Tony Blair might be considered guilty on two of the counts for which Hitler’s Foreign Secretary, Joachim von Ribbentrop was executed at Nuremberg, ‘namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.’ Ribbentrop (1) was also convicted of two further counts, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but the evidence against him chiefly concerned planning wars of aggression.
The Guardian’s legal commentator, Marcel Berlins,(2) defined international law on the crime of aggression as ‘the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations.’ In a 2007 column, written after seeing the Tricycle Theatre’s play Called to Account, Berlins outlined a potential case against Blair.
‘The main issues were the obvious ones; the shift from insisting that invasion was necessary because of weapons of mass destruction to asserting that the motive was regime change; what happened behind the scenes over the second [abandoned] security council resolution; and the still unexplained reason for Lord Goldsmith’s quick change of mind culminating in his advice that starting the war was legal even without UN backing.’
Berlins speculated: ‘Even more shocking, if true, is the allegation that, many months before March 2003. Bush and Blair had already agreed to invade Iraq, no matter what anyone else, or the UN, said. There is some, though to me inconclusive, evidence of that.’
Berlins wrote, ‘For what it’s worth, my view [on legal, not moral grounds] is that it would be very difficult to prove the prime minister’s intent to commit aggression.’
But just compare the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937, as produced at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal in 1946, with the Downing Street Memo of 2002, as leaked to The Sunday Times in 2005. (3)
Colonel Count Friedrich Hossbach compiled minutes of Hitler’s war planning meeting in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, on November 5, 1937, long before the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia and almost two years before the invasion of Poland.
‘The Fuehrer began by stating that the subject of the present conference was of such importance that its discussion would, in other countries, certainly be a matter for a full cabinet meeting, but he, the Fuehrer, had rejected the idea of making it a subject of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich Cabinet just because of the importance of the matter.’
‘Germany’s problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk.’
Matthew Rycroft, a British foreign policy aide, is said to have written the Downing Street Memo on July 23, 2002, eight months before the invasion of Iraq.
‘C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
‘Even with a legal base and a viable military plan, we would still need to ensure that the benefits of action outweigh the risks.’
Now consider the text of the charge that led to Ribbentrop’s death sentence, listening for echoes of the American phrase ‘régime change’ and noting the facts of Ribbentrop’s irresponsible and dishonest diplomacy that were uncovered in 1945 by the Nuremberg prosecutors.
‘Ribbentrop was not present at the Hossbach Conference held on November 5, 1937, but on January 2, 1938, while still Ambassador to England, he sent a memorandum to Hitler indicating his opinion that a change in the status quo in the East in the German sense could only be carried out by force and suggesting methods to prevent England and France from intervening in a European war fought to bring about such a change. When Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister Hitler told him that Germany still had four problems to solve, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel and Danzig, and mentioned the possibility of “some sort of a show-down” or “military settlement” for their solution.’
‘On February 12, 1938, Ribbentrop attended the conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg at which Hitler, by threats of invasion, forced Schuschnigg to grant a series of concessions designed to strengthen the Nazis in Austria, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of Security and Interior, with control over the Police. Ribbentrop was in London when the occupation of Austria was actually carried out and, on the basis of information supplied him by Goering, informed the British Government that Germany had not presented Austria with an ultimatum, but had intervened in Austria only to prevent civil war. On March 13, 1938, Ribbentrop signed the law incorporating Austria into the German Reich.
‘Ribbentrop participated in the aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia. Beginning in March 1938, he was in close touch with the Sudeten German Party and gave them instructions which had the effect of keeping the Sudeten German question a live issue which might serve as an excuse for the attack which Germany was planning against Czechoslovakia. In August 1938 he participated in a conference for the purpose of obtaining Hungarian support in the event of a war with Czechoslovakia. After the Munich Pact he continued to bring diplomatic pressure with the object of occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia. He was instrumental in inducing the Slovaks to proclaim their independence. He was present at the conference of March 14-15, 1939, at which Hitler, by threats of invasion, compelled President Hacha to consent to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. After the German troops had marched in, Ribbentrop signed the law establishing a Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia.
‘Ribbentrop played a particularly significant role in the diplomatic activity which led up to the attack on Poland. He participated in a conference held on August 12, 1939, for the purpose of obtaining Italian support if the attack should lead to a general European war. Ribbentrop discussed the German demands with respect to Danzig and the Polish Corridor with the British Ambassador in the period from August 25 to August 30, 1939, when he knew that the German plans to attack Poland had merely been temporarily postponed in an attempt to induce the British to abandon their guarantee to the Poles. The way in which he carried out these discussions makes it clear that he did not enter them in good faith in an attempt to reach a settlement of the difficulties between Germany and Poland.
‘Ribbentrop was advised in advance of the attack on Norway and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries; and prepared the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggressive actions.
‘Ribbentrop attended the conference on January 20, 1941, at which Hitler and Mussolini discussed the proposed attack on Greece, and the conference in January 1941, at which Hitler obtained from Antonescu permission for German troops to go through Rumania for this attack. On March 25, 1941, when Yugoslavia adhered to the Axis Tripartite Pact, Ribbentrop had assured Yugoslavia that Germany would respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On March 27, 1941, he attended the meeting, held after the coup d’état in Yugoslavia, at which plans were made to carry out Hitler’s announced intention to destroy Yugoslavia.’ (4)
There was also limited evidence against Ribbentrop in the matter of war crimes and crimes against humanity. But by 1942, the year of the inception of the Final Solution and the death camps, Ribbentrop’s influence on war and politics had declined as fast as Tony Blair’s influence on war and politics is expected to decline after 2007.
Notes
- The accused were indicted on four counts. Count One concerned a general conspiracy to wage aggressive war. Count Two concerned substantive crimes in furtherance of that end. Count Three concerned war crimes as defined by the Geneva Convention and similar agreements. Count Four concerned Crimes against Humanity.
- The Guardian 30 April 2007.
- Always bearing in mind that Hossbach’s relevance was contested by A.J.P. Taylor, though supported by Professor Hugh Trevor Roper, and that the text of the Downing Street Memo was ‘retyped from a photocopy’ by the reporter Michael Smith for The Sunday Times, onetime publishers of the faked ‘Hitler Diaries’.
- Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals