalist’ or left fascist tendency (31); the ‘mystical traditionalist’ tendency based on the theories of Italian ‘conservative revolutionary’ philosopher Julius Evola (32); the ‘Nazi-Maoist’ tendency that evolved out of the Evolan current in response to the rise of the New Left (33); the intellectual ‘Nouvelle Droite’ (ND) tendency (34); and the legalistic ‘national right’ tendency associated with the moderate and conservative factions within the ‘neo-fascist’ electoral parties like the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), Spain’s Fuerza Neuva (FNU), the West German Sozialistische ReichsPartei (SRP), the Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN) and Front National (FNA) in France, and the British National Front (NF).(35)

One can hardly make a general claim about the ideological bases for right-left cooperation without coming to grips with these crucial distinctions. However, since futher untangling the various strands of extreme right-wing ideology would take the discussion too far afield, I will confine myself to making a few relevant general observations.

As Italian political commentator Giorgio Galli noted several years ago, the contemporary European radical right has adopted two main geopolitical perspectives, one Atlantic-oriented, the other pan-European.(36) The bulk of the non-fascist ultra-right – including radical nationalists, Catholic integralists (‘national Catholics’), monarchist extremists, certain circles among the rightist intelligentsia etc. – is politically wedded to the Atlantic alliance and its major sponsor, the United States, since it views these as the military bulwarks of a Western civilization that is locked in a life-or-death struggle with an implacable communist adversary. This view is also shared, albeit more reluctantly, by the conservative ‘national right’ elements within the aforementioned neo-fascist electoral parties. (37) In marked contrast, most radical neo-fascist-factions promote the establishment of a strong, united Europe – a ‘Nation Europa’ – that would be capable of constituting a ‘third force’ in opposition to the twin ‘imperialisms’ of international communism and international finance capital, both of which they perceive as being decadent, materialistic, exploitative, dehumanizing and – according to pro-Nazi elements – controlled by parasitic Jews.(38) This neo-fascist substitution of an ‘international of nationalism’ for ‘national chauvinism’ (39) has precedents in classical fascist and Nazi rhetoric,(40) but it developed primarily as a pragmatic response to the ‘inescapable geopolitical fact’ that no single European nation could hope to match the post-war military and economic strength of the two superpowers. (41) The resulting pan-European ‘third force’ perspective is well captured in the following Nazi-fascist slogan: ‘Against the gold of America and the iron of the USSR, the blood of Europe’. (42)

These radical neo-fascist elements also generally subscribe to a number of notions that parallel those of left-wing terrorists. (43) Among other things they believe:

that clandestine paramilitary vanguards are the engines of revolutionary transformation;
that violence and direct action are inherently purifying cathartic experiences;
that bourgeois democracy is a cancer that must be destroyed to make way for a new social order;
that Zionism is an evil, insidious movement;
that moderate ‘respectable’ elements within their respective political milieus (like the MSI’s ‘double-breasted’ (doppio petto) faction and the reformist majority in the Partito Communista Italiano (PCI) are contemptible sell-outs.

It would therefore seem that in most of its current variants, the ideology of neo-fascism – like that of classical fascism – has a number of genuinely revolutionary components which are not wholly alien to certain doctrinal positions normally associated with the voluntarist, post-Marxist, ultra-left. And since it is from the ranks of such radical elements that most postwar right-wing terrorists have been drawn, at least since the early 1960s, Harmon’s interpretation is not as far-fetched as it might at first appear.

Finally, both black and red terrorists aim to destroy the ‘pseudo-democratic’ bougeois state by provoking violent repression (44) In the left-wing variant, ‘armed struggle’ is initiated to force the regime to abandon its democratic facade and expose its underlying ‘fascist’ core. This, in turn, will supposedly catalyze public discontent and allow the ‘advanced’ elements of the proletariat to lead a revolutionary transformation of society.(45) In the right-wing version, terrorist acts are launched to create chaos and thereby pressure the public into clamoring for ‘law and order’. This will provide the necessary preconditions and pretext for an authoritarian response led by ultras within the state apparatus,(46) particularly the army, the military police, and the secret services. Although Harmon seems to conflate or equate these two approaches, it is important to recognize that to the paramilitary left provoking state repression is only a means to an ostensibly different end; whereas to the paramilitary right it is to be viewed either as an end in itself or as the first step in the development of a strong national and ‘social’ state purged of divisive and subversive elements. (47)

In sum, Harmon’s first assumption that attitudinal bases exist for cooperation between the radical right and left appears to have considerable validity. Nevertheless, when one actually investigates the earlier pattern of relations between right~wing terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left, a rather different picture emerges, one that not only casts some doubt on this assumption but also seems to directly contradict his second assumption about the genuine nature of neo-fascist participation in the ‘anti~imperialist’ struggle. Far from displaying authentic solidarity with their red ‘brothers’, the most radical elements of the extreme right have frequently attempted to infiltrate bona fide leftist groups in order to goad them into undertaking violent, counterproductive actions – actions which would not only serve to discredit the left and terrorize the public, but also to provoke an authoritarian response by the government. And when such provocateurs found themselves unable to successfully manipulate the actions of existing left-wing formations, they often proceeded to launch terrorist attacks and attribute them to the left, or, alternatively, establish bogus ‘red’ organizations which could serve as a cover for all sorts of disruptive activities.(48) Even more disconcertingly, the predominant form of ‘collusion’ that has so far been documented has been between black terrorists and various repressive agencies linked to NATO and the US, the very ‘imperialist’ forces that neo-fascist ultras claim to oppose. (49)

Evidence of Right-Wing Manipulation.

To illustrate this widespread rightist strategy of disruption and intoxication (50), I will focus on two well-documented cases. The first involves the far-flung infiltration and assassination operations launched by former Organisation de l’Armee Secrete (OAS) terrorists under the cover of a Lisbon-based press agency called Aginter Press (AP). The second involves a series of violent provocations initiated by members of the two most active neo-fascist organizations in Italy, Ordine Nuovo (ON) and Avanguardia Nazionale (AN). As we shall see, the latter actions were partially planned and/or executed by some of the very people Harmon identifies as key figures in his purported black-red terrorist alliance. In both of the cases under consideration, once can find two common denominators.

First, the terrorist groups in question worked in close cooperation with rightist elements within various security agencies. Some of the specific evidence will be provided below, but here it should be pointed out that this type of linkage is not a new phenomenon. As long as secret police forces have existed, they have recruited and made use of provocateurs drawn from sympathetic or desperately impoverished segments of the population.(51) The antecedents of post-war ultra-right recruitment stem from the World War 2 period and its immediate aftermath, and include such developments as:

the alliance between American intelligence and various organized crime syndicates (which began in 1942) (52);
the exfiltration of thousands of Nazi war criminals and collaborators from Europe by US Army counterintelligence officers and pro-Axis factions within the Vatican (53);
and the subsequent recruitment of Axis intelligence and security personnel by several Western secret services at war’s end.(54)

The latter specifically set the pattern for the post-war recruitment of new generations of right-wing extremists, which has unfortunately continued up to the present day. (55)

Second, the methods employed by these terrorist outfits were derived in large part from French counterinsurgency techniques via the medium of the OAS.

The Development of Guerre Revolutionnaire Doctrine.

Following the trumatic defeat of the French expeditionary corps in Indochina at the hands of the Viet Minh, certain of France’s most brilliant and battle-hardened junior officers became obsessed with trying to understand how a relatively ill-equipped peasant army had overcome an experienced and professional fighting force. They immersed themselves in the military writings of Mao Tse-tung and other communist theorists in order to acquaint themselves further with the enemy’s techniques of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.(56) On the basis of these studies and their own first-hand experience in southeast Asia, they developed a potent counter-revolutionary doctrine known as guerre revolutionnaire which eventually came to dominate French military thought in the late 1950s.(57)

Put simply, guerre revolutionnaire wedded a simplistic and Manichean geo-political conception to a fairly sophisticated ensemble of operational techniques. The former held that the Third World War between the West and its intransigent communist foe had already begun, but in a new guise.(58) Nuclear weapons had made large-scale conventional war impractical and potentially suicidal, so the communists had devised and launched a new type of ‘subversive warfare’ to destroy Western civilization. Rather than engaging in direct confrontations, the Soviet Union was waging ‘remote control’ or ‘surrogate’ wars by stirring up discontent in the Third World, particularly within the territories of colonial empires. The ultimate goal was to strip the West of its resources and isolate Europe geopolitically, thereby creating the preconditions for its total defeat. From this perspective, all so-called decolonization or national liberation struggles were seen as communist-inspired and serving Soviet ends. (59)

Moreover, this Third World War was viewed as a total war being waged on all fronts. It was no longer possible for Western nations to concern themselves solely with military measures, for in communist subversive war such measures were inextricably linked with political, social, psychological, and especially ideological elements.(60) To protect itself from this multi-dimensional assault, the West had to rally behind a coherent, monolithic doctrine that could successfully oppose the totalitarian doctrine of the communists on equal terms.

From an operational standpoint, the guerre revolutionnaire theorists described communist revolutionary strategy as a combination of partisan (guerrilla) warfare and psychological warfare.(61) According to their analysis, its primary objective was to ‘conquer’ the population, not to gain strategic territory as in conventional war.(62) They had been amazed at the extent to which the Viet-Minh had retained the support of the population of Vietnam; but rather than examining the underlying historical and social causes of this allegiance, they focused on the organizational and psychological techniques used by the guerrillas to assert their control.(63) These were identified as the creation of ‘parallel hierarchies’, clandestine cross-cutting vertical and horizontal networks that tightly enmeshed each person in an elaborate, all-encompassing infrastructure geared towards exerting social control;(64) the skilfull and systematic application of action psychologique, which included both mass propaganda directed at groups and ‘thought reform’ employed against particular individuals; (65) and the ruthless but controlled utilization of terrorism, whether discriminate or indiscriminate, to intimidate the population and complete its psychological separation from the incumbent regime. However, it is important to note that said theorists did not see these as discrete or successive processes, but rather as different components of a single coordinated effort to gain control of the population; indeed, they felt that it was precisely this fusion of methods that made subversive war so dangerous and effective.

Having thus identified enemy techniques, the proponents of guerre revolutionnaire sought to devise ways of countering or neutralizing them. Most concluded that to gain the upper hand in the struggle against international communist subversion, it was necessary to adopt the enemy’s totalitarian methods and turn them against their users.(66) Therefore, the young colonels experimented with varying combinations of these techniques to keep Algeria French and, in the process, avenge the army’s earlier humiliations in Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, and at Suez.(67) But their zeal to apply totalitarian solutions throughout Algeria was not shared by the majority of the army, government, or the French population.(68) As a result, despite some notable successes achieved through guerre revolutionnaire methods, e.g., the destruction of the rebel Front de Liberation National (FLN) network in Algiers in 1957 (69), the bitter war dragged on without definitive resolution, causing the government to waiver in its commitment to Algerie Francaise. This official vacillation completed the alienation of the guerre revolutionnaire officers, who had already become deeply estranged from the French public and regime due to the apathy and pusillanimity the latter groups had displayed during the Indo-China war.(70) Feelings of betrayal and abandonment again welled up inside them, and many decided that the only way to retain control of Algeria and recover their lost honour was to apply guerre revolutionnaire techniques against their own countrymen and thereby morally regenerate France itself.(71) This subversive attitude was fanned by extreme rightist groups in both Algeria and the metropole.

The stage was thus set for the fateful alliance between the disaffected practitioners of guerre revolutionnaire, especially those working in the army’s 5th (Psychological Action) Bureau or commanding elite Foreign Legion and paratroop units, and fanatical pied noir ultras.(72) This alliance soon bore fruit in the series of insurrections in Algiers – the 13 May 1958 coup, ‘barricades’ week in January 1960, and the ‘generals’ putsch’ of late April 1961 (73) which brought down the Fourth Republic and threatened the political survival of its Gaullist successor. Eventually, elements of the same forces joined together in the clandestine OAS,(74) which applied numerous guerre revolutionnaire techniques, first to maintain control over Algeria and later to overthrow the Fifth Republic and replace it with an etat muscle capable of rallying the nation behind its efforts to confront international communism. (75)

The Spread of Guerre Revolutionnaire Concepts

For our purposes, the important thing is to indicate how this alliance affected both groups and thereby provided a foundation for subsequent right-wing terrorism. The rebellious colonels, who had been seeking to develop a powerful counter-revolutionary ideology capable of resisting communism, were offered several by civilian ultra-rightists. The most important of these were ‘national Catholicism’, which was promoted in slightly different versions by militant far-right lay organizations like Jean Ousset’s Cite Catholique and George Sauge’s Centre d’Etudes Superieures de Psychologie Sociale (76), and ‘national communism’, a doctrine promoted by radical neo-fascist groups like Jeune Nation (NJ).(77) Both doctrines had their adherents within the army and thence within the OAS, which was divided between an integralist wing led by Colonel Pierre Chateau-Jobert and a fascist wing dominated by Colonel Antoine Argoud.(78)

On the other hand, right-wing extremists throughout the world were galvanized by the exploits of the seditious guerre revolutionnaire officers who led the military revolts in Algeria (79), and those in the super-heated Algerian milieu were indoctrinated with guerre revolutionnaire concepts and more or less systematically trained in their application by elite, battle-hardened military personnel. To be sure, many pied noir and even metropolitan ultras had already developed strong links with official coercive agencies. For example, some had been recruited into the so-called ‘Main Rouge’, a counter-terrorist organization created by the French secret service (Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), to eliminate the FLN’s support network in Europe and prevent supplies from reaching rebel forces in Algeria.(80) Others had provided services for the army’s 2nd (Intelligence) Bureau or various police apparatuses. (81) Moreover, the Algerian colons had established several paramilitary ‘counter-terrorist’ groups on their own, most of which were later incorporated into the OAS.(82) But at that point they were directly exposed to the most advanced techniques of clandestine organization, action psychologique, and, above all, terrorism. OAS experts were even sent elsewhere to help European supporters of the organization accomplish various tasks.(83) Finally, the collapse of the OAS forced many of its members to flee abroad where, in return for asylum and other amenities, they offered their considerable skills to help train foreign counter-insurgency and parallel police units. (84) This is why many have viewed the OAS as the embryo of later black terrorist internationals.

Indeed, Aginter Press was itself a product of the OAS diaspora.(85) Its founder Yves Guerin-Serac (nee Guillot) had fought in Asia and then been attached to the notorious 11th Demi-Brigade Parachutiste du Choc, a special ‘dirty tricks’ unit stationed in Algeria that was at the disposal of SDECE,(86) before joining the OAS and leading one of its commando units in the Oran area. (87) In June of 1962, he fled to Spain and helped Chateau-Jobert organize the Mouvement du Combat Contre-Revolutionnaire (MCR),(88) then moved onto to Portugal, one of the most intransigent European colonial powers. In Lisbon he made contact with old Vichyite exiles and other OAS fugitives, and was introduced to the Portuguese authorities by former Petainist and ultra-nationalist pro-Salazar editorialist Jacques Ploncard d ‘Assac.(89) He was hired as an instructor for the paramilitary Legiao Portuguesa, and later employed to train counter-guerilla units of the Portuguese army. Meanwhile, several of his OAS comrades arrived in Lisbon, and together they decided to try and form an international anti-communist organization of their own. Fortunately for them the Portuguese government was then attempting to set up covert intelligence networks using foreign personnel in various African countries, and it agreed to fund their projected venture through the intermediary of its much-feared secret police, the Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado/Direccao Geral de Seguranca (PIDE/DGS).(90) Thus was born Aginter Press (AP) and its satellite organizations.

Aginter Press

Aginter Press was formally established in September 1966 and did in fact serve as an actual press agency: it syndicated articles in various right-wing media outlets and published its own bi-monthly bulletin.(91) But its main function was to camouflage the activities of what Laurent refers to as a ‘center of international fascist subversion’, which was divided into several components (92), including:

an espionage office ‘covered’ by the PIDE/DGS and purportedly (93) linked to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (94), the Spanish Direccion General de Seguridad (DGS), the Greek Kentrike Yperesia Plirophorion
(KYP or Central Intelligence Service), and the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) (95):
a unit that specialized in recruiting and training mercenaries in the arcane arts of ‘unconventional’ warfare;
a strategic centre for coordinating ‘subversion and intoxication operations’ that worked in conjunction with reactionary regimes and politicians on every continent; and an international ‘action’ organization called Ordre et Tradition (0 and T), which had a clandestine paramilitary wing known as the Organization d’Action contre le Communisme International (OACI).(96)

Most of the personnel consisted of former military officers, Portuguese ultras, and rightist intellectuals, and shortly after its creation its operatives made extensive (and highly successful) efforts to establish links with extreme-right organizations throughout the world.(97) Due to these far-reaching connections and the strength of its institutional support in Lisbon, AP exerted an influence far beyond its numerical strength.

The history of AP can be divided into two major phases. In the first, which began in 1966 and ended in 1969, the agency initiated a series of operations aimed at weakening and destroying guerrilla groups operating in Portuguese Africa. (98) These were undertaken at the behest and with the direct assistance of PIDE/DGS and other agencies of the Portuguese government. In the second phase, which lasted from 1969 until AP’s formal dissolution in 1974, agency personnel offered their specialized guerre revolutionnaire training to a number of repressive regimes in Latin America, and were in fact hired to provide it in Guatemala and post-Allende Chile. (99) During this period, the organization was no longer subsidized by the Portugese state, although its Lisbon apparatus was still ‘covered’ by the PIDE/DGS. Following the April 1974 ‘Revolution of the Flowers’ led by leftist elements within the Portuguese armed forces, both the PIDE/DGS and AP were dismantled, although many of their agents later resurfaced in the counter-revolutionary Exercito de Liberacao de Portugal (ELP). (100)

While it is beyond the scope of this article to go into the entire history of AP, two of its activities throw light on later black-red relations. As noted above, one branch of AP was charged with the training of mercenaries and terrorists. It set up facilities in specially-designated Legiao and PIDE/DGS training camps, and offered an intensive three-week course that included both the theoretical instruction in the tradecraft of subversion (including methods of action psychologique, intelligence gathering, clandestine communications and infiltration), and hands-on training in urban terrorist techniques (including the use of explosives and other specialized weaponry).(101) Not surprisingly, most of those who passed through the AP’s guerre revolutionnaire course were drawn from the ranks of European neo-fascist organizations, (102) and some were later implicated in terrorist actions. (103)

Even more importantly, given the topic under consideration, ‘the infiltration of pro-Chinese (Maoist) organizations and the use, of this cover was one of the great specialities of Aginter.'(104) At the end of 1965, even before the creation of AP, Guerin-Serac and his men commenced operations in Portuguese Africa with the objective of liquidating guerilla leaders, installing informants and provocateurs in genuine resistance groups, and setting up false liberation movements.(105) Somewhat later, they found the perfect vehicle to use as a cover – the Parti Communiste Suisse/Marxiste-Leninist (PCSIML), an ostensibly Maoist organization headed by Gerard Bulliard.(106) The AP man responsible for arranging this was Robert Leroy, a former member of Charles Maurras’ Action Francaise, the pre-war Cagoule terrorist network, Vichy intelligence, the Waffen SS, and Otto Skorzeny’s commando force who worked after the war for both NATO intelligence and the BND, where he specialized in acquiring information on the left under journalistic cover.(107) With the help of the communist Chinese embassy in Berne, he persuaded Bulliard to hire him and other AP personnel as correspondents for the PCS/MI- paper, L’Etincelle. (108) Armed with these credentials, Leroy and Jean-Marie Laurent were able to penetrate ‘liberated territory’ in Angola, Guinea-Bisseau and Mozambique in order to ‘interview’ several African guerrilla leaders. After doing so, they engaged in intoxication operations to provoke dissension within the resistance movements. Leroy’s machinations may have been partially responsible for the bombing that killed Frent de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) leader Eduardo Mondlane.(109) In addition to their African ventures. AP ‘correspondents’ also infiltrated the Portuguese opposition in western Europe by posing as Maoist journalists.(110) And, as we shall soon see, Guerin-Serac, Leroy, and possibly Laurent were later linked to rightist provocations in Italy. These examples, which could be multiplied, give a general indication of the important role played by Aginter in transmitting guerre revolutionnaire techniques to the European extreme right. It is now time to consider the link between Aginter and the development of a systematic ‘strategy of tension’ in Italy.

Rightist manipulation of the postwar Italian political climate originated long before the arrival of AP’s ‘correspondents’. Before World War 2 ended, the American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) operatives such as Allen Dulles (a future director of the CIA) and James J. Angleton (a future head of CIA counter-intelligence) were working to neutralize the postwar political influence of communist-controlled resistance organizations – Dulles by arranging for the escape and/or recruitment of certain Axis intelligence and police personnel, (111) Angleton by forging close links to key industrialists and rightist circles within the Vatican, army, police and secret services.(112) After the war, Angleton helped to subsidize several far-right paramilitary groups, ostensibly to prevent a communist coup,(113) and played a decisive personal role in saving the life of the ‘Black Prince’, Junio Valerio Borghese, an Italian war hero and war criminal who was later to be involved in several right-wing coup plots.(114) Moreover, the postwar ‘purge’ in Italy was limited to a few thousand radical fascist supporters of the Nazi-backed Repubblica Sociale Italiano (RSI) and thus did not affect numerous high-ranking officials from the period of the fascist ventennio, (115) including personnel within Mussolini’s secret police apparatus, the Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascismo (OVRA) and the pre-war and wartime secret service, the Servizio Informazioni Militare (SIM).(116) Finally, from the late 1940s on, the US government secretly funnelled millions of dollars into Italy to establish anti-communist trade unions and networks of civic ‘self-defense’ committees, as well as to finance rightist publications and electoral campaigns by conservative parties.(117) It was in the context of this extensive intervention in Italian affairs that neo-fascism reconstituted itself.

The Italian ‘Strategy of Tension’

As the war drew to a close, former fascists generally followed one of two paths to ensure their survival and promote their political views.(118) Those of a more conservative stripe, including most of the adherents of the ventennio regime, swelled the ranks of the many reactionary parties that were springing up to take advantage of the new political system being imposed on Italy by the victorious Allies, especially Guglielmo Gianini’s populist anti-democratic Uomo Qualunque (UQ) party.(119) But for the intransigent pro-‘socialist’ and pro-Nazi elements among the supporters of RSI, following such a course of action was both psychologically objectionable (120) and difficult in practice, since it was precisely these ultras who were being hunted by former partisans and various Allied agencies. Many were therefore forced to go underground, and some established ephemeral clandestine paramilitary organisations, the most important of which was the Fasci d’Azione Rivoluzionaria (FAR), which engaged in acts of symbolic resistance and sporadic violence,(121). Such groups remained politically marginal until their members gradually made their way into the ranks of the MSI, an ostensibly ‘democratic’ electoral party organised by lesser RSI figures after the announcement of amnesty in late 1946,(122). However, when the pro-NATO ‘double-breasted’ moderates led by Arturo Michelini took charge of the party’s political direction in the early to mid-1950s,(123) the more radical and youthful elements grew increasingly restive and began to form new clandestine action groups,(124). Among these were Ordine Nuovo, which began in 1954 as an extremist current within the MSI and formally broke with it in 1956,(125) and Avanguardia
Nazionale, which also emerged from within the ranks of the MSI’s youth sections in 1959 (126). These organisations soon became the most active black terrorist formations in Italy and were intimately involved in every phase of the strategy of tension,(127).

With this background, we can turn to the opening phase of the strategy of tension in Italy, which began in earnest in 1968 and culminated in the terror bombings in Milan and Rome in 12 December 1969. A number of official and ‘unofficial’ organs of repression appear to have played an important direct or indirect role in the evolution of this rightist strategy, including NATO intelligence, the CIA, the Greek KYP, the Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), and sections of the Italian army and police (128); but here I will focus attention on the series of Nazifascist infiltrations and provocations apparently inspired by guerre revolutionnaire doctrine as practiced by the barbouzes of Aginter Press.(129). This provides another excellent illustration of the nature of the previous relations between black terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left, one that undermines Harmon’s simplistic interpretation of the complex role played by Italian Nazi-Maoist and other types of neo-fascist groups.

The initial acquaintance of the Italian extreme right with guerre revolutionnaire concepts goes back to the early 1960s when the OAS was waging its desperate struggles against both the FLN and De Gaulle. To establish a support network for their political and military efforts, OAS, representatives made contact with far-right circles throughout Europe. As a result. young Italian neo-fascists from ON and the Italian section of Jean-Francois Thiriart’s international Jeune Europe (JE) organisation went to special training camps in Belgium and West Germany to learn techniques of OAS and Nazi propaganda, (130) and the OAS set up bases in Italy to give them ‘refresher courses’,(131) presumably in methods of action psychologique and terrorism. Moreover, among those who took a special interest in rendering assistance to the OAS were several Italian neo-fascists who were later deeply implicated in the strategy of tension, including Guiseppe (‘Pino’) Rauti, one of the founders of ON, who organised demonstrations on behalf of the OAS;(132) Serafino De Luia of AN, who offered to shelter fleeing OAS terrorists at his home;(133) and Guido Giannettini, a Nazi-fascist journalist, intelligence asset for several secret services, and national leader of the MSI, who was mentioned in a Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate (SIFAR) report as one of the principal agents of the OAS in Italy. (134)

Not surprisingly, Giannettini and Rauti later played a key role in disseminating guerre revolutionnaire doctrine among the upper echelons of the Italian military. They made a particularly strong impression on General Guiseppe Aloja, then Army Chief of Staff, at a time when he was waging a bitter battle with General Giovanni De Lorenzo over the reorganisation of the armed forces. Essentially, Gianetti had convinced Aloja of the need to employ action psychologique and institute commando-style training to create an elite, ideologically sound, and highly motivated military instrument capable of warding off communist subversion; whereas Lorenzo preferred to rely primarily on an expanded intelligence service and fully militarized police apparatus,(135). Although neither general won a clear cut victory for his pet project, one indication that guerre revolutionnaire was taken seriously is provided by the SID-funded Instituto Alberto Pollio conference devoted to the subject at Rome’s Parco dei Principi hotel in May of 1965.(136). This conference brought together numerous high-ranking military officers, conservative politicians, rightist journalists and neo-fascist terrorists like Stefano Delle Chiaie and Michele Mario Merlino. and it featured presentations by both Giannetti and Rauti, (137). While it is difficult to assess the impact of guerre revolutionnaire concepts on the Italian officer corps as a whole perhaps a study of specialized military publications would provide some indication (138) – there is a considerable body of evidence demonstrating that extremist factions within the security forces aided black terrorists in applying them over a period of several years. (139)

Guerre revolutionnaire methods also reached Italy via a somewhat surprising intermediary – the ultra-rightist Greek colonels who had launched their own highly successful military coup in April 1967. Some indications of the important functions they served in the first phases of the strategy of tension will be given below, but here is should he pointed out that Colonel George Papadopoulos and other officers linked to the KYP (and thus to the CIA)(140) had long been devotees of guerre revolutionnaire doctrine. Papadopoulos was himself apparently an avid reader of the French counter-insurgency theorists, including Colonels Charles Lacheroy, Roger Trinquier and Argoud.(141) Moreover, the Greek golpistas employed their own ‘strategy of tension’ with great success in the months prior to their coup. and it involved the same elements that soon made their appearance in Italy – terrorist bombings, provocations launched under ‘leftist’ cover, action psychologique etc.(142)

Finally – and perhaps most significantly – the leading figures behind the strategy of tension in Italy had long been in direct contact with Aginter’s operatives. The first known link was established between Robert Leroy and Delle Chiaie, the founder of AN and arguably the world’s most dangerous quasi-governmental right-wing terrorist during a 1965 Nouvel Ordre Europeen/ Neue Europaische Ordung (NOE/NEO) convention sponsored by ON in Milan.(143) Several other such meetings took place during the period from 1966 to 1969,(144) and apparently Leroy became close friends with a number of Italian neo-fascists, including Merlino (ON and AN). Stefano Serpieri (Europa Civilta), Clemente Graziani (co-founder of ON with Rauti), Prince Borghese (founder of the Fronte Nazionale), and Carlo Maggi, a friend of Nazi-Maoist Franco Freda.(145) The most important of all these get-togethers may have occurred on 31 January 1968, only a couple of months before the eruption of the strategy of tension, when Guerin-Serac himself met with Rauti to discuss ‘anti-communist activities’ involving both propaganda and ‘eventual offensive actions’.(146) Aside from these meetings, an ex-OAS veteran named ‘Jean’ helped to train AN personnel in the use of explosives and participated with AN members in a bombing of the South Vietnamese embassy in Rome, which was then attributed to the left.(147) This ‘Jean’ was later tentatively identified as AP’s Jean-Marie Laurent.(148) Still another concrete indication of AP’s direct involvement was provided by Merlino, who attempted to infiltrate the Italian Maoist group Avantguardia Proletaria by boasting of his connections to the Swiss ‘Maoist’ journal, L’Etincelle (149).

However, the most damning evidence linking Aginter to the strategy of tension in Italy was provided by a November 1968 report from one of AP’s Italian ‘correspondents’ to the agency’s Lisbon headquarters, where it was later discovered. In this report, the manipulative tactics characterizing the strategy were clearly outlined:

‘We think that the first phase of our political action should be to promote chaos in all the structures of the regime Our activity must be to destroy the democratic state under the cover of communist or proChinese activities; we have already infiltrated some of our people into these groups and obviously we will have to adapt our actions to the ambience of that milieu (propaganda and forceful actions of the sort that seem to emanate from our communist adversaries) The introduction of provocateur elements into the circles of the revolutionary left is merely a reflection of the wish to push this unstable situation to the breaking point and create a climate of chaos. Pro-Chinese circles, characterized by their own impatience and zeal, are suitable for infiltration That will create a feeling of hostility towards those who threaten the peace of each and every nation (ie the radical left) We should work on public opinion to demonstrate the failure and incapacity of the legally-constituted apparatus, making ourselves appear as the only ones who can furnish a social, political, and economic solution adapted to the moment. At the same time we should raise up a defender of the citizens against the disintegration provoked by subversion and terrorism.'(150)

Similar ideas can be found in a terrorist manual prepared by Guerin-Serac, in which he argued that the psychological purpose of terrorism was to achieve ‘power over the masses by the creation of a climate of anxiety (and) insecurity’, thereby conditioning them to accept authority. (151)

Now that it has been established that certain guerre revolutionnaire concepts were disseminated within the Italian neo-fascist orbit by Aginter operatives, it remains only to outline the intoxication tactics employed in the initial stages of the strategy of tension to show that they were applied. As the above document suggests, the first stage was characterizied by a ‘vast operation of infiltration in the milieu of the left and the creation of new fascist groups masquerading under labels that vaguely echo Marxist terminology.'(152) The second witnessed the launching of several terrorist attacks, especially bombings, many of which were attributed to the left by police and judicial authorities working in collusion with the rightists that actually committed them.

Prior to 1968, the most violent Nazi-fascist outfits in Italy confined their activities to traditional squadristi tactics and occasional terrorism directed against the left; but the growth of the New Left and the increasing possibility of PCI participation in the government led the far right to adopt new and more severe measures associated with guerre revolutionnaire theories. I have already mentioned the possibly seminal meeting between Guerin-Serac and Rauti in January 1968, but the actual launching of provocation operations directly followed another important event. In April of that year, members of several Italian neo-fascist organizations took a ‘tour’ of Greece with some ultra-right Greek counterparts who were studying in ltaly.(153) This tour was arranged by Rauti, who had personally visited Greece right after the coup and had established close relations with the ruling junta.(154) In Greece, a series of meeting were held between the visitors, among whom were Merlino and Serpieri, and representatives of the Greek regime, including Rauti’s friend Konstantin Plevris, leader of the Nazified ‘4th of August’ movement and an agent of the KYP.(155) Since Plevris was himself the architect of the Greek ‘strategy of tension’, most researchers have supposed that he advised the visiting rightists on the techniques he had used to manipulate the political climate in Greece prior to the launching of the coup. (156)

This assumption seems entirely justified, for the ‘tourists’ who returned from Greece appeared to have undergone a miraculous political transformation. Within days Merlino had founded the ‘anarchist’ Circolo XXII Marzo with ‘converted’ fascists,(157) and a number of other ‘leftist’ groups were also established by far-right militants, including De Luia’s Movimentio Studentesco Operaia d’Avanguardia, Attilo Strippoli’s ‘anarchist’ Grupo Primavera, Diego Vandelii’s Banda XXII Ottobre, and – perhaps most importantly – a complex of ‘left-wing’ organizations and distribution companies established by Nazi-Maoist Freda and Giovanni Ventura.(158) Other neo-fascist ‘converts’ penetrated genuine leftist organizations and attempted to generate internal dissension and provoke violent confrontations with the authorities. Merlino, for example, infiltrated and fractured the anarchist Circolo Bakunin, while Domenico Polli (of ON) and Alfredo Sestili (of AN) joined the Maoist Partito Communista d’Italia/Marxista-Leninista (PSdl/M-L) and created considerable confusion before being identified as provocateurs. (159) Many of these manipulation ventures met with only partial success because their executors were as yet too unprofessional, but even those that were exposed served to heighten general paranoia and create further divisions within the already divided student movement.(160)

This phase of the strategy of tension gradually merged into a second phase marked by continued provocation coupled with the initiation of numerous terrorist attacks, especially bombings (161) As early as November 1968, Della Chiaie’s operatives had placed a number of bombs in schools and outside police stations, hoping to make them appear to be the work of leftists.(162) But things really began to heat up in 1969. From 3 January to 12 December of that year – the date of the Piazza Fontana massacre – at least 145 attentats were launched by neo-fascists. Of these, 96 were targeted at the left and the remainder, almost all bombings in public places, were attributed to the left.(163) In April 1969, after meeting with Rauti and a ‘journalist agent’ (perhaps Giannettini), members of the Freda-Ventura group set off several bombs in Milan and Padua which were falsely pinned on the opposition. (164) This event set the pattern for a number of similar ‘incidents’ throughout 1969, incidents which were invariably blamed on the left by both the conservative press and various underhand police officials. The goal was to persuade the more moderate elements within the army and security forces that a violent ‘communist’ coup was in the works, thus providing a stimulus and pretext for military intervention.

This process culminated in a series of 4 blasts on 12 December 1969 in Milan and Rome. Of these, the most serious occurred in the lobby of the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura off the Piazza Fontana, where 16 people were killed and over 80 wounded(165) Only a few hours after the attack, Milan police commissioner Luigi Calabrese notified the press and other police agencies that he suspected that anarchists were behind the massacre, just as he had done after the April bombings earlier that year.(166) Shortly thereafter, several anarchists belonging to the Circolo 22 Marzo were arrested, including Pietro Valpreda, an unemployed ballet dancer who had previously refused to ‘cooperate’ with the police and inform on his friends.(167) Another politically active anarchist named Guiseppe Pinelli was brought to police headquarters for questioning and thence ‘accidentally’ fell to his death out of an upper story window while being interrogated. (168) Soon after, Valpreda and his associates were charged with the bombings and sentenced to prison. The Italian public breathed a sigh of relief, thinking that a group of violent subversives had been brought to justice.

Unfortunately, the true authors of the attacks had not been put behind bars. The Circolo 22 Marzo had in fact been established in late 1969 by Merlino. His purpose was to persuade some genuine anarchists to join so that they could be blamed for the upcoming terror bombings, and Valpreda and his friends had taken the bait. (169) In other words, the Piazza Fontana bombing was yet another neo-fascist provocation. aided and abetted by elements of the police and SID.(170) It was not until years later that a handful of honest investigating magistrates were able to overcome political obstacles, piece together the sequence of events, and indict the real perpetrators. On 18 January 1977 – over seven years after the event – thirty-four neo-fascists and officers of the secret services were formally charged with the crime, but only Freda, Ventura and Gianettini were actually in the dock.(171) The rest of the accused had disappeared or were otherwise unavailable for prosecution, including Delle Chiaie, Leroy and Guerin-Serac himself, identified as the actual planners of the crime in a 17 December 1969 SID report that had been conveniently ‘misplaced’ in the agency’s files. (172)

Meanwhile, the strategy of tension continued to unfold in Italy. From 1969 to 1975 there were 4334 officially-registered acts of terrorist violence, 83% of which were attributed to the extreme right (173). Throughout those years the country was afflicted by waves of public bombings, abortive coup attempts, widespread intoxication, provocations behind a ‘leftist’ cover, mass uprisings (as in Reggio Calabria in 1970), ‘deviations’ of the secret and security services, and other forms of black subversion of the democratic process.(174) Although these activities did not precipitate an overt rightist military putsch, as the employment of similar tactics accomplished in Greece (1967),(175) Chile (1973),(176) and Turkey (1971 and 1980),(177) they caused the deaths of hundreds of innocent bystanders, created a general climate of psychological insecurity, inhibited the political growth of the democratic left, and helped prompt the government to enact a series of harsh ‘anti-terrorist’ measures that adversely affected the civil liberties of all Italians.

Provisional Conclusions

What does this suggest about the black-red collusion thesis promoted by Harmon and others? On a superficial level, there is no way to reconcile the radical anti-system pronouncements of neo-fascist terrorists with their past history of intelligence-connected manipulations and provocations, except by (i) ignoring or minimising the latter, as most ‘collusion’ proponents have done,(178) or (ii) assuming that all black expressions of solidarity with the reds and antipathy toward the bourgeois state are simply rhetorical devices designed to mislead and disrupt the extraparliamentary left – as most ‘manipulation’ supporters have done.(179) In other words, the problem has hitherto generally been presented as an either-or issue. However, I believe that one must conjoin elements of the two perspectives in order to grasp the real complexity of the situation, even though it is not yet possible to clarify it fully.

As I suggested above, it would be a serious mistake to ignore neo-fascism’s revolutionary ideological components or underestimate the profound sense of alientation felt by recent generations of fascists.(180) The expressions of hostility toward the corrupt pseudo-democratic partitocrazia, US and Soviet domination of Europe, the tyranny of international capitalist exploitation, and modern bourgeois society in general are as palpable in the in-house writings of many radical neo-fascists as they are in those of the ultra-left.(181) There is no reason to suppose that such visceral hatred could not engender violent attacks on the state and a search for allies on the left who were likewise both anti-Soviet and unremittingly hostile to what Brigate Rosee (BR) communiques have often referred to as the ‘imperialist state of the multinationals’. (182) Indeed, one of the salient characteristics of the post-1968 period has been the adoption of certain New Left perspectives and tactics by various neo-fascist elements,(183) a development that was further stimulated in Italy by the partial mid-1970s crackdown on black terrorist formations that had previously been covertly aided, abetted, and protected by factions within the secret services and security forces.(184) Since they had begun to be subjected to official repression of the type that had been employed against the left for years, they saw increasing value in New Left critiques of the state and red terrorist organizational techniques.(185) For these and other reasons, new left-leaning, neo-fascist organizations and ideological currents arose in many parts of Europe during the 1970s, including ‘national revolutionary’ groups like the West German Sache des Volkes/ Nationalrevolutionare Aufbauorganisation (SdV/NRAO),(186) the Maoist evoliani in Italy’s Terza Posizione (TP),(187) and ‘solidarist’ outfits like Jean-Gilles Malliarakis’ Jeune Nation Solidariste (JNS) in France (188) and the Solidaristische Volksbewegung (SVB) in West Germany. (189) Towards the end of the decade neo-fascist terrorists were assassinating representatives of the state (especially in Italy), having shootouts with the police, bombing NATO installations (especially in West Germany) and – most relevantly – exchanging operational ‘assistance’ with their red counterparts, (190) all of which would seem to confirm Harmon’s views.

Nevertheless, other factors should make us wary of accepting this thesis without major qualifications. For one thing, many of the rightists that Harmon and others have assumed to he genuine ‘anti-imperialists’ were linked to organizations which were either identical to, or direct offshoots of, those implicated in the earlier phases of the strategy of tension. These include Pierluigi Paglai of AN, famous for his later participation (along with Delle Chiaie) in the rightist Bolivian ‘cocaine coup’ of 1980;(191) Marco Affatigato of ON, a suspect in the 1980 Bologna bombing;(192) Nazi-Maoists Freda, Mario Tuti and Claudio Mutti;(193) and Delle Chiaie himself. (194) Likewise Paolo Signorelli, one of the key animators of the late 1970s left fascist groups like TP and the circle associated with Costruiamo I’Azione, had been a long term member of ON and had been backed by AN as an MSI parliamentary candidate in the mid-1960s.(195) Yet these and other links, while suggestive, do not necessarily indicate that later left fascist outfits were merely bogus front organizations since, as Vittorio Borraccetti has pointed out, it is hardly surprising that some personnel from previous neo-fascist formations would drift into the newer, more dynamic groups.(196) Nor should one assume that politicos and terrorists never change their ideological perspectives or tactical methods in response to changing conditions.

Much more significant than past affiliations per se is the fragmentary but nonetheless growing evidence of rightist manipulations – covert or otherwise – of the violence-prone extra-parliamentary left since 1980.(197) This manipulation has taken at least two forms, both of which should now be familiar to the reader. The first is external and involves neo-fascist expressions of solidarity with the reds that are clearly not genuine but, rather, are intended both to publicly discredit the left and/or enable the blacks to enter into a destructive ‘cooperative’ arrangement with them. This is certainly the modus operandi of Delle Chiaie, who still poses as an ‘anti-imperialist revolutionary’ despite his long history of collusion with forces that would be considered reactionary by any standards, and probably also of several other rightist ultras. Thus, it has been recently suggested that West German neo-Nazi Odfried Hepp, who has publicly proclaimed that ‘everyone is justified in this (anti-imperialist) struggle’ and whose interaction with both Arabs and left-wing European terrorists has been thoroughly documented,(198) was employed as an agent provocateur by the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). (199) If so, this throws an entirely different light on his participation with other neo-Nazis in a series of unclaimed bank heists and bombings of NATO facilities, crimes that were invariably blamed on red terrorist groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and Revolutionare Zellen (RZ) until a ‘black trail’ was later uncovered.(200)

Other ‘black trails’ seem to lead directly inside the ranks of several of the most notorious left-wing Euro-terrorist outfits, including the BR in Italy (201), Action Directe (AD) in France (202), the Crupos de Resistencia Antifascistas Primero de Octubre (GRAPO) in Spain (203) – and possibly the Cellules Communistes Combattantes (CCC) in Belgium.(204) This second sort of manipulation is even more sophisticated and effective, since it apparently involves the internal direction of some ‘red’ terrorism by rightist provocateurs linked to Western security agencies. Although the extent of such activity is at present impossible to determine, the results help to justify the massive Western propaganda campaign about the threat posed by the ‘communist terror network’. (205)

Thus we are still unable to arrive at definitive conclusions since evidence can be found to support both the ‘collusion’ and ‘manipulation’ theses. Yet these seemingly contradictory interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. After all, some neo-fascists may have been pursuing a strategy of disruption even as others were making efforts to establish a common black-red oppositional front. For this reason, and despite the long and continuing history of right-wing provocations, I believe Borraccetti is right to insist that the development of new left-leaning, neo-fascist groups advocating spontaneous actions and attacks on the heart of the state represented ‘real political processes’, and were not simply ‘camoflaged tactics’ adopted by older organizations. (206) Even if one were to assume the most conspiratorial scenario – that the founders and leaders of all these groups had purposely created bogus formations to confuse and discredit the left – it seems clear that many of their youthful adherents were not aware of this dissimulation and joined them precisely because they found the ultra-revolutionary rhetoric of such figures to be highly appealing. ‘This explains the disillusionment that resulted’ on those occasions when radical neo-fascist youths discovered that they had been misled into supporting ‘reaction’. As early as 1967, for example, a young AN member accused Delle Chiaie of being a tool of the system rather than a genuine revolutionary, a sentiment apparently shared by others. He was killed by a car bomb after threatening to expose his chief’s links to the Ministry of the Interior.(207) Therefore, as a tentative hypothesis and potential heuristic device to explain examples of genuine collusion, I would suggest that we are dealing at least in part with inter-generational strife of a sort which has often developed within youth-oriented fascist movements and regimes.(208) In this case, however, it was further exacerbated and greatly influenced by the far-reaching social and political transformations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly those associated with the New Left. (209)

To sum up, it seems that recent relations between right-wing terrorists and the extra-parliamentary left in Europe have involved both sporadic collusion and the systematic manipulation of the latter by the former. As a result, the precise nature of black-red interaction cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be thoroughly investigated on a case-by-case basis. If this is not done, discussions of both terrorism and the contemporary extreme right will continue to be dominated by political polemics, disinformation and other sorts of distortions and over-simplifications.

Notes

See, e.g., Algazy (1984) p.16 for France; for Italy see Corsini and Chiarini (1983) p.13; for Germany see Tauber (1967) pp..xv – xviii.
Although the terms ‘clandestine’ and ‘covert’ are often used as synonyms today, even by intelligence personnel, they in fact refer to different sorts of actions. According to former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative Christopher Felix (pseudonym) clandestine operations are ‘hidden but not disguised’, whereas covert operations are ‘disguised but not hidden’. Thus the former would apply to a group of camoflaged armed men seeking to disembark secretly on, say, the Cuban coast, the latter would apply to the landing of a CIA operative at Havana airport under business or State Department cover. See his fascinating and revelatory work (1963) pp. 27-9.
Cf the remarks of Tomlinson (1981) p.104: election returns do not disclose the whole story by any means. Parliament may to one arguable extent or another reflect ‘the will of the people’, but it cannot, indeed does not, always protect that interest from the undue influence of the infiltrator, the disruptor and the street fighter. ‘ A better evaluative approach in such cases would be to examine the hidden organizational networks linking these groups to their counterparts abroad and, perhaps more importantly, to sympathetic factions within powerful private and public institutions, particularly the state apparatus. Unfortunately, this is rarely done.
Another research paper altogether would be required to substantiate this statement thoroughly, but there is a great deal of evidence to support it, though much of its is admittedly indirect and circumstantial. What can be said with certainty is that almost all of the leading promoters of the ‘Soviet terror network’ thesis – for example Brian Crozier, Arnaud de Borchegrave, Ray Cline, Paul Henze, Michael Ledeen, Robert Moss, John Rees, Claire Sterling, Pierre de Villemarest and a number of Israelis – have a long history of direct or indirect intelligence connections; that some of these people have been personally involved in prior ‘counter-terror’, counter-insurgency, psychological warfare, or propaganda operations; that most have at some point been connected to think tanks or other organizations which have themselves been covertly funded by intelligence agency slush funds; that they frequently meet to exchange information (and perhaps to develop and coordinate disinformation themes) at pseudo-academic conferences; and that the data they cite to buttress their claims are derived primarily from each other and ‘unnamed’ intelligence sources – i.e. sources that are untraceable, unverifiable and arguably contaminated. A good introduction to this whole convoluted subject is Paull (1982). Additional material can be found regularly in specialized investigative publications like Covert Action Information Bulletin, Bulletin d’Information sur Intervention Clandestine (France), Intelligence/Parapolitics (now Intelligence Newsletter) (France), Lobster (UK), National Reporter (formerly Counterspy) (US, recently defunct), The Public Eye, Celsius (formerly Article 31) (Belgium), Searchlight (UK) and the now defunct State Research Bulletin (UK). A great deal more is scattered throughout dozens of books and needs to be synthesized. In any event, one would have to have exceptional faith in both coincidence and the morality of covert operatives who specialize in deception to view this type of literature as unproblematic.
Examples of works that promote this thesis are Alexander and Cline (1984), Becker (1985); Francis 1981); Goren (1984); Moss (1980; Possony and Bouchey (1978); Sablier(1983); Sterling (1982). A recent anthology with the same theme is Ra’anan et al(1986). Not surprisingly, many of the same ‘experts’ appear in its pages. A discussion of the background of the above authors would be highly revealing, but unfortunately cannot be attempted here.
An excellent critique of the contaminated, circular and/or unconfirmable nature of these sources can be found in Paull pp 59-91. Cf also Herman (1982) especially pp 53-5; idem and Brodhead (1986), pp 132-6 and passim.
The term ‘Nazifascist’ signifies a Nazified form of fascist belief, i.e. one which emphasises biological racism. For more discussion on the currents of fascism and Nazism, see notes 29-36.
It should be pointed out that official investigators have recently concluded that neo-Nazis were probably not primarily responsible for the Rue Copernic bombing, even though it was claimed at the time by a Federation d’Action Nationale et Europeen (FANE) spokesman. Most of the clues later unearthed have pointed to Arab involvement. Nevertheless, 122 incidents of violence and arson of extreme right provenance were recorded by French authorities during the first ten months of 1980, and one week before said bombing neo-fascist terrorists from FANE had launched machine~gun attacks on five Jewish establishments. See Hoffman,(1994) p.18. For more on FANE see Dumont (1983), pp. l88-9; Chairoff (1977) pp. 209-212.
See Sheehan (1981),p. 25, Hoffman (1984) also notes, pp.16-19, the lack of concern about the threat posed by right-wing terrorists among security personnel in West Germany. Cf also Walraff (1979), pp.40-52, for a striking illustration of the double standard of the West German police toward rightist and leftist groups. However, as will be suggested below, this ‘neglect’ may have more sinister ramifications.
Even Sterling (1982) refers to the existence and potential future significance of a ‘continent-wide Black Terrorist International’, but that is as far as she takes the discussion. See p.1. In Europe it is customary to use the adjective ‘black’ when one refers to the extreme right and the adjective ‘red’ when one is specifying the extreme left.
See his important study, Laurent (1978).
For more on the background of the Heritage Foundation, see the articles collected by the Investigative Resource Center vol 1 pp. 156-66. Heritage was founded in 1974 with money provided by right-wing ‘philanthropists’ like Joseph Coors and Richard Scaife. It is among the many right-wing think tanks that have cropped up in America, but is generally considered to be less prestigious than the Hoover Institution (with which has also been affiliated), or the American Enterprise Institute, and less ‘spooky’ (i.e. intelligence-connected) than the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.
See especially Harmon (1982) pp. 5-7, and (1985) pp. 48-9.
Here I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union is uninvolved in terrorism or that it does not frequently engage in similar types of covert machinations, but only that there is as yet no evidence for Harmon’s accusations in this particular context.
Harmon (1985) p. 41. Cf idem (1982) pp. 2-7; Hoffman (1984) pp. 23-5; Lee and Coogan (1987), pp. 40-6, 52-4. Harmon is the only one to emphasize a Soviet connection. Moreover, he wrongly identifies the groups on the left who share these similarities with the ultra-right. It is not orthodox communists, Trotskyites, and anarchists who are generally involved, but Maoists and other ‘unorthodox’ groups among the extra-parliamentary left.
Here it is worth noting that reliable information on terrorist operations is very hard to come by, and it is probable that many details about them will never be known.
See e.g. Weber (1965), pp.1-3. In this paper I have nonetheless employed the traditional designations, not because I find them satisfactory, but only to avoid undue confusion.
The ‘totalitarianism’ theory was popularized by a number of people, but especially by Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965), and Arendt (1966). The work which opened the debate on ‘the authoritarian personality’ was written by Adorno et al (1950). Although Adorno and company sought to measure right-wing authoritarianism – one of their tests was known as the ‘F’ (for fascism) Scale – later researchers argued that it could be applied equally well to left-wing authoritarianism. See,e.g. Shils(1954). For a recent version of the ‘extremism’ thesis, see the interesting work by Bravo (1982). Similar arguments are also characteristic of the self-justificatory ‘pluralist’ school within American political science.
Cf Lee and Coogan p. 54. A classic statement of this perspective is that of Hoffer(1951). However, I do not attribute this ‘extremism’ to personal pathology, as Hoffer and many other political analysts have done, but view it as a natural – if not exactly ‘rational’ – response to the dehumanizing features of all bureaucratized industrial or ‘post-industrial’ societies. As Fromm argued in The Sane Society (Fromm, 1955) estrangment and resistance are healthy responses to pathological social environments, not evidence of individual psychosis.
According to RAND corporation researcher Bruce Hoffman, this is true of terrorism as well. See Hoffman (1985) pp. l-2. However, he appears to be assuming that all terrorists are anti status-quo, which rules out the personnel involved in state terrorism waged through parallel apparatuses, as is common in Latin America and many other ‘under developed’ regions of the world.
Thus, Bravo has attempted to define extremism as a political phenomenon in its own right, one which is to some extent independent of particular ideologies. See Bravo pp. 7-12. Cf also the remarks of Hoffman (1985) pp. 3-4: studies of terrorist prisoners in a number of countries (Italy, Germany and Turkey among them) have concluded that in many cases it was a matter of chance whether the prisoner joined a left- or a right-wing terrorist group….’ (emphasis mine).
Cited by Harmon (1985) p. 46.
ibid p. 49
Fascists have always viewed themselves as revolutionaries and expressed contempt towards traditional conservatives and other types of ‘reactionaries’. As Hitler himself argued, ‘there is more that binds us to Bolshevism than separates us from it. There is, above all, genuine revolutionary feeling….. The petit bourgeois Social Democrat and the trade union boss will never make a Nazi, but the Communist always will.’ Cited by Harmon (1982) p. 7. This assessment is partially borne out by the fact that so many leading fascists had earlier been revolutionary socialists or communists, as well as by the recruitment of Kommunistische Partie Deutschlands (KPD) personnel by the Sturmabteilung (SA) during the Wiemar period.
Cited by Hoffman (1984) p. 24.
Harmon (1985) p. 42. What Harmon apparently doesn’t realize is that this was also true of ‘classical’ fascism. Moreover, it would be more accurate to characterize the extreme left as anti-Zionist than ‘anti Jewish’, although one can no doubt find examples of leftists who are anti-Semitic.
See e.g. Algazy pp. 289-91
Brigouleix (1977) p.92. For various classificatory schema of the French far right see Petitfils (1983), pp. 5-10; Duprat (1972) pp.211-215; Dumont (1983) pp. 5-57; Pons (1978), passim, but especially diagrams on pp.250-3
See my as yet unpublished study, ‘The Main Currents of Neo-Fascist Ideology: an Overview’. Cf Cadena (1978) pp.17-72. These divisions within neo-fascism stem from the heterogeneity and ambiguity of the ‘classical’ fascist ideological synthesis. The most important common denominator of all genuinely fascist ideologies lies in the attempt to conjoin certain currents of nationalist and socialist thought, specifically a radical romantic, populist and authoritarian variety of nationalism, with virulent anti-liberal and anti-bourgeois sentiments, and a revolutionary, voluntarist, elitist, and mythopoetic variety of socialism with strong anti-rationalist and anti-materialist (ie anti-Marxist) tendencies. The complex causes of the alliances between groups of radical nationalists and ultra-revolutionary socialists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries cannot be entered into here, but it is important to emphasize that ever since, fascism has appealed to a diverse political constituency whose elements have been attracted primarily by either its nationalist or socialist components, i.e. by a particular combination in which one of these components took precedence. Thus, although all reasonably coherent fascists have promoted a revolutionary ‘third way’ of organizing the national community that would enable them to overcome the manifest shortcomings of both ‘plutocratic’ capitalism and ‘collectivist’ Bolshevism, every fascist movement has been internally divided along basic ideological lines, and in all of them one can usually identify a ‘left’ and ‘right’ wing, not to mention many other factions. Yet despite its ideological variations, fascism should never be equated with traditional conservatism or standard varieties of reaction; nor should it be conflated with its Nazi variant, which was highly atypical due to Hitler’s overwhelming obsession with biological racism and eugenics. For the best analyses of fascist ideology see Webber (1964); Sternhell (1978); idem (1983); idem (1976) pp.315-76; and Gregor (1969). Note, however, that the latter devotes more space to codified fascist doctrine in the regime phase, at which point it had assumed a more compromised conservative character. Ideologies are always ‘purer’ in the movement phase, before the accession of power.
Bale pp.33-8; Cadena pp.29-36. This tendency represented an attempt by pro-Nazi elements to adapt the Hitlerian emphasis on biological racism to postwar political and geopolitical realities. The key works promoting ‘social racism’ are Binet (1950,1951,1975); and Amaudruz (1971). Cf also the original Zurich ‘dedaration’of the neo-Nazi international Binet and Amaudruz helped found, the Nouvel Ordre Europeen/Neu Europaische Ordung (NEOINEO), which can be found in Smoydzin (1966), pp. l79-88.
Bale, pp.38-46; Cadena pp.37-47. The major proponents of this tendency in the pre-1968 period was Belgian neo-fascist Jean-Francois Thiriat, (1964 and 1965). However, this tendency became much more widespread after 1968, as many young neo-fascists sought to adopt and adapt certain New Left analyses and tactics.
Cadena pp.48-61. This tendency was especially influential in Italy, where elements of Evola’s esoteric views – which were in fact technically neo-fascist came to be adopted by both ‘social racists’ and ‘revolutionary nationalists’ for reasons too complicated to go into here.
Evoia’s most politically relevant and influential works are Evola (1969 1964 1971 1953 and1961). His key disciples in postwar Italy were neo-fascists Rauti (1976) and Romualdi (1978 and 1973), among other works. For a general though somewhat superficial English introduction to Evola’s thought, see Drake (1986) pp.61-89.
Cadena pp. 70-2. The key theorist of Nazi-Maoism is Freda (1969), a fascinating work which is truly innovative in its attempts to synthesize various Evolan and New Leftist notions and thereby develop a new revolutionary neo-fascist program of action. Other important Nazi-Maoist proponents include Mario Tuti and Claudio Mutti.
The ND represents a Gramscian-inspired attempt by neo-fascists and other rightist intellectuals to supplant what they perceive as Marxist ideological hegemony in France and, by extension, throughout Western Europe. Its key animator is Alain de Benoist (aka Fabrice Laroche and other pseudonyms), whose chief works are 1979 and 1979. Despite repeated protestations that the ND is ‘apolitical’- see e.g. de Benoist’s self-righteous denials of both the neo-fascist background and the ‘fascistoid’ orientation of the ND in a threatening letter he sent in response to an excellent study by Verhoeyn (1974-6), published in vol.3 of same, pp.39-43 – the ‘scientific’ anti-egalitarian views promoted in its various organs and in certain mainstream media outlets (including the widely-read Figaro Magazine), clearly have serious political implications. The neo-fascist origins of de Benoist and many other ND figures have been ably recounted in Taguieffs outstanding article, ‘La Strategic Culturelle de la Nouvelle Droite en France 1969-1983’, in Union des Ecrivains (1984), especially pp.19-41.
This ‘national right’ perspective is in many respects similar to the pro-American and pro-capitalist views generally promoted by mainstream European rightist and centre-right parties like the West German Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC). For this reason it has not appealed to neo-fascist ultras, who view it as inherently reactionary.
Galli (1974), p.60. There are of course others with more marginal political significance, including the ‘pro-East Bloc’ perspective of the so-called ‘nationalist neutralists’ in West Germany, as well as ‘NaziSoviet’ elements among ex-SS men and a few younger neo-fascists, who admire the Soviets for successfully creating the sort of totalitarian socialist state that Hitler had failed to build.
For the case of MSI, see Del Boca and Giovana (1969) pp. l40-1; Weinberg (1979) p.20.
For more on the ‘third force’ perspective see Galli, pp. 60-3; Tauber pp. 208-29; Bale pp. 25-8,32. In addition to the neo-fascist works cite above in notes 30-2 and 34, see Bardeche (1961) pp. 112-5, and Soucek (1956) passim. However, not all radical neo-fascists adopted this perspective. For example, the Nazi-Maoists advocated an alliance between ‘spiritual’ warrior elites in opposition to the materialistic bourgeois decadence which prevailed in Europe. See Freda, pp.9-15. Also, Bardeche appears not to have taken the ‘third force’ perspective seriously. See his comments in (1961) p.114, where he refers to Nation Europa as an ‘imaginary island’.
Tauber p.205. These phrases both appear in neo-fascist works.
Ibid pp.20-5–6; Bale pp.26-31. This is especially true in connection with the myth developed about the Waffen SS, an organization whose prewar image as an elite caste of Germanic (‘Aryan’) political soldiers was transformed during the war into that of a pan-European warrior aristocracy engaged in an anti-Bolshevik crusade to save European civilization. See, e.g. Koelil(1983) p.201.
Tauber pp.206–7.
Cited in Galli p.61
These themes can be found in varying combinations throughout most of the works listed in notes 30-4 above.
Bertini (1978) p.119.
Ibid; Ronchey (1979) pp.933-4.
Bertini p.19. This is precisely the theory behind the Italian ‘strategy of tension’, on which see below.
For some idea of the authoritarian socialist state most neo-fascists hoped to establish, cf Soucek pp.251-70; Thiriart (1964) pp.99–153, 279-86; Binet (1950) pp.36-8; Bardeche pp.106-11, 173-95; Freda pp.27-38.
These techniques will be familiar to those acquainted with the standard operational procedures employed in covert political warfare, for which see Blackstock (1964), esp. pp. 41-94; Momboisse (1970) esp. pp.45–46 and 161-72; Felix pp. 21-177.
The only apparently genuine examples of radical right-left collusion in the post-war period prior to the mid-1970s involve cooperation between Nazi veterans and/or neo fascists and particular Arab nationalist regimes, most notably those of Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir in Egypt and Mu’ammar al-Qadhadafi in Libya, or factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). However in these cases, particularly those of the aforementioned regimes, it is quite debatable whether the ideology of the Arabs was ‘leftist’ in any meaningful sense, since both Nasir and Qadhadafi were overtly anti-communist and were seeking to forge a ‘third way’ between capitalism and communism – not unlike the radical fascists, albeit in an entirely different social, cultural and political context. What made it possible for these groups to cooperate with each other was their shared hatred of Israel and resentment towards the two ‘imperialist’ superpowers. This type of cooperation was exemplified by such things as the occasional employment of ex-SS and Wehrmacht men as military instructors, intelligence officers, and/or propagandists by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya; the sporadic material support offered to the PLO by European neo-fascists (and vice versa); Qadhdafi’s bankrolling of ex-SS commando Otto Skorzeny’s Paladingruppe; the financial help given by Swiss Nazi financier Francois Genous to the rebel Front de Liberation National (FLN) during the Algerian war and, later for the legal defense of captured Palestinian terrorists. This entire subject has yet to be researched thoroughly.
The French term intoxication, which in general means poisoning, here refers specifically to manipulation of the political environment by means of the systematic dissemination of false or misleading information to a target group (or groups), the purpose of which is to paralyze or otherwise influence that group’s subsequent actions. The targeted group can be relatively small or encompass an entire society. For further discussion, see Nord (1971),esp. pp. vii – x (Gabriel Veraldi’s preface), and 57. The term was commonly employed in a more imprecise yet delimited way by French counterinsurgency specialists during the late 1950s and 1960s, for reasons which will become clearer below.
For an anecdotal history of police provocation see Thomas (1972). For more on the methods of provocateur recruitment and handling, see the old but still relevant work by Serge pp. 4-21.
For the beginning phases of this intelligence-gangster interlock, see Campbell (1977), Servadio (1976) pp.79-94, Marshall (1976) p.42. For the later development and extension of this nexus, see Ashman (1975), Joubert (1973) pp.403-54 and passim, Kaplan and Dubro (1986) esp. pp.63-9, Kruger (1980), McKoy (1972), and Sarrazin (1977) pp.36-41, 94-98, 327-8 and passim.
It was formerly thought that the bulk of the Nazis who managed to escape justice as the war ended had done so with the help of shadowy networks that they themselves had created, including the Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehoriger (ODESSA), the Kameradenwerk, the Spinne, Stille Hilfe, the Bruderschaft, the Schleuse etc. But it is now generally accepted that these networks were not as extensive as was once believed and that most of the Nazis and collaborators who escaped did so via the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) ‘rat lines’ or other routes established by the Vatican’s Refugee Bureaus. See, e.g. Linklater et al (1984), pp. 144-96. Allen Jr (1985) esp. pp.38–48, Farago (1974) pp.186–203. The latter work should be used with extreme caution since much of the information the author relied on from South American sources is untrustworthy. This does not apply to his account of the role of the Vatican in helping Nazi fugitives, however.
The most famous example of such recruitment involved the so-called Gehlen Organisation – the former Frerride Heere Ost (H0) section of OKH intelligence under the command of General Reinhard Gehlen – which was heavily staffed with SS and Sicherheitsdienst personnel. For more on this see Cookridge (1971), Guerin (1968), Hohne and Zolling, and Whiting (1972). However, many other Nazis and collaborators were recruited by American intelligence operatives, especially those with unconventional warfare or espionage experience and/or those from eastern Europe. See e.g., Guerin (1967), Loftus (1982), US Government Accounting Office Comptroller General (1985), Bower (1984), pp.129-87, Infield (1981) pp.l49-63 and especially Simpson (1988).
A wealth of evidence of uneven quality now exists on the use of ultra-rightists by Western intelligence services in the postwar era. Specific information can be found in a large number of sources, but in general see Chairoff (1975), idem, (1977), Gonzalez-Mata (1978), and Kruger all passim. However the works of the first two authors need to be used with special caution. Chairoffs real name is Ivan Dominique Catzi, and he himself is a neo-fascist and Western intelligence asset who worked for many years behind a left-wing journalistic cover. See Algazy p.311, Pons pp.244-6, Kruger pp.199-202. Gonsalez-Mata was a 30-year veteran of the Spanish intelligence service under Francisco Franco (see his own account in Cygne (Paris, Grasset, 1976)), and there is some doubt about whether his later political conversion was entirely genuine. Nevertheless, both men are extraordinarily knowledgeable about rightist intelligence connections, and they have good reason to use that knowledge to embarrass rival secret services and neo-fascist groups,
Paret (1964), pp.6-7, 101, Ambler (1966) pp.l70, 308-9.
The new doctrine’s acceptance was ‘not immediate’, according to Paret p. 8. Cf also Menard (1968) pp.93-4, Ambler p.309, de la Gorce (1963) pp.402-3.
Ambler p.309.
ibid pp.311-13, Menard pp. 87-8.
Paret p.17, Menard p.91.
Paret p.10, citing Colonel Gabriel Bonnet’s formula.
ibid pp.ll-12; Ximenes (pseudonym) (1957), pp.17-19, Trinquier 1968) pp.34-5, Deon (1959) pp.16-20, de la Gorce p.401, Kelly (1965) pp.l, 19-20, Planchais (1967) p.322.
Ambler pp.317-8, de la Gorce pp.401-2.
This was especially emphasised by Colonel Charles Lacheroy in a series of published and unpublished articles. The best description of the system of ‘parallel hierarchies’ in English is that of Pike (1966), especially pp.109-231.
For more on ‘psychological action’, see especially Megret (1959). This general term is further subdivided into guerre psychologique, operations directed against the enemy; and action psychologique proper, operations directed against elements of one’s own population.
The techniques utilized were derived from different sources, including the direct experience of French troops captured and ‘brainwashed’by the Viet-Minh and the writings of various Pavlovian psychological theorists, particularly Chakotin (1940).
Ambler pp. 301, 316-8.
Thus, while Lacheroy focussed on parallel hierarchies, Colonels Antoine Argoud and Trinquier emphasised the employment ‘adapted justice’, i.e., torture and terrorism; whereas others, particularly 5th Bureau personnel, concentrated on mass propaganda and individual re-education.
Ambler p.160; Menard p.97; Paret p.57.
For a good but self-interested description of the battle, see Massu (1972) pp. 85-271. For the FLN organization of the city, see Trinquier (1961) pp.10-15.
de la Gorce pp. 390–3,399-400, Ambler p.113.
For the OAS’ plan to use intoxication in the metropole, see OAS (1964), document 48 pp. 225-6, wherein the organization’s objectives were listed as (1) the ‘paralysis of Gaullist power’, (2) the ‘creation of a climate of generalized insecurity’, and (3) the ‘total paralysis of the country’. Cf also the remarks attributed to General Salan in the course of his trial. As he expressed it to his fellow OAS conspirators, their mission was to create a ‘climate of generalized insecurity by spreading false news We must inflame all sectors’. See Salan (1962), p.457. Naturally, systematic terrorism also played a role in OAS operations, both in Algeria and France. See Sergent (1968) pp.315-18, 328-37.
The term pied noir, which means ‘black foot’, refers to Algerians of European descent, specifically the offspring of French colonists. Since they desperately sought to remain in their north African birthplace without turning over power to the Arab majority, they flocked to the ranks of rightist organizations that actively sought to keep Algeria under French control.
On these events see Bromberger (1959 and 1960), Azeau (1961).
There is a substantial literature on the OAS. Among the more important works are Bocca (1968), Buchard (1963) 2 volumes, Heinnisart (1970), Barange, Morland and Martinez (pseudonyms) (1964), Nicol (1962), Susini (1963).
For later OAS operations in the metropole, see Buscia (1981) pp.89-128, Demaret and Plume (1975), Guerande (1964); Sergent pp.53-295.
For ‘national Catholicism’ in general, see Garrigou-Lagrange (1959), pp.515-43 and Maitre (1961) pp.106-117. Cf also Algazy pp. 182-92, Pons, pp.115-46, Ambler pp.319-23, Kelly pp.243-7. For excellent examples of the practical ‘this-worldly’ orientation of the national Catholics, cf the subversive guerre revolutionnaire tract, Contre-Revolution: Strategic el Tactique (Liege, Pierre Joly,1957).
For ‘national communism’, see especially Ambler pp. 323-5 and Kelly pp .247-8. This doctrine has been often characterized as ‘fascist’, a label I view as appropriate in this context. Cf the ideology of JN as presented by Algazy pp.116-21.
Laurent p.112. For the political goals of the OAS, see the documents collected in OAS (1964) especially document 44, pp.210-14, and the OAS program printed in the 15 June 1961 issue of L’Express.
Del Boca and Giovana p.88; Laurent p.99
Joesten (1962) pp.62-3.
Gaucher (1965) p.252.
Algazy pp. 228-30; Duprat, pp. 103-4; Del Boca and Giovana pp. l94-6.
Laurent pp.102-3.
To give only one example, former OAS operatives, including Delta Commando Francois Chiappe and guerre revolutionnaire practitoner Colonel Jean Gardes, played an important role in the massacre of left-wing peronistas by their rightist Peronist counterparts at Argentina’s Ezeiza airport on 20 June 1973. See Gillespie (1982) p.153, note 69, citing the Peronist left publication El Descamisado 7 (3rd July 1973). Later they were employed as trainers and operatives in Agentine Social Welfare Minister and Propaganda Due (P2) member Jose Lopez
Rega’s Alianza Anticommunista Argentina (AAA), a particularly vicious right-wing ‘death squad’, i.e. parallel police apparatus. See Kruger pp.113,165. For more on the links between the OAS and Argentine right see Janzen (1986) pp.96-105 and Dias and Zucco (1987) pp.103-5.
Other OAS veterans served in similar capacities elsewhere in Latin America, Africa, and the Iberian peninsula, a subject which remains to be explored fully.
The following section on AP is based primarily on Laurent’s account, which is in turn based on a detailed study of the agency’s documents discovered at PIDE/DGS and AP headquarters by leftist officers of the Movimento des Forcas Armadas (MEA). It is supplemented by some references in Chairoff (1977) pp.253-4 and 464-5, Gonsalez-Mata pp. 153-M, Roger-X Lanteri, ‘L’Intemationale Noire’,in L’Express (21 February 1977), p.34; and De Luttis (1984), pp. 165-9, all of which appear to be at least partially independent sources of information. Most other discussions of Aginter tend to rely on Laurent, e.g. de Lauwe (1981) pp. 35-7, Frisliknecht et al (1979) pp. 474-8.
Faligot and Krop (1985) pp. l65-70. Cf the account of Erwan Bergot, a former commander in the ’11th Choc’, (1976).
For Guerin-Serac’s biography, see Laurent pp. 120-2, which is based on a report compiled by the post-1974 Portuguese secret service. Note that Chairoff claims (1977) p.158 that Guerin-Serac served as a liaison man betweeen the SDECE and the CIA while stationed in Korea.
For more on the MCR, see Algazy pp.247-52.
Those interested in Ploncard d’Assac’s political views can consult his numerous publications, among which see those of 1965, 1960, and 1972; and, perhaps most relevantly, Coexistence Pacifique et Guerre Revolutionnaire (1963).
Laurent p.123. For the PIDE, which changed its name to the DGS after Caetano succeeded Salazar, see Dossier PIDE: Cis Horrores e Crimes de uma ‘Policia’ (Lisbon, Agencia Portuguesa do Revistas, 1974); Gallagher (1979) pp.385-403. Gouveia (1979), Luso,(1975), Vasco (1977). For the Legiao Portuguesa, see da Silva (1975).
Laurent pp. l19-20. There are many other intelligence-connected extreme right ‘press agencies’, including the defunct World Service (linked to the Greek service during the reign of the Colonels) and Agenzia Oltremare (linked to the Italian corpi separati).
ibid. p.119
I say ‘purportedly’ because I have not yet seen the AP documents upon which this claim is based, but because I think it unlikely.
The BND is in many respects the lineal descendent of the Gehlen Org. in terms of both personnel and structure. See supra. note 54. For the general organization of the BND, see Walde (1971) pp.79-105. For BOSS, see the amazing revelations by one of its former agents, Gordon Winter (1981). Cf also International Defence and Aid Fund (1975).
[Footnote omitted from original]
I have followed Laurent’s description (p. 119) here, though I suspect that O and T is identical to the strategic centre for subversion and intoxication he lists rather than a separate component. OACI would then have formed its ‘action’ arm. See Gonzalez-Mata pp.159-64, for OACI’s ‘missions’.
Laurent pp.128-34; Gonzalez-Mata pp.159-64
Laurent pp.139-56
ibid pp. 156-65
ibid 318-26, Gonsalvez-Mata pp.140-l41, Cadena pp.255-6. For more on the ELP, see the investigative report by Walraff (1976). Walraff posed as a rightist in order to obtain inside information on Portugese counter-revolutionary organizations. Cf also Dossier Terrorismo (Lisbon, Avante, 1977) for a listing of the violent actions undertaken by the ELP and other ultra-rightist groups up to March of 1977.
Laurent pp.135-6, DeLutiis p.168. Here it should also be pointed out that Guerin-Serac himself ‘drafted a small manual on the perfect terrorist’. See Lanteri 1977.
Laurent p.135.
See the discussion below for the direct involvement of AP-trained personnel in the Italian ‘strategy of tension’. Cf also De Lutiis pp.168-9, who notes that some of the specific elements of AP’s training courses later appeared in the writings of the Nazi-fascist Italian journalist Guido Giannettini. Interestingly, Giannettini had also established contacts with the Legiao Portuguesa in 1962 or 3. See ibid p.167.
Laurent p.148.
ibid p.139 (emphasis mine). Unfortunately, the AP files do not provide many details of these earlier actions. Those familiar with British counter-insurgency efforts will draw parallels here with Major General Frank Kitson’s establishment of ‘counter-gangs’ in Kenya and elsewhere. For which see Kitson (1960) pp.72-211.
Laurent pp.148-51
ibid pp. 154-6
The story is more complicated than I have indicated. See ibid pp.148-51. It maybe that Bulliard himself had consciously established a Maoist party which was then used by AP personnel, i.e. he may have been a player rather than a dupe. Moreover, the aid provided by the Chinese embassy may have been far from innocent, since the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) expended increasing efforts to neutralize Soviet influence in Africa following the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s. See, e.g. Larkin (1971) pp.44-5, 63-8 etc. Also, around the same time operatives of the communist Chinese secret service (KCCPC) were cooperating with Belgian left fascist Thiriart, according to Chairoff (1977) pp.444-5.
Laurent pp. 151-4.
ibid pp.l48-9,154.
See Scott (Covert Action Information Bulletin ) (1986) pp.5-7,11-14, and Loftus (1984), p.11 (about Dulles’ provision of aid to Nazi fugitive Walter Rauff, inventor of the portable gas chamber). Cf the general account of the negotiations between Dulles and SS leaders in northern Italy by Smith and Agarossi (1979). Naturally, Dulles’ own account (1966) is none too revelatory about these matters.
Faenza and Fini (1976), pp.32 note 5 and 318-30. This work is primarily based on US government documents obtained via the FOIA. Cf also Giorgio Bocca (1978), p.49 and Pier Giuseppe Murgia, in Problemi di Ulisse (1976), pp.127-35.
Faenza and Fini pp.169, 262-6; Christie (1984), pp.2-5. Christie, a well known British anarchist, was himself arrested in Spain for possessing explosives and plotting to assassinate Franco. It should be emphasised here, however, that most of these groups were not composed of radical fascist elements, but reactionary rightists of various sorts, including Catholic integralists, monarchists, and ‘patriotic’ veterans.
Faenza and Fini p.327, Christie p.6. This ‘rescue’ occurred on 29 April 1945. For
Borghese’s naval exploits earlier in the war, see his own account (1954), which prudently only covers the period prior to the establishment of RSI. For his subsequent anti-partisan campaigns, see Algardy (1958) pp. 183-248, Bertoldi (1976), pp.127-42, idem (1963) pp. l73-88, Tamaro (1948~50), vol pp. 3282-5. For insights into Borghese’s attitudes, see Pansa (1971); for his Fronte Nazionale (FNaz) organization, see Ferraresi ed. idem (1984) pp.57-61. The ‘black prince’ was a key figure in both the abortive ‘Tora Tora’ coup of December 1970 (for which see Valentini 1978), and the ‘Rosa dei Venti’ putschist infrastructure, as well as many less dramatic ultra-rightist ventures.
For the purge see Murgia (1975) pp.85-121.
On the continuity of wartime and postwar personnel within the Italian security services, see De Lutiis pp. 44, 48-51, and Collin (1976), pp.12-13.
Faenza and Fini pp.288-330, Faenza (1978) pp. 264-376, Barnes (1982) pp. 662-4. Some of this is also recounted in the US Congressional investigation headed by Rep. Otis Pike, portions of which have been published as CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham (UK), Spokesman, 1977), pp. 193-5. Cf also the interviews with Pike and various ex-CIA operatives in Stajano and Fini (1977), pp. 164-88, and the self-justificatory but nonetheless revealing version of William Colby (1978) pp. 108-40.
For good surveys of the post-war Italian right see Weinberg pp.13-69, Bartieri (1976),
Rosenbaum (1975), Del Bocca and Giovana pp. l26-73.
For the nature and appeal of Giannini’s party, see Palotta (1972); Setta (1975), Murgia (1975) pp.233-56, idem (1976) pp.9-83.
Those elements considered the conservative fascists who had plotted with the King against Mussolini to be reactionaries, opportunists and traitors. See Weinberg p.15, Del Boca and Giovana p.12.
For the early clandestine neo-fascist paramilitary organizations in Italy, see Murgia (1975) pp.25794, idem (1976) pp. 120-30, Weinberg, pp.14-16, Rosenbaum pp.35-6, Barbieri (1976) pp.18-23, Del Boca and Giovana pp.131-2. Fora first-hand account by a key member of FAR, see Tedeschi (1950). Tedeschi later became a ‘respectable’ MSI deputy and journalist.
For the birth of the MSI, see Murgia (1975) pp. 295-331, Rosenbaum pp.35-8, Weinberg pp.16-17.
For a good overview of this internal strife, see Weinberg pp.13-69. More details are provided by Murgia and Rosenbaum.
A good introduction to the more violent groups of Italian neo-fascists is provided by both Minna (1984) pp.21-72, and Ferraresi (1984) pp. 54-118.
For ON see Minna especially pp.33-35, Ferraresi pp. 62-6, Nunziata (1986) pp.71-86, Barbieri (1976) pp.62-4 and passim, Rosenbaum pp.19-20, Gaddi (1974) pp.35-6, Flamini (1981-5), vol 1 pp.21-5 and passim throughout all four volumes of this outstanding work.
For AN, see Minna especially pp.35-6, Ferraresi (1984) pp.66-71, Gaddi pp. 33-5, Flamini vol. 1 pp.76-7 and passim.
Minna p.32.
Virtually all the available secondary sources that focus on the strategy of tension in Italy emphasise the collusion between the neo-fascists involved and various Western intelligence and security agencies. Although most have been written by leftist investigative journalists, they are based almost entirely on mainstream media accounts and, more importantly, the reports made public in the course of official parliamentary and judicial investigations, including both previously classified documents and the direct testimony of witnesses and defendants, some of which they reproduce verbatim. The single most thorough account is provided by Flamini but cf. also Sassano (1974), idem (1972); idem and Roberto Pesenti, eds. (1974), Pesenti ed. (1974), Stajano and Fini (1971); el Bosco (1972); Carla Mosca (1978); Ibio Paolucci (1977), all passim. See also Christie pp.24-70, 76-41, 109-23; Laurent pp.169-288, De Lutiis, pp. 95-300, Boatti (1978) pp.137-42, Gonzalez-Matapp78-99. The evidence of collusion is blatant in the case of the Italian secret services, but somewhat more circumstantial in the case of foreign intelligence agencies.
The term barbouze means ‘false beards’ and refers to those engaged in covert missions. To my knowledge, it was first applied to a group of anti-OAS ‘counter-terrorists’ who were recruited from the French underworld by operatives of the Gaullist Service d’Action Civique (SAC) and dispatched to Algeria in order to eliminate the OAS infrastructure. Although these barbouzes did not succeed in their task, the term was later extended to encompass covert action specialists of all sorts. For the anti-OAS barbouzes, see the account by one of their leaders, Bitterlin (1983).
Del Boca and Giovana pp.158-9. For more on JE see Dumont especially pp.114-20, 142-5; and Verhoyen vol 1 pp.20-3.
Barbicri (1976) p.68.
Laurent p.174. For a thumbnail biography of Rauti, see Rivelli, pp. 189-90, note 5.
Stajano and Fini (1971) p.74
Laurent pp.193-4, Flamini Vol 1, p.60. For more Giannettini, see De Lutiis pp.l60-5. SIFAR, the Italian military intelligence service, was reorganised and renamed SID after the coup machinations of its former head, General Giovanni De Lorenzo, were exposed. For this sordid affair, see Collin, Zangrandi (1970), Martinelli (ed) (1968), and Flamini pp.41-4. More cautious but less convincing analyses can be found in Trionfera (1968), Pisano (1978) pp.15-16, and Bartoli (1976) pp.l63-203.
De Lutiis pp.76-9, Flamini vol. 1 pp. 94-6 Laurent pp. 202-3, llari (1979) pp. 523-9, 96-116 (especially 678); Giannettini and Rauti (1975) pp.12-16 (from introduction by leftist Lotta Continua commission). The last-named work is an hysterical anti-communist tract purporting to show that the communists were subverting the Italian armed forces. Although originally commissioned by General Aloja, it was considered too extreme to have the desired effect on public opinion and was withdrawn from circulation. Later it was published by the left to illustrate the paranoid rightist attitudes within factions of the Italian officer corps.
Flamini vol 1 pp.83-103, Laurent pp.201-8, Barbieri (1976) pp. 94-9, Christie pp. l39-40, De Simone (1972) pp.29-34. The conference proceedings were edited by rightist commentator Eggardo Beltrametti (1965). As the title indicates, this work was totally inspired by French guerre revolutionnaire theories.
For a list of some of the participants, including Delle Chiaie and Mario Merlino, see Flamini vol 1 p.77, Barbieri (1976) pp. 94-5. Rauti’s article was titled ‘La Tattica della Penetrazione Comunista in Italia’; that of Giannettini, ‘La Varieta delle Techniche nella condotta della Guerra Rivoluionara’. Both are in Beltrami (1965).
E.g., some indications of Italian ‘anti-subversive’ thinking are cited by Lehner (1975), pp. 51-68.
See supra, note 128 and cf. the general assessment of Amorosino, (1976) p.383: ‘The security services, from SIFAR to SID, have been involved in all of the most obscure events of recent years: from massacres to CIA funding, from anti-worker to international industrial espionage, from trafficking in weapons to kickbacks on military spending to privileged relations with state industry, from polluting of political life via the whole arsenal of files (on both citizens and government officials), extortions, bribes, and violations (of privacy) to their presence, as actors and abettors, in coup attempts along with the systematic sabotage of judicial investigative proceedings into these criminal events.’
The CIA helped found, fund, organize, and staff the KYP, and Papadopoulos served as the KYP’s liaison man to the CIA. For the close links between the CIA and the KYP and/or Papadopoulos, see ‘Athenian’ (Rodo Roufos) (1972) p.73, Flamini Vol. 1 pp. l47-8, Goldblum (1972) pp.234-3, Iatrides (1980) pp.66-7, Katris (1971) pp.44-6, Laurent pp.238-41, Meynaud (1970) pp.249-51, Papendreou (1970) pp.221-2, 226-30; Stern (1977) pp.13,18,23-4,35-46; and Wittner (1982) pp.299-301, 305-6.
Meynaud p.240. However, the Greek military already had extensive first hand experience in counter-guerilla and clandestine warfare as a result of the Greek Civil War and the revolt against the British on Cyprus. The French guerre revolutionnaire connection should therefore not be exaggerated.
Laurent pp.236-8, Barbierei (1976) pp.115-7, De Simone p.18, Stajano and Fini (1971) p.126, Flamini vol 1, pp.147-8. Meynaud pp.221-31 provides some details of the terrorism employed by the Colonels prior to and after the coup itself. For some Greek works – unfortunately inaccessible to me due to language barriers – dealing with pre-coup covert action, subversion and/or terrorism, see Diakogiannes (1968), written by a former KYP officer; Karagiorgas (1975), which examines one of the rightist secret societies within the officer corps that launched the coup; and Lentakes (1975) which covers the right-wing paramilitary groups.
Flamini vol 2, p.132. Delle Chiaie was later issued an Aginter press card in the name of ‘Roberto Martelli’. See Laurent p.211, Linklater et al p.206.
Laurent p.173.
Flamini vol 1 pp.143-4.
Laurent pp.173,176. Rauti had already met with Guerin-Serac earlier in Portugal. Ibid p194.
Stajano and Fini (1971) p.74.
Laurent p.173
Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.50-1.
This document is partially reprinted by Laurent (pp.169-71). I have altered the sentence order slightly to make it read better, since there is some needless repetition, but the meaning is unchanged. The original was written in French, and some think Della Chiaie himself may have been the author.
Cited in Lanteri 1977
Stajano and Fini (1971) p.78
De Simone pp.9-28. Among the Italians were representatives of ON, AN, Europa Civilta, Nouva Caravella, and the MSI’s youth group, the Fronte Universitario di Anzione Nazionale (FUAN). The Greek ‘tourists’ were members of ESESI, an organizations of rightist Greek students in Italy that served as a ‘cover’ for KYP operations supervised by Konstantin Plevris. See Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.121-8. For more on Plevris, see infra, note 155.
Barbieri (1976) p.115. According to De Lutiis (p.97), the real organizers were the KYP and SID, in which case Rauti may have only served as a go-between (in intelligence parlance, a ‘cut-out’) or ‘private’ intermediary.
For Plevris, see De Simone pp.18-19, Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.126-8, Laurent pp. 175, 236. Flamini (vol 1 p.150) cites an Italian judicial report noting that Plevris taught official courses on guerre revolutionnaire theory. His ‘4th of August’ movement had a swastika emblem and was named after the day when the pro-Axis dictator Ioannis Metaxas took power in 1936.
Barbieri (1976) pp.115-6, De Simone pp.15,52-4; Stajano and Fini p.126.
For Merlino’s activities see especially Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.47-63.
lbid pp.79-80, De Simone p.56. For more on Freda and Ventura, see the latter pp. 59-110, Sassano pp.39-41 and passim, Presenti and Sassano (eds), Stajano and Fini pp.45-72.
Stajano and Fini pp.80-1
De Simone claims too much success for these intoxication operations when he writes that ‘almost all the small groups of the extra-parliamentary left were infiltrated’ (p.55). The account in Stajano and Fini (pp. 45-81) reveals the ineptness and failure that characterized some of these efforts.
1 do not wish to artificially separate the first and second phases here. The fact is that infiltration and terrorism occurred in both, but infiltration predominated in the first and bombings in the second. This reflected an escalation of action psychologique aimed at both the public and the security forces. For the stages of the strategy of tension, see the scheme of Mario Sassano (1976) pp.139-40.
De Simone pp.42-5.
Stajano, and Fini (1971) pp. 26-7. According to the more complete and inclusive figures analyzed by Ugo Pecchioli, there were 312 acts perpetrated by neo-fascists in 1969. (See Galleni 1981, pp. 18-19)
De Simone p.64
Flamini, vol 2 p.120, Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.25-6, Laurent p.7, Stajano and Fini (1977) p. 5.
Stajano and Fini (1971)
See especially Fini and Barbieri (1972). Cf also Laurent p.7, Stajano and Fini (1977) pp.5-34.
For the Pinelli case, see Marco Sassano (1971), Cederna (1971), Comitato di Controinformazione (1970), and Stajano and Fini (1977).
Stajano and Fini (1971) pp.57-60. Note that the Circolo 22 Marzo, should not be confused wth Merlino’s earlier Circolo XXII Marzo group, which was made up entirely of ‘converted’ neo-fascists.
Minna p.57, Weinberg p.48. The involvement of the security forces in this affair is reflected in any number of ways, beginning with the fact that one of the members of the Circolo 22 Marzo who helped set up Valpreda was police agent Salvatore Ippolito, who naturally kept his superiors informed about what was going on. Then, Commissioner Calabrese and Procurator Antonio Amati falsely accused the anarchists, and the police both destroyed important material evidence (an unexploded bomb in Milan) and ignored the crucial testimony of a vendor who apparently sold some satchels that had been used to hold the bombs to Freda two days before the blast. Finally, members of SID’s Section D (Counter-espionage) knew of the bombing beforehand and did nothing to stop it. Later they helped Giannettini escape by providing him with a false passport and sending him stipends abroad. All of this is well summarized by Laurent, but can be found in more detail in the many Italian sources cited in this section.
Laurent pp.208-9. Unfortunately, the initial ‘guilty’ sentences were appealed and eventually the defendants were absolved on the basis of ‘insufficient evidence’. This conforms to the general pattern of resolution in the trials of right-wing golpistas and terrorists – but not those involving the left – and is widely recognized that such results demonstrate more about the political pressure on (and biases of) members of the Italian judiciary than about the guilt or innocence of those indicted. For recent overviews of these general prosecution problems see Borraccetti (introduction) pp.ll-19, Nunziata (1985) pp.246-75. According to Borraccetti
(p.17), the final judgement of absolution following the second appeal in the Piazza Fontana bombing – which wasn’t handed down until 1 August 1985! – was the ‘least acceptable’ of all in the many poorly-handled trials of black terrorists.
Flamini vol 2 pp.131-2, who cites said report. Cf. also Sassano and Pesenti (1974) p.180.
Peechioli, Prefazione in Galleni (ed).
For the later phases of the strategy of tension in Italy, see especially Flamini vols 3 and 4. Cf. also Borraccetti (ed), Corsini and Novati (eds), Lega and Santerini (1976), Testa (1976), and the references to the P2 Masonic lodge infra, note 201.
See supra, note 142
The best accounts of the subversion of the Allende regime in Chile are Landis (1975) and US Congress (1975).
The pre-coup situations in Turkey witnessed the sanctioning or sponsorship of provocative intoxications and terrorist operations by the so-called Kontr-gerilla (KG – Counter Guerrilla) organization attached to the general staff of the Turkish army. The purpose of these activities – in Turkey as elsewhere – was to create a climate of fear and chaos that would serve to destabilize society and precipitate a rightist military takeover. For more on the KG which the CIA was instrumental in establishing, see Deger (1978), Genc (1978), Yucel (1973), Roth and Taylan (1981) pp.70-90. Of special relevance here is the fact that there were intimate personnel links between the KG, the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT – National Intelligence Agency), and the paramilitary Bozkurt (‘Grey Wolves’) commandos affiliated with Alparslan Turkes’ fascistoid Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP Nationalist Action for Movement Party), for which see Deger, Roth and Taylan pp.90-4, 116-20,130-7. Ironically, the MHP was later suppressed by the military regime it had helped to seize power in 1980, apparently because Turkes was becoming too power-hungry.
It is significant that none of the ‘collusionist’ articles cited above in note 15 directly discuss the strategy of tension, although Lee and Coogan allude to it.
See, e.g., Laurent’s one-sided depiction (pp.410-417) of both Nazi-Maoists and the ‘Nazi-Sovietists’ as nothing more than provocateurs. This is possible, but Laurent completely ignores the cultural and ideological ferment in the neo-fascist milieu during the 1970s, which could serve as the basis for an alternative explanation of these phenomena.
See supra pp.195-8.
See, e.g. Freda, passim, all of Evola’s later works, and a number of recent neo-fascist articles reprinted in Giuseppe Bessarione, ed. (1979). A dramatic illustration of this hostility toward the status quo was provided by Evola in a 1970 interview. Speaking of the impossibility of temporizing with the modern order, he exclaimed: ‘It is not a question of contesting and polemicizing, but of blowing up everything.’ Cited in Drake p.79.
Freda had advocated such a right-left alliance and ‘common struggle’ as early as 1969. (See Freda pp.68-71), and this theme subsequently appeared in the writings of many other neo-fascist formations, including Clemente Graziani’s ON splinter group, the Movimento Politico Ordine Nuovo (MPON). See Ferraresi (1984) p.77. However, one cannot help but be wary since Freda wrote Disintegrazione right in the midst of the early ‘manipulation’ phase of the strategy of tension, in which he himself played an important role.
As an example, note the views presented in the neo-fascist journal Costruiamo L’Azione, which sought to abolish the traditional right-left distinction, favored anti-imperialist national liberation movements, promoted spontaneous actions, insisted on the involvement of ‘the people’ in the revolutionary project, and in general fused New Left-inspired analyses with the traditional Evolan contempt for bourgeois society. For this, see Ferraresi (1984) pp.78-81, Borraccetti (ed) pp.184-6, and especially Capaldo et al in Borracetti (ed) pp.203-11. Cf also the discussions of the neo-fascist ‘Gramscianism of the right’ and ‘metaphysics of youth’ in Revelli pp 119-214, and Zucchinali pp.169-97. It is this late 1970s rightist youth revolt that is reflected in many of the selections in Bessarione (ed).
Ferraresi (1984), Borracetti pp.21-3.
For the adoption of Brigate Rosse (BR) methods by neo-fascist terrorists, see Ferraresi
(1984) pp.73-4, Minna p.68.
See Bartsch pp.154-71, Prohuber pp.36-45.
For TP, see Capaldo et al pp.216-20, Ferraresi (1984) pp.83-5.
See especially Pons pp.233-40.
See Bartsch pp. 171-6. Prohuber pp.31-5.
For some examples of right-left collusion, see Minna p.68. Harmon(1985) pp.44, 47-8.
Generally this cooperation has involved exchanges of information and the provision of logistical support – weapons, money, false documentation, ‘safe houses’, etc – before and after operations rather than the formation of joint red-black cells.
Mentioned by Harmon (1985) p.43. For the Eurofascist role in the rightist Bolivian coup of 17 July 1980, see LAB/IEPALA pp.100-44, Linklater et al pp.277-302, and the six part article in Der Stern from 10 May 1984 to 14 June 1984.
Mentioned by Harmon (1985) pp.44-5.
Mentioned in ibid pp.43-4.
Mentioned by Lee and Coogan, p.43, although they are surely aware of Delle Chiaie’s background. Of all the individuals under consideration, Delle Chiaie is the least likely to be a genuine advocate of solidarity with the left. Since his omnipresent involvement in provocation operations in Italy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, he has served with Spanish, Argentine and Chilean military and parallel police units during their extermination operations. For a general overview of the so-called ‘black bombadier’s recent career, see Christie pp.71-128, Linklater et al pp.203-14, 278-302, and George Black pp. 525, 538-41, although the latter contains some minor errors. In any event, after years of official sponsorship and protection, Delle Chiaie was finally arrested in Venezuala in 1987 and deported to Italy to stand trial for his numerous terrorist crimes. The way on which his case is handled should prove quite revelatory, one way or the others. (He was acquitted in 1988 of involvement in the Bologna bombing for lack of evidence, and in February this year of murder charges relating to a 1969 bombing. See Daily Telegraph 21/2/89. Ed.)
For Signorelli’s early affiliations with ON, see Ferraresi p.62; for his AN backing see Flamini vol 1 p.97, citing the court testimony of AN member Paolo Percoriello.
See his Strage del 2 Agosto pp.186-7.
For some recent examples of extreme right infiltration of the radical left, see Dumont pp.205-6 and Haquin p.57 and passim. The latter work is must reading for anyone interested in neo-fascist interlocks with the Belgian security forces.
Hoffman (1984) p.24, citing Die Welt 23 September 1983.
See the fascinating but not conclusive article from the German press reprinted in Intelligence/Parapolitics 67 (July 1985), pp.18-20. This would certainly not be out of character for the BKA – since its recruitment of Vertraunsmanner had been quite extensive. Cf. Intelligence/Parapolitics 62 (February 1985), p.2. Amongst the ‘leftist’ terrorist organizations Hepp cooperated with were the Abu Nidal group, the pro-Iraq Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the mysterious and ultra-violent Fractions Armees Revolutionnaires Libanaises (FARL) organization headed by Jurj Ibrahim Abd-Allah and linked to Action Directe (AD).
Intelligence/Parapolitics (July ’85) p. 18. Cf Hoffman (1984) pp.24-5 and Lee and Coogan pp.53-54. Among Hepp’s main comrade-in-arms was another advocate of right-left ‘collusion’, Walter Kexel of the neo-fascist Volkssozalistische Bewegung Duetschlands/Partei der Arbeit (VSBD/PdA). In connection with this whole issue of neo-fascist support for ‘black-red’ cooperation, see the interesting article by Chiodi, pp.14-17. Although the author seems to believe that the ultras he talked to were honestly colluding with groups on the far left – including the PRC regime – some of the personnel involved in planning this strategy were among the most notorious black infiltrators and intoxicators, including Yves Guerin-Serac and Delle Chiaie! (ibid p.15).
There are a number of suspicious things about the BR, particularly the faction formerly led by Mario Moretti. Thus, e.g., two recent studies of the kidnapping and assassination of left-leaning DC leader Aldo Moro have convincingly argued that the BR were aided by elements of the Italian underworld, intelligence personnel and neo-fascist terrorists linked to Licio Gelli’s secret ultra-rightist Masonic lodge, P2, and possibly the CIA. See Zupo and Recchia pp.192-349, Scarano and De Luca pp.37-69,111-57, 201-9, 266-72. Cf De Lutiis pp.241-93. Prior to its recent exposure following a series of financial and political scandals, the P2 lodge constituted a sort of parallel or shadow government in Italy whose 975 or so members included high-ranking officials from every political party (except the PCI) and the heads of several intelligence and military apparatuses. Information that has surfaced in the course of various parliamentary and judicial investigations has revealed the links between P2 and right-wing terrorist actions ranging from the Piazza Fontana to Bologna bombings. See especially De Litiis (ed) 1986 pp.185-223, 293-4, 303-80 etc. For more on this extremely important organization see Berger (1983), Barbieri et al, Rossi and Lombrassa, and Piazzesi. For P2’s own version see Carpi and Capparelli.
Certain AD personnel (including the leader of its anti-Zionist ‘internationalist’ faction, Frederic Oriach) had previously been involved with the so-called Brigades Internationales (BI), a mid-1970s ‘Maoist’ umbrella organization that adopted different names and specialized in the ‘political assassination of diplomatic personnel posted in Paris’. See Harmon and Marchand (1986) pp.28 (BI), 101 (Oriach faction). According to these two authors (ibid p.28). one such action involved the assassination of the Bolivian ambassador, General Joaquin Zentano Amaya, by the ‘BI Che Guevara’ on 10 May 1976. However this attack has already been linked to the extreme right, specifically to a Bolivian intelligence agent named Saavedra and three terrorists from Otto Skorzeny’s Paladingruppe, and perhaps was initiated in connection with the third ‘sanction’ phase of Operation Condor, a joint operational project of the secret services of various South American military dictatorships, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uraguay. See Kruger pp.212-3. For more on the Paladingruppe, see Chairoff (1975) pp.58-9, 256; Gonzalez-Mata pp.164-7, De Lutiis (1984) pp.169-73. Other noteworthy points are that other violent leftist groups did not trust AD for a long time because they saw it as an ‘amateur’ outfit that was ‘heavily infiltrated by the police’, and that AD later developed links with GRAPO, a Spanish ‘leftwing’ group led by Franco-era intelligence officers that sought to sabotage the transition to democracy following the Caudillo’s death. For the AD-GRAPO link, see Harmon and Marchand, p.162; for the nature of GRAPO see note 203.
GRAPO was long ago exposed as an outfit controlled by rightist provocateurs. See eg
Gonsalvez-Mata pp.266-74. According to him GRAPO was infiltrated and manipulated from the outset by a parallel secret service known as the Servicio de Coordinacion, Organizacion y Enlace (SCOE), a ‘direct heir’ of the DGS’s Technical Services Division, which was mainly staffed by fascist and other ultra-rightist exiles living in Spain. Cf also Scott (1986, Lobster 12) p. 19 citing articles in the New York Times (15 January 1977) p.7, and London Times (3 February 1977) p.16.
See Pour p.16, who cites a CCC comminque expressing support for the 14 June 1984 attack on a NATO installation in West Germany by the RZ, and claims that the latter organization was set up by the Hamburg-based Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten (ANS), a well-known neo-Nazi group headed by Michael Kuhnen and others. However, the RZ are generally believed to be a bona fide left-wing terrorist group, and I have seen nothing to suggest that they constitute a ‘front’ for the ANS. Even if this were true, CCC support for their anti-NATO attack might invite an example of the kind of fraternal black-red solidarity that Harmon hypothesizes rather than proof that CCC was infiltrated and manipulated by others.
Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that there are plenty of bona fide leftists engaged in counter productive terrorist operations. The most difficult task of the researcher lies in determining precisely where leftist stupidity ends and at what point – if at all – rightist manipulation begins.
Borracetti p.186
Stajano and Fini (197 1) pp.76-7
Few revolutionary movements have been as youth-oriented as fascism. Fascist leaders continually glorified and addressed their appeals to the young, and the result was the creation of a veritable ‘cult of youth’ by many fascist regimes. This later created problems when these regimes became more conservative in the process of institutionalization and lost their radical aspects, for those exalted youthful elements that had been weaned on revolutionary rhetoric thence turned on their elders. See, e.g., Koon, passim, although it suffers somewhat from her stereotypical depiction of fascism as an inherently reactionary movement.
Here, the comments of a cell leader of the neo-fascist Nuclei Armati Rivolazionari (NAR) are illustrative: ‘[the late 1970s] was a period of great change for the right wing. New ideas and new needs sprang up…. We changed our attitude towards the ultra-left groups. The guy with the long hair was no longer our enemy. We realized that we were victims of the same system, and we started to grow our hair long and use the same terminology that was typical of the extreme leftwing. We felt a generational bond with left-wing youth, and we appreciated their anti-bourgeois attitude. We understood that left- and right-wing revolutionaries had to stop killing each other.’ Cited by Lee and Coogan p.43.

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