




Appendix 1



E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

FROM STORMONT  
DATED AND RECEIVED 5.8.82  
IMMEDIATE



E - CLASSIFICATION

E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE

FOR LA AND <sup>E - STAFF</sup> <sup>DES</sup>  
BT

TO SNUFFBOX <sup>E - ADDRESS</sup> IMMEDIATE  
RP <sup>E - ADDRESS</sup> IMMEDIATE  
RP <sup>E - ADDRESS</sup> IMMEDIATE

IN SNUFFBOX <sup>E - STAFF</sup> <sup>DES</sup> FOR LA AND  
IN HQNI FOR <sup>D - PROTECTION OF</sup> <sup>IDENTITY</sup>  
IN RUC HQ KNOCK PERSONAL FOR <sup>D - PROTECTION OF</sup> <sup>IDENTITY</sup>  
FROM <sup>D - PROTECTION OF</sup> <sup>IDENTITY</sup>

KINCORA AND CAMERON

E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE

REFERENCE YOUR TELEGRAM ADDSD <sup>E - DOCUMENT REFERENCE</sup> OF 23 JULY 1982.

E - TRANSMISSION METHOD

1. FOLLOWING OUR DISCUSSION ON 26 JULY I GAVE YOUR VIEWS TO HSB WHO SAID HE WOULD HAVE A WORD WITH CASKEY AND THEN ASK ME TO REPEAT PARAGRAPH THREE OF YOUR TUR TO CASKEY.


2. I HEARD NO MORE UNTIL 4 AUGUST WHEN CASKEY PHONED FROM DHSB'S OFFICE. HSB WAS AWAY FOR THE DAY AND CASKEY WAS TO START LEAVE ON 5TH. I ESTABLISHED THAT HSB HAD NOT SPOKEN TO CASKEY SO I WENT OVER TO KNOCK, EXPLAINED THE PROBLEM TO DHSB (WHO SAW THE DIFFICULTY) AND HE CALLED IN CASKEY TO WHOM I EXPLAINED YOUR PRINCIPLE - THAT NO SERVING OR FORMER MEMBER OF THE SECURITY SERVICE SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED BY THE POLICE. I THEN GAVE HIM CAMERON'S RECOLLECTIONS AS IN PARA. 3 OF YOUR TUR.



3. CASKEY MADE A NUMBER OF POINTS:

A. ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THE ENQUIRY THAT HE IS PURSUING IS THAT 'MILITARY INTELLIGENCE' WAS AWARE THAT MCGRATH WAS COMMITTING CRIMINAL OFFENCES BUT THEY CONCEALED THIS OR DID NOT REPORT IT FOR THEIR OWN REASONS: THIS, IF TRUE WAS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE. GARLAND HAS ALLEGED THIS AND WALLACE HAS HINTED AT IT TO CASKEY SEMI COLON

/ B. ....



PAGE TWO

STORMONT 

E - SECTION REFERENCE	E - CLASSIFICATION
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B. WALLACE HOWEVER HAS NOT YET GIVEN A STATEMENT. ALTHOUGH GRANTED LIMITED IMMUNITY BY DPP HE WANTS MOD TO ABSOLVE HIM FROM HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER OSA. (HE ALSO SAYS THAT WITHOUT RETURNING TO LISBURN TO EXAMINE THE RECORDS (WHICH HE THINKS WOULD TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS) HE CAN'T BE MUCH HELP EXCLAMATION MARK CASKEY FORESEES DIFFICULTIES FOR MOD AND NIO) SEMI COLON

C. ACC WHITESIDE HAS AGREED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT CASKEY HAS TOUCHED ON IN HIS ENQUIRY (GEMMELL, WALLACE, CAMERON ETC) WILL BE IN A SEPARATE SECRET REPORT TO DPP SEMI COLON

D. CAMERONS RECOLLECTIONS TIE IN WITH WHAT GEMMEL SAID:

E. GEMMELL MADE IT CLEAR TO CASKEY THAT DID NOT PROPOSE TO SHOULDER THE BLAME FOR HIS PART IN THIS AFFAIR. HE STATED CLEARLY THAT CAMERON ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION ON GEMMELL'S REPORT SO IF AT ANY PUBLIC ENQUIRY CAMERON DOES NOT APPEAR GEMMELL COULD EMBARRASS US. SEMI COLON

F. CAMERON COULD BE SUBPOENA'D TO APPEAR AT A PUBLIC ENQUIRY SEMI COLON

G. CASKEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET LA, EXPLAIN TO HIM WHAT QUESTIONS HE WANTED CAMERON TO ANSWER AND THEN RECEIVE A WRITTEN STATEMENT DRAWN UP BY LA AND CAMERON. CASKEY RETURNS FROM LEAVE ON 23 AUGUST AND WOULD LIKE TO MEET LA SOON AFTERWARDS IF THIS IDEA IS ACCEPTED

/ H. ....

## Appendix 2

Some 'off the cuff' information on TARA for the Press.

Information Policy  
File pl  
ADJ  
JHC

Notes. 1P

### TARA

TARA first came to notice in the late sixties when the group issued a statement to the press claiming to be "the hard core of Protestant resistance", and it is thought that the organisation was set up as a counter to the civil disturbances associated with the NICRA marches.

The name TARA is derived from the place where the ancient high kings of Ireland were crowned and is, therefore, an unusual choice of title for a Loyalist paramilitary group.

Operating from its HQ at Clifton Street Orange Hall, Belfast, as 'The Orange Discussion Group', TARA was organised initially into platoons of 20 or so men and run on military lines not unlike the old Ulster Special Constabulary ('B' Specials). Membership is drawn almost exclusively from the Orange Order and each platoon has a Sgt/QM (Quartermaster) and IO (Intelligence Officer). Contributions: 50p per month - half to a central fund - half at pin level. Pins are able to draw on the central fund if the opportunity to buy stores arises. Training includes radio, weapons and guerrilla tactics.

The OC is William McGRATH. He is a known homosexual who has conned many people into membership by threatening them with revealing homosexual activities which he himself initiated. He is a prominent figure in Unionist Party politics and in the Orange Order.

McGRATH uses a non-existent evangelical mission as a front for his homosexual activities and also runs a home for children on the Upper Newtownards Road, Belfast (Tel: B'fast 657838). Also at [REDACTED] Newtownards Road (B'fast [REDACTED]).

The TARA 2 i/c is Roy GARLAND, <sup>he said he resigned</sup> a close personal friend of McGRATH and his former employer.

McGRATH's 'ADC' is Frank MILLER who comes from the Shore Road area of Belfast and who is also an active member of the Unionist Party. He is the author of a number of political pamphlets including one called 'Dangers and Sinister Realities'.

TARA's 'Intelligence Officer' is Clifford SMITH who lives with McGRATH, and the group's 'Admin Officer' is David BROWN from Bangor Co Down. BROWN is Deputy Editor of Rev PAISLEY's 'Protestant Telegraph'.

Other people closely associated with McGRATH and aware of his activities are Thomas PASSMORE, Rev PAISLEY, Rev Martin SMITH, James MOLYNEAUX and Sir Knox CUNNINGHAM QC MP.

\* 'ULSTER'S children of conflict'. New Society 15. Apr 71

Dr. M. FRASEL ?  
Ruh

## Appendix 3

Hugh P. Mooney

Tel: [REDACTED]

Mrs [REDACTED] FCO Official  
Information Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Room G/94  
Old Admiralty Building  
London SW1

4 December 1992

Dear [REDACTED] FCO

Since talking to you about the House of Commons Defence Committee's special report on Colin Wallace, I have had a chance to look at the documents and fear that the Ministry can be accused of misleading the Committee.

In his letter dated 14 February, the clerk to the committee asked for a copy of a document relating to TARA reproduced on page 292 of Paul Foot's Who Framed Colin Wallace. In her reply, the private secretary said: .."We have not been able to establish whether this is an official document."

→ This is surprising since the MoD has identified the official who originated the document from his distinctive italic note which said: "Some 'off the cuff' information on TARA for the Press". I myself recall passing the document to Wallace. Other manuscript notes on the page show that it was entered as page 45 of an Information Policy file at Headquarters Northern Ireland. All this is known to Wallace and his supporters, who can be expected to raise it. The MoD will be found to have lied and Wallace's credibility will have been increased.

[REDACTED]

The record should be put straight. Perhaps you could do something?

Yours truly  
Hugh P. Mooney

# Appendix 4

E -  
CLASSIFICATION

E



HEADQUARTERS NORTHERN IRELAND  
British Forces Post Office 825

Army Network (Lisburn Military)  
Post Office Lisburn 5111

E - TEL EXT

<b>E - SECTION DESIGNATION</b>	<b>E - FILE REFERENCE</b>	Your reference
BOX 500		
Copied to: <b>D - MIS DIRECTOR</b>		Our reference: <b>E - FILE REFERENCE</b>
DOI		Date: 22 April 1976

*Handwritten initials and date: 29/4*

**E - FILE REFERENCE**

In an article in the New Statesman on 19 March 1976 about the extreme Loyalist organisation TARA (copy attached marked A) Robert FISK refers to "the Army's account of their activities collated by an intelligence officer at Lisburn".

2. The reference is almost certainly to a summary on TARA (copy attached, marked B) held in the AIS records at HQNI. The information in the summary was no doubt drawn from G (Int) files at a time when the IP element within the AIS was working closely - too closely! - with G (Int).

3. WALLACE would have had access to the AIS file and I do not think there is much doubt that, also in this instance, he was FISK's source.

4. The passages which have been underlined had been published in one form or another, previously.

**E - SIGNATURE**  
[Redacted]  
**E - SIGNATURE**  
I D Cameron

ENCL. <sup>3</sup>.....

*Handwritten initials*  
26 APR 1976  
**E - FILE REFERENCE**

Enc:

**E - ADMIN ANNOTATION**

**E - CLASSIFICATION**

**BOSS BACK IN THE DOCK!**

**PAUL FOOT**

**reporting**

**King of the cover-up**



**OH, NO MINISTER**

**TOM KING:** No information, he says. But that is not the case

**MORE** about John Sutcliffe's, the Grimsby docks firm whose unusual business practices I wrote about last week. I hear sad news about former commercial director, Anthony Berwick. Mr Berwick was inclined to put his docks experience to a rather eccentric purpose. He was convicted last year of smuggling 300 kilos of cannabis into Felixstowe. He was sentenced to five years.

**Tories' private grief**

**TORY** councillors in Bromley, Kent, will stick with private enterprise even if it costs their ratepayers more money. Imagine their horror when the council's own department bid the lowest for four parks contracts. Like Solomon, the Tories thought up a fair solution. They awarded three contracts to the council, and one to a private contractor. The private contract costs the council an extra £3,300 - and 27 council jobs must go. Councillor Joan Wykes who chairs Bromley's Leisure Services Committee told my colleague Bryan Rostron: "If one does not keep the competitive edge for the council, services will be to enter the market is. "If you do not know what the market is, you're lost."

**Spot the difference**

**IN** June 1984, striking miners tried to close down the Orgreave coking plant near Rotherham. 3,400 policemen were sent to stop them. Now British Steel announces that it will close the coke works forever - 289 workers will lose their jobs. Can you guess how many police will be sent to stop them?

**THE THINGS THEY SAY**

**MIKE GATTING** has come here with no knowledge of the country and has said nothing more stupid than a lot of white South Africans do every day.



**MIKE GATTING**

Dr Ali Bacher, managing director, South African Cricket Union, Independent on Sunday, February 4.

**LISTEN TO Defence Secretary Tom King**

**How** the Home Office is examining Colin Hughes, who was found to be a cover-up in 1973: including George Hughes. "The Office is a sexual who many people with homosexuality which he is a... home for the Upper Road, Belfast 65783

**THE MINISTER**

**Colin Wallace** still has a copy of this document. This week, for the first time, Peter Broderick, Wallace's boss at the time, confirmed to me that he saw the document and wrote on it. "That is certainly my writing," he told me. "I saw the document and approved it." At least four journalists say they were briefed in 1973 by Wallace about TARA and McGrath. He gave them the address and telephone number of Kinora.

**In** November 1974, Wallace wrote in a...

**Don't let the cat out of the bag**

**senior army and intelligence officers:** "Various allegations of homosexual activity on inmates of the Welfare Department staff in 1967, this action was taken against anyone... McGrath was the subject of an internal investigation by the Belfast Civil Liberties Commission in 1973 following allegations of more homosexual assaults on the staff of Kinora... I find it very difficult to accept that the RUC consistently up have been restricted. The Terry inquiry was held in secret.

**Information Policy**  
When the...  
as a front for his homosexual...  
the Wallace Kinora briefing paper.

**There** was no published report. The Hughes inquiry was specifically excluded from locking into a cover-up by army or intelligence. The Calcutt inquiry set up by the government into the Wallace affair is specifically excluded from investigating Kinora.

**Inquiry**  
Even the Commons Defence Select Committee inquiry, announced yesterday, will exclude Kinora. And Tom King tells the House of Commons there is "no information" of a Kinora cover-up. That is drivel. There is plenty of information. It has been there for at least six years. But Thatcher and her Ministers are still ducking and weaving away from it.

**SKY falls in on Maggie 'air force'**

**DOWN** the steps comes Margaret Thatcher, jubilant about her 1987 election success and the airline which ferried her round the hustings, British Island Airways. And three years later, it down the plughole goes British Island Airways. It owes £10m. 200 people who bought BIA tickets will have to whistle for their money along with all the other creditors. Here are some expert sayings about British Island Airways over recent years.

**"The** airline has achieved a rare if not unique distinction in modern aviation - it is making money, and looks set to expand". - Derek Brown in the Guardian, April 2, 1983.  
**"We** haven't got a brand new shiny aeroplane, so we make up for that in other areas by running a very safe and tidy little airline and looking after our passengers". - Mr Peter Villa, chairman of British Island Airways, just after he floated the company on the Stock Exchange and became a millionaire. Today, June 9, 1985.  
**"A** classic success story of Thatcher's Britain. It is all there -



**SHOT DOWN:** Maggie Thatcher's dream airline

**an** ambitious businessman risking everything on a carefully thought-out formula: an airline captain who abandons security and wins through to glittering prizes, and a staff to whom keeping the aircraft in the sky comes before job demarcation. - Robert Porter, Sunday Telegraph, April 17, 1988

**PARTYLINES!**  
24 HOUR LIVE CHAT!  
LONDON 0898 448 441  
LONDON 0898 448 442  
SOUTH WEST 0898 448 443  
WALSLEY 0898 448 444  
MIDLANDS 0898 448 445  
NORTH WEST 0898 448 446  
YORKSHIRE 0898 448 447  
NORTH EAST 0898 448 448  
SCOTLAND 0898 448 449

**IF YOU** have something you think I ought to investigate, write to me at the Mirror or phone 01-822-3365

Appendix 6

SECRET

KIN-103051 (NB (6ii))<sup>41</sup>

PUS to see

4

MR ANGEL

6/3

RECEIVED  
- 1033  
- 1 JUL 1983  
RECORD ROOM  
ATTENTION: MR. HAMMOND

cc: PG/Sir Philip Woodfield (L&B) M  
Mr Brennan  
MIS DIRECTOR (DCI)  
Mr Burton M  
MIS OFFICER  
Mr Hammond

PUS/2480  
1 JUL 1983  
NO RELEASE

KINCORA

1. As I indicated in my minute of 16 June, I have been pursuing with Mr Hammond and others the proposed tribunal's modus operandi. I think I should draw to your attention the outcome of some discussions I have had on the intelligence angle to a possible enquiry.



2. MIS DIRECTOR (DCI) has briefed Mr Hammond and me. He said he was worried about the likely intrusion of the inquiry into intelligence matters if the terms of reference were as wide as those we had in mind. There seemed little likelihood of any improper conduct being revealed, let alone criminal behaviour. But there were at least two possible witnesses who could come forward with evidence which (unless restrictions were imposed on what could be said) might touch directly on the extent to which the intelligence services were or were not aware of homosexuality in this area, and might reveal (perhaps gratuitously) information about the structure and range of activities of these services at the time in question. Names might be mentioned.



3. Mr Hammond and I have now seen Mr Bernard Sheldon. Mr Sheldon echoed MIS DIRECTOR (DCI) concern about information being given to the tribunal which would not be in the interests of the intelligence services. He was also concerned about what would be said about secret work very close to extreme Protestant organisations, and close therefore also to some politicians. If these activities were to be revealed - through a leak if not through a public session of the inquiry - there could be a brisk reaction. He pointed out the political embarrassment to be caused to the Secretary of State by any such revelations, quite apart from the difficulties they might cause those engaged in secret work. He accepted of course that the method of the tribunal's operation would directly affect the risks; for example, whether certain

SECRET

**SECRET**

material was heard only by the Chairman, by all the members, by its counsel, by other people's counsel etc ....

4. Mr Sheldon therefore took the view that, if there had to be a public inquiry at all, its terms of reference should (a) preclude the submission of evidence which was merely gossip, since it was not in any event a proper function of a judicial inquiry to listen to unsubstantiated rumours for 2-3 years; and (b) concentrate on the child-care aspects of the affair as well as on such criminal and police matters as were left unresolved by the RDC reports to the DPP and Sir George Terry's report. Any other matters, such as what public servants or political leaders did with allegations or rumours concerning homosexual activities, raised questions of professional or moral obligation which did not warrant a judicial inquiry. And these questions would have serious implications for the Security Service, which had never acted on the basis that they were obliged to see that all allegations which came their way were investigated by the police or other enforcement agencies. He set out for Mr Sheldon the difficulties of too limited an enquiry, and the wide aim of lessening grounds for suspicion it has in the Secretary of State's mind.

5. Mr Sheldon also raised the following points:

- i. If evidence about intelligence matters were to be offered to the tribunal, whatever its terms of reference, the Treasury Solicitor should be able to discuss the handling of that submission with the Tribunal Chairman and the Tribunal's Counsel. It would be better for those discussions to exclude the other two tribunal members, especially if members of the Security Service were then to be seen. (But Mr Sheldon hopes, of course, that the latter situation can be avoided altogether).
- ii. The Security Service would prefer a GB judge. If the Secretary of State wished to press for an NI judge, the LJC(NI) would have to be fully apprised

**SECRET**



E.R.

SECRET

3

of the difficulties over evidence-taking (once the Attorney General and Lord Chancellor had accepted that course) so that the best man for the job could be appointed.

iii. If immunity from criminal prosecution were to be granted, it would be important for the range to be limited and clearly defined so as not to allow people to escape from the requirements of the Official Secrets Act.

6. All these aspects will of course need to be aired with the Secretary of State when the time comes to submit the matter to him. This must at a minimum await receipt of the Terry Report. But I felt you should be aware of the points Mr Sheldon raised at this stage. He certainly would see them as bearing directly on the Secretary of State's own long-term interests in Northern Ireland. I have no doubt this is right. I assume he will take steps to ensure that they are exposed to the Home Secretary and the Attorney General. He might want to suggest to them either an inquiry limited to the child-care aspects (presumably therefore under the NI Powers, not the 1921 Act) or a 1921 Act inquiry with terms of reference limited in the way suggested above.

7. I expect that all these issues will therefore also feature in the exchanges between Ministers in due course, and we will need to consider them in the discussion I am sure we will be having before we go to the Secretary of State. For the moment, I do not suggest we can take them further, but you may want to reflect on them in the meantime.

S.W. Boyd Smith

S W BOYD SMITH

30 June 1983

## Appendix 7

### Volume 9 – Kincora Boys’ Home (Part 2)

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#### Reference by ADCI to ‘false files’ in 1982

- 636 In a telex sent on 29/30 June 1982 by the MI5 Assistant Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (ADCI) he referred to the possibility of creating “false files” in anticipation of lines of enquiry which it was anticipated D/Supt Caskey would seek to follow in his Caskey Phase Three investigation into Kincora.<sup>463</sup> The use of the expression “false files” demonstrates that a senior MI5 officer considered the possibility of creating a “false”, that is a misleading or untrue, file to show to the police. This reference could be interpreted to mean either (a) that such a file would be composed of fabricated documents, or (b) that genuine documents would be brought together from other files but placed in a single file in a manner that would conceal sensitive material. Whichever was in the officer’s mind when he used the expression, the use of the expression “false files” was at best unwise and at worst demonstrated a willingness to deceive the police.
- 637 The relevant portion of the telex relates to whether MI5 should disclose the identity of one of its agents to D/Supt Caskey because MI5 had not told the RUC Special Branch that the person was an MI5 source. The MI5 officer’s telex continued:
- “We will also ask HSB [Head of Special Branch]/DHSB [Deputy Head of Special Branch] about the status of this particular enquiry and what is likely to happen to any report that is produced. We assume Caskey is an astute police officer and we should be in difficulty if we attempt to deceive him and manufacture false files or deny the existence of real ones.”<sup>464</sup>
- 638 The context of the telex makes it clear that the idea was only raised to be discarded by the officer concerned, and we are satisfied the suggestion was not pursued in this instance.

## Appendix 8

Extract from HIA Inquiry Report regarding the destruction of official files relating to Kincora.

### **The DPP and Ian Cameron's responses to the 30 questions**

198 In order to ascertain whether Sir Barry Shaw received and considered the responses to the 30 questions made by Ian Cameron and recorded by Bernard Sheldon we are dependent upon MI5 records to which we have referred. This is because there do not appear to be any surviving records held by the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland relating to meetings held between Sir Barry Shaw and the Attorney General in relation to the Caskey Phase Three investigation. When we asked the Attorney General's Office in London to produce any papers they held regarding these meetings we were informed that the files they held in relation to Kincora had been destroyed in 2004. In response to the Inquiry Warning Letter the Attorney General's Office informed us a mistake had been made (for which they apologised) and that the relevant file was destroyed in 2009. We criticise the destruction of files relating to Kincora in view of the persistent allegations that there had been over many years about wrongdoing at Kincora.

*Guardian* 3 April 1991

HOME NEWS 5

# Yard told not to pursue Wallace case

Richard Norton-Taylor

**S**COTLAND Yard has been told by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Allan Green, QC, not to investigate allegations that the Ministry of Defence and MI5 conspired to cover up a dirty tricks campaign in Northern Ireland.

The decision, announced yesterday, follows a complaint six months ago that officials perverted the course of justice by secretly approaching the Civil Service Appeal Board in 1975 about Colin Wallace, a former Army information officer who says he was forced to resign.

Mr Wallace says the MoD wanted him out after he complained about a black propaganda operation against leading politicians and an MI5 cover-up of child abuse at Kincora, an east Belfast boys' home.

James Nichol, Mr Wallace's lawyer, drew up the claim in the light of a report by David Calcutt, QC, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, into the handling of Mr Wallace's appeal. Mr Calcutt said that, shortly before the hearing, MoD

officials were "in private communication" with the chairman of the appeal board, Sir Leslie Williams, and "the full range of Mr Wallace's work" was not disclosed to the board.

Detective Superintendent Graham Searle of the Yard's organised crime branch, said that although the case warranted further investigation, he was reluctant to go ahead without the DPP's approval. He did not want to embark on a lengthy inquiry if the Crown Prosecution Service had no intention of bringing charges.

A CPS spokeswoman said yesterday that Sir Allan had decided the evidence did not justify a police inquiry.

Mr Wallace, who may now bring a private prosecution, said despite all the Government's assurances, the rule of law still did not appear to apply to the Security Service.

The MoD admitted last year that it had misled Parliament by denying there was any truth in Mr Wallace's allegations.

Following the report by Mr Calcutt — who has not been seen by the police — the MoD gave Mr Wallace £30,000 in compensation.

# Appendix 10

Director of Public Prosecutions  
Allan Green Q.C.



Deputy Director and Chief Executive  
D. S. Gandy CB OBE

Director of Headquarters Casework  
C. W. P. Newell

Messrs Taylor Nichol  
Solicitors  
3a Station Place  
London  
N4 2DH

## Crown Prosecution Service

Headquarters Casework

10 Furnival Street  
London  
EC4A 1PE

Telephone 071-417 7157  
Switchboard 071-417-7000

Your Ref: JN/Wallace

Our Ref: GCBL/4260/90

Date: 22 March 1991

Dear Sirs

RE: COLIN WALLACE


I refer to your letter of 21 September 1990, with which you enclosed a copy of a letter and enclosures that you sent on the same day to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner. I am sorry that you have not had a substantive reply before now.

Having considered carefully the matters raised in your letter to the Commissioner, the Director has decided that the evidence is not such as to justify the institution of police enquiries.

I have informed the Metropolitan Police accordingly.

Yours faithfully

C W P NEWELL  
Director of Headquarters Casework



E

E - CLASSIFICATION

NOTE FOR FILE  
E - FILE REFERENCE

I called on Sir George TERRY the Chief Constable of Sussex at the County Police Headquarters at Lewes at 12.30 on Thursday 27 January. I had previously warned him that we were getting into difficulties with the RUC about their conduct of the KINGORA enquiries and would value his advice and if possible assistance in resolving these problems. The day after the arrangements had been made I was informed by DCI that WHITESIDE and Supt CASKEY of the RUC were aware of my visit and of its general purpose. They had apparently heard from TERRY's Staff Officer.

2. TERRY had his Staff Officer Det Chief Insp FLENLEY standing by but we agreed that in the first instance I should explain the problem to him so that he could decide whether FLENLEY should join us.

3. I opened the conversation by saying that I would give TERRY all the facts lying behind the difficulties which were known to me and would inform him of all the steps which we had taken in an attempt to resolve matters. I said that in doing so I was conscious that things might look different if seen through the eyes of WHITESIDE and CASKEY who were responsible for the investigations and that I would not attempt to influence TERRY's own view. I said I was also conscious that it would be important to him in the discharge of the functions which he had been given to avoid putting him into a position where his impartiality might be called in question. I then detailed what had happened and covered the following points:-

- a. the CASKEY interview with GEMMEL in July 1982,
- b. CASKEY's attempts to interview CAMERON and the reasons why we had been unwilling to authorise CAMERON to make a statement. I said that it was my understanding that the RUC had been informed that CAMERON agreed that he had received a report in general terms alleging that McGRATH was a homosexual, that he would have told GEMMEL that he should make no further enquiries in this field and that neither he nor anyone else in that part of the intelligence machine under our control had passed information to the police. CAMERON regarded the information as gossip and the



E - CLASSIFICATION

E - ADMIN ANNOTATION

/...

[REDACTED]

search for information about TARA as too sensitive to be handled by the Army,

- c. I said that CAMERON was a senior officer of MI5 who had been seconded to HQNI to advise upon the conduct of Army intelligence operations. TERRY said that he personally had not previously been aware that he was anything other than a civil servant,
- d. DCI's meeting with the Deputy Chief Constable of the RUC,
- e. my discussions with the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions NI in October at which I informed them of the action we had taken and had stressed that if there were problems of which we were unaware we would wish to take part in discussions to resolve them,
- f. the list of questions prepared by the RUC which they wished to put to CAMERON. These confirmed our fears that, if permitted, they would lead to an unacceptable identification of UK intelligence officers and their functions,
- g. [REDACTED] meeting with the Chief Constable in November 1982 and his belief that HERMON would sort matters out on his return from the United States,
- h. DG's meeting with HERMON on 13 January at a FBI party at which HERMON said that WHITESIDE had told him two days earlier that their enquiries were at an end,
- i. CASKEY's interview with [REDACTED] on 11 January and his references to a Security Service cover up. I said that I understood that there had now been a further interview with Lt Col WALTON at which CASKEY had made similar remarks,
- j. the meeting with Sir Philip Woodfield on 20 January at which it had been agreed that Woodfield would attempt to arrange a meeting in London to be attended by HERMON, NURSAW the Legal Secretary and myself. At the same meeting with Woodfield it had been agreed that I should seek a meeting with TERRY to see whether there was any part which he could take in the resolution of this matter and whether he would be prepared to do so,

4. TERRY expressed amazement that none of this had been reported to him by Jack HERMON. With my agreement he then called in Chief Inspector FLENLEY to whom I repeated the story. FLENLEY made the following observations:-


- a. He had been aware of the RUC attempts to interview CAMERON and had inferred as had CASKEY even if he was unaware of the true position, that CAMERON was a member of the Security Service. He had not however understood the reasons for our reluctance to allow CAMERON to be seen.
- b. In making his enquiries Supt CASKEY had been influenced by the fact that the successful prosecution of McGRATH and others in connexion with KINCORA had been stimulated by allegations in the press. As the press had made similar allegations about the involvement of UK Civil Servants and about an Army cover up CASKEY did not wish to appear before any judicial enquiry without having carried out a full investigation. CASKEY had been informed by press sources that Colin WALLACE <sup>REFERENCE</sup> had told them many years ago about the homosexual goings on at KINCORA. Apart from this there was no actual evidence to establish the involvement of Civil Servants or of any Army cover up.
- c. CASKEY was being given a surprising degree of access to members of the Army some of whom had actually produced classified files for his inspection.
- d. CASKEY was in his view a very ambitious officer who took care to mix with the right people. He thought he was solely motivated by his own self-interest and by his desire to get on. He did not think that he was influenced by any anti-British or anti-intelligence sentiment. This might now be true of some other RUC officers.
- e. He implied that the relationship between RUC officers and their Chief Constable was such that they would not rely upon his support in moments of difficulty. He thought that CASKEY would be content however if the Chief Constable told him that there was no need to follow this line of enquiry.
- f. FLENLEY had interviewed Chris RYDER after the article in the Sunday Times of 5 December 1982. Although RYDER made no admissions that CASKEY had been a source, FLENLEY had little doubt that this was the position. He had learned that RYDER had had a meeting with CASKEY in the




E - CLASSIFICATION

4.

week before publication (I gathered that meetings between these two were either unknown or very rare).

- g. FLENLEY did not believe that CASKEY thought that there had been any Security Service involvement in the affairs of KINCORA and stressed that he was pursuing his enquiries to protect his own position.
- h. FLENLEY explained how CASKEY had come to learn of the arrangements for my visit. His Chief Constable had asked him to expedite the delivery of a draft report from CASKEY which was expected the following week. CASKEY had expressed surprise at the urgency of this request as FLENLEY was due to visit Ulster on the following Monday. In the circumstances he had thought it better to tell him.
- i. In the course of our discussions I also referred to NURSAW's discussions with the DPP in Northern Ireland and to SHAW's unwillingness to give directions to the investigating officers. We had inferred that this was connected with his well known desire to maintain the integrity of his office. TERRY expressed great surprise at this reluctance and said that in his view the DPP ran the RUC and not the Chief Constable. FLENLEY also confirmed that RUC officers consulted the DPP on all sorts of matters which were not properly within his province. 
- j. I asked TERRY whether he should attend the meeting with HERMON. He said he was willing to do so and that he had a part to play. When I returned to London I confirmed that Woodfield would welcome his presence and, as agreed with me, TERRY spoke to HERMON to tell him of my visit. He confirmed that HERMON too would welcome his presence.

E - SIGNATURE



Bernard Sheldon

IA  
3 February 1983

E - CLASSIFICATION

## Appendix 12

HOUSE OF THE BINNS  
LINLITHGOW EH49 7NA

29/07/14

Telephone: 01506-83-4255

Dear David,

In the 1980's and 1990's, I was immersed in the case of Colin Wallace, a cause célèbre at the time.

After all these years, I can reveal that one of the reasons I was so sure that Wallace had been unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield. Tony Cavendish, another senior member of the Intelligence Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stanger. (I knew them well, and wrote both their obituaries for the Independent).

I heard you say on TV "I will get to the bottom of this".

Actually, I'm very sympathetic to you on these matters, as disentangling events of 30 years ago is exceedingly difficult. I happen to think that Ministers such as Archie Hamilton and Tom King acted in good faith.

I enclose Wallace's dossier. It might be helpful if you asked a civil servant involved in "getting to the bottom" to SEE Wallace. He is not unreasonable, and not after money - simply an acknowledgment that he acted honourably in the interests of our country. He went to the Press at the behest of General Sir Peter Lepp. If Lepp and Wallace's allegations had been acted upon, many children would have been spared abuse.

(MP West Lothian 1962-2005)

Yours  
Tom Dabryell

## Appendix 13

SECRET

### Typed copy of original handwritten letter to The Prime Minister, The Rt Hon David Cameron

[REDACTED]

Telephone: [REDACTED]

29 August 2014

Dear David,

In the 1980's and 1990's. I was immersed in the case of Colin Wallace, a cause célèbre at the time.

After all these years, I can reveal that one of the reasons I was so sure that Wallace had been unjustly treated was that I had talked to my friend, the late Sir Maurice Oldfield, Tony Cavendish, another senior member of the Intelligence Community was equally uncomfortable, as was Field Marshal Sir John Stanier. I knew them well, and wrote both their obituaries for the Independent.

I heard you say on TV "I will get to the bottom of this." Actually, I am very sympathetic to you on these matters, as disentangling events of 30 years ago is exceedingly difficult. I happen to think that Ministers such as Archie Hamilton and Tom King acted in good faith.

I enclose Wallace's dossier. It might be helpful if you asked a civil servant involved in "getting to the bottom" to SEE Wallace. He is not unreasonable, and not after money - simply an acknowledgement that he acted honourably in the interests of our country. He went to the Press at the behest of General Sir Peter Leng. If Leng and Wallace's allegations had been acted upon, many children would have been spared abuse.

Yours sincerely,

Tam Dalyell

MP West Lothian 1962-2005

## Appendix 14

Extract from The Sunday Correspondent article by Kevin Toolis.

18 March 1990

Mr Mooney also admitted that Mr Wallace had told him about the sex scandal at Kincora boys home in Belfast - casting further doubt on Government claims that the security forces had no knowledge of the long-running rape and buggery of children in care.

*"I do know he mentioned it. He was dropping it in and feeling his way. He kept pushing it. But I could never understand why. I thought it was totally irrelevant to our concerns. I did get the feeling he was pushing this. But how the hell did he*

know? He certainly did not know by anything he was doing officially."

Mr Mooney, from the Foreign Office's department's cold-war psychological warfare unit, the *Information Research Department*, along with Colin Wallace ran the black propaganda campaign to smear the IRA and other opponents of the Government.

Mr Mooney also attended high-level security briefings at the Northern Ireland Office to co-ordinate overall information policy in Northern Ireland in the mid-seventies and acted as a liaison officer between MI5 and the Foreign Office.

His role was confirmed by Col Maurice Tugwell, founder of the Information Policy Unit.

"Mooney had his own agenda. He reported to this extraordinary Foreign Office set-up that was run by Howard Smith, who later became head of MI5 in Belfast," said Col Tugwell.

"It was the liaison office between the Foreign Office and the Northern Ireland situation. And whilst he kept the General Officer Commanding briefed he really reported to that office."

Mr Smith was the security co-

ordinator for Northern Ireland and later Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1976-78. He was Director General of MI5 from 1979-81.

Mr Mooney's role was to plant stories in the foreign media, particularly the influential American papers. He cultivated foreign journalists on assignment to Northern Ireland.

A Foreign Office official confirmed that Mr Mooney had been seconded from the Foreign Office to the Northern Ireland Office for that period.

The Information Research Department was founded in 1947 to conduct secret propaganda operations against communist governments and run "hearts and minds" operations in Britain's restless post-war colonies. Special training courses in psychological operations for army personnel and senior civil servants were held at the Ministry of Defence's Joint Warfare Establishment near Salisbury.

The department was closed by David Owen in 1977 when he was Foreign Secretary, in a row over its right-wing bias. Its function was transferred to a new Overseas Information Department.

## Appendix 15

Prepared for Disclosure to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry KIN-190218

Statement of **Dennis** to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry

Prepared for Disclosure to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry KIN-190218

Statement of **Dennis** to the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry

1. In early November 1975, as a Sergeant in the Intelligence Corps, I was posted to Northern Ireland in the role of Liaison Intelligence Non-Commissioned Officer (LINCO) based at RUC Castlereagh, Belfast. My role was to act as liaison on all intelligence matters concerning East Belfast between: locally based Army units (primarily the Intelligence Sections of 2 Regiment Royal Military Police based at RUC Castlereagh and the Province Reserve battalion at Palace Barracks); various RUC departments and the Intelligence Section & G Intelligence Staff at HQ 39 Infantry Brigade in Lisburn. Although my operational 'boss' was Captain Brian Gemmell, Intelligence Corps (OC of 123 Int Section, HQ 39 Bde) I could also be directed for specific orders/taskings by the G-Int Staff Officers at 39 Bde. Apart from my liaison role, my duties also included acting as the advisor to the local Army units on: screening/interrogation & source targeting/recruitment/handling. I was also responsible for developing/handling my own sources.
2. This was my second, long tour of NI having previously served as a Desk NCO at HQ Northern Ireland (HQNI) from December 1970 to October 1972. On that occasion my primary role had been collation and analysis of intelligence on Loyalist paramilitary organisations – Province wide.
3. Although there was an active, albeit small, Republican enclave centred around the 'Short Strand', the major influence in the area was the development and activities of the Protestant Paramilitaries - Ulster Volunteer Force {UVF}, Ulster Defence Association {UDA} and the Red Hand Commando {RHC}.
4. On taking up my post as LINCO I had a handover/takeover briefing with my predecessor – Sergeant **R** Int Corps. Among a variety of documents, I was shown a copy of a report into an investigation concerning TARA and the activities of various personalities associated with it, which had been produced by the LINCO / CONCO in March 1975. I recall being somewhat interested in its subject matter as I already had, due to my previous tour, a

good background knowledge of Loyalist paramilitary and associated organisations but had never heard of TARA before.

5. I have been provided with a redacted, three-page copy of this report and acknowledge that this was the same document I was shown. However, I distinctly recall other elements of the report which have either been redacted or the copy I have been shown is incomplete. The missing elements I refer to concerned details of the TARA organisation, including: its background, its aims, its 'Doomsday' remit (as a replacement government structure in the event of a sell-out of NI by Westminster); its recruitment policy, including the professional, social and financial requirement for potential members and the preference that they should already have a legally-held firearm. There was also reference to several leading members of the organisation having homosexual tendencies.
6. I also recall Sgt [REDACTED] R [REDACTED] commenting that the report had been passed 'up the chain' and that the instruction came back that no further action was to be taken. I personally did not question this at the time; however, I later had several discussions with Captain Gemmell at HQ 39 Bde during one of which he described how the report had been disseminated up to HQNI, in the normal way, but that a strongly worded rebuke had come back from them to drop the matter immediately – whether this rebuke was in written or verbal form, or by whom, I do not know. I do know from other, later, discussions with him that he continued privately to pursue the matter of TARA and reports of the abuse of boys at the Kincora premises. Capt Gemmell eventually left the Province, I believe prematurely, and I later heard that he had resigned his commission.
7. On one occasion, the date of which I cannot recall – although it would have been in the period of early 1976 – I was instructed to drive and escort an individual into East Belfast from HQ Northern Ireland. Such instructions were not unusual and there were several occasions when I, and others in similar roles, were instructed to drive and escort visitors from outside the Province, both military and civilian, to specific addresses or areas in Belfast. In such circumstances, it was normal procedure for the driver/escort to receive advance details of the address/location to be visited so that a risk assessment and route plan could be conducted. However, on this occasion I did not receive any advance

notification of the address, only that the unnamed visitor required to be driven into East Belfast and I would receive my directions from him at the time. It was usual for such instructions to come from 39 Bde as they were my operational controllers; however, I cannot now recall if this was the case in that instance.

8. My instructions were to pick up the individual at the front entrance of HQ Northern Ireland at a specific time in the evening – although I cannot be precise I believe it was in the region of 1900hrs. I remember it being already dark, which would indicate the timeframe to be probably before March 1976. I arrived driving my issued civilian vehicle and drove to the front entrance of HQNI where I was met by a man already standing and waiting. He was aged approximately mid-40s with somewhat curly dark hair, about 5ft 7ins in height, slim build, pointed features and wearing what appeared to be a suit under a fawn-coloured raincoat. The man had been provided with my name but at no time did he identify himself. He occupied the front passenger seat beside me and directed me to drive towards the Newtownards Road area of Belfast but did not identify the ultimate destination. During the journey, there was minimal small-talk but I remember forming the distinct, albeit subjective, opinion that he was not military but most probably civilian. This was not unusual and I thought little of it, presuming that he was from one of the civilian agencies or MOD. I drove via what was then known as the 'back road' to Belfast, via the Hillhall Road, Newtownbreda and Knock, which was generally regarded as the safer option.
9. It was only after we had joined the Upper Newtownards Road at Knock that he directed me to turn left towards Belfast and eventually instructed me to stop and turn right into a large detached house which sat on a road junction. The house had gates and a driveway to the left-hand-side and was positioned immediately on the junction of Upper Newtownards Road and a side road, the name of which I do not recall. On stopping to turn across the road I found that I could not gain access to the driveway as it was blocked by another vehicle and there was at least one behind that. I was thus forced to turn right on the side street, execute a U-turn and then turn left at the junction back onto the main road, to be able to position my vehicle on the footpath parallel to the wall. This was not an ideal situation from my perspective for security purposes but the best available option given the circumstances. The man then exited the vehicle and indicated that he would be approximately an hour or

possibly less. He then walked up the driveway towards the house but passed out of sight due to trees and bushes. I remained with the vehicle and alternated with occasional checks on foot along the side and front of the house. I did not enter the grounds at any time. There were no incidents and eventually the man returned to the vehicle. I do not recall how long he was away but I do not remember it being significantly longer or shorter than an hour. I did not observe anyone else in or around the house during the period in question. I then drove via the same route back to Lisburn and dropped the man off at the perimeter entrance of HQNI. There was again minimal small talk during the return trip. I did not see this man again.

10. Although I did not realise the significance of the house at that time, I did later become aware that it was the Kincora premises. I do not recall whether Brian Gemmell was still in post at that time.

11. Towards the end of 1976 I moved from East Belfast to take over as LINCO Belfast City Centre and my territory and responsibilities changed accordingly.

12. I confirm that in the early to mid 1990's I spoke to Chris Moore about the above events. I confirm that from reading the extract from Chris Moore's book on Kincora I am confident that I am the person who he refers to as "Dennis" (at pages 144 and 145). I further confirm that I believe that Mr Moore misrepresented what I told him in certain aspects. The above account is the accurate account of what I told Mr Moore.

I confirm that this statement is true to the best of my knowledge and memory.

Dennis



21 December 2016



## Appendix 16

# Ulster: how homosexuals were used

by Chris Ryder

BRITISH intelligence officers in Ulster used homosexual loyalist politicians in the early Seventies to gather information about extreme Protestant groups because they did not trust the integrity of the Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch.

At that time male homosexuality was still a criminal offence in the province and the politicians were easily compromised. One politician used in this way was William McGrath, founder and leader of an extreme loyalist group called "Tara". McGrath is now serving four years in jail for a series of homosexual assaults on boys in his care while he was housemaster at Kincora boys' home in East Belfast.

But, despite knowing of his homosexuality and his employment, the intelligence community attached to the Northern Ireland Office from the security service and military intelligence did not alert the welfare authorities or the RUC.

This is one of the findings in reports for the Northern Ireland secretary, James Prior,

which are now being completed by the police. Even by Northern Ireland standards, it will make bizarre reading.

The scandal takes its name from a bleak publicly-run boys home called Kincora in East Belfast. A year ago, three male staff members were jailed for homosexual assaults.

Sentencing them to terms of between four and six years, the Lord Chief Justice, Sir Robert Lowry, spoke of the "loathsome and perverted" behaviour of the staff. McGrath was known as the "beast of Kincora" to the RUC officers investigating the affair, which had gone on for 20 years.

Prior asked for the RUC to extend its criminal investigation of the homosexual allegations and agreed with the RUC chief constable, Sir John Hermon, to call in an English police team headed by Sir George Terry, chief constable of Sussex, to examine the way the affair developed and why nothing was done about it for so long. Terry was also asked to examine allegations that police files on the affair had disappeared.

The RUC traced more than 300 of the 400 former inmates of Kincora and other homes where homosexual abuses had taken place. Detectives travelled to mainland Britain, Europe and Canada to interview witnesses.

During these interviews two political figures were mentioned. One of them was John McKeague, who played a prominent part in the sectarian disturbances in Belfast in 1969.

But soon after he was interviewed by the RUC and warned that he would be reported to the DPP for alleged homosexual offences, McKeague was murdered on 29 January last. Later that evening, a call to Downtown Radio claimed that the killing was the work of the Republican Irish National Liberation Army.

This claim is doubted, however, and detectives believe McKeague was murdered to keep him quiet.

In the period before his death McKeague, a bachelor

had frequently threatened to expose others. But he never actually said what he had in mind.

The other politician interviewed by the police was a 70-year-old bachelor, Joss Cardwell, a former Stormont MP and a long-serving member of Belfast city council. On April 25 this year, Cardwell was found dead on the front seats of his car in the garage at his Belfast home. At an inquest in July, the coroner decided he had died from carbon monoxide poisoning caused by car fumes and said the death was "inexplicable".

But Cardwell had also been mentioned during the Kincora investigation and his role as chairman of the council welfare committee, responsible at one time for running the Kincora home, had come under scrutiny.

But the most controversial exposure in the reports will concern the private wars between the RUC special branch and military intelligence in the early 70's and the parallel war within the Army HQ at Lisburn between the "Psychological Operations" team and the

Army Information Service, which ran the press desk.

In the private intelligence war, the Army and the security service ran their own operations because they distrusted the RUC special branch information about loyalist activities. The "Psyops" team had access to this intelligence and used some of it, through leaks to journalists, to discredit certain figures.

But such tactics were causing friction within the Army HQ, where an influential group of senior officers argued for a straightforward release of information and for an end to black propaganda which they believed was doing serious harm to the credibility of the Army and the government in its efforts to find a political solution to the Ulster problem.

Some politicians fear that Prior will now come under pressure to close the affair without holding the promised judicial inquiry, which could reopen scarcely-healed wounds within the security forces and give the Provisional IRA a propaganda field day.

Sunday Times

Sunday 5/Dec/1982



