

# **Kincora: abuse and the British state**

**Colin Wallace**

**T**he Kincora boys home scandal sent shock waves throughout Ireland when it first received media coverage in early 1980. Since then there have been at least five enquiries of various kinds into the systematic sexual abuse of boys in public care in Kincora and other institutions, but none of them has satisfactorily addressed public concerns.

What makes Kincora remarkable is the lingering suspicion that British Intelligence connived in the continued abuse of children, in order to secure intelligence on Loyalist paramilitaries. This paper shows that there is good reason for that suspicion.

At the heart of the Kincora scandal is one of the convicted sex abusers, William McGrath. A prominent Orangeman and right-wing Protestant zealot, he exerted a powerful influence on the development of Loyalist politics in the 1970s and 1980s as the IRA campaign of violence escalated. McGrath was the leader of a loyalist paramilitary organization called Tara and had two expressed hatreds: the Roman Catholic Church and Communism.

On 29 October 2014 the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, wrote to Tam Dalyell, the former Father of the House of Commons, regarding the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA) chaired by a former High Court Judge, Sir Anthony Hart. In that letter she said:

'I want to take this opportunity to make it absolutely clear that all officials, Government departments and agencies will give their fullest possible cooperation to his Inquiry. This includes the Security Service and the Ministry of Defence, if it transpires they have any relevant information to share.

I am confident that a full commitment by all Government departments and agencies to share relevant information as described above, on a voluntary basis, will be sufficient for this purpose and I will be monitoring the position carefully. But, if this does not prove to be the case, then I will review the position and, if necessary, seek agreement to bring the Kincora allegations within the Terms of Reference of the Child Sexual Abuse Panel Inquiry, with the option of converting it into a statutory inquiry as necessary. I am copying this letter to Sir Anthony Hart and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.' <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Copy of letter supplied to author.

On 18 June 2015, Prime Minister David Cameron wrote to Tam Dalyell essentially confirming what Theresa May had said:

'As you will be aware, this Government has already promised "the fullest possible degree of co-operation by all of Her Majesty's Government and its agencies to determine the facts." I reiterate that commitment.'

Sadly, despite what the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary said, we now know that the reality of what actually happened was very different. This paper sets out a synopsis of how Parliament has been deliberately and repeatedly misled over what has become known as the 'The Kincora Scandal'.

Mr Dalyell wrote to David Cameron (appendices 12 and 13)<sup>2</sup> because, on 1 August 2014, the *Belfast Telegraph* reported:

'Retired judge Sir Anthony Hart, who is leading the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA), has said the inquiry "does not have sufficient powers" in its present form to investigate issues relating to the Army or MI5.<sup>3</sup>

It is important to note that Sir Anthony Hart was expressing his concerns about MI5 publicly and in the presence of the press. That was an unusual step for a former High Court Judge to take, but it is now suspected that he was aware of some of the issues that will be mentioned below. For example, a telex message from MI5 staff at the Northern Ireland Office on 5 August 1982 to MI5's Legal Adviser, Bernard Sheldon, in London, restated a general directive by the Director General of MI5 that: 'no serving or former of the Security Service should be interviewed by the police'. (Appendix 1)

From 1982 until the commencement of the HIA Inquiry into Kincora, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) made several futile attempts to interview one senior MI5 officer, Ian Cameron, who had been attached to Army HQ at Lisburn during the mid-1970s. It was alleged that he had ordered an Army Intelligence officer, Captain Brian Gemmell, to cease investigating allegations which he had become aware of about the possible sexual abuse of boys at the Kincora home. Brian Gemmell has since publicly confirmed that he was given such an order.

Although the RUC did make a number of attempts to gain access to Ian Cameron, they failed to do so because of the MI5 Director General's directive. Eventually, MI5 agreed that Cameron would be permitted to provide written answers to a series of agreed questions submitted by the RUC. However, a letter from MI5 to the Cabinet Office on 10 November 1989, states:

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<sup>2</sup> The appendices are in a separate file: 'Kincora Appendices'.

<sup>3</sup> <<https://tinyurl.com/39sndr3h>> or <<https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/secrets-act-call-over-abuse-inquiry-30476534.html>>

'It is understood that Mr Cameron's answers to Det Supt Caskey's written questions were eventually sent to Northern Ireland. But there is no record that they were communicated to the RUC, whose enquiries finished in 1983.'<sup>4</sup>

In other words, despite the assurances that Theresa May and David Cameron gave to Tam Dalyell, Ian Cameron's written answers were never made available to the RUC.

## **In the beginning**

**I**n 1973, I was ostensibly working for the Army Information Services, which included the Army Press Desk. However, in reality, I was part of the Army's Psychological Operations unit (Psy Ops) which worked under the cover title Information Policy. Early that year, Army Intelligence gave me a document (Appendix 2) with a request that I draw the attention of the press, on an unattributable basis, to the alleged sexual activities of William McGrath. He was then leader of a paramilitary organization called Tara and also a house father at the Kincora boys home in Belfast. Referred to as the 'Tara press briefing document', its origin was confirmed to Information Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in a letter dated 4 December 1992 from Hugh Mooney, a former senior FCO official who had been in the FCO's Information Research Department (IRD). In the 1970s he, too, had been based at Army HQ in Lisburn operating under the cover title of 'Information Adviser to the GOC', but he actually reported to the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence at the Northern Ireland Office. (Appendix 3) The Tara briefing document is significant in that it contains the correct, but then the little known, address and telephone number of both McGrath's home and his place of work, i.e. Kincora.

Although the Tara briefing document was clearly annotated in the Intelligence officer's own handwriting with 'Some off the cuff information for the press'. However Ian Cameron later reported to MI5 HQ in London that, by sharing the contents of that document with the press, as I was requested to do by Army Intelligence, I was in breach of the Official Secrets Acts. (Appendix 4) Moreover, according to *The Daily Mirror* on 8 February 1990, the former head of the Army Information Services at Army HQ in Lisburn, Peter Broderick, is quoted as saying that he had seen the document and approved it for release.

'This week, for the first time, Peter Broderick, Wallace's boss at the time (1974), confirmed to me that he saw the document (The Tara press brief

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<sup>4</sup> HIA inquiry disclosed MoD document KIN-102649. See p. 149 at <<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/Rucker-Report-part-2-RO.pdf>>.

used by Wallace to highlight McGrath's homosexuality and his role in running a children's home) and wrote on it. "That is certainly my writing", he told me. "I saw the document and approved it." (Appendix 5)

Peter Broderick also confirmed this to the *Sunday Times* a few days later (11 February 1990). He told the *Sunday Times* that he had signed the document and authorised its release to the press. Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland in September 1974, so it is obvious that the document must have predated that. Similarly, the document was annotated in Hugh Mooney's handwriting. He left Northern Ireland in December 1973, so the document must also have predated his departure.

Despite the very obvious significance of that document, neither the police, nor any of the official inquiries into Kincora, ever questioned Peter Broderick, Hugh Mooney or the named Army Intelligence Officer who provided it to me. Detective Inspector Cooke of the RUC did interview Peter Broderick on 13 May 1985, but in his record of that interview there is no mention of the document's existence. That appears to be inexplicable, bearing in mind its obvious significance to the RUC investigation.

Moreover, although Peter Broderick informed RUC DI Cooke that my superior officer in Psy Ops was Colonel Geoffrey Hutton, there is no record that either the RUC or any of the official inquiries ever interviewed him about Kincora, or about my role in briefing the press about William McGrath. Even more remarkable, although the Tara briefing document was annotated by another Psy Ops officer, Lt Colonel Adrian Peck, who was interviewed by the RUC on 3 July 1985 about Tara/Kincora, the police did not ask him about the document. Lt Col Peck did not leave N Ireland until June 1974 – almost one year after the document was given to me for disclosure to the press.

It is reasonable to assume that, if the information presented in that briefing document had been acted upon properly in 1973, subsequent years of sexual abuse at Kincora could have been prevented.

## **Previous Inquiries into Kincora**

**I**t is now clear that the Terry Inquiry, which was established by James Prior in 1982 and led by Sir George Terry of the Sussex Police, misled Parliament. It's report failed to disclose that a senior MI5 officer at Army HQ NI, Ian Cameron, had ordered an Army Intelligence Officer, Captain Brian Gemmell, to stop investigating allegations of sexual abuse by William McGrath at Kincora. Moreover, contrary to what James Prior told Parliament, Sir George was not a truly 'independent' chief constable. Records now show that he was actually 'the preferred choice of Sir John Herman', Chief Constable of the RUC, whose officers had been accused of covering up the Kincora abuse! Had Parliament

been told the full truth about these matters, a public inquiry would, almost certainly, have been inevitable.

By covering-up the failings of the Terry Inquiry, James Prior was able to assure Parliament on 18 January 1984 that a public inquiry into Kincora was not necessary. Instead he announced setting an inquiry under Judge William Hughes to investigate only the *administration* of homes, such as Kincora. Despite the very limited nature of the Inquiry, he did, however, assure the House that:

'It will be up to the Inquiry and the eminent judge [Judge William Hughes] who will preside over it to examine anything that is relevant to the particular boys' home [Kincora], or to the other five boys' homes, and the circumstances which led up to the problems.'<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, when asked on The World at One (BBC Radio 4, 18 January 1984) if the Inquiry would take evidence on the alleged activities of the Intelligence agencies, he replied that if there was any evidence, it would.

Despite Mr Prior's assurances, in his report (page 5 para 1.2) Judge Hughes stated:

'The conduct of the police, or elected representatives, or clergymen, or military Intelligence or any other persons who may have been in receipt of allegations, information or rumours relating to Kincora or any other home, was not under scrutiny in this Inquiry.'

This was remarkable because, on 3 May 1984, when Judge Hughes set out the Terms of Reference for his Inquiry at a public meeting, he made no reference to any such restrictions. Indeed, when James Prior announced in Parliament the setting up of the Hughes Inquiry, he responded to a question from the Rev. Martin Smyth MP saying:

'The hon. Gentleman [Rev Smyth] said that Sir George Terry understood why the police did not investigate the matter before 1980. I believe that it would be within the [Hughes] inquiry's terms of reference to examine why no inquiry was instigated before 1980. This goes to the heart of much of the concern expressed in Northern Ireland.'<sup>6</sup>

Some six years later, on 22 January 1990, Sir John Blesloch, Permanent Under Secretary at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), had a meeting with Judge

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<sup>5</sup> See the Hansard record at <<https://tinyurl.com/ycxehc9m>> or <[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jan/18/kincora-childrens-home#S6CV0052P0\\_19840118\\_HOC\\_180](https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jan/18/kincora-childrens-home#S6CV0052P0_19840118_HOC_180)>.

<sup>6</sup> See <<https://tinyurl.com/bdejkhht>> or <[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jan/18/kincora-childrens-home#column\\_322](https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jan/18/kincora-childrens-home#column_322)>

Hughes. In a 'Note for the record' of what was said at that meeting, Sir John Blelloch wrote:

'Judge Hughes put it to me firmly that he believed his Committee had done a full and conscientious job within its Terms of Reference. Those TOR [Terms of Reference] did not require him to look into the activities of the RUC, the Army and of the Security Services and he had not done so.'

In terms of the file which I sent to Mrs Thatcher personally in November 1984, for onward transmission to the Hughes Inquiry, Sir John Blelloch wrote:

'Judge Hughes feels that the terms of Lord Trefgarne's letter of December 1985 implied that the Hughes Inquiry had been shown the contents of Wallace's file as transmitted to the Prime Minister whereas in fact this was simply not the position – that in spite of the fact that a specific request had been made by the Committee to see the file.'

In paragraph 6 of his Note, Sir John Blelloch says:

'I said to him [Judge Hughes] that we cannot be absolutely sure that Wallace would not be able to substantiate the claims that he had so far made only in writing.'

Sir John Blelloch's Note was copied to the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, Stephen Rickard of MI5 at the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), and to No. 10 Downing Street.

After the Terry Inquiry had been set up, declassified Government files now reveal, there was a consensus among Northern Ireland senior civil servants that an Inquiry into Kincora – under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 – was considered essential. However, the declassified files also show that MI5 opposed such an initiative. Moreover, a detailed minute of a meeting held at Stormont Castle on 30 March 1982, to discuss the Kincora issue, records:

'Given the importance of securing public confidence in the Inquiry, it was agreed that in the absence of powerful arguments to the contrary it would be held under the authority of the 1921 Act.'

A minute by M. W. Hopkins, from the Security and International Liaison Division of the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), states that a Mr Brennan (an NIO official in London) said that they needed to consider whether the inquiry:

' . . . would have to extend to allegations of a cover-up by, inter alia, the RUC, the NIO, and NI politicians . . . the general view seemed to be that only an inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 would have the right powers, but there would clearly be difficulties in persuading the senior ministers who would have an interest, as well as both Houses,

that this was a matter of “urgent public importance”, the criterion in the Act.’

One year later, on 30 March 1983, MI5’s Legal Adviser, Bernard Sheldon, wrote a ‘Note’ on a meeting which he and several other senior officials (Sir Philip Woodfield, Permanent Secretary at the NIO; Clive Whitmore, Permanent Secretary at the MoD; Barry Shaw, NI director of public prosecutions; and an unidentified MI5 officer) had with the Attorney General at the House of Commons the previous afternoon. Paragraph 8 of that ‘Note’ stated:

‘There was brief discussion between Woodfield and the Attorney about the judicial enquiry into Kincora. The Attorney thought that a firm commitment had already been given, but Woodfield appeared to suggest that no enquiry might be necessary once the Terry report had been received. He also said that the Northern Ireland Chief Justice had refused to co-operate unless the enquiry was set up under the 1921 Act and the Secretary of State doubted whether he would get approval for such an enquiry from the House of Commons.’

On 30 June 1983, a senior official at the Northern Ireland Office, Mr Boys Smith, circulated a minute to several other key officials, including Sir Philip Woodfield (Permanent Secretary at the NIO), drawing their attention to concerns expressed to him personally by the Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (Hal Doyne Ditmas of MI5) about the possibility of such an inquiry into Kincora following the outcome of the Terry investigations. Mr Boys Smith reported that:

‘The DCI was worried about the likely intrusion of the inquiry into Intelligence matters if the terms of reference were as wide as those we had in mind. He went on to say that at least two possible witnesses who could come forward [i.e. Fred Holroyd and myself] with evidence which (unless restrictions were imposed on what could be said) might touch directly on the extent to which the Intelligence services were or were not aware of homosexuality in this area, and might reveal (perhaps gratuitously) information about the structure and range of activities of these services at the time in question. Names might be mentioned.’

He added that the DCI:

‘was also concerned about what would be said about the secret work very close to extreme Protestant organizations, and close therefore to some politicians. If these activities were to be revealed – through a leak if not through a public session of the inquiry – there could be a brisk reaction.’

According to the minute (Appendix 6, para 5 ii), MI5’s Legal Adviser, Bernard

Sheldon, stated that MI5 'would prefer a GB judge' to lead the Inquiry. In addition, Mr Boys Smith recorded that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 'might want to suggest' to the Home Secretary and the Attorney General that 'an inquiry limited to the child-care aspects (presumably therefore under the NI Powers, not the 1921 Act), or a 1921 inquiry with limited terms of reference'.

A totally independent and impartial judiciary is one of the cornerstones of any democracy. It is vitally important the judiciary as a whole is impartial and independent of all external pressures, including interference from MI5 or other Intelligence agencies. Why, therefore, was MI5 attempting to secure a 'GB judge', rather than a Northern Ireland one, to chair any inquiry into Kincora arising from the Terry investigations? Did MI5 regard Northern Ireland judges as unreliable? It is, therefore, no surprise that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, did exactly as Bernard Sheldon of MI5 suggested: he set up an inquiry under the powers contained in article 54 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 and thus avoided the judicial inquiry which most people, including senior NIO officials (other than MI5), wanted.

So, not only did MI5 attempt to manipulate the appointment of a GB judge to head any post-Terry inquiry, they also attempted to manipulate the RUC investigations prior to that inquiry. This can be clearly seen from a telex sent on 29/30 June 1982 by the MI5 Assistant Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (ADCI) who referred to the possibility of creating 'false files' in anticipation of lines of enquiry which it was expected Detective Superintendent Caskey would seek to follow during his investigation into Kincora.

The use of the expression 'false files' demonstrates that a senior MI5 officer considered the possibility of creating false evidence, misleading or untrue files, to show to the police. The MI5 officer's telex (Appendix 7) continued:

'We will also ask HSB [Head of Special Branch]/DHSB [Deputy Head of Special Branch] about the status of this particular enquiry and what is likely to happen to any report that is produced. We assume Caskey is an astute police officer and we should be in difficulty if we attempt to deceive him and manufacture false files or deny the existence of real ones.'

Although the suggestion was not put into effect, the intent to deceive clearly existed. That intent was, of course, a criminal offence. Why did MI5 feel the need to deceive the police about Kincora?

That proposal by a senior MI5 officer is utterly appalling, given the assurances that Theresa May and David Cameron later gave to Mr Dalyell. It is



very clear that MI5 were not only strongly opposed to the Government's suggestion of a possible public inquiry at the end of the Terry investigation, but also that MI5 were deliberately manipulating the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in such a way as to create an inquiry that was effectively meaningless. In other words, MI5 were more concerned about protecting the confidentiality of its operations involving 'secret work very close to extreme Protestant organizations, and politicians' than it was with uncovering the facts about the sexual abuse of children in homes and hostels.

### **Destroying official records**

**I**t is now very clear that part of the cover-up involved the destruction of official records. A report written in 1989 by A G Rucker at the MoD to Sir Michael Quinlan, the Ministry's Permanent Under Secretary, stated that:

'all documents, other than policy documents, about Information Policy (PSYOPS) had been destroyed in 1976 when the Information Policy section had been disbanded: the policy documents on IP had been destroyed in 1981: those responsible for this destruction were still to be interviewed.'

Simply because the Information Policy unit was disbanded in 1976 should not have justified the destruction of the unit's documents – they would normally have been archived for future record.

The 1976 destruction of documents may be significant because it was in that year that my London solicitor and I had a meeting with my then MP, Roland Moyle, to discuss attempts by the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland during 1974 to discredit various political figures, including Harold Wilson.

The 1981 destruction of documents may also be significant. That was the year that three staff members, including the Tara leader, William McGrath, of the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast were convicted of sexually abusing boys in their care. It may be that the press allegations arising from the trials could have been a factor in the apparently unauthorized decision to destroy those files.

An internal MoD inquiry report commented:

'the decision to destroy HQNI's policy papers in 1981 might now be open to some criticism. The same criticism might also apply to the destruction of some MoD HQ papers, although the dates on which this was done have not yet been established.'

The Army was not alone in destroying potentially important files about William McGrath and Kincora. A transcript of Day 217 of the Northern Ireland Historical

Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA) (29 June 2016) refers to a file compiled by Army HQ on Tara and states:

' . . . it has not yet been possible to find the Army HQNI Tara file, which definitely did exist, or the 39 Brigade Tara file, which may be the one that Brian Gemmell [the Army Intelligence Officer at Lisburn who was ordered by Ian Cameron MI5 to stop investigating McGrath and allegations about his sexual activities] had and which this document may well have been found on. Those files, according to Mr Rucker, [senior MoD security official] who you are aware did the report examining much wider issues, but including looking at matters relating to Kincora and the Army, according to Mr Rucker, they appear to have last been with The Security Service in that he sent them to The Security Service for them to reconsider matters in them that he was looking at, but The Security Service hasn't as yet been able to trace them in order to know do they still have them, did they send them back to the Army or have they been destroyed.' <sup>7</sup>

Records show that even Kincora related files held by some of the most senior Law Officers in the UK were inexplicably destroyed. Page 198 of the HIA Inquiry's Report on the Kincora abuses refers to the destruction of files (held by the Attorney General's Office in London) on meetings between the Attorney General and the DPP. The report states:

'When we asked the Attorney General's Office in London to produce any papers they held regarding these meetings we were informed that the files they held in relation to Kincora had been destroyed in 2004. In response to the Warning Letter the Attorney General's Office informed us a mistake had been made (for which they apologized) and that the relevant file was destroyed in 2009. We criticize the destruction of the files relating to Kincora in view of the persistent allegations that there had been over the years about wrongdoing at Kincora.' (Appendix 8)

In 1989 the accidental discovery by MoD staff of information in some Ministry records from 1975, showed that a number past statements made by the Government in Parliament in response to my allegations were inaccurate. The discovery was drawn to the attention of Sir Michael Quinlan, then Permanent Under Secretary of the MoD, who felt that the inaccuracies were sufficiently significant to merit an extensive, confidential investigation into how they had occurred. The discovery also indicated that much of the relevant

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<sup>7</sup> This paragraph may look scrambled but it is verbatim. See the top of page 158 of the document at <<https://tinyurl.com/5cretzf8>> or <<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/M15-D217-Trans-Rev2-RO.pdf>>.

documentation from that period had been inexplicably destroyed. To oversee the investigation, Sir Michael Quinlan appointed Arthur Rucker, D/Sec (NATO/UK) at the MoD. Some of Mr Rucker's findings were potentially very unpalatable for the Government. This can be clearly seen from a memo written on 12 December 1989 by the then Defence Secretary, Tom King, to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Regarding the findings of the internal MoD investigation initiated by Sir Michael Quinlan into the nature of my Psy Ops role in Northern Ireland, Tom King's memo said:

'We need to correct some mis-statements made by Ministers and in official correspondence, concerning the Wallace case. In particular:-

(i) Misleading information has been given about the nature of Mr Wallace's duties in Northern Ireland;

(ii) It has been stated incorrectly that all of his allegations have been fully and carefully investigated and that none has been substantiated; and

(iii) It has been stated that Ministers are aware of no evidence that a plan by the name of "Clockwork Orange" ever existed. Evidence of such a plan has now come to light; although it is clear that it was not approved.'

Tom King went on to say (para 7):

'A difficult question is whether the terms of Mr Wallace's draft supplementary job specification should be revealed. It is most unattractive to do so, because it contains references to "psychological warfare" activities; and also to the press providing information "of substantial intelligence interest".'

The term 'supplementary job specification' is important because, in a report written in February 1975, Ian Cameron of MI5 stated that 'the title Head of Production Services' was a 'cover' for my 'full and true function' in Psy Ops. He also said that I was required to prepare my own material 'after liaison with Intelligence' and 'to make individual and on-the-spot decisions on matters of national security' when giving information to the press.

To deal with these 'difficult questions', Mr King suggested retaining the services of 'an independent arbitrator to review the MoD's internal investigation papers' and 'to make recommendations on what remedial action should be taken.'

Mr King went on to explain to Mrs Thatcher his strategy for the creation of a 'fake' official investigation which would not only stop Members of Parliament from having access to the full facts, but also from demanding a more robust inquiry:

'Mr David Calcutt QC, the Master of Magdalene College Cambridge, has

carried out a previous sensitive inquiry most satisfactorily and, if you agree, I would approach him to see if he would be willing to undertake this investigation. I am confident that we could rely on him to approach these very sensitive issues with complete discretion. It would be important to restrict his terms of reference to the handling of Mr Wallace's CSAB appeal, so that he could avoid getting drawn into Kincora, "Clockwork Orange", assassinations etc. I envisage that his recommendations and my subsequent decision should be published; but that Mr Calcutt should not make a published report.'

Most fair-minded people would feel that Tom King's advice to Mrs Thatcher fell far short of advocating the thorough and impartial investigation that most MPs sought into my role in Northern Ireland in general, and my allegations about Kincora in particular. Indeed, the memo makes it very clear that, at the very top of Government, there was a deliberate ploy to restrict, and thus manipulate, the outcome of what was presented to Parliament as having been a genuine and independent investigation by David Calcutt. It is not unreasonable to assume that, had Tom King's memo to Mrs Thatcher been shown to MPs, there would have been a fully justified uproar in the House.

Why, for example, should the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister want to prevent David Calcutt from investigating 'Kincora, Clockwork Orange and assassinations' when targeting William McGrath and his sexual proclivities was clearly part of my role in Psychological Operations? It would appear from Tom King's memo that David Calcutt's inquiry was simply to placate Parliament and to avoid the MoD having to publish the much more sensitive report produced in 1989 at the request of Sir Michael Quinlan.

There is no doubt whatsoever that David Calcutt was an honorable man, who did his best to achieve a proper result – despite the remarkable constraints imposed upon him by the Government. In complete disregard for Mr Calcutt's role, as set out by Tom King, the MoD failed to provide him with a copy of the full, written justification (Appendix 9) for my Psy Ops role in Northern Ireland. All he was given was a relatively meaningless one paragraph summary, which had been taken from a report written in February 1975 by Ian Cameron of MI5.

What David Calcutt did not know, however, was the extent to which the MoD and MI5 went to manipulate my disciplinary hearing. In 1990, one of my former superiors in Northern Ireland told the press that the MoD attempted to exert an undue influence on him when he volunteered to give evidence on my behalf at my disciplinary hearing in 1975.

On 4 February 1990, *The Observer* newspaper reported:

'Now, retired civil servant Mr Peter Broderick, who was Wallace's boss as head of the MOD information department in Northern Ireland, has told of another alleged dirty trick designed to muddy the waters of Wallace's appeal against dismissal. Mr Broderick, who says he was never aware of Wallace's secret "Clockwork Orange" role, [it occurred after Peter Broderick left Northern Ireland] said:

"A few days before Wallace's appeal, the chief of public relations for the MoD in London (John Groves) spoke to me on the phone. He told me: 'You know this Wallace chap is an active member of a militant volunteer force. He is an active terrorist, a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force.' The suggestion was laughable – that sort of thing would have been known about. It simply wasn't true."

Peter Broderick claims that his London chief, Mr John Groves, went on to tell him that this was "the real reason we want him out of the way". Mr Broderick said: "He told me that the charge of leaking a document to a journalist was just a convenient way of getting rid of him. The clear implication was that I should bear this in mind when I spoke at the tribunal".'

Despite knowing Peter Broderick very well, I found it hard to believe he could have had the conversation he was claiming he'd had with John Groves. I was aware that John Groves had openly expressed his hostility to the Psy Ops unit at Lisburn. We were located in close proximity to the Army Press Desk, over which he had control, and we thus learnt of his negative attitude towards us. However, it still seemed incredible to me that someone of Groves' seniority within the UK army would have been so deceitful. However, a MI5 document, 'Chronology of Northern Ireland', disclosed to the HIA Inquiry, contains a brief biography of me and various key dates related to events in the Province. The biography is littered with mistakes – it even gets my date of birth wrong. Bearing in mind that MI5 would have had access to my personal files at Army HQ in NI and at the MoD, the errors are remarkable and highly questionable. The most significant item in the document is the comment which claims that I was a 'member of the Ulster Volunteer Force – the "B" Specials'. This indicates that MI5 supplied a false allegation to the MoD in 1975 to manipulate my disciplinary case by attempting to influence key witnesses such as Peter Broderick, in such a way as to be prejudicial. MI5's actions were almost certainly deliberate. I had actually been a member of the Ulster Special Constabulary in the 1960s; but that was a part of law enforcement in Northern Ireland – completely different and unconnected to the illegal Ulster Volunteer Force. It is simply not credible that, after operating in Northern Ireland for many years, the Service did not know the difference between the Ulster

Special Constabulary and the Ulster Volunteer Force. If MI5 really did not know the difference between those two organisations, it would be the most inept intelligence organisation in existence. The provision by MI5 of the same false information to the Northern Ireland HIA some 40 years later indicates that MI5 attempted to manipulate that Inquiry – just as they had my disciplinary hearing in 1975. That assumption is based on the belief that MI5 would have checked the content of all documents the Service disclosed to the Inquiry.

Following the publication of the conclusions of David Calcutt's investigation, the MoD also refused Parliament's Defence Select Committee access to that supplementary job specification. This shows that Parliament is totally impotent when it comes to dealing with abuses carried out by the Intelligence Services.

Despite those deliberate limitations, the Metropolitan Police understandably regarded the MoD's handling of my case as potentially fraudulent. The press reported Detective Superintendent Graham Searle, of the Metropolitan Police organized crime branch, as stating that 'although the case merited further investigation, he was reluctant to go ahead without the DPP's approval. He did not want to embark on a lengthy inquiry if the Crown Prosecution Service had no intention of bringing charges'.

It was no surprise, therefore, that the then DPP, Sir Allan Green, decided that David Calcutt's findings did not justify a police inquiry. That judgement by the DPP made the MoD cover-up watertight. (Appendix 10)

Bearing in mind that Tom King was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 1985 to 1989, one would have expected him to be well versed in the remarkable failings of the Terry Inquiry by its deliberate withholding from Parliament of crucially important information. It would also be very strange if he had not been made aware that the terms of reference, for the Inquiry led by Judge William Hughes, had been altered – without the knowledge of Parliament – to prevent that Inquiry from examining the role of RUC and the Intelligence Services in gathering information about William McGrath and Kincora.

The reality of the relationship between MI5 and the RUC during the Terry Inquiry into Kincora was far removed from the assurances to Parliament by David Cameron and Theresa May. A good example of this can be seen from the notes compiled by Bernard Sheldon, Legal Adviser to MI5, during a meeting with Sir George Terry and Det. Chief Inspector Flenley of the Sussex Police on 27 January 1983. (Appendix 11) In those notes Bernard Sheldon states:

'Flenley had interviewed Chris Ryder after the article in the Sunday Times

of 5 December 1982.<sup>8</sup> Although Ryder made no admissions that [Det Supt] Caskey had been a source, Flenley had little doubt that this was the position.'

Bernard Sheldon's notes are critically important for several reasons. First, they show that the Chief Constable appointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, James Prior, did not know that Ian Cameron – a potentially key witness who allegedly ordered Army Intelligence to stop investigating allegations about Kincora – was a senior MI5 officer! Second, the notes make a clear allegation that the most senior RUC officer involved in the Terry Inquiry had leaked to the press information, which if true, would have been a very serious breach of the Official Secrets Acts. Third, Chris Ryder had close links with the RUC. On 3 August 1977, he telephoned Army HQ in Lisburn suggesting that the Army should search my home in England, to see what documents I had in my possession. This followed a reference made by David Blundy in the *Sunday Times* about how I had briefed him about Tara in 1974.

Given that the information contained in Bernard Sheldon's notes was available to both MI5 and to Sir George Terry, it is remarkable that no formal 'leak' inquiry appears to have been initiated on the basis of Chief Inspector Flenley's comments. That failure is particularly important because in 1975 Ian Cameron wrote a report to MI5 HQ in London in 1975 accusing me of a breach of security. It was alleged that I had provided 'restricted' information about Kincora to the press, despite the fact that Army Intelligence and his superiors had instructed me to do so. Moreover, if the information, allegedly given by Det Supt Caskey to Chris Ryder of the *Sunday Times*, was accurate, why was it not included in the report which Sir George Terry submitted to Parliament? Significantly, Bernard Sheldon does not say in his notes that DCI Flenley believed that the *Sunday Times* report was untrue. (Appendix 11)

DCI Flenley's allegation is indicative of the total lack of real accountability of the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland. That lack of accountability was described in May 2011 by Lord Stevens, former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, when he gave evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills. On that occasion, he recounted his experiences when carrying out three Inquiries in Northern Ireland. He said:

'There was the RUC, MI5 and the army doing different things. When you talk about intelligence, of the 210 people we arrested, only three were not agents. Some of them were agents for all four of those particular organisations, fighting against each other, doing things and making a

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<sup>8</sup> The *Sunday Times* article was 'Ulster: how homosexuals were used'. See Appendix 16.

large sum of money, which was all against the public interest and creating mayhem in Northern Ireland. Any system that is created in relation to this country and Northern Ireland has to have a proper controlling mechanism. It has to have a mechanism where someone is accountable for what the actions are and that has to be transparent, especially in the new processes and the new country which, thank the Lord, Northern Ireland is becoming and, God willing, will continue to be.'

9

The investigations carried out by Lord Stevens, Sir Desmond de Silva and Judge Peter Corry all concluded that some members of the Intelligence community, including MI5, should face prosecution for their collusion with paramilitaries. To date no members of the Intelligence Services have been charged with any offence uncovered by the Inquiries. That failure leads to the inevitable conclusion that such Inquiries are purely window dressing activities, to allay the genuine fears of the public. The inescapable conclusion from all of this is that the security authorities have treated Parliament with contempt.

Despite Sir Anthony Hart's concerns about being unable to investigate MI5, the HIA Inquiry did proceed, but it failed miserably. In its Report, the HIA Inquiry concluded (Volume 9, Chapter 28, Module 15: 'Kincora and the security agencies'):

'We are satisfied that the RUC Special Branch first learnt of William McGrath in July 1966 when he was reported as present as one of the platform party at a rally led by the Reverend Ian Paisley in the Ulster Hall in Belfast. McGrath was otherwise an unknown figure. In 1971 MI5 learned that a man named Magrath was reported to be the OC of Tara. However, despite efforts to establish who this person was, and gathering much information about him that was inaccurate, it was not until April 1973, 20 months later, that RUC Special Branch identified the Commanding Officer of Tara as the William McGrath seen on the platform in 1966. It seems that it was not until November 1973 that MI5 learned that the OC of Tara and McGrath were one and the same person, probably as the result of a letter sent to MI5 in November 1973 by RUC Special Branch.'<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See page 13 of <<https://tinyurl.com/2y3zc6b8>> or <<https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/joint-committees/detention-terrorists-suspects-bills/cJDDTS30511ev5.pdf>>.

<sup>10</sup> Paragraph 29 on page 8, at <<https://tinyurl.com/23f56jaf>> or <<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/Chapter%2029%20-%20Module%2015%20-%20Kincora%20Boys'%20Home%20%28Part%202%29.pdf>>.



In chapter 29 the report states:

'The intelligence agencies soon concluded that Tara was not a significant force, and they only paid intermittent attention to it and to McGrath in succeeding years.'<sup>11</sup>

The Inquiry's conclusion at paragraph 30 of chapter 29 was clearly false. At the Army's request, I briefed members of the press prior to August 1972 that members of Tara were believed to be involved in a series of sectarian shootings in the Crumlin Road area of Belfast in which a number of Roman Catholics were killed. The press published some of that information.<sup>12</sup>

A former member of the Army Intelligence Corps submitted a written statement to the HIA Inquiry. Using the name 'Dennis', he explained how, during the mid-1970s, he drove a senior Intelligence Officer from Army HQ at Lisburn to the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast. He explained that the officer gave him directions on where to go and it was obvious that he had been there before. In his statement, 'Dennis' said that the officer spent about an hour inside Kincora before being driven back to Army HQ. Despite the obvious importance of this witness, the HIA Inquiry failed to call him to participate in any of its hearings. Why? There is no record that 'Dennis' was ever interviewed by the RUC. (Appendix 15)

On 18 March 1990, *The Sunday Correspondent* newspaper published details of an interview by one of its reporters, Kevin Toolis, with Hugh Mooney of IRD. The report said:

'Mooney also admitted that Mr Wallace had told him about the above sex scandal at the Kincora boys home in Belfast – casting further doubt on Government claims that the security forces had no knowledge of the long-running rape and buggery of children in care. I do know he mentioned it. He was dropping it in and feeling his way. He kept pushing it. But I could never understand why. I thought it was totally irrelevant to our concerns. I did get the feeling he was pushing this.' (Appendix 14)

In another unreported letter sent to a senior figure in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 4 December 1992 Hugh Mooney wrote:

'Since talking to you about the House of Commons Defence Committee's special report on Colin Wallace, I have had a chance to look at the documents and fear that the Ministry (MoD) can be accused of misleading

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<sup>11</sup> See paragraph 30 at <<https://tinyurl.com/23f56jaf>> or <<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/Chapter%2029%20-%20Module%2015%20-%20Kincora%20Boys'%20Home%20%28Part%20%29.pdf>>

<sup>12</sup> See *Hibernia* magazine, 4 August 1972.

the Committee. In his letter dated 14 February, the clerk to the committee asked for a copy of a document relating to TARA reproduced on page 292 of Paul Foot's Who Framed Colin Wallace. In her reply, the private secretary said: "We have not been able to establish whether this is an official document."

This is surprising since the MoD has identified the official who originated the document from his distinctive italic note which said: "Some 'off the cuff' information on TARA for the Press".

I myself recall passing the document to Wallace. Other manuscript notes on the page show that it was entered as page 45 of an Information Policy file at Headquarters Northern Ireland. All this is known to Wallace and his supporters, who can be expected to raise it. The MoD will be found to have lied and Wallace's credibility will have been increased.'

Although the HIA Inquiry had in its possession a copy of *The Sunday Correspondent* story, it not only ignored what Mooney claimed, but also failed to call him and the reporter, Kevin Toolis, as witnesses. It also ignored Mooney's written communications with the Foreign Office about Tara and Kincora. Moreover, the RUC also failed to interview Mooney and other key identified witnesses, such as the head of Army Intelligence in Northern Ireland, Colonel Goss - referred to in the redacted memo below as 'MoD official Brigadier'.

KIN 200507  
Reference..... 01/RR 96/1175

SECRET & PERSONAL

Mr Joy 3/2/75 (11)

**COLIN WALLACE: PRESS LEAKS IN NORTHERN IRELAND**

I had a long talk with the **MOD OFFICIAL**  
Brigadier during my visit  
to Ashford yesterday.

2 He told me that Colin Wallace of the Army Information Services in Northern Ireland, had been disciplined in some way, following an investigation into the leaking of information to the Press.


3 Though I knew that Colin Wallace was leaving, I had no idea that this was the reason but did not admit this to Brigadier **MOD OFFICIAL**. He went on to say that he thought the question had been badly handled, since Colin Wallace had been one of his best sources, when he had been Colonel GS (Intelligence) in Northern Ireland. He made it clear that Wallace was no longer working there having been suspended. There was at some stage a question of Wallace being prosecuted.

4. I was somewhat shattered to hear this, since, like Brigadier <sup>MoD</sup> ~~official~~ I considered Wallace the most valuable member of the Army Information Services, who throughout the time I was there launched many very damaging stories against the IRA and other extremists.

5 Two points arise, that I s could be grateful if we could discuss:

a How far does the Wallace affair compromise my own operations there in the past ?

b What safeguards exist in the present Army Information Services set-up for the handling of classified information in the light of the AIS request to us to supply a research assistant ?



H P MOONEY

20.3.75

On 7 July 2014 Prime Minister David Cameron was quoted in the *Daily Telegraph* as saying:

'I am absolutely determined that we are going to get to the bottom of these [child sex abuse] allegations and we're going to leave no stone unturned to find out the truth about what happened.

That is vital, it's also vital that we learn the lessons right across the board from these things that have gone wrong and it's also important that the police feel that they can go wherever the evidence leads and they can make all the appropriate arrangements to investigate this properly.'

The internal MoD investigation initiated by Sir Michael Quinlan in 1989 into my role in Northern Ireland commented on the 1982 Kincora Inquiry led by Sir George Terry of the Sussex Police as follows. The 'Terry report', which was compiled in three parts:

'was obtained from the Chief Constable (Sir John Hermon) shortly before 1 July (1983), on which date it was shown to Mr Prior. The reaction of officials to the Report was one of disappointment. As Sir Philip Woodfield put it to Mr Prior: "the document as a whole is a slightly disappointing one - a view which the Chief Constable privately shares. It is written in parts in peculiar English, which could be mocked by sophisticated commentators, there is a tendency to homily and some of the passages about the child care service need to be looked at carefully if they are to be published."

Other officials rejected the presentation of the Report as "remarkably

inept” and it was even proposed “to try to release a Principal (civil servant) . . . give him the three reports, and ask him to produce a condensed publishable version which can be offered to Sir George as a draft” – although this suggestion was not acted upon.’

Despite the obvious importance of the Kincora Inquiry, Sir George Terry’s Report was submitted to Parliament without further improvement or comment, and despite the damning criticism of it by senior officials at the Northern Ireland Office. This is a good example of how Parliament has been repeatedly treated with disdain by Government agencies when dealing with child abuse allegations in Northern Ireland.

According to the official transcript of Day 205 of the HIA Inquiry (1 June 2016), Counsel to the Inquiry said that the Deputy Director of MI5, who gave evidence anonymously to the Inquiry via a video link, had told the Inquiry that:

‘The first MI5 knew of the allegations about child sexual exploitation at Kincora was when the stories emerged in the media in 1980 and the RUC investigation which led to the conviction of William McGrath, the Kincora housefather, and two others (Mains and Semple).’<sup>13</sup>

The Deputy Director’s evidence was truly remarkable bearing in mind that, in an interview with BBC TV on 1 August 2014, former Army Intelligence Officer, Captain Brian Gemmell, who had been based at Army HQ in Lisburn. Gemmell told the BBC how, in 1975, Ian Cameron of MI5 had instructed him to stop investigating allegations of sexual abuses at Kincora. He said:

‘I was summoned to go and see him. I went up thinking he was going to be pleased with me. He bawled me out. He was rude and offensive and hostile. He told me not just to stop any investigation into Kincora, but to drop “Royal Flush” [the code name for the agent Brian Gemmell was running inside Tara].’

If the Deputy Director’s evidence was true, is it credible that Ian Cameron, a senior MI5 officer, did not tell his superiors in London about Brian Gemmell’s report and that he was running an agent inside ‘Tara’?

The transcript of a call made to the RUC’s Confidential Telephone on 23 May 1973 shows that senior police officers, including the Head of the Special Branch, were made aware of the fact that William McGrath was employed at Kincora. The transcript further records the caller as saying: ‘his methods of dealing with boys is to suggest homosexual activities will cure a variety of

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<sup>13</sup> Transcript page 38 beginning at line 19 at <<https://www.hiainquiry.org/sites/hiainquiry/files/media-files/D205-Rev-Trans-RO.pdf>>.

complaints'. The transcript also says that: 'McGrath practices various kinds of homosexual perversion, but is known to be indulging in other kinds of perversion as well.' (Appendix 17) Knowing that McGrath was the leader of a paramilitary organisation, did the RUC not share that information with MI5?

The transcript does, however, show that it was copied to Assistant Chief Constable William Meharg (A.C.C. Crime). We now know that the person who made the anonymous telephone call to the RUC was Roy Garland, who had been McGrath's second-in command in Tara. Roy Garland had become aware of McGrath's sexual activities in 1971 and left the organisation in disgust. Members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, who had attended Tara meetings prior to that, also left the organisation for the same reason. Were MI5 not aware of this?

In between 1974 and 1976 Roy Garland had a number of meetings with Jim Cullen, a detective from the RUC Drugs Squad. DC Cullen referred Roy Garland's allegations to Assistant Chief Constable William Meharg, and in 1976 submitted a substantial file of evidence, including documents from the Welfare Department, to him for direction. That file disappeared inside the RUC's HQ and was never found. McGrath continued his abuse of boys at Kincora for another three years. The HIA Inquiry was understandably critical of ACC Meharg's handling of Roy Garland's allegations. The Inquiry concluded:

We consider that the Cullen/Meharg investigation was inept and inadequate at both the 1974 and 1976 stages. We are satisfied there were the following systemic failings: it was not properly directed nor supervised by ACC Meharg . . . We consider that the responsibility for these failures rests with ACC Meharg.'

Since the publication of the HIA Inquiry's Report, questions have been raised over ACC Meharg's personal connections with Captain Gemmell's Tara source known as 'Royal Flush'. It would also appear that Meharg was associated with Belfast's Town Solicitor, John Young, who was suspected of preventing complaints from welfare workers about suspected abuse incidents at Kincora from being referred to the police for investigation.

At page 101 of his book on Kincora,<sup>14</sup> journalist Chris Moore states a Welfare Department manager, Henry Mason, sent details of such complaints to John Young on 21 August 1971:

'But it seems the file disappeared with no evidence of any response, let alone action from the Town Solicitor's office. Indeed there may be a very

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<sup>14</sup> *The Kincora Scandal: Political Cover-up and Intrigue in Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Marino Books, 1996)

simple explanation for this apparent “inaction” on the part of the Town Solicitor. The late John Young was a practising homosexual, active in a small coterie of men which included Joe Mains. As the police were to discover, the third member of this group was a Unionist Councillor, Joshua “Joss” Cardwell.

With John Young, Semple and Mains formed a homosexual triumvirate that was undoubtedly able to keep complaints from the young male residents under wraps, at the same time safeguarding its own dark secret.’

However, like so much of the background to the Kincora scandal, there are still more questions than there are answers.

The key unanswered question surrounding the Kincora story is: to what extent was McGrath protected for many years by Government agencies? One of those who knew McGrath particularly well during the 1960s and 70s was Roy Garland, a founder member of Tara. He highlights how McGrath, a self-styled, evangelical Christian, attempted to have him assassinated:

‘McGrath felt almost impregnable, but he asked others to kill me. He approached Loyalist hardliners, possibly under MI5 control, and the threat was so serious that I was advised to keep out of the public eye and might have to leave the country. I was told the threat would remain while the killers lived. One of the hardliners was Davy Payne, who had been a former member of Tara and also of the Ulster Freedom Fighters. Years later, he apologised to me personally for planning to kill me, but later made what seemed a threatening gesture at me as if pulling a trigger on a gun. Another former Tara leader, Jay Wyatt, warned me about plans he was aware of for my assassination.’<sup>15</sup>

Jay Wyatt is another significant figure in the Tara/Kincora story. He joined Tara in 1973 after William McGrath issued a ‘Proclamation’ in April that year proposing, inter alia, that:

‘The Roman Catholic Church must be declared an illegal organisation. All Roman Catholic centres of education must be closed. Religious education must be provided only by Evangelical Protestants.’<sup>16</sup>

In subsequent years, it would appear that Jay Wyatt and two other Tara senior members were involved in repeated attempts to smuggle arms for Tara from South Africa via Holland. It was also believed that McGrath personally visited

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<sup>15</sup> Email from Roy Garland to Colin Wallace 12 February 2022.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Group urges ban on Catholic Church’, *Irish Times*, 12 April 1973

Intelligence Officers at the South African Embassy in London.

In his book on Kincora, journalist Chris Moore recounts an interview he had with Jay Wyatt (referred to in his book as 'Adrian') during which Wyatt claimed that, after one arms smuggling trip to Holland, he was invited to William McGrath's home where he met 'an elderly man . . . with long grey hair and wearing a pinstripe suit [who] spoke with a very refined English accent.' It would appear that the meeting lasted about 90 minutes. McGrath later told Wyatt that the stranger was 'a senior Northern Ireland Office official at Stormont, someone with power and influence and who was a good friend of Tara's who would always be available to us!' McGrath also referred to the official as an 'Under Secretary', a title that would indicate the official's significant seniority.<sup>17</sup>

Bearing in mind the relatively small number of English officials based at Stormont Castle, and the very distinctive description of the individual referred to by Jay Wyatt, it is truly remarkable that McGrath's 'good friend' does not appear to have been identified by the police or by any of the Inquiries into Kincora – a remarkable failure given the nature of the alleged discussion.

According to Chris Moore, the meeting between William McGrath, Jay Wyatt and the senior official from Stormont Castle took place in 1977. That is four years *after* the RUC Special Branch obtained information on the Confidential Telephone that McGrath was employed at the Kincora Boys Home, that his 'methods of dealing with boys is to suggest homosexual activities will cure a variety of complaints', and that he 'practices various kinds of homosexual perversion, but is known to be indulging in other kinds of perversion as well'.

A letter, dated 22 November 1973, from the RUC Special Branch to MI5 and copied to the Director and Controller of Intelligence at Stormont (disclosed to the HIA Inquiry), not only shows that the RUC knew McGrath's correct date of birth and that he was working at 'Kincora', but also that they knew he was about to visit Amsterdam. It also shows that they knew the name and address of the person with whom he intended to stay there. It is important to note that the RUC letter was written less than six months after Roy Garland had left his message, quoted above, on the RUC's Confidential Telephone about McGrath's activities. But the RUC's letter to MI5 makes no mention of that information.

One of Jay Wyatt's two Tara colleagues involved with him in obtaining arms from South Africa met UDA intelligence chief, Brian Nelson, when he arrived in Durban to set up illegal arms shipments to the Ulster Defence

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<sup>17</sup> Chris Moore, *The Kincora Scandal: Political Cover-up and Intrigue in Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Marino Books, 1996) pp. 124/5

Association (UDA). Nelson was, however, also a clandestine agent for the Army's undercover Force Research Unit (FRU). In 1992, Nelson pleaded guilty to 20 charges, including five of conspiracy to murder and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. A number of charges, including two counts of murder, were dropped as part of his plea bargain. At the time Nelson was recruited as an agent, he had already served seven years in prison for the kidnap and torture of a partially-sighted man, Gerald Higgins, who died several weeks later from his injuries. Nelson only served three years for that crime.<sup>18</sup>

There is no record of Jay Wyatt being interviewed by the RUC in connection with his arms smuggling activities. It is believed that he later died abroad (in Thailand?) on an unknown date and in what was described as an unexplained swimming accident.

Despite being in possession of all the above information, the HIA Inquiry concluded in 2017:

'We are satisfied that it was not until 1980 that the RUC Special Branch, MI5, the SIS and Army Intelligence became aware that McGrath had been sexually abusing residents at Kincora, and they learnt of that when it became the subject of public allegations and a police investigation was launched. All four agencies, whilst aware that McGrath was alleged to be homosexual, had no proof of that. They were aware that he worked in a boys' hostel where he was in a position of authority.'<sup>19</sup>

Most reasonable people will find it very difficult to reconcile the HIA's conclusions with the information set out above. It is clear that nothing less than a full public inquiry could have established the truth about these matters. As the official records now show, that is what MI5 and other Government agencies successfully prevented.

This document is about two types of abuse: the sexual abuse of children in the care of the State and the abuse of power by State agencies by manipulating Government inquiries and, as result, undermining our democratic process by misleading Parliament. It must not be forgotten that 1,441 British soldiers died carrying out the will of Parliament in Northern Ireland during the so-called 'Troubles'. The sexual abuse of children at Kincora and others homes should not have been covered up by government agencies. Some of the victims of abuse have now died and others are old and in poor health. In a very powerful Judgement by the Court of Appeal relating to a victim of sexual

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<sup>18</sup> *The Independent* obituary for Brian Nelson, 14 April 2003 at <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/brian-nelson-115033.html>>.

<sup>19</sup> Source: HIA Inquiry Report - Volume 9 (part 2). Summary of Conclusions.



abuse (Gary Hoy - 27 May 2016 paragraph 41) the judge (The Northern Ireland Lord Chief Justice, Sir Declan Morgan) commented:

'This society has been rocked to its core by the shocking disclosure of the abuse of children in this community over many years. Just as shocking has been the manner in which the institutions to which some of the abusers belonged sought to protect the institution rather than the children. There is a suggestion in this case that children in Kincora were abused and prostituted in order to satisfy the interests of national security. If that is true it must be exposed. As a society we must not repeat the errors of the institutions and should remember our obligations to the children. If the suggestion is not true the rumour and suspicion surrounding this should be allayed. We have decided that the HIA is entitled to proceed along the route mapped out by it. That does not in any way detract from the need to ensure that our obligations to these children are satisfied.'

The information highlighted above shows that six years after the Lord Chief Justice made his statement, the British Government's obligations to these children have still not been met. The manipulation of Parliament and official Inquiries by Government agencies, as described above, has made their experiences significantly worse. Why is Parliament still failing to act on this?