“The anomaly of going to war in your own country was not lost on Harry.” (Harry’s Game, Gerald Seymour, Fontana, London 1975)
Airey Neave was killed in March 1979 by a bomb planted beneath his car just outside the Houses of Parliament. The then little known Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) soon claimed responsibility. The widespread shock which greeted his assassination was probably nowhere more clearly felt than by Mrs Thatcher, then leader of the Conservative opposition.
Neave had masterminded Thatcher’s rise to power in the Conservative Party, organising her election as party leader. It was probably him who directed the ‘dirty tricks’ campaign against Heath which proved so effective. From 1975 until his death Neave headed Thatcher’s private office.
It was expected that he would be an important influence on her when she was elected to power: no-one else had been quite so close or had kept the faith for so long.
As Shadow Spokesman on Northern Ireland it was assumed that, following the election of a Conservative Government, his normal posting would be Northern Ireland. But it was revealed (Private Eye 13 April 1979) that he would have been selected as Minister without Portfolio with responsibilities for the intelligence complex.
Neave had strong intelligence connections. During WW2, after escaping from Colditz, he became a leading figure in MI9, the escape organisation controlled by MI6. Towards the end of the war he was involved with a sub-section called IS9(WEA) attached to SHAEF, a section some called ‘another secret army’. It included future Conservative MPs Maurice McMillan and Peter Baker.
Shortly after the war Neave used his legal training at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and then spent a curious year with the Territorial version of IS9 (WEA) before becoming an MP.
His record in Parliament was hardly impressive – perhaps he deliberately kept to the background. It appears though that his intelligence connections were maintained because shortly before his death he discussed with former operatives of the intelligence services the possibility of ‘stopping’ Tony Benn MP if Labour came to power. (New Statesman 20 February 1981).
Unlike her predecessors, Mrs Thatcher had maintained an interest in intelligence matters while in opposition. Through journalist Chapman Pincher, Maurice Oldfield of MI6 expressed MI6’s desire “to keep in touch with her.” Prime Minister Callaghan allowed the MI6 director to brief the leader of the opposition. Oldfield and Thatcher became firm friends. The day after her election as Prime Minister she requested the head of MI6 and the Director of MI5, Arthur Franks and Howard Smith, to brief her on intelligence matters.
The briefing “followed the same pattern as that given to her predecessor when he came to office: it was non-specific in terms of actual cases, but highly detailed in explaining the basic modus operandi of MI5 and MI6 operations … although we can’t be sure it is a fair guess that Neave’s killing came up at that briefing.” (Magill June 1979)
Following this “The personal involvement of Mrs Thatcher with Airey Neave led to an unprecedented move. An intelligence sub-committee was set up to hunt Neave’s killers. The then Paymaster General, Angus Maude, well known right-wing Minister, liaising with the Co-ordinator of Security and Intelligence in the Cabinet, Brooks Richards, headed it.. He promised unlimited financial resources to capture Neave’s killers”. (Magill above)
“I want the maximum effort to get the killers and fast. I don’t want an investigation that runs a month, two months or six months”. (Harry’s Game)
For British Intelligence in Northern Ireland there was a problem in tracking down Neave’s killers. It knew next to nothing about INLA though it knew something of the political organisation, the Irish Republican Socialist Party which was allied to it. The IRSP had been established by a break away militant faction of the Official IRA, led by legendary Republican figure, Sean Costello, following the Official IRA’s ceasefire in 1974. INLA itself appears to have formed – initially as the Peoples’ Liberation Army – in late 1974 when feuding, lasting a year, broke out with the Officials. (Costello himself was assassinated in 1977)
Costello was assassinated in 1977. Kenneth Littlejohn had claimed that Costello was already on a British Intelligence assassination list. It was thought that the shotgun blast which killed him in a Dublin street had also destroyed the IRSP and INLA. But they returned to prominence with the Airey Neave killing and received formal recognition when they were proscribed by the Thatcher government in July 1979 (Guardian 18 May 1981)
Military intelligence in Northern Ireland, represented by the 12 and 14 companies of the Army’s Intelligence Corps, had little on INLA. Neither had the other intelligence groups, MI5, MI6, DIS, the Anti-terrorist squad, and Scotland Yard – all came up empty handed. A Defence Intelligence staff report (Document No 37) obtained by the IRA in early 1979, was published in part in May of that year. It made little mention of INLA. Mrs Thatcher was apparently appalled by the disparity of reports she received on intelligence in Northern Ireland. (British Intelligence in Action, Kennedy Lindsay)
“British intelligence officers met their contacts and talked … all were to report later that night to their controller that nothing was known.” (Harry’s Game)
Intelligence appointees were confined to ‘tasking’ – delineating collection areas for different services – and arbitration in inter-service disputes, of which there were many. Thatcher had decided major changes were required and appointed a security co-ordinator for Northern Ireland.
First choice was ‘tough man’ Sir John Killick who had a long career in intelligence going back to the war. He declined but she persuaded her close friend Sir Maurice Oldfield to come out of retirement. (At the time he was writing a book on international affairs at All Souls College, Oxford).
Oldfield only lasted six months and had to retire through ill-health. His replacement in May 1980 was Francis Brooks Richard. During the war he had been involved in intelligence work, running the secret Telford Flotilla, and was President of the Special Forces Club. Around the time of his appointment “the Dublin weekly Hibernia, stated that it had received confidential reports showing that if the INLA unit responsible could not be found, other sections of the movement could serve as acceptable substitutes.” (The Kitson Experiment, Roger Faligot, Zed Press 1983)
“The Prime Minister was virtually inaudible. ‘We’ll need some results and soon.’ ” (Harry’s Game)
If it is hard to accept the thesis that Thatcher was seeking revenge for Neave’s death, events in Northern Ireland were certainly taking a bloody turn. Miriam Daly, a lecturer at Queen’s University and former President and founder of the IRSP (which was close to INLA) was brutally murdered. She was shot five times in the head in her Belfast home. She had been tied hands and feet to a chair and a pillow had been used as a silencer. The phone had been cut off. Four well-dressed young men were seen leaving the house. The weapon used and the manner of execution were totally at odds with the usual Loyalist killing methods. Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, along with Costello, founder member of the IRSP, suggested at the time that the killing bore the characteristics of an SAS-style operation.
In June John Turnly, a leading member of the Republican Irish Independent Party and a former SDLP member, was shot nine times in front of his Japanese wife Myoko and their two children, as he arrived to address a meeting in the village of Canrough, County Antrim. The true significance of this episode became apparent later.
On October 15th two leaders of the IRSP, Noel Lyttle and Ronnie Bunting, were murdered. Bunting was a Protestant, the son of Major Bunting, a former aide to the Reverend Ian Paisley. “It is understood Bunting was a leading member of INLA – probably Belfast commander but possibly as Senior as Chief of Staff.” (Guardian 18 May 1981) They were killed by a group of men who moved into the house after opening up the front door with a sledgehammer. The attack was too well planned, carried out by men who were cool and calm and knew what they were doing… they wore green ribbed pullovers with suede patches on their shoulders and ski-type masks which covered their whole faces, with only holes for their eyes.” (Irish Press 29 October 1980) They also spoke with English accents.
On October 20th a similar raid took place at Provisional Sinn Fein advice centre where a meeting to plan publicity and strategy for the Provisionals’ hunger strike was being held. The troops wore balaclavas and blue anoraks with orange armbands and carried automatic weapons and sledgehammers. Official sources would not say whether SAS troops had been involved but neighbours said that soldiers and policemen did not arrive until later and a regular major was told to ‘go away by one of the raiders’ (Daily Telegraph 21 October 1980)
The men did not identify themselves but all spoke with English accents. They arrived in a convoy of four cars and a van, surrounded one house before breaking in the front door. A 14 year old girl and her mother were tied up by troops but later released. One shot was fired and a youth was later treated for a hand injury. One witness recalled that at least one masked man carried a ‘handgun with a silencer.’ (Daily Telegraph 21 October 1980). Was it a 9 mm army issue with silencer of the type found to have been used to kill Miriam Daly?
Bernadette McAliskey and her husband were shot at their home in the country on the evening of 16 January 1981. Three gunmen drove up to the house and smashed down the door with a sledgehammer. Firing handguns they hit Bernadette in the chest, arm and thigh. They found her husband in the kitchen and shot him. The attackers tore out the telephone.
The RUC were denied details of what took place at the McAliskey’s for several hours by the British Army. On the afternoon before the attack the regular Army patrol was replaced by the Third Battalion of the Parachute Regiment which normally operated on the border near Crossmaglen. It appeared that they had staked out the house.
Spokesmen for the loyalist paramilitary group the UDA had boasted openly to journalists that it was responsible for attacks on H Block activists. A UDR member had told a British journalist that Bernadette McAliskey was on their assassination list. (New Statesman 23 January 1981). Following the attempt on her life it was suggested that the Red Hand Commando had been responsible. (Guardian 17 January 1981). It is strongly believed by some that the Red Hand had been used in the past as a pseudo-gang by the British Army. Formed in 1972, and outlawed in 1973, they had little prominence in the next five years. A shadowy group, they overlapped with the UFF which, in turn, had strong links with the UDA.
In 1982 three men were jailed for the assassination of John Turnly, mentioned above. They claimed membership of the UDA. One of them, Robert McConnel, said that he agreed to work for the Army’s secret undercover men two months before he killed John Turnly. Two SAS men, Sgt. Tom Aiken and Corp. McGow had given him weapons, uniforms, intelligence gathering equipment, and they also talked of gathering information on Turnly, Miriam Daly and Bernadette McAliskey. (Guardian 11 March 1982)
This had taken place at the very time of the suspected new initiatives against INLA and others, and the appointment of Sir Brooks Richards.
While the killings seemed to come to an end, the hunt for the killers of Neave did not. Four years after the event The Mail On Sunday (24 July 1983) exclusively disclosed their names. According to a Scotland Yard intelligence dossier revealed in Paris on May 22 1983 they were: Brendan O’Sullivan, Vincent Ford, and Michael Plunkett, a member of the IRSP.
Plunkett and 3 others had been arrested in Dublin 8 days after the Neave killing, charged with possessing explosives. Plunkett escaped while on bail, apparently hiding out in France. No other evidence has been presented which links Plunkett to the Neave killing. He was arrested along with Stephen King and Mary Reid, both alleged to be members of INLA, in August 1982, near Paris. (This was only a few days after President Mitterand had gone on television to announce a government crackdown on ‘international terrorism’.)
The police who carried out the arrest were from the GIGN (Groupe D’Intervention De la Gendarmerie Nationale), a counter-terrorist squad responsible for the personal security of the President and for carrying out hostage rescues. They had been given the secret dossier in December 1982 by John Wilson, the operational head of Scotland Yard’s Special Branch.
Although initially seen as a spectacular success, doubts soon arose about the real importance of the three ‘terrorists’ and the circumstances of their arrest, doubts which eventually led to their release by the examining magistrate. (Times 23 May 1983). The GIGN, who claimed to be members of the SAS, were already coming under increasing criticism. Capt. Paul Barril faced charges of giving detonators to an extreme right-wing group before the victory of the socialists at the French general election. Barril had swooped on the flat of Plunkett and the others with Major Commandant Christian Prouteau who was directly linked to the Elysee. Prouteau had been brought in by Mitterand to oversee his personal security. Barril had issued a statement in which he said he had acted on orders from his superiors – ie Prouteau. It was also claimed at the time that a police superintendent involved in the arrest was to be questioned about links to the British Secret Service.
The Mail On Sunday article concluded…”The three were not wanted for offences in Britain”. Since one of them, Plunkett, was being accused of the Neave assassination, one wonders where journalists Chester Stern and Nicholas Polven thought the Houses of Parliament were situated.
Another supposed participant in the Neave assassination was Dominic McGlinchey (Guardian 16 August 1983). This is claimed even though he didn’t join INLA until 1981, two years after the killing. In an attempt to gain information about his movements, MI6 set up Caruso Holidays. Belfast Republicans Henry and Bridget Logue and IRSP members Tony and Mary Hyde ‘won’ holidays in Spain from Caruso. While on holiday both couples were approached by MI6 agents who offered money, substantial sums, for information on IRSP and republican members. They also inquired of the Hydes about McGlinchey who they knew slightly. The invitations were declined.
‘Caruso Holidays’ had an address at Albermarle Way, an alleyway off the Clerkenwell Road in London. The phone number given for the firm belonged to what is believed to be the London station of MI6 – 60 Vauxhall Bridge Road, the Government Communications Bureau. (Sunday Times 12 October 1983)
McGlinchey was eventually captured and extradited to Northern Ireland where he was imprisoned for life for a number of terrorist offences. The Neave assassination was not mentioned. This showed once again that the authorities were no nearer to finding out the true assassins, but in this ‘game’ that didn’t matter. Others, with only the slimmest connections to INLA, were perfectly acceptable victims.
There is, of course, not enough hard evidence to sustain the idea that Thatcher called for a blood revenge. Only an official enquiry could achieve that and we are not going to get one. In the end it comes down to our perception of Thatcher, sections of the British State and the intelligence empire. The question is: does the shoe fit?
SD
This article is based on a small section of Roger Faligot’s book, The Kitson Experiment: British Military Strategy in Northern Ireland (Brandon/Zed Press 1983). Faligot was, I think, the first to put into print details of he bloody aftermath of Neave’s killing and its possible origins.