Did Churchill reveal the pending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to Roosevelt two weeks before it happened? Below is what purports to a transcript of a telephone conversation recorded by the Germans during World War 2. If genuine, it shows, as has been alleged in the past, that Roosevelt was indeed warned of the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. This appeared in the Internet newsletter, The Konformist on 11 March 1998. (On which see Sources below.) The Konformist’s editor, Robert Sterling believes this to be a fake – largely because of what he sees as the rather stilted language used by the two participants. Knowing nothing about this subject I sent it to Andrew Rosthorn who I knew had some passing interest in it. His initial assessment follows the transcript. The preamble to the transcript appeared in the original and is by whoever sent this to The Konformist.
The transcript of the German intercept of the Churchill call to FDR on 26 November 1941
This material has sat in American archives since 1945. The source is the 1948 interrogation of Henrich Muller published in 1995 by R. J. Bender of San Jose, CA., a well-known militaria publisher. Muller was the German intelligence officer in charge of anti-Soviet operations and the material about the Soviet Union in the conversation was forwarded to him. At the end of the war, the U.S. turned Muller to its own uses and his files were lodged in the National Archives – evidently without being sanitized. The transcript is located at: National Archives Roll T-175, frames 129 et seq. I have transcibed the entire conversation. The bracketed portions represent German inserts in the original text to better explain word meanings that were thought to be too obscure for German readers.
The original transcript shows Roosevelt as ‘A’ and Churchill as ‘B’. For clarity, I have replaced their names for the letters. The Germans were reading the radio-telephone transmissions of Roosevelt and Churchill from September 7, 1941. I am told (since I haven’t read the book yet, just these xeroxed pages) that Muller was amazed that the two statesmen took no greater care in their conversations than they did. But, of course, he was unaware of the even greater blunder of ‘Enigma’ on the German side.
The German Transcript
November 26, 1941 13:15 hours (Berlin or Holland time?)
Churchill I am frightfully sorry to disturb you at this hour, Franklin, but matters of a most vital import have transpired and I felt that I must convey them to you immediately.
Roosevelt That’s perfectly all right, Winston. I’m sure you wouldn’t trouble me at this hour for trivial concerns.
Churchill Let me preface my information with an explanation addressing the reason I have not alluded to these facts earlier. In the first place, until today, the information was not firm. On matters of such gravity, I do not like to indulge in idle chatter.
Now, I have in my hands, reports from our agents in Japan as well as the most specific intelligence in the form of the highest level Japanese naval coded messages [conversation broken] for some time now.
Roosevelt I felt that this is what you were about. How serious is it?
Churchill It could not be worse. A powerful Japanese task force comprising [composed of] six of their carriers, two battleships and a number of other units to include [including] tankers and cruisers, has sailed yesterday from a secret base in the northern Japanese islands.
Roosevelt We both knew this was coming. There are also reports in my hands about a force of some size making up in China and obviously intended to go [move] South.
Churchill Yes, we have all of that. [Interruption]… are far more advanced than you in our reading of the Jap naval operations codes. But even without that, their moves are evident. And they will indeed move South but the force I spoke of is not headed South, Franklin, it is headed East…
Roosevelt Surely you must be…..will you repeat that please?
Churchill I said to the East. This force is sailing to the East….. towards you.
Roosevelt Perhaps they set an easterly course to fool any observers and then plan to swing South to support the landings in the southern areas. I have…
Churchill No, at this moment, their forces are moving across the northern Pacific and I can assure you that their goal is the [conversation broken] fleet in Hawaii. At Pearl Harbor.
Roosevelt This is monstrous. Can you tell me…indicate… the nature of your intelligence? [conversation broken] reliable? Without compromising your sources…
Churchill Yes, I will have to be careful. Our agents in Japan have been reporting on the gradual [conversation broken] units. And these have disappeared from Japanese home waters. We also have highly reliable sources in the Japanese foreign service and even in the military…
Roosevelt How reliable?
Churchill One of the sources is the individual who supplied us the material on the diplomatic codes that [conversation broken] and a naval office [sic] whom our service has compromised. You must trust me, Franklin and I can not be more specific.
Roosevelt I accept this.
Churchill We cannot compromise our codebreaking. You understand this. Only myself and a few [conversation broken] not even Hopkins. It will go straight to Moscow and I am not sure we want that.
Roosevelt I am still attempting to…..the obvious implication is that the Japs are going to do a Port Arthur on us at Pearl Harbor. Do you concur?
Churchill I do indeed. Unless they add an attack on the Panama Canal to this vile business. I can hardly envision the canal as a primary goal, especially with your fleet lying athwart their lines of communications with Japan. No, if they do strike the canal, they will have to first neutralize [destroy] your fleet [conversation broken].
Roosevelt The worst form of treachery. We can prepare our defenses on the islands and give the a warm welcome when they come. It certainly would put some iron up Congress’ ass [asshole].
Churchill On the other hand, if they did launch a bombing raid, given that the aircraft would only be of the carrier-borne types, how much actual damage could they inflict? And on what targets?
Roosevelt I think torpedoes would be ruled out at the outset. Pearl is far too shallow to permit a successful torpedo attack. Probably they would drop medium bombs on the ships and then shoot [conversation broken] damage a number of ships and no doubt the Japs would attack our airfields. I could see some damage there but I don’t think either an airfield or a battleship could sink very far. What do your people give you as the actual date of the attack?
Churchill The actual date given is the eighth of December. That’s a Monday.
Roosevelt The fleet is in harbor over the weekend. They often sortie during the week…
Churchill The Japs are asking [conversation broken] exact dispositions of your ships on a regular basis.
Roosevelt But Monday seems odd. Are you certain?
Churchill It is in the calendar. Monday is the eighth. [conversation broken]
Roosevelt …then I will have to consider the entire problem. A Japanese attack on us, which would result in war between us…and certainly you as well…would certainly fulfill two of the most important requirements of our policy. Harry has told me repeatedly…..and I have more faith in him that I do in the Soviet ambassador…that Stalin is desperate at this point. The Nazis are at the gates of Moscow, his armies are melting away…..the government has evacuated and although Harry and Marshall feel that Stalin can hang on and eventually defeat Hitler, there is no saying what could transpire [happen] if the Japs suddenly fell on Stalin’s rear. In spite of all the agreements between them and the Japs dropping Matsuoka, there is still strong anti-Russian sentiment in High Japanese military circles. I think we have to decide what is more important …..keeping Russia in the war to bleed the Nazis dry to their own eventual destruction [conversation broken] supply Stalin with weapons but do not forget, in fact he is your ally, not mine. There are strong isolationist feelings here and there are quite a number of anti-communists…
Churchill Fascists…
Roosevelt Certainly, but they would do all they could to block any attempt on my part to more than give some monetary assistance to Stalin.
Churchill But we too have our major desperations, Franklin. Our shipping upon which our nation depends, is being sunk by the huns faster than we could ever replace [conversation broken] the Japs attack both of us in the Pacific? We could lose Malaya which is our primary source of rubber and tin. And if the Japs get Java and the oil, they could press South to
Australia and I have told you repeatedly, we cannot hold [conversation broken] them much but in truth I cannot deliver. We need every man and every ship to fight Hitler in Europe….India too. If the Japs get into Malaya, they can press on virtually unopposed into Burma and then India. Need I tell you of the resultant destruction of our Empire? We cannot survive on this small island, Franklin, [conversation broken] allow the nips to attack, you can get your war declaration through your Congress after all. [Conversation broken]
Roosevelt … not as capable as you are at translating their messages and the army and navy are very jealous of each other. There is so much coming in that everyone is confused. We have no agents in place in Japan and every day dozens of messages are [conversation broken] that contradict each other or not well translated. I have seen three translations of the same message with three entirely different meanings [conversations broken] address your concern about British holdings in the Pacific…if the Japanese do attack both of us, eventually we will be able to crush them and regain all of the lost territories. As for myself, I will be damned glad to be rid of the Philippines. [sic]
Churchill I see this as a gamble [conversation broken] what would your decision be? We cannot procrastinate over this for too long. Eleven or twelve days are all we have. Can we not agree in principle now? I should mention that several advisors have counseled [advised] against informing you of this and allowing it to happen. You see by my notifying you where my loyalty lies. Certainly to one who is heart and soul with us against Hitler.
Roosevelt I do appreciate your loyalty, Winston. What on the other hand, will happen here if one of our intelligence people is able to intercept, decipher and deliver to me the same information you just gave me? I cannot ignore it…..all of my intelligence people will know about it then. I could not ignore this.
Churchill But if it were just a vague message then?
Roosevelt No, a specific message. I could not just sweep it under the rug like that [conversation broken]
Churchill Of course not. I think we should let matters develop as they will.
Roosevelt I think that perhaps I can find a reason to absent [leave] myself from Washington while this crisis develops. What I don’t know can’t hurt me and I too can misunderstand messages, especially at a distance [conversation broken]
Churchill Completely. My best to you all there.
Roosevelt Thank you for your call.
Andrew Rosthorn comments:
I just happen to have on my shelves Betrayal at Pearl Harbour by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, (Michael O’Mara Books Ltd, London 1992; Simon & Schuster, New York). Eric Nave was the man who broke the Japanese naval cipher JN-25 in 1939.
Churchill actually sent a message to Roosevelt at 03h20 London time on 26 November. It was personal telegram T-871, quoted in his Second World War and in the Churchill Papers. This is what Rusbridger and Nave wrote.
At 3.20 am [London time] on 26 November, Churchill sent Roosevelt a message containing the following: ‘Of course it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?’
Churchill’s sudden interest in China was surprising and not particulary convincing. He had shown little interest in Chian Kai-Shek before. Nor does his remark that he did not want Japan to commence hostilites with America ring true, when he had always made it plain that this is what he wanted most. He had frequently repeated his intention to drag America into the War at all costs because he knew it was the only way, to ensure Britain’s survivial. But this message was not the only one that passed between Churchill and Roosevelt that day. Sometime later on 26 November, Churchill’s private Secretary Anthony Bevoir sent by hand to the American Embassy a second message to be transmitted to Roosevelt, accompanied by a note ‘I enclose a telegram from the former naval Person to the President for dispatch as soon as possible. I am so sorry to trouble you at this hour.’
Of all Churchill’s voluminous correspondence with Roosevelt during World War 2, this is the one message that cannot be read, since the file containing it is withheld from the Public Record Office in London for the next seventy years. According to Britain’s Foreign Secretary to release it would harm national security. That some such message was received by the Americans on 26 November was later confirmed by the Army enquiry which sat from July to October 1944, and the Naval enquiry, which sat at the same period.
At the Army enquiry it was stated: ‘On 26 November there was received specific evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States.’
But no details of what this specific evidence consisted of were placed before the enquiry.’
At the US naval inquiry, the Pearl Harbour commander, Admiral Kimmel was allowed to question Admiral Stark about whether Stark received information that day. Stark refused to answer: ‘It would involve the disclosure of information detrimental to the public interest.’
Later on 26 November Japanese diplomats were brusquely rebuffed at the State Department in Washington.
The date is the right date. It has been established by Rusbridger that the Americans could not read the JN-25 Japanese naval cipher until after Pearl Harbour, but the British could. The Americans intercepted at least twenty JN-25 radio messages from Yamamamoto’s Task Force between 20 November and 7 December. Nave says the British, at a base called FECB, in Hong Kong, read all the messages picked up by the Americans. Dutch codebreakers were also sharing the British success, at Kamer 14 on Java. On 27 November Kamer 14 decrypted a JN-25 message from Tokyo ordering the Task Force to sail from Tamkan Bay in the Kuriles. The Dutch concluded the Task Force was sailing south and told their attaché in Washington to tell the Americans.
Nothing in the alleged German document fails to fit the facts. In particular, it is impressive that Churchill is supposed to have said that the Task Force had sailed the day before his call of 26 November 41. That is what happened and importantly, FECB decoded on 25 November 41 a JN-25 message from Yamamoto to his waiting Task Force: ‘The Task Force will move out of Hitokappu Wan [Tankan Bay] on the morning of 26 November and advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4 December and speedily complete refuelling.’
Rusbridger and Nave say: ‘Details of these intercepts reached London late on 25 November at a very critical and sensitive time.’ R and N say that a naval strategist could then work out from the timing, and the known steaming speeds of the Task Force vessels that the mission must be directed eastwards, away from Malaya, Java and the US bases in the Philippines, towards Pearl Harbour or the Panama Canal.
Lastly, there was a Heinrich Mueller who was the head of Branch IV of the RSHA, part of the SS, if it’s the right Heinrich Mueller [it’s the most common German surname] and he is sometimes called ‘Gestapo Mueller’ to avoid confusion with others. Heinrich Mueller was head of the Gestapo in 1941. He was an SS Obergruppenfuehrer. He was the man who sent Adolf Eichmann to see how the killing of Jews was going in Minsk in July 1941. He was at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, not so long after 26 November 1941. At that time, he was not really head of intelligence on Russia. That would really have been Canaris, since the SD was not at first supposed to do spying abroad under a Hitler edict. But they were encroaching more and more at this time and swallowed Canaris’s Abwehr in the end. So it could have been him, I suppose.
In November 1941, the Germans were near to Moscow, as the transcript says, but they were not collapsing. The Russians were counter-attacking the Germans for the very first time on a big scale. Stalin had felt he could bring forces from the East, for the first time since Barbarossa on 21 June 1941. This was no doubt because Churchill and other informants [including Richard Sorge] had made it clear that his Eastern territories were not to be a target of the Japanese. The great general Zhukov was held in the East until that threat could be discounted. Once again, it fits.
David Kahn’s book Hitler’s Spies, (Hodder & Stoughton 1978) says that Roosevelt and Churchill’s conversations were definitely bugged by the Germans: Kurt E. Vetterlein at the Deutsche Reichspost research institute in a converted youth hostel on the Dutch coast, nicknamed the ‘Forschungsstelle’. Kahn says Vetterlein was descrambling many top level telephone conversations ‘By the Fall of 1941’. They were sometimes sent to Hitler. But Kahn says the Allies knew the telephone was dodgy and there was therefore ‘lack of substance in the talks’. But apparently, Churchill was one of the least guarded persons on the phone. A serious problem with this American item, therefore, is how Churchill could have talked in such detail about numbers of ships. He had already that day sent coded messages to Roosevelt via the US Embassy. If the unreleased message in the British archives is the BIG ONE, then Churchill would hardly be breaking the news to the Roosevelt on the scrambler phone. Or just maybe he might have decided to do belt and braces and make a personal phone call as well as send a cryptogram.