

Transnationalised Repression; Parafascism and the U.S.

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This essay was written in the summer of 1977. I lost track of it in subsequent summers, when I first suffered a major illness, and then was side-tracked into preparation of a trade book on the Kennedy Assassination (*Beyond Conspiracy*) that was eventually killed by its publisher on the eve of its appearance. I am grateful to *Lobster* for reviving "Transnationalised Repression". Though the essay starts from events of the seventies (Watergate, the murder of Orlando Letelier in Washington, the Nixon war on drugs) which have since passed into history, the essay also builds to a general overview of transnationalised backing for right-wing repressive forces, or parafascists, that operate on the fringes of state intelligence and security systems.

Except in details, I have not attempted to update the essay, whose general thesis has been unfortunately only too corroborated by ensuing events. The assassins of Letelier did in fact go to jail, but with sentences that were either token, or soon reversed in higher courts. On a higher level, the fall of the Shah in Iran and of Marcos in the Philippines have been followed by new revelations of those dictators' links to private as well as public forces in the United States. Indeed the speculation reported in this essay (at footnote 159), that Asian bribes had influenced Nixon's Vietnam interventions through the Watergate period, seems only too relevant today, as we learn how much money had been channelled by Marcos into U.S. political campaigns over the last decade and a half. The thesis of "Transnationalised Repression" also seems only too relevant to U.S. politics in Nicaragua, as we learn of support for the Contras from first Argentina and Israel, and now allegedly from South Africa.

The restrained optimism of the essay's conclusions, written in the first year of the Carter presidency, may sound a little odd after six years of Reagan. Support for drug-running criminals has moved from being the dark underside of U.S. foreign policy to (in the case of the Nicaraguan Contras) being at that policy's visible centre. In 1977 I was concerned about the access of foreign parafascists and WACL publicists to the office of Senator Thurmond and the staff of the National Security Council. Today General Singlaub, the President of WACL, has access, through his support work for the Contras, to the Reagan White House (cf. footnote 50).

In my view, this continuing demoralisation of U.S. foreign policy and the concomitant trivialisation of domestic U.S. political debate, makes my modest

hopes for change through “new human groupings”, or what since the fall of Marcos has become famous as “people power”, not less but more relevant. It is not that I am at all sanguine about the possibilities for such transpolitical change outside the traditional political system. It is just all the clearer that such new human forces, however weak and immature at present, are ultimately our best hope.

Tolerated Crime and Tolerated Murder

On September 21, 1976, a sophisticated bomb killed former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and an American friend while they were driving to work down Washington’s fashionable Embassy Row.

Two weeks later, on October 6, a Cuban commercial airliner exploded in mid-air over the Caribbean, killing all 73 passengers on board.

Confessions in the latter case implicated Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, a Cuban emigré then living in Venezuela and a veteran of at least three anti-Castro plots with CIA and/or Mafia backing. Bosch, in turn, had participated enough in the planning of the Letelier assassination by Cuban exiles to give information leading to subpoenas for several former CIA Cuban proteges in the United States, one of whom has since been sentenced to jail for refusing to testify.

If past U.S. history is to repeat itself, the killers of Letelier, if they have not indeed been correctly identified as part of the CIA/Mafia milieu will not be sent to jail.¹ In 1943, the prominent Italian-American anti-fascist editor, Carlo Tresca, was murdered in the streets of New York. The case against New York Mafioso, Carmine Galante of the Bonanno family, might have seemed air-tight; he was under surveillance at that time, for parole violation, and thus was placed in the murder vehicle at the time and place of the killing. But he was not arrested or brought to trial and shortly after a leading anti-Communist informant for the FBI claimed to have learnt that the Communist Party was

¹ In fact three assassins were apprehended and served token sentences. The ringleader, Michael Townley became a federal witness and was given ten years with credit for time served; he was paroled some two years after sentencing. A U.S. Federal court also refused to extradite him to Argentina to stand trial for the murder of the Chilean General Prats. Two of his accomplices were initially given life sentences but these were thrown out on appeal; the two were subsequently acquitted of murder, though one, Guillermo Novo, was convicted, along with his brother, of perjury. A cynic might note that the case was only “solved” and Townley located, after Pinochet, under pressure from Carter and Chilean bankers, had begun to crack down on Townley’s employers, the Chilean secret police, DINA. Cf. John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982).

responsible for the killing.² Today – i.e. in 1977 – Galante is commonly referred to as the head of the United States' Mafia.

In 1956, a distinguished emigre scholar from the Dominican Republic, Jesus de Galindez, was kidnapped on the streets of New York and flown to his home country, where he was almost certainly murdered by order of his political enemy, the dictator Trujillo. In this case, a former FBI agent, John Joseph Frank (who had worked for the CIA as well as a Trujillo lobbyist) pleaded *nolo contendere* for his role in chartering the kidnap plane; he was let off with a \$500 fine. Ten years later *Life* reported that the plane had been chartered by Mafioso Bayonne Joe Zicarelli, another member and a 'fast' friend of Trujillo whom he had supplied with over \$1 million worth of arms.³

More recent revelations indicate that both killings have escaped adjudication because of their proximity to current intelligence-Mafia collaborations. We know now that by January 1943, when Tresca was killed, two U.S. intelligence services, OSS and ONI (Naval Intelligence) were in direct negotiation with Meyer Lansky for the provision of Mafia collaboration with the Allied invasion of Sicily. In exchange for this, Lucky Luciano would be released from jail by Governor Dewey and deported to his native Italy.

The underboss of Luciano's family, Vito Genovese, had already been deported to Italy and must have figured in the OSS-ONI-Mafia plans, since immediately following the U.S. occupation we find him running massive black market operations from his post as official translator for the chief of the Allied Military Government, a former senior Democratic politician and Lieutenant-governor from New York.

Recent Mafia histories report that the anti-fascist, Tresca, was killed by Galante on orders from Genovese, who was then running narcotics traffic from North Africa, with the blessing of Mussolini.⁴ Genovese was already wanted in the U.S. for another murder charge, yet when a young army CID captain arrested him, he was able to predict confidently that he would escape conviction. So he did – until new narcotics charges in 1958. The only witness in the murder case was conveniently murdered while in protective custody in a

² Guenther Reinhardt, *Crime Without Punishment: the Secret Soviet Terror Against America* (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), pp. 80-83.

³ *Life*, September 8 1967, p. 101.

⁴ Alfred W. McKoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972): pp. 22-23. I attempt a general overview of U.S. relations since World War 2 to the drug traffic, including Genovese, in my Foreword to Henrik Kruger, *The Great Heroin Coup* (Boston: South End Press, 1980), pp. 1-26.

Brooklyn jail.⁵ A vigorous prosecution of the Tresca case was even less likely than of the earlier murder case, since national security could easily rationalise the decision not to risk exposing any intelligence-Mafia contacts in court.

The same intelligence-Mafia background overshadows the Galindez affair. We now know that in 1961, when the U.S.-CIA shifted from Trujillo to those around him, three M1 carbines were provided by the U.S. Embassy, on CIA authority, to those who soon afterwards assassinated Trujillo. The recipient of the arms was one Antonio de la Maza, whose brother Octavio had been implicated in the Galindez killing (he was suspected in 1957 of murdering the pilot of the kidnap plane in Santa Domingo, in order to silence him).⁶ At this time, the CIA was in contact, through former FBI agent, Robert Maheu, with Mafia figures Sam Giancana, John Roselli and Santo Trafficante – in the hope of arranging the assassination of Fidel Castro. Trafficante, by most accounts at this time was succeeding Meyer Lansky in the role of chief organiser for the world heroin traffic, put together by Luciano, Lansky and Genovese after World War 2.⁷ A confidential White House memorandum of January 25, 1971, prepared one week after Jack Anderson's disclosure of Maheu's role in the CIA-Mafia plot, noted that Maheu "was a close associate of rogue FBI agent John Frank, generally believed to have engineered the assassination of Jesus de Galindez in New York City on March 12 1956, on behalf of the assassinated Rafael Trujillo."⁸

The memo's author, Jack Caulfield, was in a position to speak authoritatively. From 1955 to 1966 he served with the New York City Police Department's Bureau of Special Services (BOSS) where he was assigned to a number of political plots involving other countries.⁹

The foregoing facts suggest how embarrassing it would be to see court convictions of those close to this high level CIA-Mafia connection. Subsequent Justice Department initiatives to prosecute Maheu, Giancana and Roselli were frustrated by the invocation of their CIA immunity. We now know of an official CIA memo in 1962 informing that a pending prosecution of Maheu (and

⁵ Nicholas Gage, *Mafia, USA* (New York: Dell, 1972) pp. 157-8.

⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (henceforth cited as Church Committee) *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* – Senate Report No 94-465, 94th Congress. 1st. Session (November 20, 1975), pp. 200-06. Henceforth cited as *Assassination Report*.

⁷ McCoy (see note 4) pp. 54-55.

⁸ U.S. Congress. Senate, Watergate Hearings, Vol. 21, p. 9750.

⁹ J. Anthony Lukas, *Nightmare: the Underside of the Nixon Years* (New York: Viking, 1976), p. 14: Watergate Hearings, Vol.1, pp. 249-50

possibly Giancana) "would not be in the national interest".¹⁰

The third, and most powerful collaborator with Maheu, Santo Trafficante, has never faced indictment despite repeated indications that he has succeeded Lansky as the top organiser of the world heroin traffic.¹¹

One should not immediately conclude that the CIA-Mafia connection is unassailable, or the only relevant factor in US politics. A *New York Times* editorial called for vigorous prosecution in the Galindez case, just as the *Washington Post* has done recently in the Letelier case. Justice in the Tresca and Galindez killings was demanded repeatedly by U.S. socialist leader Norman Thomas, who himself enjoyed a CIA connection of sorts; just as Galindez had a special relationship to Thomas' "left" section of CIA (the International Organisations Division), while Frank and Maheu worked with the CIA's competing right-wing (Western Hemisphere and Security).

The CIA-Mafia-Narcotics Connection and the U.S. Press

The fact remains that prior to about 1970, the invocation of an alleged "national interest" seems to have protected those actively involved in the intelligence-Mafia connection from serious harassment by either the courts or the establishment press. (For the sake of verifiability we shall define the "establishment media" as including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, Time-Life, *Newsweek*, *Readers Digest* and the three major television networks). Since Watergate, and the dramatic collapse of the press-government anti-Communist consensus, it is possible that this relative immunity is no longer unassailable. First in conjunction with Vietnam, then in conjunction with Watergate and since around 1974 in conjunction with the CIA itself, the establishment press has begun to reveal marginal details of the post-war CIA-Mafia connection and even of its involvement in the post-war restoration of the world heroin traffic.

But the revelations of the past few years make the establishment media

¹⁰ *Assassination Report* (see note 6) p. 131; Peter Dale Scott, *Crime and Cover-Up* (Berkeley: Westworks, 1977), p. 22

¹¹ McCoy (see note 4) p. 55. Both CIA and drugs emerged in the background of those eventually arrested for the Letelier assassination. The CIA even admitted in court to have once given "preliminary security approval" to the use of Townley "in an operational capacity" in February 1971. At this time Townley was working in Chile with the para-fascist group Patria y Libertad (Dinges and Landau [see note 2] p. 373; cf. *infra* at footnote 102). His accomplices Alvin Ross Diaz and Guillermo Novo Sampol were arrested by Miami police in 1978 with a large plastic bag of white powder which they identified as cocaine. (Branch and Propper [see note 1] p. 529). Miami police wished to hold the pair on drug charges, but the FBI intervened. In 1976 CIA Director George Bush and nameless intelligence officials were reported as saying that the Chilean military junta had not been involved in the Letelier killing, but that "left-wing extremists" might have been. (Dinges and Landau [see note 2] pp. 242-252)

before 1970 appear guilty not merely of silence but of active collusion in disseminating false official cover-ups of the facts. Take, for example, the post-war development of new opium growing areas in non-Communist South-east Asia to replace fields which the Chinese revolution now denied to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. For two decades the most flagrant of official Thai and KMT involvement in this traffic, to say nothing of the US infrastructure support, was systematically downplayed by the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, with the necessary collaboration of the U.S. establishment media.¹²

The key figures in this official U.S. cover-up were U.S. Narcotics Commissioner, Anslinger – a Treasury official – and his West coast chief, George White, a former OSS official and CIA consultant who had represented OSS in the Operation Underworld negotiations with Meyer Lansky.

For years Anslinger would uncritically transmit KMT propaganda about a world-wide Red Chinese opium conspiracy and document it persuasively with evidence of what he knew very well was in fact the KMT's own narcotics traffic. Thus, Anslinger would use the term 'Yunnan Opium' to describe the opium grown under KMT auspices in Burma, Laos and Thailand; and would document the involvement of officials from the Bank of Canton, without noting that this was controlled by the Soong family of Taiwan.¹³

Supporting these misleading charges, George White announced, in 1959, the breaking of what was reported in the *New York Times* as "the biggest Chinese narcotics operation 'that we've come across'". White also spoke of 270 pounds of heroin "most of it from a vast poppy field near Chungking".¹⁴ Only in the local San Francisco papers, where the arrests and the trial occurred, did one learn that a key co-conspirator in the case (not prosecuted) was Chung Wing Fong, identified as a former official in Chinatown's powerful Six Companies (key overseas KMT supporters) and also of the Chinese Anti-Communist League here.¹⁵

The Chinese Anti-Communist League was, in fact, a U.S. branch of the KMT's world-wide intelligence network. Fong, a former President of the pro-KMT Hip Sing tong, had been spared arrest by timely U.S. Government intervention. When he visited Hong Kong in 1958 "the American consul in Hong Kong seized his passport and he was ordered to Taipei/Taiwan". He and others

¹² Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972) pp. 200-201

¹³ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary *Soviet Total War*, Hearings 85th Cong. pp 759-61: Peter Dale Scott, "Opium and Empire" in *Bulletin of Concerned Asia Scholars* (September 1973) pp. 49-56, at footnote 33.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, January 15, 1959, pp. 3-4

¹⁵ *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 15, pp. 1,4

were then named as unindicted co-conspirators “because they are out of U.S. jurisdiction”.¹⁶

White’s carefully worded but wholly misleading claims of a Chinese Communist (rather than anti-Communist) conspiracy were later supported in official Narcotics Bureau (FBN) reports by so-called “documentary evidence” which came from the pro-KMT defendants.¹⁷ Such elementary distortions by “responsible” officials of the true facts about the international heroin traffic were still being repeated as late as 1973, though they have since been officially refuted by the new Drug Enforcement Agency. The latest accusation against China was made by two veteran New York crime fighters, Frank Rogers – city-wide prosecutor of narcotics cases – and Brooklyn District Attorney, Eugene Gold at a press conference. Rogers showed reporters a plastic bag on which the words “Peoples’ Republic of China” were printed in English and Chinese.¹⁸ Needless to say, such distortions could never have succeeded if ‘responsible’ papers like the *New York Times* had not followed the Narcotics Bureau in suppressing the locally published facts about men like Chung Wing Fong.

What was at stake in these high-level cover-ups was nothing less than the CIA’s basic strategy for the containment of Communism in East and South-East Asia, which (as documents published with the Pentagon Papers have confirmed) relied heavily on the opium growing KMT troops of the Burma-Laos-Thailand border areas and their contacts with the pro-KMT secret societies in the overseas Chinese communities.¹⁹ Through its ‘proprietaries’ like Civil Air Transport (CAT) and Sea Supply Inc., the CIA had provided logistic support to the anti-Communist ‘assets’ in the region, whose profitable involvement in the narcotics traffic very soon took priority over their political responsibilities. No doubt the CIA branch responsible (the Office of Policy Co-ordination, or OPC) could rationalise its role in restoring the narcotics traffic in this area with the thought that it was merely prolonging a regional practice common both to the imperialist powers of Britain, France and Japan, and to the native rulers of Thailand and Kuomintang China.

¹⁶ *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 15, p. 4

¹⁷ U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Organised Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics*, Hearings, 88th Congress, 2nd Session (1964) p. 1131; cf. Federal Bureau of Narcotics, *Traffic in Opium* 1959, p. 26.

¹⁸ Frank Faso and Paul Meskil, *New York Daily News*, March 20, 1973; reprinted in Congressional Record, June 12, 1973, p. 19324.

¹⁹ *Pentagon Papers* (Gravel Edition) (Boston: Beacon, 1972), pp. 1, 366, 438; McCoy (see note 4) pp. 128, 139.

Protection for Intelligence Assets

In 1953-4, as the Eisenhower Administration faced growing KMT resistance to its proposed disengagement from Korea and Indochina, so also the CIA disengaged somewhat from its disreputable OPC proteges in Thailand as their opium trafficking became notorious. By 1959, Council on Foreign Relations spokesmen, backed by the influential CIA-backed Conlon Report, were even suggesting some kind of normalisation of relations with mainland China. This context of detente makes all the more remarkable the propaganda activities of the Narcotics Bureau and George White in the 1959 Hip Sing opium case. In effect, the FBN was covering up for the KMT-narcotics network overseas, even while attempting to crush its movement of heroin into the continental United States. Such a two-faced policy was probably impractical, in as much as in 1959 the world's only sizeable population of heroin addicts was in the U.S. It was, however, understandable in terms of national policy, if one recollects in 1959 all the leading anti-Communist U.S. proteges of the region – Ngo dihn Nhu of South Vietnam, Sarit Thanarat and Prapas Charusathien of Thailand and Phoumi Nosavan of Laos – were profiting in one way or another from the KMT narcotics traffic.²⁰

The fact remains that in 1959 the official U.S. position on the KMT troops was that it was no longer supplying them and therefore in no position to control their narcotics activities: the U.S. arms which Burma found at the KMT camps in 1961, still packed in boxes showing their trans-shipment through a Californian air force base, just weeks before, had gone first to Taiwan and then to Burma in a CAT-Air America plane leased by an affiliate of the KMT-Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League. This is a disturbing analogy with the present status of the former CIA Cubans operating around Orlando Bosch. Like the KMT troops, they too have now been officially disowned by the CIA because of their illegal activities and are now supported by other governments and intelligence agencies, most notably the governments of Chile, of Nicaragua and of the Dominican Republic.²¹ More specifically, a chief reason for the closing down of the last of the CIA's Miami station JM/ Wave operations – a counter intelligence operation under Joaquin Sangenis Perdomo, usually referred to by its original CIA name of Operation 40 – was because one of the group's CIA planes had been apprehended in the act of smuggling narcotics into the U.S..²²

Today, no one seems to deny the illegality of the CIA's domestic JM/Wave station in Miami, which employed from 300 to 700 U.S. agents and from 2,000

²⁰ McCoy (see note 4) pp. 142-143, 153, 259.

²¹ George Crile. CBS Broadcast, transcript, p. 30. Henceforth cited as CBS.

²² *New York Times*, January 5, 1975, p. 4.

to as many as 6,000 Cubans.²³ An Bill Moyers has noted, “seducing the press was critical” to JM/Wave’s maintenance in Miami; the CIA secured “explicit agreements with the press here to keep their secret operations from being reported, except when it was mutually convenient . . . It amounted to a massive conspiracy to violate the country’s Neutrality Acts and other federal, state and local laws as well”.²⁴

Assassins, Narcotics and Watergate

Seven years after the event, to its credit, the *New York Times* finally revealed a little of the story about the wind-up of the CIA’s Operation 40 because of its narcotics activities.²⁵ It did so as part of a series of stories exposing operations for which the CIA’s counter-intelligence chief, James Angleton, had been responsible; and Angleton himself has recently confirmed (to author Edward Jay Epstein) the published suggestions that these stories were being leaked by Angleton’s chief enemy within the agency, CIA Director, William Colby, as part of a successful campaign to force Angleton’s resignation.²⁶

What concerns us, as in the case of the KMT-Hip Sing narcotics case, is the refusal of the *New York Times* to tell the most significant features of the Operation 40 narcotics story:

(a) Operation 40, originally, at least, included professional assassins. According to the former *New York Times* reporter, Tad Szulc, it was originally designed by Sengenis as part of the Bay of Pigs planning “to assure that a post-Castro regime contained no trouble makers”, i.e. men opposed to Howard Hunt’s political protege, Manuel Artime.²⁷ (As political action officer for the Bay of Pigs operation, Hunt would almost certainly have been responsible for this phase of Operation 40). Szulc adds that “According to well informed Cubans, Operation 40 also had a second task; that of assassinating, if necessary, political leaders who stood in the way. It was reported that the project included a hand-picked task force of professional killers”.²⁸

(b) The *New York Times* failed to name the Bay of Pigs veteran who, in its words, “was part of the group and who was accused by the Federal authorities

²³ CBS; *New Times*, May 13 1977, p. 46

²⁴ CBS, p. 14

²⁵ *New York Times*, January 5, 1975, p. 4.

²⁶ Edward Jay Epstein. *Legend: the Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978), pp 272-274

²⁷ Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer. *The Cuban Invasion* (New York,:Ballantine, 1962), p. 95

²⁸ Tad Szulc and Karl E. Meyer (see note 27) p. 95

of being a large cocaine smuggler [and] was killed in a gun battle with the Miami police".²⁹ This was Juan Restoy, arrested in June 1970 as part of the Justice Department's "Operation Eagle", against what Attorney General Mitchell called "a nation-wide ring of wholesalers handling about 30% of all heroin sales and 75 to 80% of all cocaine sales in the United States".³⁰ Of the three Cuban ringleaders of this network, one had his conviction thrown out on a technicality, and the third, Bay of Pigs veteran Jorge Alonson Pujol y Bermudez, was eventually released and placed on probation.³¹

(c) Of the nine Cubans who came to Washington for the Watergate break-in of June 1972, at least four, and possibly all nine, had been members of the Sangenis counter intelligence phase of 'Operation 40'.

Bernard Barker testified that Felipe de Diego, who, with Barker and Rolando Martinez, had previously burgled the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist for Howard Hunt and the Nixon White House, "had been a member of Operation 40";³² this aspect of Barker's testimony was neither reported by the *New York Times* nor included in its transcripts of the Watergate Hearings. Other members of the Sangenis operation included Barker himself, who, according to Helms, was fired by the CIA when "we found out that he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements".³³ A third member was almost certainly Eugenio Martinez who, back in 1957, had been part of an anti-Batista assassination plot funded by former Cuba president Carlos Prio Socarras. In November 1963 Martinez skippered the ill-fated Rex mission from Florida against Cuba, a mission involving the Somoza family of Nicaragua.

To sum up, the *New York Times* systematically ignored or understated the involvement of Operation 40 in political assassinations, the world heroin network, and Watergate. Exactly the same can be said about the *Times* and entire establishment press coverage before this year: in all its thousands of words about the so-called "Plumbers" of Watergate itself, it never mentioned that the Nixon White House had recruited, for the ostensible purpose of combating the drug traffic, an illegal covert action team with links to organised crime and (through Operation 40) the drug traffic itself. At its peak the

²⁹ *New York Times*, January 5, 1975 p. 4

³⁰ *New York Times*, June 22, 1970, p. 1

³¹ Peter Dale Scott, Paul Hoch and Russell Stetler. *The Assassinations: Dallas and Beyond* (New York: Vintage, 1977), p. 395

³² Watergate Hearings, Vol.1, p. 375

³³ Bernard Fensterwald Jr. with Michael Ewing, *Coincidence of Conspiracy* (New York, Zebra, 1977), pp. 512, 551

Sangenis operation had some 150 Cubans; and we know now from a recent CBS news interview of Bernard Barker by Bill Moyers, that no less than 120 ex-CIA Cubans were recruited for Operation Diamond under the Hunt-Liddy "Plumbers Unit" at the White House.³⁴ This group included "people superbly trained in explosives" and "specialists in weapons": as Bill Moyers observed, it too was "a small secret army". Barker dissented from Moyers' allegations that Operation Diamond was preparing to perform political "kidnappings" and "assassinations", but only on semantic grounds: "there is a difference between assassination and killing . . . The word 'kidnap' sounds to me like a term used in law. Remember that I'm a CIA agent, CIA background. We neutralise these things. We don't think . . . in criminal terms".³⁵

According to the CBS-Moyers programme:

the secret army was not to be disbanded after Watergate. It was to be used in President Nixon's drug war, in Barker's words, "to hit the Mafia using the tactics of the Mafia".³⁶

Barker and his colleagues, meanwhile, hoped that their participation would help lead to the "liberation of Cuba".³⁷ He explained that the key to this liberation lay in helping Mr Hunt, "in the way where hundreds of Cubans have been helping [i.e. the CIA and the U.S. armed services] in Africa, in Vietnam and in other areas of the world." ³⁸

Domestic Repression and DEA Narcotics Enforcement

All this should be very disturbing. Liddy's own original plans for Operation Diamond, after it moved from the cover of White House narcotics enforcement to the Committee to Re-elect the President, also included political kidnappings and "men who have worked successfully as street-fighting teams at the CIA".³⁹ At that time, when San Diego was the projected Republican convention site, Liddy had proposed that Hunt recruit some "400 or 500 . . . Bay of Pigs veterans who were located in the southern California area"; Hunt actually obtained print-outs of the available veterans, from Brigade 2506 Veterans

³⁴ CBS p. 26

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Watergate Hearings, Vol. 1, p. 367

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 372

³⁹ John Dean, *Blind Ambition* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976), p. 81. Cf. Watergate Hearings, Vol. 2 p. 788

Association (the AVBC) in Miami.⁴⁰

These plans for organised governmental violence were by no means wholly forestalled by the timely exposure of Hunt's Cubans at the July 17 1972 Watergate break-in. Some of them have survived Nixon's fall from power and are today officially established under the guidance of narcotics control. To see how this could happen, however, we must look at the co-ordinated use of ex-CIA assets for 'black operations' which followed the Watergate arrests.

One Watergate-related Nixon horror never investigated by either the Ervin or the Church Committee was the use of Hunt's ex-CIA Cuban, Pablo Fernandez, as a provocateur planning to protest at the 1972 Republican Convention in Miami. Fernandez, who in May 1972 had been recruited by Hunt's aid Barker to 'get' Daniel Ellsberg at an anti-war rally in Washington – whether by merely punching him or possibly by more serious violence, is not clear. In June and July, under the overall guidance of Robert Mardian at the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, Fernandez, working with the Miami Police and the FBI, was recruited to offer machine guns to the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, in the hope that this would produce some sort of overt act of violence. A Miami police detective later confirmed to the Miami Herald that 'We were hoping for the overt act necessary to produce a charge of conspiracy'.⁴¹ The ensuing court case against Scott Camil and the other VVAW leaders saw apparent perjury by a Justice Department representative on the subject of government informants, and a break-in at the office of Camil's lawyer which (in the words of the *Times* correspondent, Anthony Lukas) is one of many unsolved break-ins which "may have been carried out by 'contract' operatives hired by the CIA".⁴²

Scott Camil himself, after being acquitted along with the other VVAW defendants, was reindicted after being first set up and then shot and almost killed by DEA narcotics agents. (The national establishment media, whose attention helped expose the false government testimony by the Nixon administration at the first trial, showed little interest in the second.) But Camil was only one instance where the government's expanded "war on drugs" was used, at least under Nixon, to harass selected political targets – and possibly in support of major CIA covert operations against countries like Cyprus,

⁴⁰ U.S. Cong. House Committee on Armed Services, *Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters*, Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session (1974) pp. 513-14. Henceforth cited as Nedzi Hearings.

⁴¹ Lukas (see note 9) pp. 167-88, 196; Steve Weissman (ed.) *Big Brother and the Holding Company* (Palo Alto, California: Ramparts, 1974), pp. 76-77

⁴² Lukas (see note 9) p. 37; Weissman (see note 41) pp. 78-81

Argentina, Lebanon and Chile.

It must be kept in mind that OSS and CIA has been using the connections of the international heroin traffic for covert operations virtually without interruption since "Operation Underworld" in 1943. At first these operations may have been tactical rather than strategic: to expel the Fascists and forestall the Communists in Italy, to break Communist control of the French docks during the first Indochina War, to support a string of anti-Communist puppets in Southeast Asia. But as a former CIA agent and publicist confirms, this intelligence-Mafia connection was seen as vitally important.

Nixon himself has left office, and the public style of his two successors has been visibly muted, but none of the repressive legislation which his administration put together for the silencing of dissent has been repealed; and indeed the Carter administration has taken up Nixon's demand for an Official Secrets Act which would provide criminal sanctions against future Daniel Ellsbergs.

CIA, DEA, and Their Assassination Capacity

It is true that on June 11, 1973, the Justice Department abolished the Intelligence Evaluation Committee which had co-ordinated the harassment of Camil in Miami, for which the special grand juries had collected political intelligence, and which had, in its first two months of existence alone "compiled computerised dossiers on nearly 14,000 Americans, including selected political officials and moderates".⁴³ The IEC was secretly terminated on June 11, 1973, or shortly after press accounts of Dean's highly-bowdlerised revelations concerning IEC which he was about to make to the Ervin Watergate Committee. Such evasive tactics do not mean very much in today's age of computerised intelligence. Revelations about Army surveillance of U.S. citizens before another of Senator Ervin's Committee in 1970 had led to the formal termination of that programme on June 9, 1970, which we now know was four days after White House planning had begun on the escalated Huston Plan which resulted in the IEC.⁴⁴ Public assurances that the Army's intelligence dossiers had been destroyed were misleading, if we are to credit subsequent reports that:

on 29 July 1970, the day after the President moved to reconsider the Huston Plan, army intelligence had given the entire print-out of its

⁴³ Church Committee, Hearings (1975) Vol. 2 p. 266 (Memo of June 11, 1973, from Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen). U.S. Cong. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Military Surveillance Hearings (1974) p. 221

⁴⁴ U.S. Cong., Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Federal Data Banks* Hearings (1970) p. 147

civilian surveillance computers to ISD (i.e. IEC in Mardian's Internal Security Division).⁴⁵

In like vein the CIA's new director, William Colby, as part of his reorientation of the CIA towards foreign targets, terminated, in 1974, the CIA's Operation Chaos for the surveillance of U.S. citizens in conjunction with the IEC (though when the Rockefeller Commission reported this fact 15 months later it noted that the Chaos "files and computerised index are still intact").⁴⁶ Two years earlier CIA director Helms, in response to U.S. press reports about CIA involvement in assassinations, had directed that "no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel".⁴⁷ But the official reports on both of these controversial operations ignore the relevant fact that a high level 1968 meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations of CIA veterans and their colleagues in the New York-CIA financial establishment had already agreed CIA operations had become too visible and too bureaucratic, and in future should be left, where possible, in the hands of "private organisations, many of the personnel of which would be non-U.S. . . . hands of third parties, particularly third country nationals".⁴⁸

A series of working groups to implement these proposals were officially recognised when Richard Nixon, in 1969, appointed Franklin Lindsay, a CIA veteran and chairman of the chief working group (as well as of the Rockefeller-financed Itek Corp.) to head up an advisory panel on reorganisation of the CIA.⁴⁹

In the ensuing years many of the key 1968 proposals were implemented by successive CIA directors, most notably the recommendation that the ageing CIA bureaucracy had become too large and should be dramatically cut back. In the context of this reversion to "unofficial cover", the March 1972 Helms injunction against assassination seems to have been a case of carefully locking the door of an already empty stable. Nine months earlier Lucien Conein, the CIA's case officer in the Diem assassination and a high level contact with the heroin trafficking Corsican Mafia, resigned from CIA, to be brought back at the

⁴⁵ Weissman (see note 41), pp. 58-9; cf. *New York Times*. April 2 1971, p. 25

⁴⁶ U.S. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Report pp. 148-9. Henceforth cited as Rockefeller Report.

⁴⁷ Assassination Report (see note 6), p. 282

⁴⁸ Council on Foreign Relations: "Intelligence and Foreign Policy" Discussion Meeting Report, January 8 1968 ("Confidential: Not for Publication"); reprinted in Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1974) pp. 381-398

⁴⁹ *New York Times Magazine*, April 17 1971

suggestion of his old OSS colleague Howard Hunt into the White House narcotics effort. There, Conein (by his own admission) supervised a special unit which would have the capacity to assassinate selected targets in the narcotics business.⁵⁰

A memo of late May 1972, drafted by Hunt's superior in narcotic matters, Egil Krogh, reports on what is apparently President Nixon's authorisation for the Conein assassination squad, with the staggering budget of \$100 million in non-accountable funds:

According to Krogh's detailed "Outline of Discussion with the President on Drugs", the President agreed to "forceful action in [stopping] International trafficking of heroin in the host country". Specifically the memorandum of the meeting noted, "it is anticipated that a material reduction in the supply of heroin to the U.S. can be accomplished through a \$100 million (over three years) fund which can be used for clandestine law enforcement activities abroad and for which BNDD would not be accountable. This decisive action is our only hope for destroying or immobilising the highest level of drug traffickers." . . . According to Krogh, this [flexible law enforcement . . . for clandestine activities] would be used for underworld contacts and disruptive tactics, with the eventual goal of destroying those deemed to be heroin traffickers.⁵¹

According to the *Washington Post* at least twelve other CIA operatives, all of them first-generation (i.e. naturalised) Americans, joined in this BNDD assassination squad.⁵²

In the fall of 1971:

Hunt also approached the Cuban exile leader, Manuel Artime, in Miami and – according to Artime – asked him about the possibility of forming a

⁵⁰ Edward J. Epstein, *Agency of Fear; Opiates and Political Power In America* (New York: Putnam's, 1977) p. 146; *Washington Post*, June 16, 1976. Hunt and Conein were both veterans of OSS operations in Kunming, China, the centre of the Yunnan opium traffic, as was Conein's 1970s business partner Hitch Werbell 3, a mysterious White Russian arms dealer who was indicted on a major drug smuggling charge in August 1976. (The case collapsed after the chief witness was killed (Kruger pp. 181-2). Werbell was later said to have been on the CIA payroll, paid through the notorious drug-related Australian Nugan Hand Bank (Penny Lernoux, *In Banks We Trust* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1984) p. 158). Two other veterans of this OSS post were Paul Halliwell who set up the drug-related Castle Bank for the CIA (Lernoux p. 79) and General John Singlaub, who visited his friend Werbell shortly before leaving the U.S. Army in 1978. (Hank Messick, *Of Grass and Snow* [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979] p. 84) Today General Singlaub is the president of WACL and perhaps the chief public fund-raiser for the Contras inside the United States.

⁵¹ Epstein, *Agency* (see note 50) pp. 142-3

⁵² *Washington Post*, June 16, 1976

team of Cuban exile hit men to assassinate Latin American traffickers still outside the bailiwick of United States law.⁵³

Arttime told other reporters that the anti-narcotics operations would take place in Panama (pinpointed after the arrest of the son of Panamanian Ambassador to Taiwan on July 8, 1971 – the day Hunt spoke to Conein in the White House) after Frank Sturgis independently told the press that in 1971 he had joined Hunt in an investigation of the drug traffic reaching the U.S. from Paraguay through Panama.⁵⁴

This lends strength to the recurring rumour that Hunt's narcotics activities included an assassination plan against the Panamanian President Torrijos, whose brother had been fingered by U.S. Customs commissioner Ambrose as a major heroin trafficker.⁵⁵

DEA, Crime and the Press Today

If these reports are true, we can reasonably conclude that the old CIA-organised crime connection, though technically banished from the CIA after Jack Anderson's exposure of it in January 1971, was still pursuing its old political objectives under White House narcotics cover in 1971-2, pending its intended integration into a new superagency, the Drug Enforcement Agency of July 1, 1973, which many observers have compared to a domestic CIA. Hunt and Arttime had both been associated with previous CIA assassination plots against Castro, who, at that time, had been named by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as the man behind the heroin trade of anti-Castro Cubans. Torrijos, too, was at least as much a political as a narcotics target: he and Chilean President Salvador Allende were the only heads of state to defy the CIA-enforced ban on friendly relations with Castro's Cuba. Barker and Arttime, as we have seen, had been allegedly dropped from the CIA for their involvement in criminal activities – the latter for smuggling activities from a Costa Rica base owned by Anastasio Somoza, the patron of Torrijos' current enemy Orlando Bosch. According to an FBI report on Frank Sturgis in 1972, when Hunt recruited him and Barker for Watergate "sources in Miami say that he is *now* associated with organised crime activities". (emphasis added)⁵⁶

⁵³ Epstein, *Agency* (see note 50). p. 144

⁵⁴ Scott *et al* *The Assassinations* p. 402. Sturgis claimed that "he undertook several missions for Hunt involving tracking narcotics" (Epstein *Agency* etc. p. 205n), and that Hunt had been involved in some assassination attempts that had succeeded. (*True*, August 1974)

⁵⁵ Andrew Tully, *The Secret War Against Dope* (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghagan, 1973) p. 139

⁵⁶ Fensterwald p. 506; L. Patrick Gray Hearings p. 47

When this FBI claim was made part of the highly publicised Senate Hearings in February 1973 on the nomination of L. Patrick Gray, the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, then locked in battle with Nixon, declined to report it. The press interviews with Artime and Sturgis about their anti-narcotics activities were likewise ignored at the time, as were all the growing indications that the White House, under the guise of anti-narcotics activities, had begun to assemble a secret parallel police, with an assassination potential, from former CIA assets dropped after the exposure of their associates in the narcotics traffic.

This reticence or resistance to expressing the criminal scope of Watergate was assuredly not inspired by a desire to protect President Nixon. It indicates, I believe, an understanding at high levels, that when right-wing CIA assets are formally “disposed of”, their potential usefulness to other employers should not be diminished. Take for example, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) itself which now employs somewhere between 50 and 100 CIA agents in addition to Conein and his twelve assassins.

Of all the “White House horrors” to come out of the so-called “plumbers” in Room 16, DEA is perhaps the most dangerous. A super-agency, whose very statutory authority is open to challenge, it has been plagued from the outset with serious charges of illegal behaviour, high-level corruption, and protection of Mafia figures in the narcotics traffic. Its first designated chief, Myles Ambrose, resigned before taking office in May 1973, after it was disclosed he had visited the Texas ranch of a suspected smuggler, Richard Harper, who was under indictment for an arms shipment aimed at the overthrow of the Castro government.⁵⁷ It was Ambrose, we should remember, who fingered the brother of the Cubans’ target, Omar Torrijos. His deputy and successor, John Bartels, either resigned or was fired after reports by a Congressional committee that he had been in the company of a suspected courier of narcotics to Washington from Laredo, the nearest city to the Harper Ranch.⁵⁸

Walter Minnick, the nominal author of ‘Reorganisation Plan No 2’ that produced DEA, was, with Hunt, Liddy and their superior, David Young, one of the four key figures in the so-called “Plumbers” at Room 16. It was Young, a former Rockefeller employee, who wrote the orders leading to the first Plumbers break-in at the office of Dr. Fielding (Ellsberg’s psychiatrist). It was Young and Minnick with whom John Ehrlichman discussed the Watergate break-

⁵⁷ *New York Times* May 12 1973, p. 12; cf. July 3 1972, p. 15

⁵⁸ U.S. Cong. Senate, Report No 94-1039, p. 110; Epstein *Agency* (see note 50) pp. 254-55

in and cover-up on the Monday morning after the break-in.⁵⁹ Yet Young, who authorised the break-in, escaped state prosecution for the Fielding break-in by co-operating in a pre-emptive federal indictment; while Minnick, throughout the thousands of words on the Watergate scandals, was never once listed in the index of either the *Washington Post* or the *New York Times*.

The same papers were either reticent or grossly misleading about activities which Hunt and Liddy performed, without Nixon's knowledge, on behalf of Intertel, the private intelligence group now controlling the Nevada casinos of the CIA-linked Howard Hughes organisation. Woodward and Bernstein of the *Washington Post* actually used a Hunt story given them by Robert Bennett, the Washington head of the CIA front and Howard Hughes PR firm where Hunt worked at the time, as part of their litany of "White House horrors"; even though the "horror" in question – an interview with one Clifton DeMotte about Edward Kennedy and Chappaquiddick – had been suggested to Hunt, not by the White House, but by Robert Bennett himself.⁶⁰

Senator Baker's Minority Report about this and other CIA aspects of Watergate was, in turn, grossly distorted by the *Post*.⁶¹ This is hardly surprising; the Baker Report revealed a CIA report from Bennett that Woodward was "suitably grateful" for the DeMotte and other "fine stories" which Bennett had been "feeding" Woodward; and also an arrangement between Bennett and attorney Edward Bennett Williams to "kill off" revelations of the CIA's relationship to Bennett's agency, the Mullen Company. Edward Bennett Williams, the lawyer who previously had done work for the CIA with his and their Mafia contact, Robert Maheu, was, at this time, both the attorney for the Democratic National Committee in their suit about Hunt's Watergate break-in, and also the attorney for the *Washington Post*.⁶²

In short, the *Washington Post* was not at arms length from the CIA-Howard Hughes-Intertel complex, whose involvement in the Watergate scandal was hardly indicated by their reporters' stories. In like manner, the *Washington Post* barely reported the Congressional revelations in 1975 about scandals in

⁵⁹ U.S. Cong. House Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings Pursuant to House Resolution 803 (Impeachment Hearings), Statement of Information, Book 2, p. 167.

⁶⁰ *Washington Post*, February 10 1973, p. 1: Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, *All the President's Men* (New York: Warner, 1975), pp. 230-81 "Minority Report on CIA Involvement Submitted at the Request of Senator Howard M. Baker Jr." (Baker Report, in *The Senate Watergate Report* (New York: Dell 1974). Vol. 1 pp. 737, 740; Nedzi Hearings (see note 40), pp. 1073-76.

⁶¹ *Washington Post*, July 4 1974

⁶² Baker Report (see note 60), pp. 737-40

DEA, where one of the agents scrutinised by the Jackson Subcommittee Report is one of the two agents (let us call them X and Y) said to have boasted widely inside DEA of their personal contact with – and plans to retire to – Intertel. The Jackson Subcommittee investigated the DEA for its improper favours to the Howard Hughes-Intertel interests and also to the Robert Vesco-IOF interests. Although these two supergroups have been depicted as competitors vying to acquire the same Paradise Island casino, the fact remains that both have had dealings with the CIA, and also with Cuban exile groups planning to oust Fidel Castro.⁶³

An even more critical article in *Playboy* about DEA, calling it an “American Gestapo”, describes how, in April 1974, a DEA intelligence team was ready to go on a major narcotics operation involving the flow of Mexican drugs to “a Las Vegas associate of [New York Mafia chief] Joseph Colombo”:

Instead . . . the agent in charge barked out a sharp dozen words or so and ordered the project dropped. “He informed us that he didn’t want us wasting our time on organised-crime probes, that the real problem was the Mexicans and we were to drop this.”⁶⁴

It would appear that the old CIA-Mafia narcotics connection was still alive and well in the new DEA, especially when we consider that (according to reliable sources) the responsible “agent in charge” was the same X (acting in conjunction with Y); that X had almost been forced to leave the Narcotics Bureau because of the scandals under his jurisdiction as New York Regional Director; and that X became the agent in charge of CIA veteran Lucien Conein and his assassination squad. The same sources say that the suspected courier who associated with DEA Director Bartels has also admitted to being “friends” with the suspected Mafia ringleader, the “Las Vegas associate of Joseph Colombo”.

Both inside and outside the U.S., narcotics enforcement is particularly susceptible to corruption. It is also inescapably a political matter, especially in those areas of covert intelligence and operations which, up to now, have been concerns of the CIA. It is undeniable that DEA has picked up at least one former CIA operation – that of training and equipping foreign police forces – after this was terminated by Congress in 1974. Congressional investigations had disclosed that the Office of Public Safety, responsible for those training programmes, had become involved in programs of torture and even wholesale assassination in Vietnam (Colby’s Operation Phoenix) and in Latin America. As

⁶³ U.S. Cong. Senate. Report No 94-1039

⁶⁴ Frank Browning “An American Gestapo”, *Playboy*, February 1976

a consequence of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, OPS and its some 400 positions in Latin America were abolished. The Act however, did not affect AID's new International Narcotics Program set up with CIA participation alongside OPS in mid-1971 – about the time that Conein and other CIA agents migrated from CIA to the Narcotics Bureau. A subsequent report by the General Accounting Office, investigating DEA and INC to see if Congressional intentions had been circumvented, disclosed in effect that:

(a) By Fiscal Year 1974 DEA had 400 agents in Latin America, or roughly the number of abolished OPS positions;

(b) police equipment transferred abroad under the INC jumped \$2.2 million in Fiscal Year 1973 to \$12.5 million in Fiscal Year 1974, almost exactly offsetting the decrease resulting from the abolition of OPS. Essentially, the same equipment was being forwarded to the same units: the chief change was in the name of the authorisation.

As State Department Narcotics adviser Sheldon Vance testified in 1976, the U.S. maintains no control over the disposition which the receiving country will make of the equipment and trainees. In fact, from Mexico to Argentina, receiving countries – following the example of Richard Nixon in the United States – have not hesitated to use narcotics aid to deal with domestic insurgency, by the simple expedient of identifying insurgents with narcotics. In May 1974, at a special press conference to publicise the stepped-up U.S.-Argentine anti-narcotics program, Argentine Security Chief Lopez Rega announced (in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill):

We hope to wipe out the drug traffic in Argentina. We have caught guerillas after attacks who were high on drugs. Guerillas are the main users of drugs in Argentina. Therefore, the anti-drug campaign will automatically be an anti-guerilla campaign as well.

Soon afterwards, a visiting DEA team held training seminars for 150 Argentine policemen, while the Argentine penal code was amended to give the Federal Police direct nation-wide jurisdiction to make investigations and arrests in narcotics-related cases.⁶⁵ The latter development, if not the former, seems to have been important to the development of Lopez Rega's dreaded "death squads" of 1974-5, the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA). Like the White House Cubans, these squads specialised in extra-legal kidnappings and murders. Dozens and perhaps hundreds of leftists were killed by the AAA before Lopez Rega, whose responsibility was established by an Argentine

⁶⁵ Michael Klare, *The Logistics of Repression* (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1977) *passim*.

Congressional investigation, was forced to leave the country as a fugitive in the Fall of 1975.

Drugs and Parafascism: Orlando Bosch and Christian David

All this has a very direct bearing on the career of Orlando Bosch, who boasts of having collaborated with the AAA in the murder of two Cuban diplomats as late as August 1976.⁶⁶ It is quite possible that this collaboration was facilitated through the international narcotics traffic, since both Lopez Rega and Bosch, along with other high-level security figures in Latin America, have been accused of financing their anti-Communist activities in part through cocaine.⁶⁷ Bosch's daughter and son-in-law, Miriam and Carlos Rogers, were arrested in June 1977 on charges of smuggling cocaine, while his other son-in-law, Ruben Blinder, is said to be a member of the AAA. In 1975 a provincial Argentine investigation into a cocaine estancia near the Bolivian border, which was said (by the admittedly hostile Argentine military intelligence) to have involved Lopez Rega and his son-in-law, was frustrated by a timely federal intervention.

CIA defector Philip Agee has charged that the Brazilian dictatorship, established with U.S. encouragement and participation in 1964, was, in turn, responsible for the spread of fascism to Bolivia in 1971, Uruguay in February 1973, and Chile in September 1973.⁶⁸ Recent French books report that in this same general period former French members of the anti-Gaullist Secret Army (OAS), along with their opposite numbers from the pro-Gaullist *barbouzes*, worked for the security forces of Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay ... and Venezuela and Argentina, where the Peronists returned to power in May 1973. Among the rewards sought by these men were diplomatic passports, for some of these Frenchmen were working simultaneously as part of the international Ricord narcotics network.⁶⁹

One key figure in this network was Christian David, of whom a U.S. account blandly notes "reports that he infiltrated Uruguay's Tupamaro guerillas and identified several for the police".⁷⁰ French accounts add that David, based in Argentina and possessing an Argentine diplomatic passport in the name of Carlos Eduardo Devreux-Bergeret, also collaborated regularly with the Argentine and Brazilian political police in conjunction with the French

⁶⁶ *New Times*, May 13 1977, p. 48

⁶⁷ *Latin America*, December 19, 1975. *New Times* May 13 1977

⁶⁸ Philip Agee, *Inside the Company; CIA Diary* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975) p. 585

⁶⁹ Alain Jaubert *Dossier D...comme drogue* (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1973); Patrice Chairoff, *Dossier B... comme barbouzes* (Paris: Alain Moureau, 1975)

⁷⁰ *Newsday*, *The Heroin Trail* (New York: New American Library, 1974) p. 155.

intelligence service.⁷¹ An encyclopaedic study of David by the Danish journalist Henrik Kruger speculates that David's activities (which also included projects in Venezuela and Bolivia) were also co-ordinated with CIA, noting that CIA-OPS agents Dan Mitrione and Claude Fry were advising the anti-Tupamaro effort.⁷²

In Argentina David worked under the direction of the OAS veteran Francois Chiappe, another member of the Ricord gang.⁷³ In 1972 Chiappe and David were both arrested in BNDD's crackdown on the Ricord network; Chiappe, however, was liberated "by error" when the Peronistas came to power in Argentina with the election of Hector Campora in May 1973. Shortly afterwards, under the command of Lopez Rega's close subordinate Colonel Jorge Osinde, Chiappe and Colonel Gardes, another OAS veteran, took part in the Ezeizi airport massacre of June 20 1973.⁷⁴ The same article that explored Lopez Rega's links to the cocaine traffic claimed that the cocaine moved north from the Salta estancia to Paraguay, the former headquarters of Ricord, where "one of Lopez Rega's closest allies, Colonel Jorge Sinde, became Ambassador". The cocaine there was handled by General Andres Rodriguez, who, according to Jack Anderson, was one of the three top Paraguayan officials who had worked directly with Ricord.⁷⁵

Post-war Nazi Networks and the United States

The evidence, in short, suggests that while individuals like David, Chiappe and Ricord can rise and fall, the connection in Latin America between narcotics and para-legal repression is an old and enduring one. In its post-war phase it can be traced to the exfiltration to Latin America of wanted Nazi war criminals and their collaborators. Ricord himself, arriving in Paraguay via a Nazi escape route, had been one.⁷⁶ Originally arriving in Latin America thanks to networks like Die Spinne with the collaboration of such eminences as Gustav Frupp von Bohlen and Vatican titular Bishop Alois Hudal, a few of these in situ anti-Communist "assets" turned to narcotics and gun running.⁷⁷ Of these, a ringleader was the wanted Nazi mass murderer Klaus Barbie, alias Altmann,

⁷¹ Chairoff (see note 69) p. 42; cf. Jaubert (see note 69) p. 291

⁷² Subsequently published as Henrik Kruger *The Great Heroin Coup* (Boston: South End Press. 1980) p. 78.

⁷³ Jaubert (see note 69) p. 290

⁷⁴ Kruger (see note 72) p. 113

⁷⁵ Jack Anderson, *Washington Post* May 24 1972; in Jaubert (see note 69) , p. 281

⁷⁶ Ladislav Farago, *Aftermath* (New York: Avon, 1975) pp. 204-211, 370, 467

⁷⁷ Farago p. 467

who prospered in Bolivia until 1972 as the business partner of the Admiral in charge of Bolivia's "navy". Ricord's Latin American traffics were associated with the Barbie-Schwend Nazi narcotics gun running network, which in turn had been financed by illegal wartime Nazi operations.⁷⁸ Author William Stevenson has charged that "the normal police investigative agencies of Britain and the United States" were "hamstrung" in their pursuit of this illicit network: "it seemed as if the bureaucrats, the Establishment intelligence agencies, and the departments concerned with foreign affairs had intervened".⁷⁹

The key to this Allied protection of post-war Nazi networks, Stevenson shrewdly surmised, was the U.S. decision in 1945 to take over and subsidise the Nazi intelligence network of General Reinhard von Gehlen. Gehlen in turn helped place numerous former Nazis as his agents in other countries, some (like Barbie) as employees of import-export firms established by his own agency, others as local representatives of Krupp, Daimler-Benz and other large West German firms. The Gehlen network, financed by the CIA but not directly controlled by it, soon had agents employed in a number of activities in violation of U.S. law, from illegal arms sales and narcotics trafficking (the two often going together) to murder.

When the Gehlen Org became the West German Intelligence Service in 1956, CIA support, though not terminated, was drastically reduced.⁸⁰ And, as a rule, the CIA has not exercised direct operational control over the Gehlen Org's ex-Nazis. Instead, the relationship, to the satisfaction of all concerned, has become more complex and inscrutable. For example, in the 1945-50 period, the U.S. State Department generally – in contrast to some of its more powerful members, such as Ambassador Adolf Berle and then Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller – was opposed to Juan Peron, the most important patron in Latin America of the ex-Nazi Spinne network.⁸¹

U.S. opposition to networks of ex-Nazis like Barbie and Ricord appeared to be unrelenting in the period of 1970-72, when Nixon, with important help from the CIA, pressured and eventually destroyed the Ricord network of French

⁷⁸ William Stevenson, *The Bormann Brotherhood* (New York: Bantam, 1974) p. 195, Jaubert (see note 69) p. 285

⁷⁹ Stevenson, p. 195. I make a much stronger case for U.S. intelligence involvement in the exfiltration of the SS to Latin America in 'How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other' in *Covert Action Information Bulletin* No 25 .

⁸⁰ E. H. Cookridge, *Gehlen: the Spy of the Century* (New York: Random House, 1971) pp. 287-288

⁸¹ Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976) pp. 234-43

Corsican drug traffickers in Latin America. But even the Ricord crackdown, so often recounted by Customs and BNDD flacks as proof of U.S. determination and success in the war against drugs, has been seen in other countries as an effort to gain control over the drug traffic, not to eliminate it. Even the respectable French newspaper *Le Monde* has charged bluntly that the arrest of Ricord and his Corsican network, which had become highly competitive with the U.S. Mafia, was due to a "close Mafia-police-Narcotics Bureau collaboration" in the United States, the result of which was to shatter Corsican influence in the world-wide narcotics traffic, and create a virtual monopoly for the U.S. Italian Mafia connections (whose key figures were Santos Trafficante in America and Luciano Liggio in Europe).⁸² An authoritative French book on the drug traffic has added that the fall of Ricord, for which "the Mafia was possibly responsible" followed a campaign by an Italian representative of the Miami Mafia, Tomasso Buscetta, to regain control of the runaway Ricord operation.⁸³

Though *Le Monde's* alarming accusation has been passed over in silence by the responsible U.S. press, it is in fact partly confirmed by *Newsday's* Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *The Heroin Trail*. *Newsday* notes that Buscetta "was ordered by the Mafia to go to South America", where he acted as "the representative of Luciano Liggio".⁸⁴ *Newsday* adds that "Buscetta was ordered out of the U.S. as an undesirable by the Justice Department in 1970"; it does not mention that Buscetta had earlier been released from a U.S. jail "through the direct intervention of an [Italian] Christian Democrat MP".⁸⁵ In both countries, it would appear, Buscetta had powerful connections.

According to the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, the elimination of the Ricord network by Nixon and the BNDD in late 1972 was promptly followed by the establishment of a new Latin American drug network with international fascist connections, under the leadership of Alberto Sicilia Falcon, a Cuban exile. When arrested by Mexican police in 1975, as the chief of Mexico's largest heroin ring, Sicilia told police that he was a CIA protege, trained at Fort Jackson as a partisan in the secret war against Cuba. According to Mexican authorities, he was also working in Chile against the socialist government of Salvador Allende until he returned to Miami in early 1973. He also told the Mexican police of a special "deal" with the CIA. They eased his way for heroin

⁸² *Le Monde* June 17-18 1973, pp. 11-12. (I discuss this in *Kruger* [see note 72] pp. 2-4.)

⁸³ Jaubert (see note 69) pp. 292-93

⁸⁴ *Newsday, Heroin Trail* (see note 70) pp. 154, 158

⁸⁵ *Newsday* (see note 70) p. 153; Gaia Servadio, *Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Day* (New York: Delta, 1976) p. 145

shipments and, in return, his organisation smuggled weapons for terror-groups in Central America – groups whose activities forced their governments to be more dependent on U.S. aid and advice. He built up his ring in less than two years, and as the daily Mexican *El Sol de Mexico* said: “How could he do that without help from a powerful organisation?”

Falcon started to create his huge ring in 1973, and the Mexican police started to watch his operations from the beginning of 1975. He was operating from a house in Cuernavaca, 50 miles south of Mexico City. Almost daily he had long visits from one of his neighbours, and the Mexican police decided to find out the identity of the visitor who was trying to hide his face under large hats and behind sunglasses. One day agents got hold of a bottle which had been in the hands of the visiting neighbour. They sent the bottle to the FBI and the answer was quick – the man was Sam Giancana. Falcon was arrested and Giancana sent back to the U.S. where he was killed one year after his return. In Sicilia Falcon’s house the Mexican police found papers from two Swiss banks telling that Falcon had \$260 million in the bank. In April 1976 Falcon and three of his top gang members escaped jail through a 97-meter tunnel, dug by outsiders and lit up with electric light. Three days later Falcon was caught again. According to *Der Spiegel* he told his full story under torture-like conditions, and, after spelling it out, he said he was afraid that the CIA would kill him. He demanded to be brought to an isolated cell under special guard in the newest prison ‘Reclusorio Norte’. ⁸⁶

If *Der Spiegel*’s charges are correct. they suggest a possible explanation for *Playboy*’s disturbing charges that DEA officials close to Intertel (and hence, it must be said, to the CIA), were shielding a Mafia higher-up in the Mexican heroin connection (a man who coincidentally happened to have graduated, like Sam Giancana, from the Chicago Mafia). It would appear that in the mid 1970s, as in the 1940s, the U.S. turned for help in combating the Left to the milieux of right-wing para fascist gangsterism (such as the Aginter Press – of whom more shortly) and of narcotics. Indeed, the more closely we look at the evidence, the more such disturbing alliances appear to have been, not just occasional, but virtually continuous.

Even if we ignore the *Der Spiegel* story, there are many indications that the United States has repeatedly used, and hence encouraged, the para fascist successors (such as Aginter Press) of the Nazis who escaped after World War 2

⁸⁶ *Der Spiegel* May 9 1977; Kruger (see note 72) pp. 177-80. For the DEA version see U.S. Cong. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Illicit Traffic in Weapons and Drugs Across the United States – Mexican Border* Hearing, 95th Cong., 1st Session (January 12 1977). pp. 10-19, where Sicilia Falcon is misleadingly called ‘a Cuban national’, his exile residence in Miami being suppressed.

to Latin America. On the surface the opposite might appear to be the case, since the global U.S. interest in multinational trade and capital movements has tended to oppose post-war variants of fascism as a state ideology – most notably Peronism in Argentina. But where Communism – either indigenous or international – is feared, para-fascism, even where mistrusted by the U.S. as a form of government, has still been supported and used by the CIA as an ‘asset’ or resource.

The Case of Otto Skorzeny

The key figure in the post-war organisation of Nazi remnants was S.S. Major Otto Skorzeny, acting in collaboration with his close war-time colleague and personal friend, General Reinhard von Gehlen. First, Gehlen made a deal in 1946 with U.S. intelligence leaders like General Donovan and Allen Dulles, transferring his former anti-communist Nazi intelligence network to the future CIA. (The financial details were allegedly arranged by Walter Reid Wolf, a Citybank official on loan to CIA, who made similar arrangements in 1951 for the CIA’s Air America Inc..) Then Skorzeny was acquitted at a brief trial at Nuremberg, when his U.S. defence attorney produced a British army officer (actually a secret service agent) who testified that what Skorzeny had done (i.e. shoot prisoners), he would have done also. Although Skorzeny faced further charges in Denmark and Czechoslovakia, he was allowed to walk away from his prison camp. He soon found a berth in Peron’s Argentina, “amply supplied with Krupp money”.⁸⁷ By 1950, when Gehlen was functioning at Munich on a CIA budget, Skorzeny had opened an “unconventional warfare” consultancy under cover in Madrid, the post-war home of his father-in-law Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht, the banker who, with Gustav Krupp, had delivered levies from German industry to Hitler’s Reich leader Martin Bormann, had likewise been acquitted at Nuremberg and protected by the British from serving an independent eight year sentence for his Nazi activities. As a Krupp sales representative, Skorzeny became an influential figure in, first, Argentina, and then in Franco’s Spain – especially after he and Schacht (another Krupp representative) negotiated “the biggest post-war deal between Spain and Germany, for the delivery in 1952 of \$5 million worth of railway stock and machine tools”.⁸⁸

In this period Skorzeny lectured at Spanish universities on the “new warfare” that would turn to such techniques as “assassinations and

⁸⁷ Farago (see note 76) p. 370. C.f. Glenn B. Infield, *Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando* (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1981)

⁸⁸ Stevenson (see note 78) pp. 151/3, 173

kidnappings".⁸⁹ His offer to recruit a foreign legion of ex-Nazis to aid the Americans in Korea was vigorously supported in the United States by those elements in the Spain-China lobby – many of them right-wing Catholics – who later would support similar proposals from the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League. Though these offers were not publicly accepted by the U.S., some Gehlen and KMT personnel, from about 1950, began to train what became the U.S. Special Forces, as well as the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs.

Following the rise of Nasser to power in 1952-53, with CIA support, Nasser asked his CIA contact, Kermit Roosevelt, for help in reorganising the Egyptian intelligence services. Roosevelt wired Dulles; Dulles approached Gehlen; Gehlen suggested Skorzeny; and Skorzeny accepted when the CIA agreed to supplement his modest Egyptian salary. He did so partly on the urging of Schacht, who himself went to Indonesia as an advisor to Sukarno and advance man for Krupp.⁹⁰

The consequences of this CIA favour to Nasser and the Nazis were to be widespread and long term. Skorzeny left Egypt after about a year, but he left behind him about 50 former S.S. and Gestapo men, many of them recruited from Argentina and neighbouring countries by Skorzeny's Nazi colleague in Buenos Aires, Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel. Among these was the chief post-war theorist of Nazism in Latin America, Peron's friend, Johannes von Leers, a wanted war criminal who, like Rudel, had escaped to Argentina with Vatican help. After the fall of Peron, Von Leers temporarily left his Argentina Nazi paper *Der Weg* and, under the alias of Omar Amin, directed Nasser's propaganda against Israel. His assistant in this work was another former member of Goebbels' propaganda ministry, Dr. Gerhardt Harmut von Schubert, who later moved on to a similar task in Iraq.⁹¹

Skorzeny's legitimisation by the CIA at Cairo gave him new status in the countries which had to worry about American public opinion: Germany, South Africa and Spain. German Chancellor Adenauer and General Gehlen (still on the CIA payroll) could now lend active support to Skorzeny's private political warfare agency in Madrid, along with right-wing German businessmen in the post-war Circle of Friends.⁹² At the same time, as former CIA agent Miles Copeland wrote in 1969, Skorzeny "to this day remains on the best of terms . .

⁸⁹ Stevenson (see note 78), p. 153.

⁹⁰ Cookridge (see note 80) pp. 352/3; Stevenson, p. 154

⁹¹ Stevenson (see note 78) pp. 157-61; Chairhoff (see note 69) p. 58; Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 102-105

⁹² Stevenson (see note 78) pp. 162, 168

. with the American friends who were instrumental in getting him to Egypt in the first place".⁹³ One of these friends, apparently, was, as we shall see, his fellow arms salesman and veteran of CIA operations in Egypt, Kermit Roosevelt.

Fascism and Parafascism

In 1939 Britain and the United States were forced into fighting German Nazism, an aggressive ideological movement for political expansion and mercantilist autarky, which threatened the alternative Anglo-Saxon system for world trade and investment. Skorzeny himself, like his father-in-law Hjalmar Schacht, steered relatively clear of post-war political fascist movements. His self-perceived role, and that which made him useful to his British and American friends, was not as a fascist politician but as a parafascist mercenary asset, analogous to those German Freikorps leaders employed by German industrialists in 1919 to murder Communist activists, but unlike them, active in the transnational arena.

Let us adumbrate this distinction. Fascism is a fully-fledged political movement, marked by a demagoguery, a mass party, the cult of violence, and a militant ideology emphasising nationalism and militarism against both bourgeois democracy and its concomitant, international capitalism.⁹⁴ Parafascism, which in Germany -but not Italy- preceded Fascism, is content to operate covertly, without ideological fanfare or grass-roots organisation; to destroy its Communist opponents by those same techniques of organised violence – above all murder – which fascist ideology eulogises. Fascism aspires to autonomous political power: parafascism, at least in the short run, is a service, often remarkably apolitical, to protect the power of others. Especially since World War 2, traditional fascism has tended to be anti-American, and opposed to the global reach of transnational banks and corporations – the very forces which parafascists like Skorzeny and his disciples, as well as Orlando Bosch, have been only too happy to serve.

It follows that, at least in the short run, parafascism rather than fascism is the current danger to democracy and human values. Parafascism rather than fascism can be said to have murdered Orlando Letelier, even though of all the feuding anti-Castro factions, that of the suspected Novo brothers (the MNC or Christian Nationalist Movement) was the only one to claim an explicitly authoritarian ideology.

⁹³ Copeland (see note 91) p. 105

⁹⁴ Stuart J. Woolf, *European Fascism* (New York, Random House, 1969) p. 342; Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds) *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York, Basic Books, 1970) p. 341

But the distinction between fascism and para-fascism is less clear in practice. Reliance on the tolerated crimes of organised para-fascist gangsters is an inimical alternative to democratic procedure, not a supplement to it. Perhaps its most immediate result is to force a determined left-wing movement into mimetic violence and terrorism. It may even desire this, since a militant movement relying on small arms and specialists in the use of them is, as we saw in the case of the Uruguayan Tupamaros, all the more prone to penetration by para-fascists like Christian David.

Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and now Thailand are all countries where, in the last 15 years, para-fascism has been followed by the fascist overthrow of democracy. Reliance on para-fascist assets in Europe has, as we shall see, led to the establishment of a shadowy but credible *Internacional Fascista* there. So para-fascism is not merely abhorrent in itself, and a threat to exposed individuals like Letelier. In so far as it appears to represent part of a world-wide trend towards fascism, it represents a threat to democracy, even in the United States.

Transnational Para-fascism and the CIA

In its search for disciplined criminal operators, the CIA originally drew upon narcotics traffickers, notably the Italian networks of Luciano in Marseilles (1948-50). Later the CIA drew on the French gangsters employed for penetration and assassination purposes by Colonel Pierre Fourcald of French intelligence (SDECE). (The CIA already knew Colonel Fourcald from its collaboration with his *Service Action Indochine* – a special warfare operation financed by the sale of opium to the world-wide Corsican networks.)⁹⁵ It is rumoured in Europe that QJ/WIN, “the foreign citizen with a criminal background”, who was recruited by the CIA in Europe to assassinate Congolese independence leader Patrice Lumumba, was none other than the famous French heroin financier and SDECE assassin, Joe Attia, who Fourcald once defended as “an absolutely extraordinary agent”.⁹⁶

But the relationship between the CIA and Skorzeny’s para-fascist services became more complicated in the 1960s, as democracies disappeared in South America while the world’s major powers and industries competed fiercely in the rest of the third world, using whatever covert resources were available. As Skorzeny approached retirement, in Spain his place was taken by his former Egyptian subordinate Dr. Gerhardt Hartmut von Schubert, who slowly

⁹⁵ Claude Paillat, *Dossier secret de l’Indochine* (Paris, Presses de la Cite, 1964) p. 266

⁹⁶ Assassination Report (see note 6), pp. 43-45; Kruger (see note 72) p. 43; *Newsday* (see note 70) pp. 110, 123 (The rumoured QJ/Win-Attia identification is no longer generally credited; some of his close associates are still suspects.)

developed a small international squad of commandos, the so-called Paladingruppe, from former French Foreign Legionnaires, paratroopers and *barbouzes*.⁹⁷ The successive tumult of French politics supplied him and other similar services with waves of recruits whose proven capacity for violence was no longer desired at home. Thus the former anti-Gaullists of the OAS were joined by their one-time mortal enemies, the counter-terrorist *barbouzes* of Foccart's Service d'Action Civique. (SAC).

Clients for Von Schubert's Paladins ranged from the West German firm Rheinmetall to the Greek intelligence service (KYP) under the ambitiously fascist junta of the Greek colonels which lasted from April 1967 to July 1974. The KYP, which the CIA originally organised and always remained close to, played a major role – along with Exxon and its Greek-American partner Tom Pappas – in the 1967 coup. The KYP, always in collaboration with the CIA, then expanded its activities tenfold in the other countries of Southern Europe where democracy was weak or non-existent – Italy, Spain and Portugal.⁹⁸

In the case of Italy the KYP became involved in fascist (MSI) plotting against the slowly decaying Christian Democratic government. So did the CIA, according to revelations in the suppressed House Congressional Report on Intelligence – the so-called Pike Report – whose unprecedented suppression has itself been attributed to the domestic political strength of the CIA.⁹⁹ The Pike Report revealed that the U.S. Ambassador in Rome had channelled CIA money to Vito Miceli, chief of the Italian intelligence (SID), for distribution to right-wing groups. Miceli was subsequently arrested for his role in the KYP-supported coup of Prince Valerio Borghese, the fascist MSI leader, in December 1970.¹⁰⁰

The CIA's subsidy to Miceli, like its efforts in 1970 to foment a military coup against Chilean President-elect Allende, can be construed as a culmination of previous support to fascist and para-fascist groups in more marginal democracies, but it is important to discern what was new in these intrigues. In contrast to the role of the CIA in the coups of Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1975) and Greece (1967), the CIA under Nixon had never before intervened so directly on behalf of privilege against an established democracy. Retired CIA spokesman, David Phillips, in exculpating his own role in the 1970

⁹⁷ Kruger (see note 72) pp. 209-210; Chairoff (see note 69) pp. 58-59

⁹⁸ Frederick Laurent, *L'Orchestre Noir* (Paris, Stock, 1979) pp. 238-243, 327-329; Chairoff (see note 69) pp. 58-59

⁹⁹ The Pike Report, as a result of having been leaked prematurely by a friendly or hostile source to the *Village Voice*, was then suppressed by a vote of the House.

¹⁰⁰ Servadio (see note 85) pp. 258-259, 261; Laurent (see note 98) pp. 244-257

anti-Allende operation, has blamed it on Richard Nixon – neglecting to mention that the CIA drew on U.S. contacts with the Chilean Right (particularly the military) which had been carefully cultivated over a period of years and which were continued, in fact intensified, up to the successful military coup of September 1973.¹⁰¹

The U.S., Chile and the Aginter Press

In particular the CIA had subsidised a right-wing conspiratorial Chilean parafascist group – Patria y Libertad, headed by former CIA contacts like Julio Duran – which received special counter-revolutionary training from former French OAS operatives close to the Skorzeny – von Schubert Paladingruppe. These operatives were then part of the Lisbon-based Aginter Press, a cover for a world-wide network of counter-terrorist services, which functioned chiefly out of the old Portuguese colonies. Some of these Aginter operatives, including an American, Jay Sablonsky, had already taken part with former CIA Cubans and U.S. Green Berets in the great Guatemalan counter-terror of 1968-71, when some 50,000 people are estimated to have been killed. Aginter Press operatives were also present in Chile for the September 1973 coup.¹⁰²

The Portuguese coup of April 1974 forced the Aginter Press OAS operatives to abandon Lisbon (and their files) abruptly. Some of these French rightists plotted vainly with right-wing General Spínola against the Portuguese centrists who enjoyed the support of President Ford's State Department. Their strategy envisaged an independent Azores, which would then function as an offshore base for covert operations against the Portuguese mainland and elsewhere.

The plan failed, but not before it had demonstrated the ability of the OAS plotters to establish contacts with the staffs of U.S. Senator, Strom Thurmond, and with a businessman enjoying contacts with the Gambino Mafia family, with the CIA, and with two of the Cuban exiles questioned by a grand jury in connection with the killing of Orlando Letelier. Meanwhile, other Aginter operatives, including their leader Yves Guérin-Serac, had escaped to the Paladingruppe headquarters in Albufera, Spain, and thence to Caracas, the present headquarters of Orlando Bosch. Their travel was facilitated through fresh passports supplied via the French parallel police (SAC) networks of their long-time collaborator Jacques Foccart.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York, Atheneum, 1977), pp. 220-23; Church Committee, Hearings, Vol. 7 p. 186.

¹⁰² Kruger (see note 72) pp. 10-11, 207-212; Laurent (see note 98) pp. 160-63 (cf fn 11)

¹⁰³ Kruger (see note 72) pp. 20-22, 213-215

After Watergate: the Chilean-Cuban Exile Alliance

There is no doubt that the decline and fall of Richard Nixon in 1973-4, along with the flood of revelations which washed him out of office, meant – at least in the short run – a weakening of U.S. support for reaction overseas. After the Chilean bloodbath of September 1973 the tide turned briefly the other way, as a paralysed Washington did nothing to prevent the fall of Caetano in Portugal (April 1974) and of the Greek colonels (July 1974). By early 1976, following the death of Franco in Spain and the Lebanese civil war, it appeared that the organised headquarters of multinational parafascism (Aginter Press and the Paladingruppe) might be driven from the Iberian peninsula to scattered points in Latin America and Africa.

Likewise, the hopes of the Cuban exiles seemed much dimmer after the resignation of the U.S. president who, years before, had arranged for the Bay of Pigs; who had used Artime, the alleged would-be assassin of Castro and Torrijos, to launder the White House Watergate defence money; and whose close friend, Bebe Rebozo, was directly involved with Cuban exiles prominent in both the efforts to reoccupy Cuba and the international narcotics traffic. All through 1976 the FBI and Miami police moved increasingly to crack down on right-wing Cuban terrorism in Miami and elsewhere, especially after the talk in Washington of resuming trade with Cuba.

When a confidential informant told the Miami police that Henry Kissinger might be assassinated during his trip of 1976 to Costa Rica, Orlando Bosch, who was also in Costa Rica on a false Chilean passport from the Chilean intelligence service (DINA), was jailed for the duration of Kissinger's visit.¹⁰⁴ The friend who helped arrange his release, former Bay of Pigs leader, Manuel Artime, could not exercise as much influence back in the United States as in the Nixon era, when he had formed the committee to launder White House money from his other friend, Howard Hunt, to the Cuban Watergate defendants.¹⁰⁵

With the election of President Carter, the hopes of the Cuban revanchists appeared to have turned definitely from the U.S. government to the right-wing dictatorships of Latin America, above all Chile, Nicaragua and Guatemala. According to former Cuban exile Carlos Rivero Collado, the Chilean-Cuban exile alliance was formed shortly after the Chilean coup of September 1973, when the junta sent one of the representatives of its intelligence network DINA, Eduardo Sepulveda, to be Chilean consul in Miami. Sepulveda quickly contacted Ramiro de la Fe Perez, a Bay of Pigs veteran terrorist leader who

¹⁰⁴ *New Times* October 29 1976, May 13 1977 p. 48

¹⁰⁵ *Miami News* July 2 1977; Watergate Hearings, Vol 9, p 3693; Lukas (see note 9) pp. 278-9

once faced Florida charges for piracy.¹⁰⁶ Sepulveda reportedly promised material support for Cuban right-wing terrorism in exchange for help in promoting the junta's image in the United States.

According to *Washington Post* writer George Crile:

State Department files indicate that the Chileans were offering safe haven, passports and even the use of diplomatic pouches to some Cuban terrorists. One government investigator says that a remote control detonating device, used in the assassination of the exile leader Rolando Masferrer in 1975 [Orlando Bosch's one time room-mate and later enemy], had been brought into the United States in a Chilean diplomatic pouch.¹⁰⁷

For its part, the Bay of Pigs Brigade 2506 Association, with Nixon gone and their go-between Howard Hunt in jail, gave its first Freedom Award in 1975 to Chilean junta leader, General Pinochet. Meanwhile, at least since 1975, Bosch was drawing money and a false passport supplied by DINA, whose national security advisor, Walter Rauff, was a Nazi war criminal wanted for the murder of 97,000 Jews in gassing vans. Rauff, who escaped via the Vatican monasteries of Bishop Hudal in 1947, became a leading representative of the Skorzeny network in Chile.¹⁰⁸

In late 1974, junta Ambassador Julio Duran, a long-time CIA contact and organiser of Patria Y Libertad, appeared at a Miami Cuban rally organised by Sepulveda's contact Ramiro de la Fe Perez.¹⁰⁹ One year later junta Ambassador Mario Arnelo, reportedly the organiser of the Chilean Nazi party, appeared on a Union City, New Jersey platform with three persons who would later become prime suspects in the murder of Orlando Letelier; Guillermo Novo, Dionisio Suarez and Alvin Ross.¹¹⁰ In July 1976 the junta Secretary of Culture attended the Miami congress of the terrorist organisation Alpha 66, one of the most active U.S. participants in the KMT-Gehlen-World Anti-Communist League (WACL).

After the junta's condemnation in 1975 by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights which had been refused permission to enter Chile, and especially after the election of Jimmy Carter, who had made human rights a foreign policy

¹⁰⁶ *Nation* March 26 1977; *New York Times* July 27 1967 p. 2

¹⁰⁷ George Crile, *Washington Post*, November 7 1976

¹⁰⁸ Farago (see note 76) pp. 221-25; 442-43

¹⁰⁹ *Miami Herald*, November 4 1974

¹¹⁰ *Replica* (Miami) December 24 1975

election issue, the United States showed increasing disenchantment with the Chilean junta along with their exile Cuban terrorist proteges. U.S. industry, mindful of a Congressional cut-off of military aid to Chile in 1974, had been slow to risk investing in Chile; and indeed the success of Letelier in dissuading private and public foreign investors and banks is the most frequently cited motive for his assassination.

World Parafascism, Drugs and Crime

In general, the fall of Nixon and the eventual election of Carter cut off the CIA subsidies to the Right, which does much to explain the recent financing of both West European fascists and Chile's Cuban proteges by criminal activities, including narcotics. In late 1974 Italian Interior Minister Andreotti produced revelations of a tie-in between the followers of MSI leader Prince Borghese (who had recently died after fleeing to Spain) and organised kidnappings and bank robberies of the Italian Mafia (specifically a northern Italian cosca or gang, the so-called 'Anonima Sequestri', headed by the afore-mentioned Luciano Liggio and Tomasso Buscetta).¹¹¹

A similar tie-in between neo-fascism and crime became evident in France in 1976 following two spectacular, probably related crimes. In June 1976, Jean Kay, a Paladingruppe veteran of the Katanga and Biafra independence campaigns, helped embezzle \$1.5 million from the French Mirage jet company, funds which reportedly went to a right-wing organisation with members in Italy, Lebanon, Britain, and elsewhere.¹¹² One month later, Albert Spaggiari, a veteran of the famous OAS Delta-6 commando of Roger Degueldre, as well as of the Indochina and Algerian campaigns, stole \$12 million from a Nice bank which his gang reached through a tunnel from the city sewers. Spaggiari claimed to have given his money to an Italian fascist organisation in Turin called La Catena, which the police could not trace. They did, however, link Spaggiari to "the Turin-based CIDAS group and the French GRECE group, both fascist organisations".¹¹³ Later, the police speculated that Spaggiari's loot, along with the funds extorted by Jean Kay in the assault-de Vathaic blackmail scandal, found their way to the Christian Falangist Party in Lebanon.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Servadio (see note 85) pp. 258-61

¹¹² *San Francisco Chronicle* May 31 1977 p. 8; Chairoff (see note 69) p. 98; Wilfred Burchett and Derek Roebuck, *The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today* (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1977), p. 156

¹¹³ *San Francisco Chronicle* May 31 1977 p. 8

¹¹⁴ Burchett (see note 112) p. 156

In June 1977, as we have already noted, Orlando Bosch's daughter and son-in-law were arrested for attempting to smuggle \$200,000 worth of cocaine. There are, moreover, grounds for suspecting an organised connection between the criminal activities of the European neo-fascists and the Cuban exiles. Both Kay and Spaggiari visited Miami in the summer of 1976, where, according to Henrik Kruger and the *Journal de Dimanche* (September 5 1976), Kay met with Cuban exiles. (The even more suggestive contact between Spaggiari and the CIA, in Miami, will be discussed in a moment.)

International Fascista in Action

Orlando Bosch's most recent umbrella alliance, CORU (Co-ordination of United Revolutionary Organisations) had just been assembled in June 1976. In October 1976, according to Kruger, CORU representatives attended meetings in Barcelona, Spain, which established a new International Fascista. This comprised elements from the Italian MSI (the Ordine Nuovo of Pino Rauti and Giovanni Ventura), Argentine fascists, the hard-liners of the Spanish Falange (the Fuerza Nueva of deputy Blas Pinar), the Cristi Rey Guerillas of the right-wing and anti-Vatican Spanish Catholic Mariano Sanchez Covisa, Cuban exile terrorists, the remnants of Aginter Press (now known as the ELP, or Portuguese Liberation Army, but still headed by OAS veteran Yves Guerin-Serac), and – always according to Kruger – former terrorist agents of the Skorzeny-von Schubert Paladingruppe and of the CIA.¹¹⁵

In January and February 1977, according to the *New York Times* and *London Times*, members or associates of the first five groups were arrested by Spanish police for their role in six terrorist murders designed to prevent the forthcoming Spanish general election. Noting the persistent stories in the Spanish press (particularly the liberal *El Pais*) "of the so-called Fascist International", the *New York Times* reported the arrest of the Argentine fascist Jorge Cesarsky, linked to both the Fuerza Nueva and to "the right-wing Peronism", and later of his colleague Carlos Perez, a Cuban exile.¹¹⁶ Cesarsky is said to have been a member of the Argentina AAA (Alianza Anticomunista de Argentina) and the next day a new Spanish AAA (Alianza Anticomunista Apostolica) claimed responsibility for his crime.¹¹⁷ He was detained as part of a group of twenty-four rightists reported to be of at least six nationalities, including seven Argentines and three Cubans.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Kruger (see note 72) pp. 11,13-14, 208-215

¹¹⁶ *New York Times* January 26 1977 p. 1; February 1 p. 8

¹¹⁷ *New York Times* January 27 1977 p. 1

¹¹⁸ *New York Times* January 26 1977 p. 1

Mariano Sanchez Covisa was also arrested twice by police in this period – first with Cesarsky, and one month later with a group of eight Italians. One of these was Giancarlo Rognoni, convicted for his role in an attempt to blow up the Turin-Rome express; this plot, according to Italian left-wing sources, had been financed by the Ordine Nuovo-Giovanni Ventura group, at that time in touch with the Greek KYP agent Costas Plevris.¹¹⁹

All of this multinational neo-fascist violence in Spain appeared at first to be mirroring comparable violence on the left by the so-called GRAPO (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance), to which the *New York Times*, at first, devoted much attention. But, in mid-January a high Spanish official suggested that GRAPO's Maoist appearance might cloak a right-wing agenda; the London *Times* later noted its links to a party (the PCER, or Reconstructed Spanish Communist Party), which had been heavily infiltrated by the Spanish police.¹²⁰

The *New York Times* tended to downplay the right-wing killings, or what it called "the machinations of the so-called Fascist International", as a "last gasp" – albeit violent – before elections in which the right-wing knew it would do badly. (It is true that violence in Spain has subsided since the 1977 elections; but it is also true that fears of right-wing terrorism in Portugal and other parts of Europe have increased.) The *New York Times* index, which often appears to have been sanitised by the CIA's (or DEA's) computers, considers Communism worth of an Index entry, but not fascism. To my knowledge, the *Times* has not, in recent years, printed any investigative story on international fascism: it is no longer the paper that dared to note, back in 1923, the almost certainly accurate reports that an obscure German thug called Adolph Hitler was being secretly financed by Henry Ford.¹²¹ It did, however, transmit the intriguing and (I believe) highly significant detail that the Spanish AAA behind the Argentine Cesarsky and the Cuban Carlos Perez "has supporters in Argentina and South Korea".¹²² Like the Greek junta, the Park regime has taken steps throughout the world to ensure that it will never be isolated in its authoritarianism.

World Parafascism and the U.S. Chile Lobby

South Korea, since the spectacular collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, is perhaps the most conspicuous example of a nation whose existence and survival are directly attributed to U.S. support. This does not, of course, mean that every political act is somehow under U.S. control – as Kennedy and

¹¹⁹ London *Times* February 24 1977 p. 5; *L'Unita* April 26 1972

¹²⁰ *New York Times* January 15 1977 p. 7; London *Times* February 3 1977, p. 16

¹²¹ *New York Times* February 8 1923 p. 3

¹²² *New York Times* January 30 1977

Eisenhower learned in their painful travails of Ngo dinh Diem and Syngman Rhee. But in certain respects both the government and the economy of South Korea are less powerful, and less relevant to that nation's survival, than the South Korean lobby in Washington.

That such a situation was true of South Vietnam became evident in 1975. Saigon's fall in that year was not attributable to internal political or economic developments: there the situation continued as before to be "hopeless but not serious". The collapse followed the realisation that the once intransigent Vietnam lobby in Washington – which, as we shall see in a moment, was largely continuous with the China Lobby of the 1950s and the South Korean Lobby of the 1970s – no longer regarded South Vietnam as a crucial priority.

In like manner, in 1977, the survival of the para-fascist terrorist groups or 'assets' like the Aginter Press-OAS and CORU-Cubans is less a function of their own criminal resources than of their 'protection' in high places – above all Washington.

The core of that support is the essentially continuous anti-democratic lobby that harassed Democratic presidents since WW2 – whether as the China Lobby against Truman, the Cuba-Vietnam Lobby against Kennedy, or now the Chile-Rhodesia/South Korea-Panama Canal Lobby which has begun to shape against President Carter. With the passage of years this lobby has become increasingly sophisticated, faceless and multinational; the clumsy excesses of the original China Lobby are not likely to be repeated. But the integrity of the old China Lobby coalition has never been broken; and, at least under the Ford Administration, its contact with foreign para-fascism and neo-fascism has never been more overt.

Perhaps the key elements in this lobby today are – on the outside – the various committees organised from the public relations office of Marvin Liebman on Madison Avenue, and – on the inside – the Congressional power mustered by Senator Strom Thurmond. This coalition is strengthened inside Congress by the pay-off system refined most recently by the unregistered South Korean lobbyist, Tongsun Park, and outside it by the old military-industrial coalition, the American Security Council. All four elements have worked in collaboration since the days when Chinese nationalist gold, via a Mafia-tainted public relations firm, first made Richard Nixon a senator in 1950.¹²³

Take, for example, the American-Chilean Council (ACC) which Marvin Liebman founded in 1975, for a Chilean fee of \$36,000 a year plus

¹²³ Russ Y. Koen, *The China Lobby in American Politics* (New York, Octagon, 1973)

expenses.¹²⁴ At least a third of the ACC's founding members had been active in the China Lobby from as early as 1946. Of ten ACC members dating from this period, six were prominent in the China Lobby, six were members of Liebman's support group for Moise Tshombe (American Committee to Aid Katanga Freedom Fighters) in 1961, members of Liebman's Cuba lobby (Committee for the Monroe Doctrine) in 1963, and five were on the National Board of the Buckley – Liebman Young Americans for Freedom in 1963. Of the eight Americans who helped draft the WACL Charter at Seoul in 1966, four became leading members of the ACC.

In May 1976, lobbying vainly to prevent the cut-off of aid to the Chilean junta, the ACC turned for help to Cuban exiles and members of Sun Myung Moon's Freedom Leadership Foundation. The Moon group (linked by Tongsun Park to the Korean CIA) was supplied with pro-junta propaganda by Chile's Washington lobbyist, Dimitru Danielopol, a veteran of the CIA-subsidised Copley News Service and former spokesman (in collaboration with Senator Thurmond) for the Greek junta.¹²⁵ Danielpo also fed materials to Cuban exiles and others working for the American Security Council (which, in turn, interlocked with the ACC). Meanwhile Senator Thurmond was key senate contact of Tongsun Park, while in 1973 Park's House proteges Richard Hanna and Robert Leggett helped set up a new pro-Taiwan lobby after a KMT-sponsored visit to Taipei.¹²⁶ Until the fall of the right-wing Cambodian government in 1975, the Moon paper, *Rising Tide* (full of Cuban exile, Chilean junta and WACL propaganda) was distributed free of charge by the Cambodian Embassy in Washington – a service ultimately paid for by the U.S. taxpayer.

In 1975 Senator Thurmond was the focal point for visits from European neo-fascists, most notably the Italian MSI leader Giorgio Almirante, the intellectual patron of Ordine Nuovo's paramilitary leader Paolo Gambescia. Some months earlier Thurmond had been contacted by another representative of the Ordine Nuovo milieu, the OAS-Aginter Press mercenary, Jean-Denis de la Raingeard, together with U.S. supporters of the short-lived Azores Liberation Front.

Back in 1969, when OAS-Aginter operatives assassinated Mozambique independence leader Eduardo Mondlane, Thurmond had placed in the Congressional Record an editorial from his home-state newspaper, the *Charleston News and Courier*, which hailed the murder as an act in defence of

¹²⁴ Russell Warren Howe, *The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Policy* (Garden City, New Jersey, Doubleday 1977) p. 130

¹²⁵ Howe (see note 124) p. 42

¹²⁶ Howe (see note 124) p. 55

Western civilisation.¹²⁷ For some years the newspaper had printed pro-Portuguese articles on Africa generated by the U.S. lobbyists for the Portuguese overseas companies, Selvage and Lee. The key figure here seems to have been Associate Editor Anthony Harrigan, who moved to Washington in 1969 to become editor of the American Security Council's Washington Report.

In 1975, when Ford was President, Almirante and de la Rangeard were able to consult not only with Thurmond but also with the staff of the National Security Council. The CIA, meanwhile, after helping the Chilean junta to write its exculpatory White Paper, subsidised the English-language propaganda book *Chile's Marxist Experiment* by the London *Economist* staff writer, Robert Moss. (A two-part piece on Chile by Moss, which had appeared in Buckley's *National Review*, was sent to 4,000 editors in this country by Liebman's ACC.)

The CIA and the Politics of Countervalance

It is in this context that one must take seriously the contacts between Miami CIA and the French neo-fascist-OAS commando Albert Spaggiari, the Nice bank robber. According to a story in the London *Observer*, reprinted in the *San Francisco Chronicle*, Spaggiari contacted the CIA "in the United States" after the robbery and told them he had organised it. Later Spaggiari was arrested in France because a tip by an informer to whom he had tried to sell gold was acted on by Marseilles police. It was only then that detectives were given a dossier originating in the U.S. after the Nice raid. He told the CIA he had organised the Nice robbery and offered to blow up the Communist party headquarters in Paris.¹²⁸

Henrik Kruger supplies the additional information that Spaggiari came to Miami.¹²⁹ This detail, together with the AIP-Aginter connection to the Micile-MSI network (which may or may not have included Spaggiari's Italian contacts) suggests that in 1976 the old JM/Wave coalition of criminal anti-Communist 'assets', far from being dissolved as the CIA had assured the Church Committee, was merely dispersed to deeper cover overseas.

Why has the CIA continued to maintain such contacts? Probably not for covert operations funded from its own budget, since after 1974 these have been subjected to new requirements for Presidential authorisation and Congressional review.¹³⁰ But the chief problem for small plots which favour the very rich is not funding. Instead, they look to the CIA for protection of their

¹²⁷ Congressional Record, February 7 1969, p. 3288

¹²⁸ *Observer* May 31 1977 p. 8

¹²⁹ Kruger (see note 72) pp. 204, 215

¹³⁰ P.L. 93-559 (Foreign Assistance Act) of December 30, 1974, Sect. 32 88USC 1795

day-to-day illegal activities, and for legitimisation, some sign that they will enjoy the mandate of the American heaven, when these activities confront the existing regiment of power. Spaggiari's well-organised escape in March 1977, and the reluctance of police to search for him thereafter, convinced the London *Observer* that he was part of a "Fascist plot under the protection of highly placed [French] politicians and civil servants."¹³¹ There is no way this protection could not have been enhanced by his ostentatious involvement of the CIA in a cover-up of the robbery.

The CIA, it is true, did not back the OAS neo-fascists of the ex-Aginter Press Portuguese Liberation Front (ELP) and Azorean Liberation Front (FLA) under deposed General Spínola, even after Spínola's visit to the New York Council on Foreign Relations in November 1975 in the midst of his conspiratorial travels. In the Iberian peninsula, where there is no strongly based radical movement, the U.S. had favoured a moderately progressive centrist politics against a seizure of power by autarkic (and hence anti-American) neo-fascism.

How the US would respond to the threat of a Eurocommunist government in Italy or France is much less clear. In these countries, where the leading alternative to the centre is on the left rather than the right, it appears that the CIA will maintain its historic contacts to the old and new fascist right as a potential counterweight. Kissinger's last official remarks suggest that U.S. opposition to Communist victories in Western Europe is no longer, as in 1948, motivated by a fear of Soviet expansion in that area. If so, the rationale for such right-wing alliances has become increasingly cynical, just as the tactics for counter-terror have become increasingly brutal.

For the time being, however, the CIA is probably more interested in the European OAS as mercenary para-fascist assets in Arab countries and Africa, than as a political neo-fascist movement in Europe. In the CIA's defence, it can be argued that in Africa (as opposed to Italy), the U.S. CIA is now responding to Soviet KGB manoeuvres on a grand scale, and not merely provoking them. This KGB threat has been used to justify the CIA's strong involvement with Moroccan intelligence forces – which led to their implication with Christian David and other members of Joe Attia's gang in the 1965 murder of Moroccan opposition leader Mehdi Ben Barka.¹³² In 1977, when an Angolan MPLA force with Soviet and Cuban backing invaded Zaire, Moroccan forces with French-U.S. backing were there to respond. In a less overt fashion the French OAS and SAC operatives will continue, as for the last two decades, to be active in

¹³¹ *Observer* May 31 1977 p. 8

¹³² Kruger (see note 72) pp. 4-5, 59-70; Chairiff (see note 69) p. 323

'decolonised' Africa, in murder and other covert operations which at least occasionally have enjoyed CIA support.

Post-war Disposal Problems: De Gaulle and Watergate

A glance at the recent partial dismantling of De Gaulle's secret networks is perhaps the best way to understand the 'CIA problem' confronting Jimmy Carter after Richard Nixon. De Gaulle's intensive use of SDECE and SAC operatives in illegal activities left himself, and, above all, his successors Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing with a 'disposal' problem: what to do with large numbers of dangerous activists of no certain loyalty who could easily blackmail the state. The answer of de Gaulle's successors was to follow De Gaulle's own footsteps and allow the more dangerous to disperse into private employment or overseas, some of them with Aginter Press and the Paladingruppe. Henceforward the SDECE (Intelligence) and SAC (parallel police) would present a cleaner and more legal image: the most ruthless operatives, some of them quasi-independent black mercenaries, would no longer be government agents.

But the cleansing of the official French networks contributed to the strengthening of unofficial networks like Aginter Press and the Paladingruppe in the international milieu. As we have seen, it also contributed to a temporary intensification of the international narcotics traffic, as well-trained operatives with good personal police connections attempted to finance their activities by unofficial means. Thus SAC agent Christian David, in flight after the Ben Barka scandal, joined the Ricord heroin network.¹³³ Thus Roger Delouette, a strongly Gaullist SDECE agent, after Pompidou's purging of SDECE, seems to have turned to heroin trafficking (with Christian David's contacts) to finance the African arms sales he had developed in 1969 with the OAS-SAC-backed secessionist forces of Biafra.¹³⁴

Along with the strengthening of an uncontrollable international milieu and narcotics, a third by-product of the disposal process has been a wave of publicity about covert operations. Some of this have come from angry *disposeés* who absconded with microfilms of their files.¹³⁵ Some of it has been inspired from above, not so much by the 'controlled leak' – an institution more congenial to Washington than to Paris – as by the selective arrest of *disposeés* whose protection in higher places had now lapsed.

A key example of this was the October 1971 arrest in Paris of Andre

¹³³ Newsday (see note 70) p. 125

¹³⁴ Newsday (see note 70) pp. 107-109; Jaubert (see note 69) p. 36

¹³⁵ Chairoff (see note 69) p. 336

Labay, the former SAC contact with Moise Tshombe of Katanga and SDECE agent in Haiti. Labay, a higher-up in the Delouette narcotics connection, was arrested four months after Delouette as the result of a tip-off from the U.S. narcotics bureau in Paris to their French counterparts.¹³⁶ Indeed, there are many sceptics who speculate that most of the high-level French-Corsican narcotics arrests which followed the Pompidou-Nixon visit of March 1970 and the formal Marcellin-Mitchell narcotics agreement of February 1971 were not so much simple police actions as political operations against a common enemy: the intransigent Gaullist remnants like Delouette (arrested in April 1971) inside and outside of SDECE and SAC.

In the 1960s CIA clashes with SAC and SDECE had been frequent – specifically in Katanga and Haiti – and the 1970-73 U.S.-French anti-narcotics campaign coincides almost exactly with the dates (December 1970 – July 1973) of the clearly illegal collaboration of the CIA with the BNDD in the U.S..¹³⁷ In this same period Charles Pasqua, founder of SAC, recruiter of SAC gangsters like Christian David, and the former overseer in private business of the narcotics trafficker Jean Venturi, emerged as President of the French Parliamentary Commission on Narcotics Problems.¹³⁸ There he was joined by a veteran cold war warrior and participant in WACL-group meetings, Mme. Suzanne Labin.

All accounts of the SDECE-SAC purges of 1970-74 agree that the purpose was not to neutralise these agencies but merely to make them more amenable to central oversight in a less militant period. The by-product of an intensified international milieu pullulating with private arms merchants and mercenary operations networks also suited the mature phase of French 'decolonisation' in which the SDECE and SAC – having organised many of the most spectacular African assassinations and kidnappings of the 1960s – were now only too happy to assume a lower profile. Pompidou's political patrons – most notably the Rothschild family with their huge complex of African investments – could, in future, have their corporations exploit this international milieu without governmental supervision.

A similar process, culminating in a similar privatisation of covert operations assets, can be discerned in the recent history of America, particularly since Watergate. Here too, although much less is known, there has been a purge of CIA, a dispersal of former CIA Cuban operatives into new multinational networks, and a number of what appear to be controlled selective

¹³⁶ Kruger (see note 72) pp. 98-99

¹³⁷ Rockefeller Report (see note 46) pp. 233-34

¹³⁸ Jaubert (see note 69) pp. 116-117

arrests of former CIA agents who had been driven into narcotics trafficking with the Ricord network. Both a Presidential Commission and a Senate Select Committee have encouraged this process of disposal by their partial revelations; and it is probably significant that a member of the former, former Treasury Secretary C.Douglas Dillon, chaired the 1968 secret Council on Foreign Relations panel which recommended that the CIA should move to a lower profile.

Disposal as a Flight from Public Control: Thailand

There is, of course, much to commend in the steps which Congress has taken to restrain the CIA and all forms of U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other states. But the effect of these measures will be frustrated as long as new agencies – such as the DEA – are allowed to pick up the training and assassination tasks denied to CIA; as long as the U.S.-financed lobbies of client states (such as the China, Vietnam and South Korea lobbies) are used, with CIA benevolence, as a means of tilting Congress towards global intervention; and as long as the intelligence backgrounds and contacts of criminals like Orlando Bosch protects them from punishment for their no-longer-sanctioned revanchist activities.

Take, for example, the useful revelations of the Church Committee about CIA subvention for the parafascist forces which helped overthrow Allende in Chile – the Patria y Libertad whose Operation Djakarta of extermination is said to have first “been made in an internal memorandum of a United States transnational company in 1970”.¹³⁹ These revelations did nothing to prevent the recurrence of three crucial elements of the Djakarta-Santiago scenario in the bloody and nakedly anti-democratic coup of October 1976 in Bangkok. Here, as before, overt CIA interference – of the type which went out with the Bay of Pigs – was replaced by the following recurring symptoms of a U.S. supported conspiracy:

(a) a symbolic tilting of U.S. aid away from the civilian government towards the military, which in Thailand were notoriously anti-democratic. (U.S. economic aid declined from \$39 million in Fiscal 1973 to \$17 million in Fiscal 1975; military and police aid increased in the same period from \$68 million to \$83 million.)¹⁴⁰

(b) the recruiting of student goon squads – the so-called Red Gaurs – who consulted freely with U.S. personnel in Bangkok about their long-laid plans to

¹³⁹ Gary McEoin, *No Peaceful Way: Chile's Struggle for Dignity* (New York, Sheed and Ward, 1974) p. 165

¹⁴⁰ *Progressive*, December 1976 p. 6; Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston, South End Press 1979) p. 227

assassinate their opponents.¹⁴¹ The pre-coup reports that the Red Gaurs were directly or indirectly subsidised by the CIA should be investigated by the Senate Intelligence Committee.

(c) the training, equipping and rewarding of anti-government elements in the police and military who made little or no secret of their intentions. In particular the Thai Border Patrol Police, now trained and equipped by the DEA in place of the CIA, were the principal murders of the unarmed Thai students at Thammasat University, killing at least one hundred.¹⁴²

Only one month later the U.S. government, under its International Narcotics Control Programme, delivered five new helicopters to the Thai Border Patrol Police "to help the police hunt down narcotics traffickers".¹⁴³

Even if the Thai BPP are no longer, as in the past, profiting themselves from the movement of drugs out of the "golden triangle", their activities will certainly be political. The new Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Thai anti-narcotics campaign, Amporn Chanvijit, is a product of the Thai Defence School of Psychological Warfare.¹⁴⁴ But then, if the CIA had suffered any remorse after the bloody "Operation Djakartas" of Indonesia (1965) and Chile (1973), it would not have in the latter year sent Bernardo Hugh Tovar, the 1965 CIA Station Chief in Djakarta, and a veteran of student operations there, to preside over a third bloody coup, followed by extermination in Bangkok.

In Latin America, as in Thailand, INC and DEA aid to foreign police is channelled (like OPS and CIA before it) to the leading counter-insurgency forces. This is not just because guerillas and narcotics are to be found together in the same inaccessible mountainous regions. It is because the war against highly-organised narcotics activities requires a special breed of killer-police which, in unstable countries, are certain to be deployed against enemies of the regime. This is rationalised by the ideology of counter-insurgency, which assumes that guerillas and traffickers are part of the same anti-state culture. Thus Lopez Rega's statement in 1974 that guerillas are dope users was echoed in 1977 by Argentine Foreign Minister Cesar Guzzetti. Speaking of the drug problem, he proclaimed that "we attack its body through the war against guerillas and its spirit through the war against drug traffic, both carriers of

¹⁴¹ D. Gareth Porter, *Counterspy*, December 1976, pp. 50-52

¹⁴² Porter (see note 141) p. 52

¹⁴³ *New York Times* December 23 1976

¹⁴⁴ *Who's Who in Thailand*, December 1976

nihilistic and collectivist ideas".¹⁴⁵

The U.S. officials of INC and DEA know all this, and evidently approve of it. The two years of AAA counter-terror in Argentina under Lopez Rega (1973-75) saw a sudden upsurge of INC support expenditure from \$20,000 in fiscal year 1972-74 (before Rega's rise to power) to \$428,000, falling again to \$20,000 in fiscal 1976 (after his fall). In Argentina, as in Thailand, the bulk of this increase went to spotter aircraft for the Border Patrol (even though Argentina, unlike Thailand, is not a major source of any drug at all). A recent DEA report on U.S.-sponsored narcotics operations in Mexico, which are concentrated in the northern mountain areas favoured by left-wing forces, notes approvingly that "the special impact units made numerous criminal arrests" and that roadblocks netted "several persons on 'most wanted listings'".¹⁴⁶

Suppression by Proxy: the Superclient States

The CIA, having already moved assassination-coup specialists like Conein into DEA, seems intent on preserving for itself a much lower profile (in accordance with the Bissell-CFR recommendations of 1968). In its recent operations it has shown a preference to work through the employees of other U.S. agencies, and, increasingly, the agents and agencies of third countries. Thus in the Cambodia coup-slaughter of March 1970, modelled (as *Newsweek* reported) on the Djakarta operation of 1965, the key training role was played by the Indonesian military; and a similar training role was played by the Brazilian army and police in Bolivia, prior to the Chilean coup-slaughter of 1973.¹⁴⁷ This is consistent both with the Nixon doctrine and with its corollary that (in the words of the Rand Corp's Indonesia expert, Guy Pauker) "Brazil, Nigeria, Iran and Indonesia . . . are expected to assume a dominant position in their respective part of the world . . . possibly as a result of a tacit devolution of responsibilities by global powers".¹⁴⁸ The responsibilities are thus devolved, but the Djakarta scenario of coup-slaughter remains, except for refinements of technology, essentially the same.

Pauker, a strenuous advocate of the Indonesian military take-over, also

¹⁴⁵ Argentine Commission for Human Rights, "US Narcotics Enforcement Assistance to Latin America".

¹⁴⁶ Klare (see note 65) p. 32, citing State Commerce Justice Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977, p. 233.

¹⁴⁷ Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy* (see note 12) p. 161, citing *Newsweek* May 25 1970 p. 25.

¹⁴⁸ US Cong. House, Committee on International Relations, *Shifting Balance of Power in Asia*, Hearings (1976) p. 151

approves of this devolution to four notoriously murderous regimes, at least three of which are militarised dictatorships. It is no accident that three of Pauker's four favoured nations are also OPEC oil producing countries, able, since the spectacular 1973 increase in crude oil prices, to assume an increasing share of the former U.S. government's role as subsidiser of the U.S. defence industry and as aid patron to less-advantaged nations.

This vision of transnationalised order has emerged from U.S. think tanks at a time when transnational corporations, particularly oil companies, are assuming greater independence from U.S. or indeed any form of sovereign political control. It is, however, not the recipe for stability and disengagement that Nixon and Kissinger would have had us think. Dictatorships like Brazil and Indonesia are clearly not neutral arbiters of order and the status quo. Like the Greek junta of the late 1960s, they are committed to repression and fearful of open democracy in any country – particularly in the United States.

Thus, I suspect that in time we shall see more and more clearly apparently disparate lobby actions in the United States – Madame Chennault for the KMT and Saigon, Kermit Roosevelt and Richard Allen for the Portuguese colonies, Nixon's extra-national suppliers of untraceable funds through Watergate, and now the Chile and South Korea lobbies – as one single interlocking lobby for repressive violence abroad. As in the case of China in the 1940s or Vietnam in 1963-4, increasing weakness abroad – such as we may well anticipate in Chile and South Korea – will be accompanied by intensified lobbying in Washington, not just by these countries, but by those U.S. agencies (or elements within them) with which they have become identified.

Economic Recession and Arms Sales Increases

In this way weakness at the periphery of the U.S. transnational system will generate forces for instability and reactionary oppression at its centre. There is also the immediate risk that this long-run political disequilibrium will be reinforced by long-run economic disequilibrium as well. Looking back in history, it is not difficult to see capitalism's recurring lapses from the productive phase of a new industrial technology to a militaristic phase, as the only viable alternative to the paralysis of economic depression.

The precedent of the railroads a century ago is still relevant, if ominous. The great railroad companies were in the forefront of all industry, opening up the continents . . . But the companies soon cut each others throats in their ferocious competition, the construction boom collapsed as the networks covered the industrial nations . . . With the end of the railroad boom the steelmakers like Krupp, Vickers and Carnegie, who had built up whole cities in Essen, Sheffield and Pittsburgh . . . looked to the industry which was most

profitable and which was also in the vanguard of invention – to arms.

The end of the American aerospace boom has also coincided with the huge expansion of arms sales abroad, prompted by the withdrawal of American and British forces, the flow of oil money into the Middle East and the recession . . . it is not surprising that so many of the companies are former intelligence agents. Their trade is always a kind of espionage and subterranean warfare, calling for subterfuge, high-level contacts and Swiss bank accounts.¹⁴⁹

After the first U.S. foreign trade deficit of the century, in 1971, U.S. arms sales abroad which had averaged \$2 billion a year through most of the 1960s leapt to \$3.9 billion in 1973, then to \$8.3 billion in 1974, after the oil price increases of 1973 put new dollar surpluses in the hands of the OPEC countries – including three of the four new U.S. superclient states (Iran, Nigeria and Indonesia).

This swelling of the international arms trade also pumped new resources into the hands of the international sales and payoff system which had grown up to market such sales. Most of these arms traffickers were recruited from the international right-wing and/or intelligence community. Not surprisingly, many of the key contacts for illicit pay-offs on arms contracts between Washington and the client states were also key figures in Washington's lobbying corruption scene as well – among them Saigon lobbyist Madame Chennault, West German lobbyist Frank de Francis and the Saudi Arabian Adnan Khashoggi, a close friend of Bebe Rebozo. By the 1970s Kermit Roosevelt's flamboyant career – from CIA coup specialist to lobbyist for one of the oil companies (Gulf) he helped to put into Iran, to a lobbyist for Iran itself – had turned him into an arms salesman: his principal activity, from the point of both influence and affluence, was the promotion of military aircraft sales in Iran and Saudi Arabia. From Prince Bernhard of Holland to Yoshio Kodama of Japan, the transnational realm of influence in which these arms salesmen moved seems to have overlapped heavily with, and may have been indistinguishable from the 'world-wide infrastructure' of political agents developed by the CIA.¹⁵⁰

If the burgeoning of military aerospace sales fostered the influence of superlobbyists in Washington and the global scene, the closely related burgeoning of small arms sales fostered the influence of small arms salesmen and employers like Skorzeny and his successors, Aginter Press and the Paladingruppe. In terms of both dollars and high-level influence, the small

¹⁴⁹ Anthony Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar; From Lebanon to Lockheed* (New York, Viking 1977) p. 328

¹⁵⁰ Church Committee, Final Report Book 1, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, Senate Report No 94-755, 2nd Seas. (1976) pp. 146-7

arms traffic is dwarfed by the aerospace traffic: the cost of the arms supplies in the whole Lebanese war, even at the highest estimate of a billion dollars, amounts to only one-twentieth of the estimated arms exports from the West in 1975.¹⁵¹ But the same Lebanese war meant unprecedented sales commissions and status for the criminals and parafascists who exploited it – men like the French extortionist-mercenary Jean Kay, Stephane Zanettaci of the neo-fascist 'Action Jeunesse'.¹⁵²

In the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate, post-oil embargo era of wars by proxy (such as Angola or Lebanon), in which the United States has willingly devolved its former responsibility to reactionary superclients like Iran, the status and influence of parafascist mercenaries is likely to continue to increase. The Carter administration has acted unilaterally to cut back on the export of arms from the United States; and, much more cautiously, it has challenged the interventionist lobby over such issues as the Panama Canal Treaty, human rights in Chile, the CIA's clandestine services and the corruption of Congress by South Korean agents. Carter's options in a period of economic uncertainty are not easy. Above all, if he resists the current pressures from the Right for a major increase in U.S. defence spending, he risks the kind of major world-wide recession and reaction which would be conducive to the rapid growth of right-wing power. But if he is successfully to challenge the political forces for repressive intervention, he must respond, not by compromise and partial capitulation (which will further weaken the forces for peace), but by a strong alternative vision of economic innovation.¹⁵³

Transnationalised Repression; Parafascism and the U.S.: Conclusions

This essay leads to the same conclusions as Michael Klare's study for the Washington-based Institute of Policy Studies:

if we are to protect our freedoms and liberties from the inflow of barbarism [parafascism] from dictators abroad, we must act now to halt the export of repression to such regimes.¹⁵⁴

My researches would also support his specific legislative recommendations: that Congress should limit International Narcotics Control funds to their stated

¹⁵¹ Sampson (see note 149) pp. 30-31

¹⁵² Burchett (see note 112) pp. 155-58

¹⁵³ Carter, like so many before him facing recession, soon capitulated to the pressures for vastly increased defence spending, as was evident by the end of 1977; cf *Newsweek* December 12 1977 p. 31.

¹⁵⁴ Klare (see note 65) p. 66

objectives, and U.S. technical assistance to military-police dictatorships, clamp down further on U.S. arms and police technology sales etc.. We must, however, keep in mind that the post-Vietnam era had seen unprecedented numbers of such Congressional restraints, and simultaneously an unprecedented proliferation of parafascist activity beyond the reach of U.S. congressional oversight.

Thus, while agreeing with Klare's call for new hearings into CIA links with foreign intelligence and paramilitary organisations (such hearings should cover all U.S. agencies, including DEA), I would go further. The evidence already strongly suggests that the CIA's 'world-wide infrastructure' of political influence has repeatedly served to foster right-wing coups, foreign and domestic lobbies for repression, arms sales, and, most recently, wars by proxy.

I agree, therefore, with the more radical conclusions of Morton Halperin and his colleagues in another Washington think tank, the Centre for National Security Studies, that it is time to end the clandestine government, with its consequent lawlessness, which is represented by the secret charter of the U.S. intelligence agencies

The recent exposures have revealed a reality that does not come close to justifying the wounds that clandestine government inevitably inflicts on the body politic . . . Spies and covert action are counterproductive as tools of international relations. The costs are too high; the returns too meagre. Covert action and spies should be banned and the CIA's Clandestine Services Branch disbanded . . .

It is now clear that the lawlessness that has characterised America's foreign policy has come home and threatens the country's political process . . . Clandestine government accountable to no-one must end; a government of laws must be put in its place.¹⁵⁵

But even this proposal, which goes to the heart of the bureaucratic problem, is not likely by itself to lead to any solution. As I have tried to show, the problem is not simply a bureaucratic one, but rooted (particularly since Vietnam) in underlying dilemmas arising from perceptions of economic crisis and uncertainty, even though this economic crisis itself grows out of social distortions whose origins are themselves partly bureaucratic.

One need turn only to informed Marxist critiques of the current U.S. economic crisis – e.g. the *Monthly Review*. Professor Gilpin of Princeton, whose authority is recognised by such establishment audiences as the Senate Labour Committee and the Council on Foreign Relations, has persuasively challenged

¹⁵⁵ Jerry J. Berman and Morton H. Halperin (eds) *The Abuses of the Intelligence Agencies* (Washington, the Center for National Security Studies 1975) pp. 257, 263, 279

the establishment assumption that foreign direct investment by U.S. multinational corporations, or what simpler souls might call imperialism, is in the larger U.S. national interest.¹⁵⁶ He has argued that, as in the case of Rome or 19th century Britain, investment abroad has led to technological and hence economic stultification at home (with, some might add, a concomitant political stultification as well). In the past this exhaustion of technological opportunities has led first to intensified mercantilistic struggle – i.e. economic nationalism and competition – which we appear to be on the brink of repeating, and the rejuvenating catastrophe of war.¹⁵⁷

Professor Gilpin does not view this cycle with resignation, but as a challenge to seek new priorities:

In the short run, economic conflict has been intensified by the energy crisis, the global recession, and world wide inflation. Yet, viewed from a longer perspective, the critical problems of resources, environment and inflation can have a beneficial effect. They may constitute the 'catastrophe' that will stimulate a rejuvenation of the American economy. In the search for solutions to these pressing problems, the United States and her economic partners are being forced to initiate a new order of industrial technology and economic life. If this leads to technological breakthroughs and the fashioning of a new international division of labour, we may yet escape the mercantilistic conflict that threatens to overtake us.¹⁵⁸

Thus President Carter's efforts to diminish our dependency on foreign energy sources can be a step in the right direction, but only if they lead to the development of a technological breakthrough. Hitherto, like the presidents before him, he has been unable to challenge the banks and giant oil companies with their massive investments in traditional energy sources. It is at this point that the economic problem becomes again a political one, of extreme relevance to the subject matter of this essay. For I have tried to show that at every stage since World War 2, U.S. support for Nazis like Skorzeny and his parafascist disciples has involved U.S. overseas corporate interests, notably the oil majors in the Middle East with their dependent hosts. I doubt that the oil lobby can be resisted until its own network of clandestine operations, or clandestine government, has been exposed; and here one should not expect too much

¹⁵⁶ Robert Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York, Basic Books 1975) p. 7

¹⁵⁷ Gilpin (see note 156) p. 260

¹⁵⁸ Gilpin (see note 156) p. 261

from a Congress, until its domination by the oil lobby had been diminished.

From 'Political' to 'Human': the Lessons of Watergate and Vietnam

The history of the last century suggests that, to challenge these stultifying forces of expansion and repression, traditional processes must themselves be rejuvenated by fresh inputs of human energy. Traditional modes of political organisation, whether reformist or radical, have little chance by themselves of challenging the CIA's 'world-wide infrastructure' of political power. In the developed countries, at least, the traumas of a dramatic or prolonged economic recession, such as we may now very well face, are likely to shift the balance of political forces even further to the right. Unless something new occurs.

But, since U.S. political opinion helped end the disastrous U.S. bureaucratic intervention in Vietnam, and helped after that to oust a president, new human groupings, not political or institutional in any traditional sense, have indeed re-energised the American political process. The combined efforts of these human groupings has not been translated into power, and in the short run are not likely to be. Rather they have served as one small marginal force in the struggle for consciousness, a force liberated by new conditions of national division and impasse. Their focus of concern has been bureaucratic excess in any form, governmental or private. Because the goal of these groupings has not been to seize power but to influence or change it, we may speak of their civic, public or human concern, in distinction to a narrowly political one.

The debates over Vietnam and Watergate were, of course, only significant because the national establishment was divided, even stalemated, over both these issues. But both issues served to disillusion large elements of the establishment, along with the larger public, with respect to the performance of national institutions. Paradoxically, the opening of the credibility gap proved an opening to new styles of intellectual criticism and involvement: more people, especially young people, were drawn into participation, at least in the human dimension, than were driven away. And in the resulting loss of a national political consensus, the national media, albeit reluctantly at first, began to reflect and reinforce the concerns of this critical public.

Thus it is not too much to claim that the Vietnam war was ended, in part, by the long-delayed revelations of the My Lai massacre, or that Nixon's career was ended, in part, by revelations about the illegal break-in which John Ehrlichman had authorised against Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Rationalists of both the left and the right have complained, understandably, that questions as important as Vietnam and the impeachment of a president should not have

been resolved so largely by media exploitation of these and similar emotional issues. But, both My Lai and – if only symbolically – the Fielding break-in deserved the attention they received. For both Vietnam and Watergate represented, unambiguously in the end, a confrontation between simple human values and bureaucratic distortions of them into parodic horrors.

Thus the new age of media, which was expected to usher in 1984, has also opened up new channels whereby ideological and bureaucratic abstraction can be confronted by sensuous human fact. Human concerns instead of becoming increasingly irrelevant to history, have returned to criticise, disrupt and even alter the increasingly institutionalised operations of power. Though the antiwar movement was never translated, as some old-fashioned souls had hoped, into a new political movement, it has lived on in new groupings of concern – in the form of small alternative ‘think tanks’, investigative groups, newsletters and task forces on related political and environmental issues, from prisons to nuclear power.

Most of the energising questions underlying Watergate and Vietnam are still unresolved, and still urgent. Above all it is easy to see an historic trail from Vietnam to Watergate in the current ‘world-wide infrastructure’ of CIA political influence, arms sales, and institutionalised parafascist repression. A recent essay by Renata Adler has in fact suggested that the ‘bottom line’ justifying Nixon’s ouster was ‘treason and bribery’, since, she thinks, “the South Vietnamese government was bribing an American President, with American money, to keep our investment and our boys there”.¹⁵⁹ She alludes to the money from Asia funnelled through a special CREEP Asia committee, in the name of (among others) Anna Chennault. She alludes also to the bank account of over \$200 million which a “Saudi lobbyist” and arms salesman (Adnan Khashoggi) maintained in Bebe Rebozo’s bank, after having contributed \$50,000 to Richard Nixon in 1968.¹⁶⁰ Since Chennault and Khashoggi are (or were) key figures in the “world-wide infrastructure”, her perspective makes Nixon seem like only the latest recalcitrant client to be unceremoniously dumped, like Syngman Rhee or Trujillo or Diem, after it became impossible for him to go on satisfying the shifting interests of transnationalised repression.

For even the “world-wide infrastructure” itself is not fixed, cohesive or settled in its priorities. As the U.S. dollar, symbol of the global system, weakens intensely over alternative priorities for national investment (e.g. domestic energy versus global security), just as smaller sub-groups have

¹⁵⁹ Renata Adler “Searching for the real Nixon scandal”, *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1976 p. 95

¹⁶⁰ Adler (see note 159) p. 93

competed in the past for the same lucrative arms contract. If this increasing divisiveness is symptomatic of a drift towards mercantilism and perhaps war, it is also a further opportunity for a human concern to be voiced, both about the consequences of transnationalised repression, and in the larger debate over long-term human priorities.

As political instruments of power, small human groupings are the least likely to be effective. But as instruments of political opposition they are the most difficult to eradicate or co-opt, the least likely to become entangled in their own bureaucratisation, compromises of principle and conspiracies of silence. It was because of this freedom that they succeeded in building a human opposition to the Vietnam War, even while the political institutions of this country were virtually all immobilised behind Lyndon Johnson's appeals for national consensus.

The chief political lesson of Vietnam and Watergate is that the same human task must inspire the political challenge of dismantling the world repressive system. Given the present political balance, the anti-repressive forces in Congress are doomed, not to failure exactly, but to a series of meaningless and illusory successes, most of them closing barn doors after the horses have been moved into even more secure and distant stables. If I have digressed so many times about past failures of non-governmental institutions – above all the cultural distortions of our reality-perceptions as refined through foundations, universities and the press – it is to make more obvious the by no means desperate conclusion that those cultural distortions must themselves be diminished by human effort, before the political process will achieve significant change.

This may sound to liberals like a radical proposition, but unfortunately, I believe it is one which up to now radicals in particular have profoundly misunderstood. For in the delicate, sensitive area of cultural processes, most radical proposals for amendment have been not human at all but crudely political: not holistic but reductionist and (to revive a propagandistic but not wholly unjustified epithet) totalitarian.

The ensuing lesson of Vietnam and Watergate is that media distortions of events, at least, can be significantly diminished by human (as opposed to political) efforts. (The cultural distortions in the foundations and universities have, of course, proven more resistant to change). The key here is to focus attention on transnationalised repression and parafascism, not just as theoretical abstractions, remote events or future dangers, but also as immediate, local and urgent human concerns. It is for this reason that I began this digressive essay with the "unsolved" murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt by Cubans with U.S. intelligence immunity, as part of a tradition of

tolerated crime protected in part by the media's own indulgence of their intelligence connections. It is not just that the murders themselves are humanly intolerable; it is also that the press record here, and in related scandals such as parafascist mercenaries and the narcotics traffic, is so painful, so shocking, that it shouts for amendment, and is capable of it.

I am not suggesting that a human challenge to transnationalised repression is certain to win. I am suggesting that the process itself will be rewarding to those who take part in it, even if the visible outcome is failure, holocaust or dystopian stultitude. For if the tendency of particular empires is towards rapid ossification and repression, the trend of the human race is still, step by tragic step, towards individual freedom. For that vital and liberating experience, it is neither necessary nor expedient to wait.

