The Cuntocracy

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Why not call the present political system a 'cuntocracy'? This is not, as it might seem, just a reaction to the advent of someone as painfully fraudulent as Nick Clegg. We need a new name for *not just* what the political class do to us because of greed and stupidity; we need a term that advances the idea of social organisation as something innate in people. It should combine a description of the reality of our place in such a society with an accurate discription of the nature of the society. Cuntocracy describes the reality.¹

By calling our society a cuntocracy we return power to the ordinary people; we give the people a voice, a simple way for them to talk back to those who pose as leaders but take us nowhere. And we offer a meaningful contribution to David Cameron's 'Big Society'.

What are our base assumptions? Well, there is probably only one 'law' that we could say social science 'discovered' and this seems to have been engendered by sheer flippancy. This is Lord Acton's statement (in a letter to a Bishop) that all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. No one has thought to extrapolate our one law to establish its social determinants. We can adapt Acton's Law into: all power tends to create cunts and absolute power creates total cunts. If power and cunthood are thus implacably entwined they form a metaphysical pathos: an inescapable trap of cuntification awaits anyone seeking power. This trap

¹ To clarify: the use of it contains a critique which evinces a sublimated but key feature of society, in that we 'innately' order and structure society — character determines social structure. If we grasp this as a process and study it we can gain some sort of understanding of how society is shaped and how we are shaped by it, and it is bad news.

gives rise to a functional rationality: the cuntocracy. Max Weber's concept of the inescapable 'Iron Shell of Bureaucracy,' or Marx's 'Barbarism' as the incurable 'leper of civilisation' point to its social psychology.²

If mention of 'capitalism' is always off the agenda, so that its effects on society can always be ignored or obfuscated, then we are being tacitly urged to switch to something else, something we can see everyday and everywhere: a cuntocracy. Who would need a lengthy theoretical excursus into the reality of a cuntocracy when they daily encounter the activities of *every* bureaucracy, or have recently spoken to their boss, or flicked through a few television channels and caught sight of George Osborne saying something? So, given our present system of rewarding the wealthy for robbing the poor, it is vital that its reality is reflected in a terminological exactitude open to every citizen: other terms lack cuntocracy's profound poetic grace.³

Most of them have come up with nothing particularly useful, but sociologists tell us that they have laboured away to arrive at an account of why our society is the way it is. Let us leave them to it, and, with one term, state who is in control, as much as it can be said anyone is in control, and how they pull off the con. The advantage of 'cuntocracy' is that it does all the sociological work for us. But there is a problem here: sociologists make a living *sublimating* the ways of the powerful, so that people comply with directives from 'above'. We are reversing this process. For academics, 'society' has to remain something of a perpetual mystery, although we *know* that *they know* which side of their bread is buttered. Yes, there are writers who *have* uncovered the existence of a cuntocracy and the ways of the powerful, but they are

² See Arthur Mitzman, *The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970). In Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber* (London: Routledge, 1946) pp. 41-42, after World War I, Weber basically called Ludendorff a useless fat cunt who should be hung.

³ It should be pointed out that the term is drawn from the UK's northern urban demotic and the linguistic properties thereof. Those offended by it could easily replace it with 'cantocracy,' given that this might be the way some pronounce it anyway.

outcasts. Their work is totally unwanted because it reveals that the cuntocratic world has certainly been made by cunts, and its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of these cunts' mind. Universities are there to hide knowledge using a sophisticated form of administrative pedagogical cuntocracy that involves the selection and employment of ignorant, lazy cuntocrats to run a system reproducing the *cunnus quo* at the expense of any encouragement of an awareness of it. But a system based on bribery and compliance should be perfectly amenable for our purposes of selling the term, normalising it.

Antecedents

If we have to convince the intellectuals so that they can aid us spread the word, we can start by examining the theorists on whom the principles of the cuntocracy are clearly dependent: those who advanced being a 'total cunt' as a desirable condition. In the rest of this essay we will draft this out. A good start would be Robert Michels' the 'iron law of oligarchy', that explained how nature has determined that whatever the top cunts say goes. It might well be wayward gibberish, but the chances are that it, and the theorists he uses to back it up, will offer us a chance to find enough other cuntologists to provide the thing that proves things to intellectuals: the academic citation. For example, Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca could be plundered to offer evidence of the 'circulation of cunts'. Surely too, there must be reams of it in James Burnham; but here we are only talking about neo-Machiavellianism mixed with people's desperate desire not to be thought of as a communist. We should go back to the timeless master, Niccolo Machiavelli here. Would not *The Cunt* have made a better title than *The Prince*?

Some readers may be of the opinion that making up such a terms is meaningless. What idiot would fall for something as obtuse as this? What half-wit would take it seriously and start using it? Well the word 'meritocracy' was invented by Michael Young in his (1958) satirical book *The Rise of the Meritocracy*. Young's joke was that the meritocratic class had gained a

monopoly on 'merit' and got together with the symbols and designators of merit, to perpetuate its own power, status, and privilege. He wrote to the *Guardian* in 2001 pointing this out when Tony Blair started prominently using it as part of running the country — to define what our society should be like.⁴ So it should be relatively easy for someone to drop 'cuntocracy' into some dreary ramble once conference time comes round again.

So what is the cuntocracy? Is it a class or an elite? Who are the cuntocrats? How does it work? Class, it should be remembered, is not real as such, it is something people do to one and other, it is an interaction, the way you are treated. We will all have a barrage of suggestions as to what the main cuntocratic institutions are, but the cuntocracy is not limited to bureaucracies: these are the reflection of the political institutions that empower them to act. This is why bureaucracies are run by cunts who find themselves saying: 'I don't make the rules.' This bureaucratic adoption of a functional rationality also extends into a de facto code of silence that contributes to the practice of the cuntocracy hiding its actions: any crisis that threatens the cuntocracy or its important members triggers a closing of ranks to protect it from outside scrutiny, interference, and legal oversight. They form certain contours of the cuntocracy, but class and bureaucracy are not the cuntocracy. When the cunts who 'do not make the rules' go home they only enter into a wider cuntocratic realm of which they too are at the mercy of. Franz Kafka worked in an insurance company; this was where he got his ideas.⁵

Books such as *Amoral Politics*, outline thousands of years of experience to support the idea that political institutions are *fundamentally* amoral and constitute a cuntocracy.⁶ This

⁴ See <www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/jun/29/comment>.

⁵ Fiction, such as Kafka's *The Trial*, or Huxley's *Brave New World*, have ran ahead of us, with characters who sense that they have no effective defence against the cuntocracy that runs the World. Both works could quite easily have been re-titled: *Brave New Cuntocracy*, or *Brought before the Cunts*. Jonathan Swift's *A Modest Proposal*, could easily have been called *Cuntocratic Cooking*.

⁶ Ben-Ami Scharfstein, *Amoral Politics: The Persistent Truth of Machiavellism*, (Albany: University of New York Press, 1995).

'bureaucratic amorality' is basically the Nazis' claim that they could not be held personally responsible because they had a legal duty to achieve politically empowered tasks to the exclusion of anything else: either they were following orders or the law, or did not know the consequences of their actions. But they were still total cunts. Possibly the Nazis were the cuntocracy *par excellence*, but we will have to play this down as just an example. We are going to need to put it on solid (i.e. more acceptable) theoretical grounds.

The underlying meta-cuntocratic principle

 ${f T}$ he difficulty of tracking the exact origin of something can be obviated guite simply: we simply provide our own mythology; people are a lot more willing to go along with myths rather than waste time finding out facts. If a trick works once it might just work again. One overlooked aspect of F. A. Hayek's *The* Road to Serfdom (the book Margaret Thatcher slapped the table with saying that it had taken over her mind) is in a short section called 'Why the Worst Get on Top', where it is argued that the most amorally flexible people involved in a bureaucracy tend to rise to the top and become its leaders.⁸ Hayek pretended he was writing on 'totalitarianism', something he largely invented to roll the Soviets, Nazis and socialists into one; but bureaucracies are much the same everywhere, and it is clear from the examples he uses that we are also talking about capitalism here, too. But in this mélange, does not Hayek accidentally point to the underlying metacuntocratic principle underlying most societies? He also points to bureaucracies as not integral to it, but just perfectly suited to helping the unprincipled attain positions of influence and power because a lack of scruples gives them an advantage in advancing their careers. As Hayek puts it:

"...the probability of the people in power being individuals who would dislike the possession and exercise of power

⁷ Hans Sherrer 'The Inhumanity of Government Bureaucracies,' *The Independent Review*, pp. 249-264, <www.independent.org/aboutus/person_detail.asp?id=621> .

⁸ Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944) pp. 148-67.

is on a level with the probability that an extremely tender-hearted person would get the job of whipping-master in a slave plantation.'9

So for Hayek, there is a gradient in society that makes it inclined towards certain proclivities. For those who have not read Hayek (and indeed for his followers) it should be clarified that this whipping-master job is, for our purposes, not so much an aspiration: it is being ambiguously presented as an analogy, rather than seen as the be-all-and-end-all, as it was taken in Enoch Powell's famous speech on which race should have the 'whip hand' in the cuntocracy. Here Powell was advancing what we could term an 'Athenian cuntocracy.'

If we try to define our conception of 'cuntocracy' for the academics, we can also cite the belief that bureaucracies are forms of *kakistocracy*: government by the least qualified or most unprincipled citizens known to humanity. This is a cat's whisker away from our conception of cuntocracy and even sounds worse.

Beneath the mask

For Hayek, government bureaucracies, as the agencies of the cuntocracy, depend on an unreflective wielding of the power made available to their administrators: a 'truthless' rather than a 'ruthless' willingness to wield an agency's power is an occupational requirement for someone to rise to the upper echelons of the cuntocracy. ¹⁰ But our argument is that it must be a bit of both since both seem components of a larger enduring system. The attraction of power-hungry people to positions of authority in a bureaucracy will have consequences for everyone affected. So the cuntocracy must wear a benign mask at times — in our present world the whipping-masters

⁹ Hayek, *ibid*, p. 152. It escaped Hayek that it is possible that a tender-hearted person might have gained the job so as not to carry it out, operating under a pretence. Hayek's assumption is that whipping-masters like their job, are thus dedicated and good at it and not mindlessly flailing: this is an uncharacteristically heroic vision of the working class.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* pp. 159-67.

must have a euphemistic job description. Power-oriented people mask their control via such entities as 'indicative planning' or 'performativity'. Here bureaucracies can freely express inhumane prejudices, a bit like Tony Blair's *use* of meritocracy and 'God'. Government bureaucracies do not think, only individuals do that; but bureaucracies tell them not to. Thus some bureaucracies are said to be the institutional equivalent of a psychopathic individual.¹¹ Our concept of the cuntocracy is a contribution to what Ashley Montagu called the last century's 'dehumanisation syndrome'.¹²

In our mission to win over the intellectuals we will need to throw in some kind of an academic dichotomy, the perpetual discussion of which will keep them in business. Robert Merton noted the importance of discerning the difference between manifest and latent functions, and we can paraphrase the hell out of him here. A distinction between a *manifest* and *latent* cuntocracy could be devised to stop (and indeed start) the inadvertent confusion between *conscious* motivations for cuntocracy and its *objective consequences*. In other words: do cunts actually try to bring about a cuntocracy or does it just seem that way? Is it because we identify *motives* with *functions* and confuse the subjective categories of motivation with the objective categories of function?¹³ You get the idea. Hopefully that one can run as long as the Miliband-Poulantzas debate (still raging).

One thing is for sure: any self-disrespecting cuntocrat will tell others what to do. There is no way we are getting bogged down in all that semiotic linguistic guff, so we will say that the cuntocracy uses what C. Wright Mills called a 'vocabulary of motive.' Rather than expressing something

¹¹ Gilles Amado, 'Why Psychoanalytical knowledge helps us understand organizations,' *Human Relations*, No. 48, April 1995, p. 351. 12 Ashley Montagu and Floyd Matson, *The Dehumanization of Man*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).

¹³ Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, (New York: Free Press, 1957) p. 60.

¹⁴ C. Wright Mills, 'Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive,' *Sociological Review*, Vol. 5, No. 6, 1940. This is related to the earlier C. Wright Mills, 'Language, Logic, and Culture,' *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 4, No. 5, 1939.

that is prior and *in* the person, language is taken by other persons as an indicator of future actions. Mills also gave us the mechanics of how a cuntocracy operates through his conviction that in the US an elite group had enormous power denied to everyone else; that they were increasingly becoming a self-perpetuating elite; that their power was becoming increasingly unchecked and irresponsible; and that their decision-making was based on an increasingly military definition of reality, a 'military metaphysic,' a crackpot realism, that was in fact oriented towards immoral ends. Surely any academically sanctioned cuntocracy would incorporate this once spun as some glorious national security business rationale. Mills also believed the 'Power Elite' had 'sold' a believing world on themselves; and they had to play the chief fanatics in their delusional world. Perfect: there is a market for this; but we do not want our theory to appear radical fraudulent yes, radical no: the academics must recognise us as one of their own. Once formulated, better to launch it in a think tank like Demos or the Society for Social Cohesion, perhaps with an article in *Prospect* by Michael Ignatieff.

Impressing the gullible

Possibly the greatest theorist of cuntocracy was Thorstein Veblen. Is not his 'Leisure Class' elegantly harmonious with our own? Veblen's ability to gaze upon 'industrial warfare' and the 'businessman as predator' was with the 'eyes of a stranger.' He showed how the trained incapacity of businessmen, acting in accordance with entrepreneurial canons, resulted in an efficient sabotage of production and productivity. But, like Mills, he demonstrated entirely unwanted abilities in social science and is to be avoided like the plague. The ire of the academic detractors was prompted because:

'Veblen may be said to have betrayed the betrayers by thinking unholy thoughts on holy ground and by using

¹⁵ C. Wright Mills, 'Introduction,' p. vi-xix, in Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1953).

16 Thorstein Veblen: 'The Main Drift,' in C. Wright Mills, *Images of Man*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960), pp. 336-369.

the ritualistic paraphernalia of scholarship — ordinarily employed in buttressing the social order and impressing the gullible — for profoundly subversive purposes.'17

Veblen died in 1929, but these people have memories like elephants and their very trade is in sets of grudges masked as scholarship that are passed on before they die. And here we allude to an interesting feature of this form of rule: while an aristocrat might feel happy with being called an aristocrat and can even point to *noblesse oblige*, the cunt will *generally* not like the cuntocracy delineated as such and is not disposed towards any *connasse oblige*. Or are they? Theoretically if the cuntocracy is as axiomatic as we might suppose, we should need to only *listen* to those at the elite of a cuntocracy to formulate our opinion that we indeed suffer under a cuntocracy they are dishonour bound to create. An audio archive such as this interchange between Nixon and Kissinger might suffice to convince us:

Nixon: I still think we ought to take the dikes out now. Will that drown people?

Kissinger: That will drown about 200,000 people.

Nixon: Well, no, no, no, no, no, I'd rather use a nuclear

bomb. Have you got that ready?

Kissinger: That I think would just be too much, uh...

Nixon: A nuclear bomb, does that bother you? I just want you to think big, Henry, for Christsakes.¹⁸

You really have to listen to the savour of the tang of

¹⁷ Daniel Aaron, *Men of Good Hope*, (Oxford University Press, 1951) pp. 208-245. Veblen's conceptualisation of economic relations included his ideas of a 'strategy of mutual defeat' that governed the work of the industrial system. And surely utter futility is the hallmark of a cuntocracy. For Veblen, the business interests of the 'Absentee Owners' do not coincide with the underlying population's in a tension between maximum output at low cost versus moderate output at an enhanced price. Here, too, the unions are described as habitually employing 'the standard methods of the merchandising business, endeavouring to sell their vendible output at the best price obtainable; their chief recourse in these negotiations being a limitation of the supply.'

^{18 &}lt;a href="http://www.mostdangerousman.org/press_materials/MDM_presskit_Word.doc">http://www.mostdangerousman.org/press_materials/MDM_presskit_word.doc

cuntocracy in Nixon's voice when he torments Kissinger with that 'does that bother you?' The printed page just does not convey it. But of course quite a bit of Nixon's activities were supposedly secret. Surely a cuntocracy is dependent on a vast hidden propaganda apparatus? But such techniques of control are merely the basic methods by which an individual or a group asserts its cuntocratic orientation — its power and the ability to exploit this power. Even 'secret' techniques of control require channels, institutions, and structures by which the techniques and basic methods are implemented. To prevail, control techniques must form a cunto-methodology by which a cuntocratic potential is actualised and once actualised, is maintained. An established cuntocracy will presumably seek to maintain the pattern of structural and behavioural relations that it has developed in the system it tries to control (or indeed wreck): this maintenance pattern demands control devices — propaganda being one of them. So we will tell the academics that this is a form of 'public diplomacy.' We can entice them further and appeal to their vanity: promising that they can exploit another functional duality here. Because no cuntocracy is likely to adopt a single technique or restrict itself to some basic technique, certain sets of techniques tend to be required: the top cunts must appear as ruthless and/or truthless when it suits them — the good cunt/bad cunt routine. For example, if violence is the preferred technique, violent cunts will increase in importance and potential. Some concrete group of violent cunts – i.e. the police, the army, or parapolitical agencies - would subsequently increase their scope and intensity and rise to the top of the cuntocracy. But a cuntocracy might switch from violence to mass manipulation as its preferred technique. As a result *manipulatory* cunts might rise in importance and potential at the expense of violent cunts — if we take the two to be significantly unrelated. Violent cunts might lose their relative elite position in the cuntocracy and move to a lower level in the hierarchy, while manipulatory cunts using actors such as party organisers, mass organisation leaders, propagandists and covert operators — in short academics — would appear in the

elite upper echelon *gaining prestige* and influence: taking on the appearance and vocabulary of top cunts. Here we need only drop hints that academic cuntologists, like Hayek, could be said to have invented the *incredibly well-funded* field of cuntology to accompany the vicissitudes of the process.¹⁹

A problem exists in much sociological work involving the very identification of whatever it is that you are talking about — hence the subsequent ease of substituting one term for another. This suits us fine: we will say that some writers who are presumed to have been writing about elites, or bureaucracies (remember our task is to subsume both) were actually mistranslated or deliberately misunderstood by socialists. The task is merely one of reinstatement: we just slip it in. So, for example, we would say things like: according to Key (1961) a main characteristic of cuntocracies in constitutional systems of government is 'absence of sufficient cohesion among the activists to unite them into a single group dedicated to the management of public affairs and public opinion.' Our serious study of cuntology would use this to pretend we are objective the way the more Thespian Academics do. We will have to quote the right people, so we will say that Raymond Aron (1950) categorised cuntocracies in constitutional systems as divided cuntocracies; and we will say Ralf Dahrendorf (1959) extended this to argue that because of this division it was *impossible* to identify a cuntocracy because it 'consists of two constants, bureaucracy and government; and one variable, the veto group whose claims are, in particular situations, incorporated in government policy.' If required we can say that this forms the Burnhamesque view that government *managers* make decisions by processing the interests pressed on them by a variety of outside interests

¹⁹ The academics might feel that they would become analogous to those who prepared the Brothers Grimm's celebrated 'Emperor's new clothes.' So they will be required to smother any small child who might later try to expose the racket — business as usual one might say.

and 'veto groups,' but we will substitute 'top cunts' here.²⁰

If some outsider makes the derogatory assertion that our social science work here merely forms a type of satire and is incompatible with a 'serious' sociological analysis and is in effect some kind of conspiracy theory, we can say that it is at times difficult to be able to distinguish between the two when these things are made so; but we may have to play our ace here and bring in Machiavelli the maestro to show that the two are not mutually exclusive. Hit it Nicky:

'I come now to the last branch in my charge: that I teach princes villainy, and how to enslave. If any man will read over my book [of the prince] with impartiality and ordinary charity, he will easily perceive that it is not my intention to recommend that government, or those men there described, to the world, much less to teach men how to trample upon good men, and all that is sacred and venerable upon earth, laws religion, honesty, and what not. If I have been a little too punctual in describing these monsters in all their lineaments and colours, I hope mankind will know them, the better to avoid them, my treatise being both a satire against them, and a true character of them...' 21

Here, in a letter, presumably to another Bishop, Machiavelli in explaining the basis of 'The Prince' only seems to think that we need *managing* in being cuntish towards each other, no initial impetus. And note too that this conveniently comes from the epigram of James Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution*, that

²⁰ V.O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); Raymond Aron, 'Politics and the French Intellectual,' *Partisan Review*, pp. 595-606, Vol. 17, July 1950; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, (Stanford University Press, 1959) p. 305.

²¹ James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, (Penguin, 1942), p. 13. There was a second part to the quote from Machiavelli that Burnham (for his own reasons) omitted: 'Whoever, in his empire, is tied to no other rules than those of his will and lust, must either be a saint or else a very devil incarnate; or, if he be neither of these, both his life and his reign are like to be very short; for whosoever takes upon him so execrable an employment, must turn all topsy turvey, and never stick at anything; for if he once halt, he will fall and never rise again, etc.'

said that an Athenian cuntocracy had been replaced with a more anonymous, but functionally indispensable, managerial cuntocracy.²²

What other great works should undergird our thesis? Well, those that no one has any intention of reading naturally offer themselves up, particularly ones steeped in the past that impart some *gravitas* to the term. We can trot out Alexander D'Entreves (1967) description of Plato's 'Argument of Thrasymachus,' and note the early inclusion of the cuntocratic in Socrates' response to Thrasymachus. D'Entreves study of the state quickly arrives at Plato's theory of the 'Noble Lie,' what we will adapt as the 'Noble Cunt.'23 Here we will stress that only humans lie properly. A Nietzschean 'higher morality' (yes: 'higher cuntality') could be trundled out that enables the 'Überfotze' (the super-cunt) to rise above the restrictions of ordinary morality. In its essence the Noble Lie establishes rigid divisions (an exploitative cuntocracy) by telling us that only certain people can be leaders: the 'guardians of gold'. So, as a sop, we can always offer the possibility that only certain people can be cunts and that the chances are they will already be in, or want, control of things because they feel they should: let our watchword be apathy. For D'Entreves the Noble Lie was now variously termed 'ideology,' or 'myth,' or 'political formula', so we might as well feel free to add another name for it combining the lot. A powerful regime is surely one that succeeds in excluding from people's minds the issues most dangerous for that regime: that we are ruled by rich cunts in our case.

What creates the present cuntocracy?

So, what are the conditions that create the cuntocracy that we presently inhabit? Let us just go back to C. Wright Mills: his

²² Richard Gillam, White Collar from start to finish: C. Wright Mills in transition, (Stanford University, 1981) p. 4.

²³ Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, *The Notion of the State*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). Our use of D'Entreves would maintain that Thrasymachus had it that to talk of justice in relation to the state is irrelevant: 'If one is determined to do so at any cost, one must recognise that 'Cuntocracy, when great enough, is mightier, freer, and more masterly than justice.'

view was that the US had no nationally responsible political parties offering and standing upon alternative political orientations and programmes — well, we will need that but say it is a good thing: consensus. For Mills there was also no significant senior civil service composed of those whose careers were independent of private interests — that sounds perfect, we will make that sound like job creation. The political directorate was said to be composed of former generals, former corporation men or hangers-on of the highest business and legal circles — again: if they do not produce a cuntocracy no one can. The state, in its personnel and in its persistent outlook, appeared to Mills to be a committee of the ruling circles of corporation and high military.²⁴ Fine, but what drives it all? In Mills' cuntocracy - and the US is now the only Supercuntocracy – a high-flying moral rhetoric was joined with an 'opportunist crawling among a great scatter of unfocused fears and demands'— again perfect: there is our teleology. The main content of this form of 'politics' was a struggle among those equally expert in practical next steps in the thrust toward killing for sordid or for idealistic reasons — again a text book formulation.²⁵

One final problem with promoting the term is that the loony left will say that it will be useful to big business and dictators. Perfect: if that is the case we will be welcomed into academia with open arms. Once normalised, if there was big money behind it an academic managerial niche would be found for it instantly, or my name is Peter Drucker.

²⁴ C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) p. 88.

²⁵ C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War Three*, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1958) p. 90.