## When freemasons ruled the earth?

## **Simon Matthews**

HITLER'S COSMOPOLITAN BASTARD

Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and His Vision of Europe

Martyn Bond

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This is the first English language biography of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. The title is a bit unfortunate (do we really need Hitler invoked on the cover of quite so many books?) and is presumably a pitch to garner extra sales. If Coudenhove-Kalergi were alive today he might be angered at being linked with the Austrian corporal, and, like most Europeans, puzzled at the ongoing level of UK interest in the Second World War.

A major advocate of European unity from the 1920s, Coudenhove-Kalergi came from an extraordinary family whose lineage stretched back a thousand years. The Coudenhoves were originally from Flanders and provided the Habsburg Empire with a string of generals, field marshals, ministers, governors and diplomats. Relocating to Austria after Napoleon annexed Flanders, they married into the Kalergi family in 1857. The Kalergis went back to the 9th century with an ancestry including Byzantine and Holy Roman emperors and empresses. Originally from Crete, they prospered latterly under Venetian rule, subsequently being dispersed across Europe (and as far afield as Imperial Russia) after Crete was annexed by the Ottoman Empire. Over several centuries both the Coudenhoves and the Kalergis married extensively into the highest levels of European nobility and royalty, and to say they were well connected would be a considerable understatement.

The subject of this biography, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, was born in 1894, the son of an aristocratic and much-titled Austro-Hungarian diplomat and a Japanese mother. The family were devout Catholics. His lifelong interest in European unity was caused by the sudden and catastrophic breaking up of Austria-Hungary. It's worth spelling this out in some detail to understand just how much impact it had, and how

calamitous it was for many of its citizens – something author Bond doesn't really do in his narrative.

In a few months in 1918, a state that had been in existence since the time of Charlemagne, ended abruptly. Before June 1918 there seemed little likelihood of such a thing happening. Its occurrence was due to two factors: firstly, the war turning against Austria-Hungary and Germany; and secondly (and ultimately decisively), guarantees that were made by both the Republican and Democratic parties during the US mid-term elections, campaigning for which ran from May to the close of polls on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1918.<sup>1</sup>

US President Woodrow Wilson issued his suggestions about the type of peace he regarded as desirable in January 1918. These envisaged a post-war world in which much emphasis was placed on free trade and self-determination for various peoples within selected European/Asiatic Empires. None of his terms ('the Fourteen Points') mentioned reparations. In so far as they affected Austria-Hungary they stated:

'The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development' (Point 10) and

'An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant' (Point 13).

This was further than anyone in international affairs had gone previously, but neither of these requirements was considered an insoluble difficulty. The collapse of Imperial Russia had already led to the occupation of Poland by Germany and Austria-Hungary and the proclamation by them of an independent Kingdom of Poland in January 1917. Archduke Charles Albert was advanced by Austria-Hungary as a candidate for its throne. This could have been taken as representing the territory of 'an independent Polish state' and its access to the sea could have been achieved via the construction of a canal for sea-going vessels between Warsaw and a new free port on the Baltic. The former point ('the freest opportunity to autonomous development') caused less concern than one

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The key reversals were the Austro-Hungarian offensive to capture Venice being stopped at the Battle of the Piave River (23 June 1918) and the start of a German retreat in France and Flanders (20 July 1918).

might think, as such a development was already being debated within Austria-Hungary via Aurel Popovici's 1906 proposal for a United States of Greater Austria. Had this been implemented it would have created a federal monarchy of 15 autonomous states and 13 self-governing enclaves.

Campaigning in the US elections was fierce, with both parties seeking advantage amongst ethnic voting blocs (Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Slavs, Czechs and so on). Exiles from those communities suddenly found they had considerable leverage on how events might develop. Accordingly, a Mid-European Union was formed in the US on 16 September 1918 'to negotiate territorial disputes between the emerging nations' of central Europe 'and to work towards some form of federal union or economic alliance'. A key player in this was Tomas Masaryk, a Czech politician in the Austro-Hungarian parliament who supported Popovici's plan. President Wilson met Masaryk and his colleagues on 20 September and 26 October 1918. Speaking in Philadelphia, Masaryk issued a *Declaration of Common Aims* which supported independence as the objective for the Czechoslovaks, Poles, Yugoslavs, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Zionists, Armenians and many others.

All of this took place against a backdrop of clear military reversals for Germany and its allies. The first of these was the Bulgarian request for an armistice, made on 29 September 1918. This opened up a direct route to Vienna and Berlin into which a large UK-French-Greek-Serbian army duly began advancing.<sup>2</sup> It was on this basis that Germany (4 October 1918) and Austria-Hungary (14 October) requested armistices based on Wilson's 14 Points. Two days after it requested an armistice, Austria-Hungary issued a new federal constitution. For a fortnight it seemed as if both countries might extricate themselves from the war relatively unscathed, given that Wilson had not modified his terms. They were disabused of this notion when Secretary of State Robert Lansing made it known through diplomatic channels that the US now endorsed Masaryk's Declaration of Common Aims and that belated efforts by Austria-Hungary to restructure itself as a federal state were no longer sufficient. Substantial parts of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces began refusing to obey orders two days later, and the Empire collapsed amid declarations of independence, the establishment of a Soviet Republic in Hungary, numerous border disputes and plebiscites.

This was the world that 24-year-old Coudenhove-Kalergi found

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The allied forces had reached Belgrade by 1 November 1918.

himself flung into, from social strata whose function had largely disappeared. Like others, he began casting around for a solution to the woes that had befallen much of central and eastern Europe.<sup>3</sup> Associating himself with Kurt Hiller's Council of Intellectual Workers, articles by him began appearing in newspapers and journals from 1919.<sup>4</sup> Initially, in the continuing political turmoil (which included the possibility of a communist revolution and attempted Habsburg restorations) he advocated a limited form of democracy under the guardianship of aristocratic leaders. By 1920 he was suggesting the creation of a United States of Europe. Influenced by Max Pannwitz's translation of Alexandre Dumas' *Napoleon Bonaparte: Historischer Roman* (1840), he thought a United States of Europe best implemented by a strong leader, and he envisaged it based on the Pan American Union, but with increased powers.<sup>5</sup> In 1922 he attended a World Peace Conference in Prague.

Others proposing large-scale political and geographical reorganisation as a solution to contemporary problems included Prince Karl Rohan, who established a Kulturbund preaching a common European destiny (and whose path eventually led to the Nazi Party) and Wilhelm Heile, initially a colleague of Coudenhove-Kalergi's, who attended an international parliamentary meeting in Vienna in 1922, calling for the establishment of the United States of Europe. Their co-operation was short lived. Heile criticized Coudenhove-Kalergi's authoritarian leadership ('Napoleonic desires for dictatorship') and by the mid-20s was running his own rival organization.

Of greater note were Karl Haushofer,<sup>6</sup> a family friend, and Oswald Spengler. Haushofer was teaching political geography at Munich University

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Many eminent Austro-Hungarians did likewise, including Sigmund Freud who stated of Wilson in the 20s: 'As far as a single person can be responsible for the misery of this part of the world, he surely is'. Freud co-authored with William C Bullitt, *Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study*. Written in the early 30s and a strong critique of Wilson, it finally appeared in 1967.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The translation of this from German is imprecise. Bond has it as a Council of Working Intellectuals. Hiller, a gay rights activist and pacifist, argued that intellectuals had a duty to inform and raise the spirits of the masses.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization\_of\_American\_States">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization\_of\_American\_States</a>.

Pannwitz, who also translated Kropotkin, had a long-standing interest in Japanese martial arts, something that may have attracted Coudenhove-Kalergi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Haushofer had been Austro-Hungarian military attaché in Japan 1908-1910. On Coudenhove-Kalergi's geo-political thinking, see Karina Urbach's *Go Betweens for Hitler* (OUP, 2015). Urbach quotes Thomas Mann as saying of him, 'He was of genteel humanity, a man who was used to thinking in continents.'

from 1919. From Haushofer, Coudenhove-Kalergi borrowed the general theories of 'geo-politics', writing in his 1923 book *Pan-Europa* that he considered the world in the future would be based around five key blocs: the US and the rest of the America continent, the British Empire, Europe, the Soviet Union and some type of combination of China and Japan. For Europe to compete effectively with such powerful rivals, he argued that it was essential that Europe should unite, and he advocated a directly elected European Parliament (based on one representative per million people), a European Court of Justice and a European Customs Union as early steps that should be taken to achieve this. Taking his cue from Spengler's view that civilizations organically rose, declined and fell, he looked at Europe as a whole and saw successive attempts at unity: starting with Alexander the Great, followed by the Romans and then the German-Austrian entity of the Holy Roman Empire. He established the Pan European Union to achieve this.

This brought Coudenhove-Kalergi the support of Monsignor Seipel, Chancellor of Austria. He agreed to act as Chair of the Austrian branch of the Pan European Union and gave Coudenhove-Kalergi offices and living accommodation in the Hofburg, the centre of government in Vienna. With this official endorsement, he began travelling around the world drumming up support amongst the political classes. Much of 1925 and 1926 was spent lobbying in US and UK. Both countries were by now aware of the increasing instability of post-1919 Europe (inflation, reparations, shaky governments and the perceived threat from communism) and were prepared to entertain notions of European unity. But neither would commit themselves. A Pan Europa Congress took place in Vienna in 1926, opening to the strains of its recently adopted anthem, Beethoven's *Ode to Joy*. The UK declined to attend, Foreign Office advice being that Coudenhove-Kalergi was a 'frightfully impractical theorist' – the first of many such comments.

By 1928-1929 there was a lot of discussion about a European Economic Union involving France and Germany. This was debated – and endorsed – by the League of Nations on 4 September 1929. (The UK Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, did not express a view, remaining seated throughout.) The plan was that both countries would then legislate toward that end, abolishing tariffs, and co-operating on economic planning and so forth.

Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, Chancellor of Austria, 1922-1924 and 1926-1929 and a leading figure in the right-wing Christian Social Party. Assassinated by a socialist in 1932.

# 'Events, dear boy, events'

**E**vents determined otherwise. Firstly, Gustav Stresemann, Chancellor of Germany, died (3 October), Aristide Briand, Prime Minister of France, left office (22 October) and, finally, share prices on Wall Street crashed (29 October). In opposition Briand continued work on a Memorandum on the Organization of a System of Federal European Union, but he died in 1932.8 By then circumstances in Europe were looking rather different and the chances of a Franco-German economic pact, of any type, had receded considerably. What is striking now is how much progress Coudenhove-Kalergi made in 5-6 years.

With France and Germany reverting to an adversarial view of each other, the Pan European Union fell back on financial support from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. By now some political figures in the UK were taking notice of his suggestions. Leo Amery emerged as a tacit supporter with the substantial caveat that 'Mentally we are much too far from Europe ever to enter wholeheartedly into its politics'. That is, the UK didn't mind a united Europe (because it would be less trouble and likely to be anti-communist) but wouldn't participate fully in it.9 Coudenhove-Kalergi spoke at Chatham House in June 1931, arguing that if Britain participated in a united Europe, it would gain a supply of skilled migrants who could colonize and improve selected parts of the British Empire. Later Amery introduced him privately to Austen Chamberlain and Arthur Henderson, the former confirming that both took the view that 'unification of Europe is not in the interests of Britain'. Worse followed. The Pan-Europa Union was banned in Germany from 1933. Austria became its base with both Dollfuss<sup>10</sup> (Coudenhove-Kalergi's sister was his secretary) and Schussnigg<sup>11</sup> sponsoring its activities. Ever on the outlook for a strong-man who could implement his ideals, Coudenhove-Kalergi spent a lot of time, until surprisingly late in the day, trying to persuade Mussolini to play this role. He failed. When Austria fell under German control he moved to Switzerland and acquired French citizenship.

In March 1938 he was back in the UK, meeting Churchill. Events in Europe were now pointing toward war and, at Chatham House a month later, the case for European unity was put again, this time by Professor

<sup>8</sup> Stresemann and Briand shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Amery thought Europe should take 'a freely co-operating Commonwealth' as their model for unity.

<sup>10 &</sup>lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engelbert\_Dollfuss">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engelbert\_Dollfuss</a>

<sup>11 &</sup>lt;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt\_Schuschnigg>

### Robert Seton-Watson who stated:

'Great Britain can, if she wants, find a huge Dominion in Eastern Europe, a Dominion of one hundred and twenty million people, very gifted people, who will one day be the most important element of Europe. They are ready to follow Great Britain. The day she wants to take the leadership, she shall have it.' 12

Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, met people and made speeches. He also appears to have been in touch with figures in the anti-Nazi resistance, telling Churchill (as early as February 1939) that Hitler and Stalin were seeking an agreement and citing the Vatican as his source.<sup>13</sup>

#### **Another war**

It was to no avail. War broke out, and any remaining prospect of European unity vanished. The author notes that Coudenhove-Kalergi spent two weeks in Paris at a critical time (14-28 May 1940), without any subsequent explanation for this being offered. What was he doing? Even at this stage, trying to find people in the emerging pro-Vichy coterie who might yet work with acceptable figures in Germany toward an attempt to create a federal Europe? Trying to establish a network that could supply information to his organization, via Switzerland, after France fell? We have no idea. In June 1940 he arrived with his wife in Spain, eventually moving to Portugal, and finally flying to the US in August 1940. Bond notes that four pages from his diary are missing during his stay in Lisbon. Another mystery. He had considered pitching up in the UK with the various governments-in-exile but unspecified objections about this were raised by the UK Foreign Office. What could these have been? Possibly that one of his brothers, Johannes, was a pro-German manager of the family estates in the Sudetenland, whilst another, Gerolf, was secretary at the Japanese embassy in Prague (until 1941) and would later serve on Field Marshall Ewald von Kleist's staff on the eastern front.

In the US he established a relationship with Otto von Habsburg, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. Interest in the Pan European Union took off once it became clear Germany could be defeated. Coudenhove-Kalergi

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Seton-Watson supported Popovici's proposals pre-1914, arguing then and subsequently for a federal solution to the problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Richard Bassett, in *HITLER'S SPY CHIEF – The Wilhelm Canaris Mystery* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005) says that Coudenhove-Kalergi's contact with the Vatican probably came via Erwin von Lahousen, a member of the German resistance to Hitler, and formerly an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army. However, Joachim Fest in *Plotting Hitler's Death: The German Resistance to Hitler 1933-45* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997) provides nothing to link Coudenhove-Kalergi to the German resistance.

and his organization were seen as a way of keeping the Soviet Union out of Europe. Victor Cazalet, and many exiles joined him. Despite Churchill's speeches, the UK continued its distrust, but by late 1943 De Gaulle and France were in favour and Coudenhove-Kalergi's stock rose accordingly.

## **Post-war**

After his electoral defeat, looking around for a big project that suited his status, Churchill became keener on promoting a European union. In fact, by the late 40s there were many pro-European bodies of which the European Union of Federalists (within which Kim Mackay MP was a rare Labour supporter), the European League for Economic Co-operation (led by Josef Retinger) and the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe were the most prominent.<sup>14</sup> There were so many others that the reader is confronted with a virtual alphabet soup of acronyms. 15 Coudenhove-Kalergi launched his own European Parliamentary Union in July 1947, a few months after Churchill, Amery, Robert Boothby and Duncan Sandys had started the United Europe Movement. The official UK response to all this was muted, with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin stating 'Practical collaboration (with European neighbours) should not infringe on national sovereignty'. Churchill and his colleagues tried and failed to take over the Pan European Union, and at the 1948 Congress in The Hague it became clear that what Churchill actually wanted was for the UK to manage Europe without being part of it.

## **Enter the USA**

**W**ith the Cold War now in its earliest, and most threatening stages, the US began taking an active interest in these matters, particularly given the electoral popularity of communism in both France and Spain. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development was set up in April 1948, to distribute Marshall Aid, followed a few months later by the shadowy American Committee on United Europe, the key figures in which

The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe advocated a Europe that would avoid entanglement with both the US and the USSR, observing a strict neutrality. This reflected the policy of the Soviet Union, which was commonly supposed to be its funder. Its key UK delegate was Bob Edwards, General Secretary of the Chemical Workers Union and, from 1955, MP for Bilston. Oleg Gordievsky later claimed that Edwards was a long-standing Soviet agent. Coudenhove-Kalergi never achieved much support in the UK, and apart from Kim Mackay, Bond notes only a few MPs as being followers: Victor Collins, Gordon Lang, Evelyn King and Hugh Delargy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Barberis, McHugh and Tyldesley in *Encyclopaedia of British and Irish Political Organizations* (London: Pinter, 2000) list 11 pro-Europe UK lobby groups and organizations from the late 30s. Assuming similar numbers across western Europe, this would equate to about 100-200 such bodies in the 50s and 60s.

were Allen Dulles, William Donovan and Walter Bedell Smith, all later prominent in the CIA. They wanted to establish a United States of Europe, for much the same reasons that Amery had advocated in 1931: it would be less work for them and a reliable bulwark against the further spread of communism. Reviewing the constellation of pro-federal, pro-union groups, they rejected Coudenhove-Kalergi (on the grounds that his proposals were far too utopian) and opted instead to support Churchill's United Europe Movement. They were wrong. The UK often behaved in an irritating fashion toward its European allies. At the 1949 Council of Europe for instance, it was proposed that delegates should be democratically elected: Bevin rejected this out of hand, insisting that it remain a meeting of existing government ministers. Later, when the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe met at Strasbourg, the UK moved that it should be permanently based in London. When this was rejected, the UK delegates walked out.

After which the continentals took the initiative. In May 1950 Robert Schuman, Prime Minister of France 1947-1948, proposed a European Coal and Steel Community. Schuman wanted the UK to join, and visited London a month later to recommend this. He failed. Herbert Morrison stated (apparently while dining at The Ivy) that 'The Durham miners won't wear it' and Bevin proclaimed the UK was 'different in character from other European nations and fundamentally incapable of wholehearted integration with them'. This cursory rejection was a huge mistake. In 1950, with its extensive manufacturing base, the UK would have enjoyed an open market in Europe for its steel exports, which, given the requirements then for post-war reconstruction were considerable and ongoing.<sup>16</sup>

Within a few years Schuman and his colleagues were prospering and in May 1955 invited the UK to take part in establishing a European Economic Community. The UK sent only a medium rank civil servant, R F Bretherton, to these discussions. At the heart of this was the exaggerated view the UK political class took of itself, and the similarly exaggerated regard it had for its 'special relationship' with the US. This changed – a little – after the Suez debacle. The UK finally applied to join the EEC in 1960 and was rebuffed by a French veto. By the mid-1960s the UK, via Lord Gladwyn, was arguing that it could only join the EEC if there were majority voting and no permitted use of a national veto. Vetoed again by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The fact that such a decision could be made without proper discussion is reminiscent of the similarly limited and derisory debate in the Labour cabinet in the late 1970s about whether to create a Sovereign Wealth Fund based on North Sea oil revenues.

France, the UK finally joined in 1973, and at various points thereafter enjoyed either using, or threatening to use, a national veto, until it left in 2020.

Coudenhove-Kalergi thought that De Gaulle was right to use his veto in 1963, and wrong in 1967. But neither the instigation of the European Coal and Steel Community nor the European Economic Community owed much to Coudenhove-Kalergi. Both were created by democratically elected politicians, representing electorates and interest groups. By the mid-1950s his role, and that of the Pan European Union was to be that of a pro-French, pro-De Gaulle pressure group largely, though not completely, funded by France. It has been calculated that he received about £100k pa (in 2021 figures) in French government funding. He died in 1972, corresponding, writing and speaking to the end.

In the end Coudenhove-Kalergi's magnificent social connections couldn't outweigh democratic legitimacy. He never represented anyone, never got elected to anything, had no broad support and no political base. His forte was assembling and conducting, as one would an orchestra, groups of intellectuals, aristocrats and sympathetic political leaders against a backdrop of grand hotels, conference halls, transatlantic liners and Alpine ski resorts. Despite this (or perhaps even helped by this) the Pan European Union remained influential, particularly in later years when Otto von Habsburg served as President.

Elected an MEP in 1979, it was Habsburg who organised the August 1989 Pan European Picnic at Sopron, the event which precipitated the collapse of communism in eastern Europe that replicated how his own family's domains had disintegrated seven decades earlier. The Pan European Union still exists, its current President, only its third in a century, being Alain Terrenoire. It awards the Coudenhove-Kalergi prize bi-annually to politicians who have contributed in a major way to the development of a united Europe. Past winners include Angela Merkel, Jean-Claude Juncker and Kenneth Clarke. Despite his apparently marginal role in the inauguration of the major stepping stones towards today's European Union, and the federalist agenda generally, Coudenhove-Kalergi remains celebrated in Europe as the man who sketched out before anyone else how such an entity might work . . . the mechanics of the European Parliament, the Customs Union and the European Court of Justice.

And yet, the tone of this book is rather strange. The author tells us that Coudenhove-Kalergi was given to quoting Nostradamus, and was also

a follower of an obscure Swiss psychic, Fridolin Kordon-Veri.<sup>17</sup> What do we make of this? Possibly that, in keeping with his part-Japanese background, he believed in the importance of 'auspicious' timings? If that is the case, it isn't explained, or developed much as an argument. Nor are the references from Chapter 4 onwards that Coudenhove-Kalergi was a freemason, and was assisted quite frequently by fellow freemasons in his endeavours.

#### The Brotherhood

He was admitted to the Humanitas Lodge in 1921 which, in keeping with most Austrian lodges, had liberal, humanitarian views, part of a tradition dating back to the Enlightenment. Coudenhove-Kalergi attended the 1922 World Peace Conference in Prague accompanied by Richard Schlesinger and Wladimir Misar (both Grand Lodge of Austria) and Friedrich Hertz (Lodge Zukunft). An early benefactor of the Pan European Union was US freemason Nicholas M Butler. When Coudenhove-Kalergi's book *Pan Europa* appeared, the Grand Lodge of Austria (at behest of Hertz) recommended it to freemasons internationally. Additional funding for the Pan European Union came from Baron Louis Rothschild and Max Warburg, both freemasons.

By 1926 these connections had been noted by fellow Austrian, Adolf Hitler, who pronounced 'What Coudenhove writes could have been written by any Freemason'. Faced with this unwelcome publicity, Coudenhove sought permission from his Lodge to publicly resign, whilst privately remaining a member. This was granted. Both Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann were freemasons: Briand in La Chavalier du Trail Lodge and Stresemann in Frederick the Great Lodge. Leo Amery (United Grand Lodge of England) introduced Coudenhove-Kalergi to UK political circles. Winston Churchill (Studholme Alliance Lodge 1591), Victor Cazalet and Robert Boothby were all freemasons. When Coudenhove-Kalergi arrives in the US in 1940, the author remarks: 'It is hard to imagine he could support himself financially in this new situation without help from Masonic sources' and introduces a couple of new masonic names to bolster this: Otto Tolischus and Harry Woodburn Chase.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Fridolin Kordon-Veri (1906-1968), Austrian painter and clairvoyant. Coudenhove-Kalergi claimed that Kordon-Veri, pre-1939, foretold there would be a Council of Europe in 1949.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Churchill's masonic apron can be viewed at Freemason's Hall, 60 Great Queen Street, London WC2.

See <a href="https://www.ugle.org.uk/9-famous-freemasons/17-winston-churchill">https://www.ugle.org.uk/9-famous-freemasons/17-winston-churchill>.

Are were being told, in a low key, semi-embarrassed way, that today's EU owes its existence to a cabal of freemasons? If we are, given Coudenhove-Kalergi's lack of direct involvement in how events developed from the late 40s, there is no evidence that it does. Or is the author deflecting that criticism (or that particular criticism of Coudenhove-Kalergi, which is not the same thing) by making a clean breast of things early on? It's very hard to tell. What is true is that some influential people are freemasons, and networks exist internationally via the connections between the various lodges. Some of these are akin to liberal, intellectual clubs and Coudenhove-Kalergi appears to have been a significant member of one of them.<sup>19</sup> But the author provides no context for this. He could, for instance, have pointed out that other masonic-type organizations existed at this time, and were by no means benign.<sup>20</sup>

Another 'network' that existed across Europe in the 20s and 30s were the interlocking and intermarried layers of royalty, a select grouping that wobbled uncertainly between being pro-Nazi and anti-Nazi. Karina Urbach documents this in her *Go Betweens for Hitler*.<sup>21</sup> Surely the masonic connections that Martyn Bond nudges us about are just another example of this type of private, unofficial and under-explored structure? It would have been better if he had clarified this.

Equally, the author fails to sketch out the extent to which the membership of the Pan European Union overlapped with that of other, similar organizations like Intermarium. Stephen Dorril discusses Intermarium at some length in his *M16: Fifty Years of Special Operations*<sup>22</sup> and notes that the UK Pan European Committee, funded by the Warburgs, which included Amery and Cazalet, also included Count August Zaleski, Foreign Minister of Poland 1940-1944. Zaleski was also prominent in Intermarium.<sup>23</sup> Like the PEU it was part of the fall-out from the Habsburg collapse, was pro-Catholic and anti-communist. It

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> As was Salvador Allende (Lodge Progresso No 4, Valparaiso). See <a href="https://freemasonry.bcy.ca/biography/allende\_s/allende\_s.html">https://freemasonry.bcy.ca/biography/allende\_s/allende\_s.html</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Such networks are described in Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke's *The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and their Influence on Nazi Ideology* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992) and illustrate the opposition from the extreme right in Germany and Austria to people like Coudenhove-Kalergi.

<sup>21</sup> See note 6 above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> London: Fourth Estate, 2001.

And a prominent freemason too, in the Grand Orient Lodge of Poland. See <a href="http://www.loza-galileusz.pl/en/1.polscy.wolnomularze.php">http://www.loza-galileusz.pl/en/1.polscy.wolnomularze.php</a>.

advocated a federation of various emerging states in eastern Europe, in contrast to Coudenhove-Kalergi who was mainly concerned with central and western Europe. Remarkably, Intermarium still exists today partly as a vehicle for Polish influence and partly as a means by which Belarus can be detached from Russia and the Ukraine integrated into Europe.<sup>24</sup>

All of which leads one to a conclusion that perhaps taking the long view in politics (in this case the very long view) does ultimately get you somewhere. It clearly worked, after a fashion, for Otto von Habsburg. If that is the case, no-one takes a longer view than the Roman Catholic Church which bobs up in this narrative from time to time. The post-war reconciliation of France and West Germany was sealed at a Mass, celebrated at Rheims Cathedral in July 1961. An immense array of dignitaries attended this. These included Coudenhove-Kalergi, who was active in later years rustling up Catholic support for the Pan European Union, managing to get St Benedict of Nursia installed as Patron-Protector of Europe in 1970 with help from the Munich based Pro Europa Una.<sup>25</sup> Today the Catholic Church is advancing the cause of both Robert Schuman ('the father of modern Europe') and Karl I, the final Emperor of Austria-Hungary, toward sainthood. There is a context to this. The Catholic Church has long sought to promote its values, protect its interests and exercise temporal power, via proxies, across the whole of Europe. Austria-Hungary functioned in this capacity for just over two hundred years.<sup>26</sup> It was the successor state to the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted nine hundred years, which in turn succeeded the Roman Empire, wherein Catholicism was recognized as an official religion in 313 by Constantine the Great (Emperor 306-337).<sup>27</sup> Accordingly, the Catholic Church regarded the collapse of Austria-Hungary as a tragedy and was strongly opposed to the post-1918 peace treaties which enforced this course of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See Intermarium College at

<sup>&</sup>lt;a href="https://collegiumintermarium.org/en/international-human-rights-law-master-of-laws/">https://collegiumintermarium.org/en/international-human-rights-law-master-of-laws/</a>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Who have a website, in German at

<sup>&</sup>lt;a href="https://pfaffenhofen.de/artikel/pro-europa-una-e-v/">https://pfaffenhofen.de/artikel/pro-europa-una-e-v/</a>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> As part of this arrangement, the Emperor of Austria-Hungary was entitled to veto candidates at a Papal Conclave. This occurred as recently as 1903 when Franz Joseph used it (successfully) to block the candidacy of the Cardinal Rampolla, a supporter of the Austrian Christian Social Party, of whom Franz Joseph disapproved on the grounds of their antisemitism and populism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Given the UK's current position vis a vis the EU it seems ironic that Constantine was proclaimed Emperor at York.

action. It supported various groups and individuals from the 20s onwards, including Coudenhove-Kalergi, as it sought, finally with some success, to create a united Europe.<sup>28</sup>

This book is a first step toward improving knowledge in the UK about Coudenhove-Kalergi, and what motivated him. It could have gone further in making its case, though, and the author, who was formerly Head of the Office of the European Parliament in the UK and a Director of the Federal Trust,<sup>29</sup> refrains from exploring a number of areas that might have been of interest to the reader. But, in a country where very little is known by most people about how and why the EU emerged from the chaos of two world wars, it provides a useful account of an overlooked figure.

Simon Matthews' latest book is *Looking For a New England: Music, Films and TV 1975-86* (Harpenden: Oldcastle Books, 2021) www.oldcastlebooks.co.uk/LOOKING-FOR-A-NEW-ENGLAND

The following statement appears on the website <a href="https://www.emperorcharles.org/why-canonize-an-emperor">https://www.emperorcharles.org/why-canonize-an-emperor</a>: 'The Habsburg monarchy had a long relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. As the political descendant of the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg monarchy had dual responsibilities for its subjects' spiritual and temporal welfare.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> <https://fedtrust.co.uk>